The Higher Education Commission Fiji’s letter to Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka (published below) ultimately recorded more than an administrative dispute over grant eligibility.
It documented a clear failure of ministerial discipline by the Minister for Finance, Biman Prasad, whose conduct stood in direct conflict with the principles of lawful governance, respect for statutory independence, and ethical restraint expected of a senior Cabinet Minister.
While the Commission refrained from explicit criticism, the facts it placed on record were sufficient to demonstrate that Biman Prasad acted outside the boundaries of proper ministerial behaviour, compromised institutional process, and exposed the public funding system to perceptions of arbitrariness and preferential access.
Disregard for Statutory Authority
At the heart of the issue was Biman Prasad’s engagement with grant submissions that were, by law, required to be processed exclusively by the Fiji Higher Education Commission. The Higher Education Act 2008 and the Higher Education Regulations 2009 clearly vested authority for assessing higher education grants in the Commission, not in the Ministry of Finance and not in any individual minister.
Despite this, Biman Prasad received, entertained, and corresponded on funding requests from Pacific Polytech and ServicePro International, institutions that had either failed to meet eligibility requirements or had submitted incomplete documentation. This conduct demonstrated a fundamental disregard for the separation between political authority and statutory regulation.
A minister committed to upholding the rule of law would have rejected such submissions outright and redirected them to the Commission. Biman Prasad did not do so.
Normalising Bypass and Preferential Access
The letter made clear that the affected institutions bypassed the Commission entirely and approached the Minister for Finance directly. Biman Prasad’s willingness to accept and engage with these submissions normalised an improper channel, creating the impression that access to public funding could be achieved through political routes rather than lawful process.
This behaviour was unministerial not merely because it breached protocol, but because it undermined fairness. Institutions that complied with the law were subjected to rigorous assessment, while others were afforded direct ministerial attention, despite being non-compliant. Even if no funds were ultimately released, the damage to institutional credibility and public confidence had already been done.
Failure to Respect Regulatory Independence
The Higher Education Commission was placed in an untenable position. By recording Biman Prasad’s involvement, the Commission effectively signalled that it had been forced to defend its statutory independence against political intrusion.
That a statutory body felt compelled to seek Prime Ministerial direction and legal advice from the Solicitor-General underscored the seriousness of the situation. This was not routine consultation; it was a response to ministerial conduct that blurred authority and threatened regulatory integrity.
A minister acting consistently with the Ministerial Code would have protected, not tested, the independence of the Commission.
Evasion of Ministerial Responsibility
Biman Prasad’s email, referenced in the letter, acknowledged that there had been insufficient time for ministers to consider the submissions before the budget. Yet rather than treating this as a reason to exclude non-compliant requests, he allowed the matter to linger unresolved, effectively passing the burden back to the Commission and, ultimately, to the Prime Minister.
This was a failure of leadership. Ministerial responsibility required decisiveness grounded in law. Instead, Biman Prasad’s conduct contributed to administrative paralysis, uncertainty, and reputational risk for the government.
Ministerial Code of Conduct: Breach in Substance, If Not in Form
Although the letter did not invoke the Ministerial Code of Conduct explicitly, Biman Prasad’s actions conflicted with its core principles:
Even absent proof of corrupt intent, this behaviour amounted to a serious lapse in ministerial ethics. Ministerial codes exist precisely to prevent this kind of conduct, where influence replaces process and discretion overrides law.
His intervention highlighted a deeper problem: the casual erosion of governance norms by a senior minister entrusted with safeguarding public finance.
In retrospect, Biman Prasad’s conduct represented a textbook example of unministerial behaviour.
By engaging with non-compliant funding submissions, disregarding statutory process, and failing to uphold the independence of a regulatory body, he weakened institutional safeguards and diminished public confidence in the integrity of government decision-making.
The Higher Education Commission’s letter stands as a restrained but powerful record of this failure.
It showed that while the system ultimately resisted improper influence, it did so despite, not because of, the conduct of the Minister for Finance BIMAN CHAND PRASAD.
It documented a clear failure of ministerial discipline by the Minister for Finance, Biman Prasad, whose conduct stood in direct conflict with the principles of lawful governance, respect for statutory independence, and ethical restraint expected of a senior Cabinet Minister.
While the Commission refrained from explicit criticism, the facts it placed on record were sufficient to demonstrate that Biman Prasad acted outside the boundaries of proper ministerial behaviour, compromised institutional process, and exposed the public funding system to perceptions of arbitrariness and preferential access.
Disregard for Statutory Authority
At the heart of the issue was Biman Prasad’s engagement with grant submissions that were, by law, required to be processed exclusively by the Fiji Higher Education Commission. The Higher Education Act 2008 and the Higher Education Regulations 2009 clearly vested authority for assessing higher education grants in the Commission, not in the Ministry of Finance and not in any individual minister.
Despite this, Biman Prasad received, entertained, and corresponded on funding requests from Pacific Polytech and ServicePro International, institutions that had either failed to meet eligibility requirements or had submitted incomplete documentation. This conduct demonstrated a fundamental disregard for the separation between political authority and statutory regulation.
A minister committed to upholding the rule of law would have rejected such submissions outright and redirected them to the Commission. Biman Prasad did not do so.
Normalising Bypass and Preferential Access
The letter made clear that the affected institutions bypassed the Commission entirely and approached the Minister for Finance directly. Biman Prasad’s willingness to accept and engage with these submissions normalised an improper channel, creating the impression that access to public funding could be achieved through political routes rather than lawful process.
This behaviour was unministerial not merely because it breached protocol, but because it undermined fairness. Institutions that complied with the law were subjected to rigorous assessment, while others were afforded direct ministerial attention, despite being non-compliant. Even if no funds were ultimately released, the damage to institutional credibility and public confidence had already been done.
Failure to Respect Regulatory Independence
The Higher Education Commission was placed in an untenable position. By recording Biman Prasad’s involvement, the Commission effectively signalled that it had been forced to defend its statutory independence against political intrusion.
That a statutory body felt compelled to seek Prime Ministerial direction and legal advice from the Solicitor-General underscored the seriousness of the situation. This was not routine consultation; it was a response to ministerial conduct that blurred authority and threatened regulatory integrity.
A minister acting consistently with the Ministerial Code would have protected, not tested, the independence of the Commission.
Evasion of Ministerial Responsibility
Biman Prasad’s email, referenced in the letter, acknowledged that there had been insufficient time for ministers to consider the submissions before the budget. Yet rather than treating this as a reason to exclude non-compliant requests, he allowed the matter to linger unresolved, effectively passing the burden back to the Commission and, ultimately, to the Prime Minister.
This was a failure of leadership. Ministerial responsibility required decisiveness grounded in law. Instead, Biman Prasad’s conduct contributed to administrative paralysis, uncertainty, and reputational risk for the government.
Ministerial Code of Conduct: Breach in Substance, If Not in Form
Although the letter did not invoke the Ministerial Code of Conduct explicitly, Biman Prasad’s actions conflicted with its core principles:
- He failed to act strictly within statutory authority.
- He failed to maintain clear boundaries between political office and regulatory bodies.
- He enabled, rather than prevented, procedural irregularity.
- He exposed public funding decisions to perceptions of bias and informality.
Even absent proof of corrupt intent, this behaviour amounted to a serious lapse in ministerial ethics. Ministerial codes exist precisely to prevent this kind of conduct, where influence replaces process and discretion overrides law.
His intervention highlighted a deeper problem: the casual erosion of governance norms by a senior minister entrusted with safeguarding public finance.
In retrospect, Biman Prasad’s conduct represented a textbook example of unministerial behaviour.
By engaging with non-compliant funding submissions, disregarding statutory process, and failing to uphold the independence of a regulatory body, he weakened institutional safeguards and diminished public confidence in the integrity of government decision-making.
The Higher Education Commission’s letter stands as a restrained but powerful record of this failure.
It showed that while the system ultimately resisted improper influence, it did so despite, not because of, the conduct of the Minister for Finance BIMAN CHAND PRASAD.
Responding to fijivillage News, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Professor Biman Prasad says the Commission can make submissions and provide advice, but the decision on budget allocations rests with Cabinet and Parliament.
Professor Prasad says funding allocations have been made following proper parliamentary processes.
The Deputy Prime Minister adds that he is of the understanding that the Commission had not received a timely submission from the two training providers and thus made a late submission to the Ministry of Finance.
Fijileaks: Biman Prasad did not disclose his own role in the PP funding saga.
Professor Prasad says funding allocations have been made following proper parliamentary processes.
The Deputy Prime Minister adds that he is of the understanding that the Commission had not received a timely submission from the two training providers and thus made a late submission to the Ministry of Finance.
Fijileaks: Biman Prasad did not disclose his own role in the PP funding saga.
*Was BIMAN CHAND PRASAD, former USP Economics Professor, Adjunct Professor at Punjab University, Patiala, India, Adjunct Professor, James Cook University, Australia, former Director, Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, former chairman of the Fiji Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, Shadow Minister of Finance, National Planning and Statistics, and later Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister (now NFP backbencher and still NFP party leader) CORRECT in his August 2025 Response to Fijivillage?
BIMAN Prasad’s response was partially correct in a narrow constitutional sense, but materially misleading and legally incomplete when assessed against the Higher Education Act 2008, the Higher Education Regulations 2009, and the facts later placed on record by the Higher Education Commission Fiji (HECF).
1: “The Commission can make submissions and provide advice, but the decision on budget allocations rests with Cabinet and Parliament.”
Why This Was Only Partly Correct
It is true that Cabinet and Parliament hold ultimate authority over the approval of the national budget, and the Minister for Finance tables the Appropriation Bill, and Parliament authorises expenditure. However, this statement collapsed two legally distinct stages into one, creating a misleading impression.
What the Law Actually Requires
Under the Higher Education Act and Regulations the Commission is not merely advisory in relation to higher education grants. The HECF is the statutory gatekeeper for eligibility, compliance, assessment, and recommendation of higher education grant funding.
Cabinet and Parliament approve aggregate budget allocations, but they do not lawfully replace the Commission’s role in determining which institutions qualify under the Act. Budget authority does not extinguish statutory conditions attached to spending.
Biman Prasad’s statement was constitutionally convenient but legally incomplete, as it obscured the binding statutory role of the Commission.
2: “Funding allocations have been made following proper parliamentary processes.”
Why This Statement Was Misleading
The HECF letter later confirmed that no grant agreements were executed for Pacific Polytech and ServicePro. The Commission did not recommend funding for them. The Commission was unable to authorise release of funds due to non-compliance.
Parliamentary approval of a budget line does not equate to lawful allocation or disbursement to specific recipients. Proper parliamentary process requires lawful assessment, compliance with enabling legislation, and execution of grant agreements.
None of these occurred for the two providers.
While the budget itself followed parliamentary procedure, the specific funding outcomes Prasad was defending did not, making his statement technically true but substantively misleading.
3. The Commission “had not received a timely submission” and the providers therefore made a “late submission to the Ministry of Finance.”
Why This Was Legally Incorrect
This was the weakest part of Biman Prasad’s response. The Higher Education Regulations do not permit an alternative submission pathway. Key facts from the HECF letter:
A late or missed deadline does not transfer statutory authority from the Commission to the Minister for Finance. Biman Prasad’s explanation was legally unsound. There is no lawful basis for treating late submissions to the Ministry of Finance as valid substitutes for Commission processes.
Overall Assessment of His August 2025 Statement
What He Got Right
What He Got Wrong
Biman Prasad’s August 2025 response was defensive rather than accurate. It relied on broad constitutional principles while sidestepping the specific legal framework governing higher education grants.
While he was correct that Cabinet and Parliament control the budget, he was incorrect to imply that this authority legitimised funding pathways that contravened the Higher Education Act and Regulations.
In governance terms, his statement did not withstand scrutiny once the FHEC formally placed the facts and legal position on record.
BIMAN Prasad’s response was partially correct in a narrow constitutional sense, but materially misleading and legally incomplete when assessed against the Higher Education Act 2008, the Higher Education Regulations 2009, and the facts later placed on record by the Higher Education Commission Fiji (HECF).
1: “The Commission can make submissions and provide advice, but the decision on budget allocations rests with Cabinet and Parliament.”
Why This Was Only Partly Correct
It is true that Cabinet and Parliament hold ultimate authority over the approval of the national budget, and the Minister for Finance tables the Appropriation Bill, and Parliament authorises expenditure. However, this statement collapsed two legally distinct stages into one, creating a misleading impression.
What the Law Actually Requires
Under the Higher Education Act and Regulations the Commission is not merely advisory in relation to higher education grants. The HECF is the statutory gatekeeper for eligibility, compliance, assessment, and recommendation of higher education grant funding.
Cabinet and Parliament approve aggregate budget allocations, but they do not lawfully replace the Commission’s role in determining which institutions qualify under the Act. Budget authority does not extinguish statutory conditions attached to spending.
Biman Prasad’s statement was constitutionally convenient but legally incomplete, as it obscured the binding statutory role of the Commission.
2: “Funding allocations have been made following proper parliamentary processes.”
Why This Statement Was Misleading
The HECF letter later confirmed that no grant agreements were executed for Pacific Polytech and ServicePro. The Commission did not recommend funding for them. The Commission was unable to authorise release of funds due to non-compliance.
Parliamentary approval of a budget line does not equate to lawful allocation or disbursement to specific recipients. Proper parliamentary process requires lawful assessment, compliance with enabling legislation, and execution of grant agreements.
None of these occurred for the two providers.
While the budget itself followed parliamentary procedure, the specific funding outcomes Prasad was defending did not, making his statement technically true but substantively misleading.
3. The Commission “had not received a timely submission” and the providers therefore made a “late submission to the Ministry of Finance.”
Why This Was Legally Incorrect
This was the weakest part of Biman Prasad’s response. The Higher Education Regulations do not permit an alternative submission pathway. Key facts from the HECF letter:
- Late submission does not create a right to submit elsewhere.
- Submission to the Ministry of Finance is not recognised in law for higher education grants.
- Pacific Polytech was only provisionally registered at the relevant time and therefore ineligible regardless of timing.
- ServicePro’s submission was incomplete, missing mandatory documents.
A late or missed deadline does not transfer statutory authority from the Commission to the Minister for Finance. Biman Prasad’s explanation was legally unsound. There is no lawful basis for treating late submissions to the Ministry of Finance as valid substitutes for Commission processes.
Overall Assessment of His August 2025 Statement
What He Got Right
- Cabinet and Parliament approve the national budget.
- Ministers do not personally assess institutional compliance.
What He Got Wrong
- He understated the Commission’s binding statutory role.
- He implied that budget authority could override regulatory non-compliance.
- He suggested that late submissions justified bypassing the Commission.
- He failed to acknowledge that no lawful funding recommendation existed.
Biman Prasad’s August 2025 response was defensive rather than accurate. It relied on broad constitutional principles while sidestepping the specific legal framework governing higher education grants.
While he was correct that Cabinet and Parliament control the budget, he was incorrect to imply that this authority legitimised funding pathways that contravened the Higher Education Act and Regulations.
In governance terms, his statement did not withstand scrutiny once the FHEC formally placed the facts and legal position on record.
From Fijileaks Archive, 10 August 2024
How Pacific Polytech Was Funded Despite a Fragile Financial Reality in Audited StatementsPacific Polytechnic Limited’s (PP) audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2021 revealed an institution that survived not through financial strength or sustainable operations, but through continued reliance on government grants, donor assistance, and related-party support. Despite this, Pacific Polytech went on to receive funding, a decision that, when examined against the contents of its own financial report, appeared financially imprudent and contrary to principles of responsible public accountability. A close analysis of the accounts showed that the funding decision was not supported by the underlying financial reality. A Profit That Existed Only on Paper The financial statements reported a net profit of $38,039 for the year. However, this figure did not arise from strong operational performance or a viable education business model. Instead, the surplus was almost entirely the result of external grants and donor funding, particularly wage and employment support linked to COVID-19 relief measures. Tuition fees and internally generated income remained minimal. Without grants and donations, Pacific Polytech would not have covered its operating costs. The reported profit therefore created an illusion of financial health, masking the fact that the institution was structurally dependent on external support to remain solvent. |   |
Dependence on Grants, Not Sustainability
The statement of comprehensive income showed that the largest sources of income were government employment schemes and donor contributions. This raised a fundamental question: why was further funding provided to an entity whose business model depended on funding in the first place?
Rather than demonstrating progress toward self-sufficiency, the financial report confirmed the opposite. Pacific Polytech remained reliant on external assistance to pay wages, meet expenses, and continue operations. Funding under these circumstances did not support growth or transformation; it merely prolonged dependency.
Public funds are typically intended to support measurable outcomes, build institutional capacity, or assist transition to sustainability. The accounts did not demonstrate that any of these objectives were being met.
Auditor’s Warning on Going Concern
While the auditors issued an unmodified opinion, they explicitly drew attention to a material uncertainty related to going concern. The report stated that Pacific Polytech’s ability to continue operating depended on ongoing donor and government assistance and on uncertain future conditions following the COVID-19 pandemic.
This warning was not a technicality. It was a clear signal that the institution’s survival was contingent and fragile. Funding an organisation under such circumstances effectively transferred financial risk from the institution to the funder, without evidence that the risk would diminish over time.
Granting funding in the face of an acknowledged going-concern uncertainty contradicted basic principles of fiscal prudence.
Weak Balance Sheet and Limited Financial Resilience
As at 31 December 2021, Pacific Polytech’s financial position remained weak. Although cash at bank stood at $93,258, total liabilities amounted to $194,039, leaving the organisation exposed and vulnerable. The balance sheet showed limited reserves and no meaningful buffer against future shocks.
Significant liabilities included accrued expenses, lease obligations, and advances linked to related parties. This meant that any new funding was likely to be absorbed by existing commitments rather than used to improve educational delivery or long-term capability.
In effect, funding did not strengthen the institution; it simply kept it afloat.
Governance and Related-Party Warnings
The notes to the financial statements disclosed advances and support from related parties, including directors. While such arrangements were disclosed, they highlighted deeper governance concerns. An institution reliant on director support and informal financial backing did not exhibit the independence or robustness typically expected of a publicly funded body.
There was no evidence in the accounts of independent capitalisation, external investment, or a clear strategy to exit reliance on related-party financing. This raised legitimate concerns about transparency, accountability, and whether public funds were indirectly propping up private arrangements.
No Evidence of a Turnaround Strategy
Crucially, the financial report did not outline a credible pathway toward sustainability. There was no detailed turnaround plan, no evidence of improving revenue diversification, and no indication that dependence on grants would reduce in future years.
Instead, the report repeatedly acknowledged uncertainty, COVID-19 disruption, and reliance on continued assistance. Funding under these circumstances did not incentivise reform or improvement. It rewarded stagnation.
Why the Funding Decision Was Wrong
Taken as a whole, Pacific Polytech’s 2021 financial report showed an institution that was technically compliant but economically fragile. It did not demonstrate financial independence, sustainable operations, adequate resilience, and reduced reliance on public or donor funding.
By approving funding despite these clear warning signs, Biman Prasad and other decision-makers ignored the substance of the financial information in favour of its surface appearance. The result was a funding outcome that rewarded dependency rather than performance, shifted financial risk onto the public, and undermined confidence in how education funding decisions were made.
Pacific Polytech should not have received funding arising from its 2021 financial report. The accounts themselves showed an organisation surviving on external assistance, facing acknowledged going-concern risks, and lacking a credible path to sustainability. Funding in such circumstances was not an investment in education outcomes. It was a stop-gap measure that postponed difficult questions about governance, viability, and accountability - questions that the financial statements had already answered.
The statement of comprehensive income showed that the largest sources of income were government employment schemes and donor contributions. This raised a fundamental question: why was further funding provided to an entity whose business model depended on funding in the first place?
Rather than demonstrating progress toward self-sufficiency, the financial report confirmed the opposite. Pacific Polytech remained reliant on external assistance to pay wages, meet expenses, and continue operations. Funding under these circumstances did not support growth or transformation; it merely prolonged dependency.
Public funds are typically intended to support measurable outcomes, build institutional capacity, or assist transition to sustainability. The accounts did not demonstrate that any of these objectives were being met.
Auditor’s Warning on Going Concern
While the auditors issued an unmodified opinion, they explicitly drew attention to a material uncertainty related to going concern. The report stated that Pacific Polytech’s ability to continue operating depended on ongoing donor and government assistance and on uncertain future conditions following the COVID-19 pandemic.
This warning was not a technicality. It was a clear signal that the institution’s survival was contingent and fragile. Funding an organisation under such circumstances effectively transferred financial risk from the institution to the funder, without evidence that the risk would diminish over time.
Granting funding in the face of an acknowledged going-concern uncertainty contradicted basic principles of fiscal prudence.
Weak Balance Sheet and Limited Financial Resilience
As at 31 December 2021, Pacific Polytech’s financial position remained weak. Although cash at bank stood at $93,258, total liabilities amounted to $194,039, leaving the organisation exposed and vulnerable. The balance sheet showed limited reserves and no meaningful buffer against future shocks.
Significant liabilities included accrued expenses, lease obligations, and advances linked to related parties. This meant that any new funding was likely to be absorbed by existing commitments rather than used to improve educational delivery or long-term capability.
In effect, funding did not strengthen the institution; it simply kept it afloat.
Governance and Related-Party Warnings
The notes to the financial statements disclosed advances and support from related parties, including directors. While such arrangements were disclosed, they highlighted deeper governance concerns. An institution reliant on director support and informal financial backing did not exhibit the independence or robustness typically expected of a publicly funded body.
There was no evidence in the accounts of independent capitalisation, external investment, or a clear strategy to exit reliance on related-party financing. This raised legitimate concerns about transparency, accountability, and whether public funds were indirectly propping up private arrangements.
No Evidence of a Turnaround Strategy
Crucially, the financial report did not outline a credible pathway toward sustainability. There was no detailed turnaround plan, no evidence of improving revenue diversification, and no indication that dependence on grants would reduce in future years.
Instead, the report repeatedly acknowledged uncertainty, COVID-19 disruption, and reliance on continued assistance. Funding under these circumstances did not incentivise reform or improvement. It rewarded stagnation.
Why the Funding Decision Was Wrong
Taken as a whole, Pacific Polytech’s 2021 financial report showed an institution that was technically compliant but economically fragile. It did not demonstrate financial independence, sustainable operations, adequate resilience, and reduced reliance on public or donor funding.
By approving funding despite these clear warning signs, Biman Prasad and other decision-makers ignored the substance of the financial information in favour of its surface appearance. The result was a funding outcome that rewarded dependency rather than performance, shifted financial risk onto the public, and undermined confidence in how education funding decisions were made.
Pacific Polytech should not have received funding arising from its 2021 financial report. The accounts themselves showed an organisation surviving on external assistance, facing acknowledged going-concern risks, and lacking a credible path to sustainability. Funding in such circumstances was not an investment in education outcomes. It was a stop-gap measure that postponed difficult questions about governance, viability, and accountability - questions that the financial statements had already answered.
NOTE: At the time Pacific Polytech sought public support, it formally acknowledged that it had not been granted income-tax exemption and was merely “intending” to apply. Despite this unresolved status, government funding subsequently flowed. This sequence raises serious questions about regulatory due diligence, financial oversight, and whether public funds were committed before Pacific Polytech had met basic compliance standards expected of publicly supported educational bodies.
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