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GLOBAL GIRMIT INSTITUTE: As Biman Prasad and Mahendra Chaudhry head to court over $200,000 to GGI, Prasad's failure to disclose his wife's trusteeship of the GGI must lead to charges under Political Parties ACT

31/1/2026

Fijileaks (14 May 2024): Prasad says his wife was a trustee of the organisation (Global Girmit Institute) many years ago and is no longer there. Arre, Jhootha, Daulasu Levu, only last year your Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka told us that you had declared to his Cabinet that your wife is a TRUSTEE of the Global Girmit Institute when you gave GGI $200,000 to host the international global conference at USP
*Given that they lived under the same roof at 152 Sekoula Rd, Laucala Beach Estate, Suva, how could his wife's trusteeship of the Global Girmit Institute have escaped disclosure in his statutory declarations for six consecutive years (2018-2024)?

*In fact, this is not the first occasion on which he has failed to disclose her connections in his statutory declarations.
*In his 2014 declaration, submitted when he first entered Parliament, he made a false declaration by omitting to disclose that he had jointly owned a property with his wife since 2009.
*That property was sold in 2016 to Lotus Construction (Fiji) Ltd, a company he founded with his cousin and in which he holds a 50% shareholding.
*He also failed to disclose his directorship in Lotus Construction (Fiji) Ltd, and lied about the true extent of his shares in Lotus (Fiji).
*He also failed to disclose that his wife, in exchange, got two villas worth $300,000 from Lotus (Fiji) Ltd in 2017.
*We filed all the three complaints with FICAC, supported by documentary evidence, before Barbara Malimali illegally closed the files in April 2025, including the file on GGI and his wife's link.

SPOUSE, TRUSTEE, SILENCE: Why Biman Prasad’s Declarations Raise Hard Questions Under the Political Parties Act

The Global Girmit Institute did not emerge overnight. It was formally established as a charitable trust in May 2017, with its trustees appointed on 21 May that year. Among those trustees, according to official trust records, was Dr Rajni Kaushal Chand, an academic and the wife of Biman Chand Prasad, then NFP leader and later Minister of Finance.

Trusteeship is not an honorary title. Under Fiji law, a trustee is a fiduciary office-holder with governance responsibility, legal accountability, and influence over the direction and affairs of an institution. It is precisely the kind of role the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act was designed to bring into the open when held by a spouse of a party official or Member of Parliament.

Yet across a succession of statutory declarations filed by Prasad between 2018 and 2024, there is no disclosure of his wife’s trusteeship.
That silence is now the central issue.

The Institute and the Timeline

The Global Girmit Institute began operations in 2017 and continued until it was deregistered in 2022 for administrative non-compliance. It was re-registered in February 2023. Throughout that entire period, Dr Rajni Kaushal Chand remained a trustee. There is no record of resignation, suspension, or withdrawal.

This matters because disclosure obligations under the Political Parties Act are annual and continuing. They are not triggered only when an interest first arises; they apply every year the interest exists.

What the Law Requires

The Political Parties Act obliges party officials and MPs to file statutory declarations disclosing their interests and the interests of their spouses. The law is preventive, not punitive. It is designed to ensure transparency and to allow conflicts of interest to be identified before they become problems.

Three features of the Act are critical:

Spousal interests must be disclosed, even if the official does not personally hold the role.
Unpaid positions still count if they involve governance, authority, or fiduciary responsibility.
Each declaration stands alone. An omission in one year is not cured by silence in another.

A trusteeship fits squarely within this framework.

The Declarations: Year After Year

Based on the signed dates and “as at” dates appearing on Prasad’s declarations, the duty to disclose his wife’s trusteeship clearly applied in the following filings:

2018 declaration, signed in January 2019
Declaration as at 6 January 2020, signed 11 January 2020
Declaration as at 31 December 2020, signed 6 April 2021
Declaration as at 30 December 2022, signed 31 January 2023
Declaration as at 25 January 2023, signed 30 January 2023
Declaration as at 23 January 2024, signed 31 January 2024

By each of these dates, Dr Rajni Kaushal Chand had already been a trustee for years. The trusteeship existed, was ongoing, and was material.

The January 2017 declaration is not in issue. At that time, the trusteeship had not yet come into existence. From 2018 onward, however, the obligation was clear.

Two Returns, One Year, Still No Disclosure

In 2020, two declarations were filed: one capturing interests at the start of the year, another at year-end. Multiple filings in a single year can occur for administrative reasons. What matters is that both declarations covered periods when the trusteeship existed, and neither disclosed it.

Duplication did not correct the omission. It repeated it.

What About Errors and Dates?

Some declarations contain internal inconsistencies in dates. Those are administrative defects that should have been queried by the Elections Office. But they do not erase the legal duty to disclose. Once the true execution date is established, and the documents are signed and witnessed, the law asks a simple question: did the interest exist on that date?

Here, the answer is consistently yes.

Can Charges Be Laid?

Under the Political Parties Act, filing a false or incomplete declaration can constitute an offence. Repeated omissions across multiple years significantly strengthen the case that the failure was not accidental.

Which Years Matter Most?

From an enforcement perspective, not all years are equal. The strongest candidate years are those with clean dates, long-standing trusteeship, and no transitional explanations:

Declaration as at 31 December 2020 (signed April 2021)
Declaration as at 30 December 2022 (signed January 2023)
Declaration as at 23 January 2024 (signed January 2024)

These filings occur well after the trusteeship began and after multiple opportunities to correct any omission.

Earlier years, such as 2018, remain relevant but are more likely to be relied upon as background evidence establishing a pattern.

The Bigger Question

This is not about whether the Global Girmit Institute did good work, nor about whether any personal benefit was obtained. The Political Parties Act does not require proof of gain. It requires disclosure.

Transparency is not optional. It is the price of public office.

Whether regulators act is a matter for them. But the documentary record raises a legitimate and unavoidable question: why was a long-standing spousal trusteeship never declared - year after year - when the law required it to be?

That question has yet to be answered.

Across multiple statutory declarations signed by Biman Prasad between 2019 and 2024, there is no disclosure of his wife’s trusteeship of the Global Girmit Institute.

This is not a single omission. It is repeated non-disclosure.

Does Cabinet approval or public funding negate liability?
Absolutely NOT.

Cabinet processes and grant approvals are irrelevant to compliance with the Political Parties Act.
Disclosure duties are personal statutory obligations, not displaced by Cabinet knowledge, verbal briefings, or alleged institutional awareness.

Courts have repeatedly held that “everyone knew” is not a defence to non-disclosure statutes.

Charge 1: False or Incomplete Declaration (Spousal Interest)
Statute: Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act

Particulars:
That Biman Chand Prasad, being a party official and/or Member of Parliament required by law to file a statutory declaration of interests, did knowingly or recklessly fail to disclose that his spouse, Dr Rajni Kaushal Chand, was a trustee of the Global Girmit Institute, an incorporated trust, at the time of filing his declaration as at 31 December 2020, signed on 6 April 2021, contrary to the Act.

Charge 2: False or Incomplete Declaration (Repeat Offence)
Statute: Political Parties Act

Particulars:
That Biman Chand Prasad, on 30 December 2022, signed and filed a statutory declaration which omitted a material spousal interest—namely, the trusteeship of Dr Rajni Kaushal Chand--without reasonable excuse, contrary to the Act.

Charge 3: Continuing Non-Disclosure (Most Recent Filing) Statute: Political Parties Act

Particulars:
That Biman Chand Prasad, on 31 January 2024, signed a statutory declaration which again failed to disclose an ongoing spousal trusteeship interest that had existed since 2017, thereby continuing a pattern of non-disclosure, contrary to the Act.

Earlier years (2018–2019) could be pleaded as background facts establishing knowledge, continuity, and opportunity to correct.

Evidential Sufficiency
Duty:
The Act clearly requires disclosure of spousal interests, including governance roles such as trusteeships.
Existence:
Dr Rajni Kaushal Chand was appointed a trustee on 21 May 2017 and remained so throughout all relevant periods.
Non-Disclosure:
No declaration from 2018–2024 discloses this interest.
Mental Element:
Repeated omission across multiple years strongly supports an inference of knowledge or recklessness, defeating a simple “oversight” explanation.

Conclusion

There is a prima facie evidential case.

Public Interest Factors (Favouring Prosecution

Senior public office held (Minister of Finance).
Repeated omissions, not an isolated error.
Subject matter directly related to public funding and governance.
Need to maintain integrity of the disclosure regime.
Factors Against:
No allegation of personal enrichment is required (and not relied upon).

Balance:
Public interest favours prosecution, at least on a limited number of representative counts.

Fijileaks: As one of two complainants, we had provided all the documentary evidence to FICAC but in one sweep, Barbara Malimali closed Prasad's entire files. We call on Fiji Police to launch a probe against her conduct. The use of superannuation as a pretext to close the Prasad file does not withstand legal scrutiny and gives rise to a separate, serious case to answer concerning abuse of office and improper interference.

The Case Against Barbara Malimali for Stopping the Investigation Into Biman Prasad: The Matter at Hand

A serious question arises regarding Barbara Malimali, the former FICAC Commissioner, and whether she has a case to answer in relation to her conduct concerning the investigation of Biman Prasad. Specifically, the issue centers around WhatsApp messages exchanged between Malimali and Kuliniasi Saumi, a senior FICAC officer, in which she allegedly directed that Prasad’s file be halted.

This occurred after her appointment in 2024 and is a significant matter of concern due to the implications of abuse of office and interference with due process.

Key Facts and Evidence

WhatsApp messages produced before the Commission of Inquiry indicate that Malimali stated:

“I need a big one charged… to shut the critics up!”
“But it has to be proper… no charging willy nilly.”
“Well, I was after people who abused funds NOT the elections ones!”
Additionally, it was implied in a separate message that Prasad’s file should not be handled.

These communications were taken by the Commission to indicate that Malimali may have been influencing the course of investigations for reasons unrelated to the statutory process or public interest.

Legal Issues at Play

Under Sections 352–355 of the Crimes Act, public officials can be prosecuted if their communications demand or influence a subordinate’s conduct unlawfully.
Malimali’s statements to Saumi regarding Prasad’s file could potentially be considered unwarranted demands, as they suggest improper influence over prosecutorial decisions that should be made independently and impartially.

Abuse of Office

Section 139 of the Crimes Act defines abuse of office as the use of a public official’s powers to achieve personal, improper, or unlawful outcomes.
If Malimali’s message is shown to have influenced the course of the investigation for reasons outside the statutory remit, it could constitute abuse of office, especially if Saumi’s actions were directed by these communications.

Interference with Investigations

Under general legal principles regarding interference with justice, communications from an official that seek to shape or influence the outcome of an investigation could be considered interference with due process.
Malimali’s direction, even if indirect or implied, to halt the investigation into Prasad’s file could be seen as interfering with the impartiality of the investigation process, thereby raising legal concerns about the integrity of her actions as FICAC Commissioner.

Does Malimali Have a Case to Answer?

Given the facts and the legal framework established in Bainimarama's case, Malimali could potentially have a case to answer. The WhatsApp messages and their implications for the integrity of the investigation process suggest that she may have improperly used her office to influence prosecutorial decisions for reasons unrelated to law or public interest.

The legal questions that remain are:

Was her conduct sufficient to be classified as unlawful interference under the Crimes Act and related provisions on abuse of office?
Can the evidence establish that Saumi's actions were directly influenced by her communications, thereby disrupting the lawful execution of FICAC’s investigative powers?

The matter warrants further investigation and, potentially, legal action if credible evidence shows that Malimali exceeded her authority in this regard.

Charges relating to Barbara Malimali(Crimes Act)
Count 1: Abuse of Office Statute: Crimes Act, s 139

Particulars:
That Barbara Malimali, while Commissioner of FICAC, abused her office by terminating or causing the termination of investigations relating to Biman Chand Prasad on the basis of irrelevant considerations (superannuation issues), and/or for an improper purpose, thereby acting prejudicially to the administration of justice.

Count 2: Interference with the Administration of Justice (Alternative) Statute: Crimes Act (relevant provisions)

Particulars:
That Barbara Malimali, by directing or influencing investigative priorities and expressing that she did not want the Prasad file pursued, interfered with or attempted to interfere with the proper exercise of statutory investigative functions.

On 24 December 2024, FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali instructed staff to “find files” to silence or neutralize critics, indicating a politically motivated use of prosecutorial power.
When Manager Legal Kauliniasi Saumi informed her that Biman Prasad’s file was ready for charges, Malimali refused to proceed, allegedly saying:
“No, I don’t want election-related files.”

Saumi

UPPING THE PRESSURE: Our Emails, Our Rights: Being Complainants Against Biman Prasad Doesn't Stop at Malimali's Blood Pressure
From Fijileaks Archive:

Victor Lal

Assets Declared Before They Existed: Just Another Administrative Miracle. We remain, patiently, waiting for an explanation

Dear Mr Kumar,

I write in relation to the statutory declaration of assets, liabilities, and income made by Mr Biman Chand Prasad in which you appear as the legal practitioner and Commissioner for Oaths who administered and certified the declaration.

The document states that it is a declaration of assets, liabilities. and income as at 6 January 2019.

It records bank balances, property interests, and other financial particulars expressly stated to be current as at that date. However the statutory declaration section records that the declaration was declared at Suva on 17 January 2018 and was signed and certified on that basis by both the declarant (Biman Chand Prasad) and yourself.

This creates an apparent inconsistency because the declaration purports to disclose financial information as at 6 January 2019. Yet it was sworn and certified on 17 January 2018. As a matter of fact it would not have been possible in January 2018 to swear to asset positions stated to exist in January 2019.

As you would appreciate, the legal validity of a statutory declaration depends on the facts declared being capable of being true at the time the oath is administered. The role of the Commissioner for Oaths includes ensuring that the declaration sworn is coherent, intelligible, and temporally accurate.

I would therefore be grateful if you could clarify whether the date of 17 January 2018 was an error and if so how it arose, and whether the declaration was in fact sworn on a later date and subsequently misdated and what steps if any were taken to satisfy yourself that the declaration accurately reflected the date stated on its face.

This request is made in good faith and in the interests of maintaining the integrity of statutory declarations made under the Political Parties Registration Conduct Funding and Disclosures framework.

I would appreciate your response at your convenience.

Yours sincerely,

Victor Lal
Fijileaks
Founding Editor-in-Chief

Two Attachments

Economics Professor, Senior Lawyer, Two Signatures - Zero Alarm Bells (2018-2019)

From Fijileaks Archives

Kiran informed the Fijivillage Straight Talk audience that the accounts are still being audited by the Auditor-General?
*Prasad also claims that some 'deranged bloggers' are claiming that he (Prasad) gave money to his wife Rajni.
*He was indirectly calling our Editor-in-Chief the 'deranged blogger'.
*If anyone who is DERANGED and a BLOODY LIAR, it is Prasad who falsely claimed that his wife Rajni had long ago ceased to be a TRUSTEE of the Global Girmit Institute, which received $200,000 to organize a two-day international conference at USP where she is employed by Pal Ahluwalia who was the keynote speaker at the conference.
*In fact, the 'Excel Sh*t doesn't even reveal how much Ahluwalia and the USP were paid to organize the conference.
*The Global Girmit Institute must provide a comprehensive breakdown of the $200,000 it received from Prasad, without the tender process.

*BIMAN PRASAD continuing with his PACK OF LIES:
*Professor Prasad says in 2023, the total budget was $500,000 but the total expenditure was $380,308.76. He says from this money, $125,000 came through sponsorship and the government utilised $255,308.76.
*He further says the Global Girmit Institute was the only institute who could organise an international conference in such a short period of time.
*He says his wife was a trustee of the organisation many years ago and is no longer there.
* Professor Prasad says for them to say that he gave money to his wife is the type of warped logic they are trying to come up with.
*The financial report on Fijivillage online news site by Biman Prasad must have a authority indicating its official figures.
*If Kiran had any knowledge about these accounts (she was Deputy Chair of the celebrations) why didn't she state during the Straight Talk about the accounts?
*Where is the Office of the Auditor-General's seal?
*Why was the account over budgetted?
*How do we rule out that sponsors were brought in after the event? - To show low cost/spending.
*The $50,000 for admin is too vague and significant portion of total cost of event and warrants further breakdown.

Click here: GGI Re-Registered

Certificate of Registration, GGI

DE-REGISTRATION had not harmed GGI's relationship with DONORS and FUNDERS, operating out of Chicken Darbha (Coop), resembling more like the Indian Coolie Depot

Between Inquiry and Indictment: The Legal Reach of the Commission of Inquiry and Its Power to Recommend Criminal Charges and why those named in the COI ran to the Fiji High Court seeking JUDICIAL REVIEW

30/1/2026

Between Inquiry and Indictment: The Legal Reach of the Commission of Inquiry and Its Power to Recommend Criminal Charges

CHAPTER SEVEN of the Commission of Inquiry report occupies a sensitive but necessary space in Fiji’s constitutional architecture. It addresses “Possible Offences” arising from the evidence heard, while repeatedly acknowledging a fundamental limit: the Commission is not a criminal court.

This chapter is therefore not a judgment of guilt. It is a legal mapping exercise, identifying conduct that, if independently investigated and proved, may constitute offences under existing criminal statutes. Understanding the legitimacy and limits of that exercise is critical, particularly where the report names specific individuals and links their conduct to defined offences.

The Commission’s own statement of legal limits

At the outset of Chapter 7, the COI is explicit about its lack of adjudicative power. It reiterates that it cannot make pronouncements on criminal guilt or innocence, and that any apparent unlawfulness is discussed only because the Terms of Reference require it to comment on the legal character of the conduct it examined.

Crucially, the Commission also invokes section 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act (Cap 3), which provides that evidence given before a commission is not admissible in civil or criminal proceedings, except in cases of perjury.

The report spells out the consequence of this provision: the Police must conduct their own independent investigations, and prosecutors cannot rely on COI testimony itself when framing charges.

This framing is not incidental. It is the legal foundation that permits the Commission to discuss “possible offences” without trespassing into the domain of courts or prosecutors.

Identification, not adjudication

Chapter 7 does three distinct things: (1) Identifies conduct disclosed by evidence before the COI; (2) Matches that conduct to existing offences under Fiji law (principally the Crimes Act, Electoral Act, FICAC Act, and False Information Act); and (3) Flags legal risk, often using cautious language such as “potentially”, “at risk of”, or “could amount to". This approach is consistent across the chapter.

The Commission does not purport to decide facts to a criminal standard, nor does it declare that offences were committed. Instead, it draws attention to conduct that warrants scrutiny by authorities constitutionally empowered to investigate and prosecute.

The treatment of Barbara Malimali as a case study

In relation to Barbara Malimali, Chapter 7 is unusually detailed. It catalogues a range of potential offences, including:

Abuse of office under section 139 of the Crimes Act, particularly in relation to:

adopting unlawful processes for handling election-related complaints; and
directing work to stop or slow investigations involving ministers, including the Biman Prasad file.

Perverting or attempting to pervert the course of justice, arising from:

interference with investigations;
stopping contemplated charges; and
conduct affecting witnesses during the pendency of the Inquiry itself.

Perjury or making inconsistent statements, based on viva voce evidence said to conflict with documentary records.
Forgery and false representation, including signing or issuing documents that allegedly misrepresented facts or authority.

Importantly, even where the Commission’s language becomes firm, stating, for example, that certain actions “could amount to” abuse of office or perverting justice, it stops short of recommending prosecution in the sense of directing that charges be laid.

Instead, it repeatedly notes that independent investigation is required, and in some instances observes that Police investigations are already underway.

The legal basis for recommending “possible offences”

The critical question is whether the COI had the power to do this at all.

The answer, as a matter of law, is yes but only in a limited and carefully circumscribed sense.

Source of the power

A commission of inquiry derives its authority from its establishing instrument; and the Commissions of Inquiry Act. Where the Terms of Reference require the Commission to inquire into lawfulness, propriety, or integrity, it is legally permissible, indeed often unavoidable, for the Commission to describe conduct in legal terms. That includes identifying which statutes might be engaged if the conduct were proved in another forum.

Courts in common law jurisdictions have consistently accepted that commissions may make findings of fact on a civil or administrative standard; and express opinions about whether conduct appears unlawful, provided they do not determine criminal liability.

Chapter 7 stays within that boundary.

Equally important is what the COI cannot do:

It cannot lay charges.
It cannot compel prosecution.
It cannot bind the Police or the Director of Public Prosecutions.
It cannot convert Inquiry evidence into trial evidence (save for perjury).

Chapter 7 acknowledges all of this expressly. The repeated emphasis on independent Police investigation is not a disclaimer for form’s sake; it is a recognition that the prosecutorial chain remains constitutionally separate.

Are the recommendations legally problematic?

From a legal standpoint, the Commission’s approach in Chapter 7 is defensible and orthodox.

It does not invent offences. Every “possible offence” identified is anchored in an existing statutory provision, often quoted verbatim. The Commission also avoids emotive or declaratory language of guilt. Instead, it frames its conclusions as risk assessments arising from the evidence before it.

The greater legal risk would have arisen had the Commission:

declared that individuals were guilty;
urged immediate prosecution; or
purported to resolve contested facts conclusively. It did none of these things.

Practical effect of Chapter 7

The practical consequence of Chapter 7 is not prosecution, but activation:

It places Police on notice of conduct that warrants examination.
It informs the Director of Public Prosecutions of the legal terrain.
It creates a public record that certain matters cannot simply be ignored without explanation. Whether charges ultimately follow depends entirely on:
independent evidence gathered by investigators; and
the prosecutorial judgment of the DPP.

The COI’s role ends where those institutions’ roles begin.

Conclusion: recommendation without usurpation

Chapter 7 demonstrates a Commission walking a narrow but lawful path. It does not convict, does not prosecute, and does not direct outcomes. What it does is identify conduct that, if proven elsewhere, may satisfy the elements of recognised criminal offences.

In doing so, the Commission acted within its mandate. It neither exceeded its powers nor intruded into the exclusive domain of courts and prosecutors.

The power it exercised was not the power to charge, but the power to illuminate legal risk.

That distinction - between inquiry and indictment - is not merely technical. It is the line that preserves both accountability and the rule of law.

Why They Ran to Court: The Real Reason Those Named in the Inquiry Sought the Protection of the Fiji High Court: The paradox at the heart of the legal challenge

At first glance, the rush by some individuals named in Chapter 7 of the Commission of Inquiry to seek relief from the Fiji High Court appears puzzling. A commission of inquiry cannot prosecute, cannot convict, and cannot impose criminal penalties.

Why, then, the urgency? Why the litigation?

The answer lies in a fundamental misunderstanding, sometimes encouraged, sometimes feigned, about what commissions do and what their findings trigger. The legal significance of a commission does not end where prosecutorial power begins. In fact, that is precisely where its influence starts.

A Commission does not charge but it sets the legal terrain. The COI was careful, almost meticulous, in acknowledging its limits. It did not declare guilt. It did not order prosecutions. Instead, it identified conduct that may amount to offences under existing criminal statutes and recommended that such matters be referred to the appropriate authorities for independent investigation.

That distinction is not cosmetic. It is constitutional. But it does not render the findings inert.

Once a commission formally identifies 'possible offences' and names the individuals whose conduct may engage those offences, three immediate legal consequences follow.

Criminal exposure becomes real, not hypothetical

Police and prosecutors do not operate in a vacuum. A COI report performs an evidentiary and analytical function that no ordinary complaint does. It organises facts, identifies legal pathways, and signals seriousness.

When a commission says that certain conduct may constitute abuse of office or attempting to pervert the course of justice, it effectively invites investigation. Police are placed on notice. The Director of Public Prosecutions is alerted. Silence thereafter becomes difficult to justify.

For those named, the risk is no longer abstract. It is proximate.

Challenging the COI in court is therefore not about escaping conviction; it is about preventing the investigative chain from gaining momentum.

Reputational harm is itself a legal injury

Judicial review is not confined to criminal consequences. Courts recognise that reputational damage, professional ruin, and loss of office are legally cognisable harms.

A COI report becomes a public document, is cited by media, Parliament, and regulators, and can justify suspensions, dismissals, and disqualification from future roles. For senior public officials, this damage can be permanent. Even if no charge is ever laid, the label 'named in a Commission of Inquiry for possible offences' follows.

That is why the law insists that commissions observe procedural fairness. If a person can show they were denied a fair opportunity to respond to adverse findings, the High Court has jurisdiction to intervene. In short, they ran to court to protect not just liberty, but livelihood.

Stopping the report can slow everything else

A successful challenge to a COI report, whether by quashing findings, redacting names, or declaring procedural unfairness, has immediate downstream effects. Police investigations may stall. Prosecutors may hesitate. Witnesses may waver. Defence counsel gain procedural leverage.

Even an unsuccessful challenge can buy time. Time matters. Evidence goes stale. Public attention shifts. Institutional priorities change. From a defence perspective, early High Court litigation is not an act of panic; it is a standard containment strategy.

COI evidence does not vanish, but it can be neutralised

It is true that evidence given to a commission is generally inadmissible in later criminal proceedings, save for perjury. But that protection is narrower than it appears.

Documents, electronic records, and communications such as WhatsApp messages do not become immune because they were first shown to a commission. Police can obtain the same material independently.

What a High Court challenge can do, however, is undermine the credibility of the commission’s narrative, cast doubt on the handling of evidence, and arm defence lawyers with arguments about prejudice and unfairness. That can materially affect later prosecutorial decisions.

Silence would have been legally reckless

There is a final, often overlooked reason why those named went to court: failure to challenge would have been used against them. In future proceedings, criminal, civil, or disciplinary, the absence of any attempt to contest adverse findings could be portrayed as acquiescence. The High Court challenge is therefore also a matter of record-keeping: a formal assertion that the findings are disputed.

In legal terms, it preserves position.

What this tells us about the power of the Commission. Ironically, the rush to the High Court is the clearest proof that the Commission’s work mattered. If the COI were truly toothless, no urgent applications would have been filed, no senior counsel briefed, no allegations of procedural unfairness raised. People do not litigate against documents that carry no consequence.

The COI did not exceed its mandate by identifying possible offences. It exercised precisely the power Parliament intended: to expose conduct that demands further scrutiny, while leaving judgment to the courts.

Therefore, running to court was rational, not contradictory. Those named in Chapter 7 did not seek High Court protection because the Commission could jail them. They did so because it could change their legal future.

The Commission lit the path. Police and prosecutors may yet decide whether to walk it. But once that light was switched on, standing still was no longer an option.

In that sense, the High Court challenges were not an overreaction. They were an acknowledgment of a simple truth in public law: being named is often the most consequential act of all.

“From my professional perspective, the report is a travesty of justice. We are poisoning ourselves if we take this COI Report seriously … The Report’s conclusions are the triumph of idle social media prattle and lazy legal guesswork.”
Sacked Attorney-General Graham Leung

Click here to read Chapter Seven

Click here to read Chapter Eight

The Mystery of ODPP's 12 FILES. Vosarogo's Turn to S-G. Legal Advice Strategy Raises Fresh Questions About Complainants Rights and COI

29/1/2026

In publicly stating that legal advice had been sought from the Solicitor-General following the decision of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) not to prosecute matters arising from Commission of Inquiry related complaints, Filimone Vosarogo presented the move as a measure of constitutional prudence.

The statement conveyed an intention to ensure that executive conduct remained within lawful bounds in the wake of a sensitive prosecutorial outcome, particularly while related matters continue to engage the courts.

Read narrowly, the statement is orthodox. An executive government is entitled, indeed expected, to seek legal advice on the consequences of a prosecutorial decision so as to avoid constitutional missteps.

Yet once placed in context, the statement also exposes deeper legal complexities. These complexities are not abstract. They bear directly on complainants whose matters may or may not have been encompassed by the ODPP’s decision, and on the legitimacy of executive reliance on that decision.

Prosecutorial Independence and the Limits of Executive Advice

The constitutional position is clear. Prosecutorial discretion rests exclusively with the ODPP. Decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute are insulated from executive direction, supervision, or review. The Solicitor-General’s function is advisory; it does not extend to reassessing evidence, revisiting prosecutorial conclusions, or recommending charges.

Accordingly, Vosarogo cannot lawfully be seeking advice on whether the ODPP’s conclusion was correct on the merits, nor on whether prosecution should nonetheless proceed. Any such inquiry would trespass impermissibly into prosecutorial terrain. The only proper subject of advice is the legal consequence of the ODPP’s decision: what the Executive may or may not do in light of it, how it should conduct itself while litigation is live, and what non-criminal options, if any, remain open.

This distinction is critical. It explains why the approach to the Solicitor-General is defensible in principle, yet also why its practical value depends entirely on clarity as to what the ODPP’s decision actually covered.

The '12 Files' and the Problem of Opaque Resolution

The ODPP has stated that it considered '12 files' and found insufficient evidence to prosecute. That formulation has been widely treated as a comprehensive resolution of all relevant complaints associated with the Commission of Inquiry context. However, the statement is materially opaque.

No public information has been provided as to the subject matter of the 12 files, whether each file corresponds to a distinct complaint, whether multiple complaints were consolidated, or whether certain complaints were excluded altogether.

In public law terms, this opacity is consequential. Without breaking down the 12 files, it is impossible to determine whether the ODPP’s conclusion addressed specific allegations against specific individuals, or whether it represents a more general assessment of a limited subset of material. Executive reliance on such an undefined conclusion is therefore precarious.

The Position of Complainants: Vested, Not Abstract

The difficulty is most acute for complainants. As a complainant against Biman Prasad, I am directly affected by the way in which the ODPP’s decision is framed and relied upon. The concern is not disagreement with a known adverse outcome; it is uncertainty as to whether the complaint was ever substantively considered.

Absent confirmation that a complaint against Biman Prasad was among the files reviewed, no complainant can responsibly accept or contest the ODPP’s conclusion. One cannot agree or disagree with a decision whose scope is undefined. The issue is therefore procedural, not substantive: whether the decision-making process demonstrably encompasses the complaint in question.

That concern is sharpened by the author’s contemplation of lodging a further complaint against Barbara Malimali. The manner in which existing complaints have been handled, described, and communicated is directly relevant to any assessment of whether future complaints will receive transparent and procedurally fair consideration. The issue thus transcends individual grievance and speaks to systemic accountability.

Procedural Fairness and the Minimum Owed to Complainants

It is well established that complainants have no right to compel prosecution and no entitlement to detailed reasons or evidential analysis. Prosecutorial independence requires that much. Nonetheless, a minimum level of procedural fairness is owed.

That minimum includes the ability to know whether a complaint was received and considered, whether it was assessed as a standalone matter or subsumed within a broader file, and the general basis on which it was disposed of (for example, evidential insufficiency or jurisdictional limitation).

Where even this threshold information is absent, complainants are left unable to ascertain whether their complaints were decided at all. This problem is not confined to a single complainant. It potentially affects all complainants whose matters may or may not fall within the undefined '12 files'. The issue is therefore systemic, engaging transparency, rationality, and legitimate expectation in public administration.

Executive Reliance and the Risk of Over-Extension

Vosarogo’s decision to seek advice from the Solicitor-General signals that the Executive intends to rely, at least in part, on the ODPP’s conclusion in shaping its conduct. That reliance has legal and practical consequences. It may influence whether allegations are treated as closed, whether institutions are receptive to further complaints, and how the public narrative around alleged wrongdoing is framed.

Criminal non-prosecution, however, is not exoneration. It does not preclude civil, administrative, disciplinary, or parliamentary processes. Nor does it justify treating undefined complaints as resolved by implication. If executive reliance on the ODPP’s decision extends beyond its actual scope, it risks both constitutional error and public-law challenge.

Independent Review and the Role of Ian Lloyd, the Australian KC

An additional and important dimension is the involvement of Ian Lloyd KC, engaged to conduct an independent review of the files referred to the ODPP. His role has been cited publicly as an assurance of independence and rigour. Yet that assurance depends on clarity as to what was reviewed.

At present, it is not publicly established whether a file relating to allegations against Biman Prasad was among the material reviewed by Ian Lloyd KC. I have been informed informally that it was not. If that information is correct, it materially alters the meaning of claims that an independent review underpinned the ODPP’s conclusion.

Seeking clarification from Ian Lloyd KC does not entail, and must not invite, commentary on evidential sufficiency or prosecutorial judgment. Prosecutorial independence would plainly preclude that. What is sought instead is a narrow procedural clarification: whether a file relating to allegations against Biman Prasad formed part of the material reviewed, and whether it was considered as a discrete or consolidated matter.

Such clarification would serve legitimate purposes. It would allow complainants to understand whether their matters were ever within the scope of the review relied upon to justify non-prosecution. It would enable the Executive and the Solicitor-General to assess legal consequences and litigation risk on an accurate factual footing. And it would protect both the ODPP and the independent reviewer from speculation founded on silence.

Continued vagueness, by contrast, sustains a structural ambiguity. It leaves open the possibility that the ODPP’s conclusion is being treated as dispositive of complaints that were never reviewed at all. In matters involving allegations against senior public office holders, such ambiguity is corrosive of public confidence.

Conclusion

Vosarogo’s statement and his approach to the Solicitor-General reflect an orthodox desire to act within constitutional limits. Yet the legal significance of that step cannot be divorced from the uncertainty surrounding what the ODPP’s decision actually encompassed.

For complainants, particularly those whose allegations concern senior Ministers or integrity office holders, the absence of clarity is not academic. It bears directly on whether their complaints were considered, whether executive reliance on the ODPP’s conclusion is justified, and whether further complaints can be pursued with confidence in procedural fairness.

Until there is transparency as to whether specific complaints were among the files reviewed, either by the ODPP itself or through the independent review attributed to Ian Lloyd KC, neither complainants nor the Executive can responsibly treat the matter as settled.

The rule of law requires not only independence in prosecutorial decision-making, but also sufficient clarity to ensure that independence is exercised, and seen to be exercised, over the matters it is said to resolve.

Puleiwai to Rabuka: 'I stood my ground. The system did not.'

Puleiwai

Francis Puleiwai did not leave the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption quietly. She was pushed out after ordering the arrest of the very woman being installed as her boss.

In a confidential out-brief sent to Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka, the former Acting Deputy Commissioner of FICAC lays out, step by step, how Fiji’s corruption watchdog collapsed at the precise moment it reached the powerful.

At the centre of the implosion: Barbara Malimali. At the time Malimali was selected by the Judicial Services Commission to become FICAC Commissioner, she was already under active FICAC investigation for alleged abuse of office linked to her role as Chair of the Electoral Commission.

No one from the JSC asked FICAC whether she was under investigation. No one paused the process. No one warned the President until it was almost too late. “At no point in time was the Commission asked whether there was any complaint or pending case against Ms. Malimali.”

Puleiwai did what the law required. She wrote to the President, copied Rabuka, and asked for one week to complete the investigation. One week to determine whether Fiji’s next corruption czar should instead be in the dock.

The request was ignored. On 4 September 2024, Malimali walked into FICAC headquarters, escorted by police, as the incoming Commissioner. Inside the building, investigators were stunned. One senior officer openly objected: how could a suspect now be their boss?

That same afternoon, Puleiwai authorised criminal charges. “We had sufficient evidence to proceed with the record of interview against Ms. Malimali.”

The following morning, FICAC officers arrested Malimali inside her own office.

What happened next reads less like law enforcement and more like a coup.

Senior lawyers arrived. The Chief Registrar arrived. Phones rang to chambers. Puleiwai was warned that if charges were filed, court registries across Fiji would refuse to accept them. “The Acting Chief Justice has directed that registries will not accept any charges signed by the Deputy Commissioner.”

The pressure was relentless. Puleiwai was told to release Malimali “temporarily.” She refused until her own legal team began to buckle.

When Malimali was finally released, she issued her first order as Commissioner:

“No charges are to be laid without my express approval.”

That directive killed the case against herself instantly.

It also froze another explosive file - the one involving Biman Prasad, who Puleiwai had already authorised to be charged with multiple counts of false declaration under the Political Parties Act.

“The team were finalising charges against the Honourable Minister for Economy… about ten (10) charges altogether.”

By late afternoon on 5 September, Puleiwai was summoned to the Judicial Services Commission. She was given two options: resign immediately or face disciplinary charges.

“I confirmed that I cannot work with Ms. Malimali since she is a suspect and it undermines the rule of law.”

She resigned.

That night, Puleiwai was warned she was no longer safe. A tyre was punctured. She fled Suva with her family and later left Fiji altogether.

Her final message to Rabuka was not political. It was existential:

“If the Judiciary is already compromised, then where do we find justice in our own country?”

Fiji still has no answer.

Click here to read letter from Puleiwai to Rabuka

When the Wallet Came Before the Vanua. As 26 iTaukei acquitted of all sedition charges, they salute so-called 'Vulagi Lawyer' Aman-Ravindra Singh. So perhaps it's time to cut the crap about 'INDIGENOUS RIGHTS'.

28/1/2026

'Because when ordinary iTaukei villagers were hauled before the courts, broke, frightened, and politically exposed, those loud proclamations about solidarity, vanua, and collective duty evaporated the moment legal fees were mentioned. Indigenous rights, it turned out, were strictly billable by the hour.'

There is a comforting myth often repeated in Fiji that when iTaukei people are in trouble, iTaukei professionals will rally to their side out of duty, solidarity, and shared identity. It is a beautiful story right up until ilavo (money) enters the room.

When a group of ordinary villagers found themselves dragged into a serious sedition prosecution, abandoned, frightened, and openly admitting to the courts that they could not afford lawyers, the response from much of the iTaukei legal elite was not outrage or assistance. It was a price list.

Some came with excuses, carefully worded fears about 'political pressure', whispered anxieties about upsetting those in power. Others were more honest. They came to the Tavua Courthouse, calculators ready, explaining how much each accused would need to pay. Not to secure justice. Not to defend principle. But to secure a retainer.

This was not pro bono culture. This was disaster capitalism, Fiji-style, profiting from fear, from poverty, and from one’s 'own people'.

And then came the humiliation.

Because when the moment of real courage arrived, it was not an iTaukei lawyer who stepped forward. It was a non-iTaukei lawyer, Aman Ravindra-Singh, who stood on the steps of the High Court, quietly introduced himself, and took on all of them. No negotiations. No invoices. No grandstanding.

For seven years, while others counted fees and clutched reputations, he fought. He absorbed the pressure, the risk, the political hostility without once asking how much money there was. The 'vanua defenders' were nowhere to be seen. The so-called guardians of indigenous legal leadership had subcontracted their conscience to fear and finance.

The irony is almost too neat: those who speak loudest about protecting iTaukei interests were the first to monetise iTaukei suffering, and it took the so-called vulagi to remember what justice is supposed to look like.

History has a way of recording these things. Not the invoices but the silences. Not the excuses but who actually showed up.

If indigenous rights mean anything at all, they must mean more than speeches, slogans, and selective outrage. They must mean standing with your own people when it costs you something. Until then, spare the country the moral lectures. The record is already written, and it isn’t flattering.

As we used to say in the 1970s with the Raiwaqa Revolutionary Army (RRA): 'E sega ni kana na manumanu, sa kania ga na ilavo.'

Brother Aman Ravindra-Singh, we were indebted to you throughout…

We didn’t know the system of the courts, and we knew we didn’t have the $$$ to pay for a lawyer. Most of us, including me, simply told the court that we would be representing ourselves.

Some of our supporters tried to secure big-name iTaukei lawyers. I won’t name them, but they gave excuses because they were afraid of Khaiyum and Bainimarama’s style of leadership. Some iTaukei lawyers visited us at the Tavua Courthouse and told us how much each of us would have to pay. They were after money.

The first day our case was to be transferred to the Lautoka High Court, we can never forget what happened.

The first two of us to be presented at the Lautoka High Court were climbing up the steps of the courthouse when there stood a man in long black pants and a white long-sleeve shirt, offering his hand for a handshake. What happened next is still beyond comprehension to this day.

In a soft tone, the man asked,

“You from the sedition case in Tavua?”

The two gentlemen answered, “Yes.”

The man then continued,

“I am Aman Ravindra-Singh. I will be representing you and all the others.”

Brother Aman, vinaka vakalevu for standing up and fighting the dictator head-on from day one. You offered your services when all iTaukei lawyers were afraid, while some were only looking for money.

For seven years, you never asked us about money. You never told us what we had to pay you. You kept reminding us that you would fight for our families, our integrity, our freedom, and for clean justice and the rule of law. You knew from the start that we were wrongfully charged. You never backed off - not once.

Khaiyum tried with all his might to put us behind bars, but he could not.

Brother, the little that we collected every time we appeared in court to give you was all we could give. You never told us to do it. We just tried to give something from what little we had.

Isa… thank you so much, Bro.

Editor's Note: We have slightly corrected the text into clear, proper English, without removing anything, without adding anything, and keeping the meaning, emotion, and structure intact. We have only fixed grammar, spelling, punctuation, and flow.

After years under the shadow of serious criminal charges and a long legal battle, the 26 accused in a sedition case were finally free yesterday following a no-case-to-answer ruling by the High Court in Ba.
The ruling was delivered by High Court Judge Justice Samuela Qica. The accused are Pita Camaimoala Vatatawa, Samoni Nacolawa, Mosese Tawake, Ilaitia Korolawa, Timoci Nacolatabisa, Jese Vatusumu, Penasio Manasa Luqa, Joseva Caucau, Isireli Serewai, Rokoua Duatini, Qalitia Lomavatu Vakacegu, Inoke Navunilagi, Tomasi Madigibuli, Vosavosa Tunakoro, Maciu Uto, Vetaia Dale, Temesi Waqa, Sevanaia Qaranivalu, Apimeleki Wailomo, Josua Naluvou, Marika Qalo, Manueli Nadakula, Tevita Damudamu, Sanaila Qariqama, Tomasi Navimalumu and Peceli Nayadra.

They were represented by lawyers Mark Anthony and Robert Bancod, along with other legal associates.

According to the information filed by the State, the accused were jointly charged with between one and three counts of sedition, contrary to section 67(1) of the Crimes Act 2009, and with additional counts of urging political violence, contrary to section 65(1) of the Act.

The State alleged that the first to sixth accused, between January 1 and July 31, 2015, in Rakiraki, committed acts with seditious intent by bringing into hatred or contempt, or exciting disaffection against, the Government of Fiji as established by law.

It was further alleged that the seventh to tenth accused, during the same period and location, acted with seditious intent by serving as drivers for ministers of what was described as an unelected government.

Counts three and four related to allegations that the first to eleventh accused attended meetings where they intentionally urged others to overthrow the Government of Fiji by force or violence.

Count five alleged that the fifth to 26th accused participated in training activities for the purpose of overthrowing the Government by force or violence, and in doing so urged others to commit such acts.

Justice Qica ruled that there was no case to answer on all five counts.

All accused were acquitted and discharged and are at liberty forthwith. The State has 30 days to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeal. Source: The Fiji Sun, 22 Janaury 2026

From Fijileaks Archives

TABLES TURN. FROM DEFERENCE TO DISTANCE: How Richard Naidu's recent Fiji Times Article 'Tables Turn! COI Fall Out in Court' Sits Uneasily with his own affidavit being readily accepted by Justice Ashton-LEWIS

27/1/2026

When Richard Naidu recently appeared in The Fiji Times to comment on the fallout from the Commission of Inquiry (COI) into the appointment of Barbara Malimali, he spoke with the assurance of someone comfortably removed from danger.

The COI, he suggested, had become controversial. Its adverse findings were now being challenged as unfair or unreasonable. Judicial review, not institutional introspection, was the order of the day.

But this confident public posture sits uneasily with the position Naidu himself occupied a year earlier, when the COI was not an abstract object of commentary but a forum in which his own integrity had been placed in issue. The contrast is not accidental. It is revealing.

February 2025: Respect, NOT Resistance

When Naidu engaged with the COI in February 2025, his tone could not have been more different. He did not attack the inquiry. He did not question its legitimacy. He did not accuse Justice Ashton-Lewis of bias, overreach, or procedural unfairness.

On the contrary, his letter and affidavit demonstrate deference to the process and respect for the Commissioner. He acknowledged the seriousness of the inquiry and accepted its authority to hear evidence, including evidence that touched directly on him.

That is precisely why he felt compelled to act.

Naidu explained that allegations had been made against him during the hearings, arising from witness testimony, and that those allegations were said to go to his personal motivations in supporting Professor Biman Prasad in matters connected to the Malimali appointment. Because they were treated as relevant by the Commission itself, silence was no longer an option .

His sworn affidavit was not a polemic. It was not a protest. It was a shield.

An Affidavit of Necessity, NOT Defiance

Read properly, Naidu’s affidavit is a document of legal necessity, not institutional hostility. It is tightly drawn, cautious, and defensive in the literal sense: designed to prevent reputational harm arising from untested allegations aired in a public forum. He confines himself to factual rebuttal, professional demarcation, and denial, repeatedly and emphatically: “Each and every one of these allegations is untrue.”

This is not the language of a man undermining a Commission of Inquiry. It is the language of a senior lawyer who understands that allegations placed on the COI record do not evaporate unless answered. At the time, Naidu relied on the COI’s fairness to hear and weigh his sworn response. He trusted the process enough to engage with it, not attack it.

What was he protecting himself from?

The affidavit makes plain why he felt compelled to respond. The allegations were not trivial. They included claims that Naidu had:

improperly influenced tax policy benefiting water bottling companies;
done so while serving as Chair of the Fiscal Review Committee, appointed by the Minister of Finance;
acted through Munro Leys’ professional associations;
been involved, directly or indirectly, in questionable matters relating to Energy Fiji Limited (EFL);
and even been linked, however loosely, to claims invoking “money laundering”.

Any one of these, if left unanswered before a corruption inquiry, would have carried lasting professional consequences. Naidu’s affidavit was therefore an act of self-preservation within a process he otherwise respected.

A Year Later: Confidence After Exposure Has Passed

Fast-forward to the present. In his recent Fiji Times article, Naidu no longer writes as someone operating under the COI’s scrutiny. He writes as someone looking back, safely, from a position of distance. The COI is now described as controversial. Its findings are framed as legally vulnerable. Its necessity is openly questioned.

What has changed is not the record. What has changed is where Naidu now stands in relation to it. In February 2025, the COI had the capacity to harm him. In 2026, it does not.

The Discomfort Is NOT Contradiction. It is Omission.

To be clear, Naidu has not contradicted himself on facts. The discomfort arises from selective framing.

In his Fiji Times piece, readers are told that he represented clients before the COI. What they are not told is that he was also forced to defend himself personally, under oath, against allegations aired during the inquiry.

That omission matters. A reader unfamiliar with the February 2025 affidavit would reasonably assume Naidu’s engagement with the COI was purely representative. The documentary record shows otherwise. And, why this matters.

Lawyers are entitled to change their views. They are entitled to criticise institutions. They are entitled to defend clients and themselves. But when a senior legal figure praises a process when he is inside it, and later critiques that same process once the risk has passed, the public is entitled to be told both halves of the story.

Naidu’s affidavit shows respect, restraint, and reliance on the COI’s fairness. His later commentary projects confidence, distance, and critique. Both may be sincere. But they are not the same posture.

The Affidavit Record Remains

Richard Naidu survived the COI. He rebutted the allegations against him. No criminal charges followed. But survival does not erase history.

His recent Fiji Times article invites readers to view the COI as flawed and controversial. His own affidavit reminds us that, when it mattered most, he accepted the inquiry’s authority and relied on its integrity to hear him fairly.

It is the space between those two positions - deference then, distance now - that makes his latest intervention sit so uneasily with the record.

And records do not disappear simply because time has passed.

NEXT INSTALMENT: My Meet-and Greet With the COI in November 2024: Why Justice Ashton-Lewis and Senior Counsel Janet Mason directed my evidence against the NFP leader and former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister BIMAN PRASAD to FICAC and Fiji Police, and why later allegations against them do NOT sit with their actual conduct.

WHEN THE COI HAD TEETH AND RICHARD NAIDU ACCEPTED ITS AUTHORITY

In February 2025, Richard Naidu respected the Commission of Inquiry. He praised its Commissioner. He accepted its authority. And he swore an affidavit to protect himself from allegations made under oath.

In 2026, with the danger gone, the same inquiry is recast as controversial and unfair.

That is not hypocrisy. It is something subtler, and more revealing. Power changes perspective. Distance rewrites memory. But affidavits remain.

Individuals named in the Commission of Inquiry (COI) into the appointment of Barbara Malimali to the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) are pursuing civil court proceedings aimed at restoring their reputations, following the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ (ODPP) decision to dismiss all 12 related police investigations.

Prominent Suva lawyer Richard Naidu said the ongoing judicial review proceedings seek court declarations that adverse findings made by the COI should not have been made, on the basis that they were unfair or unreasonable.

“I should disclose that I was the lawyer who represented before the COI for two clients,” Mr Naidu said.

“I have alternative in some people who are not challenging the COI for two clients.”

The COI report criticised the actions and decisions of a number of people in connection with Ms Malimali’s appointment and suggested that some may have committed criminal offences. It recommended that those individuals be investigated by police, prompting the launch of multiple investigations.

Mr Naidu explained that police subsequently sought legal advice from the ODPP, which has constitutional authority over police prosecutions and provides legal guidance when requested.

After reviewing the evidence, the ODPP advised that the criminal prosecution thresholds had not been met.

“I think the ODPP was wise to seek the advice of respected Australian Kings Counsel, M Ian Lloyd to give independent advice to the ODPP on those matters.”

However, Mr Naidu emphasised that the conclusion of the criminal investigation process does not bring all legal matters arising from the COI to an end.

The judicial review proceedings remain before the courts and are civil in nature. They focus on whether the COI’s findings were lawfully and fairly made, rather than on criminal liability.

“Every Commission of Inquiry is different and that the current situation does not set a broader legal precedent.”

While Commissions of Inquiry are uncommon in Fiji, he said they can play a useful role in examining controversial events, informing the public, and identifying lessons to prevent similar issues in the future.

He added that the controversy surrounding the FICAC-related COI stems largely from how this particular inquiry unfolded, rather than from the concept of Commissions of Inquiry itself.

“Whether a COI was necessary in the case of Ms Malimali’s appointment is a matter for people to argue about.

“However, it is probably fair to say that this particular COI, rather than resolve a controversial event, seems to have become its own controversial event.”

WHY CLOSURE OF THE 12 COI FILES BY DPP DOES NOT TOUCH OUR CASE ON NFP LEADER, FORMER FINANCE MINISTER BIMAN PRASAD

22/1/2026

WHY THE CLOSURE OF THE 12 COI FILES DOES NOT TOUCH OUR CASE ON BIMAN PRASAD

Over the past 12 hours, following the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ public statement on the Commission of Inquiry files, I have received a steady stream of messages from readers asking a simple and legitimate question: does this mean the case against Biman Prasad is now over

The answer is NO. And it is important to explain why, clearly and calmly.

What the ODPP Decision Actually Does

The ODPP has confirmed that 12 investigation files referred by the Fiji Police, all originating from the Ashton-Lewis Commission of Inquiry, do not meet the criminal threshold required to sustain charges.

An independent legal opinion from Ian Lloyd, an Australian KC, was obtained and adopted. That opinion states that there is insufficient admissible evidence to prosecute those persons named in the COI.

This decision brings to an end criminal prosecutions flowing from the COI itself.

It does not go beyond that.

What Those 12 Files Were About

Those files shared a common feature:

they arose because of the Commission of Inquiry,
relied on COI material, and
concerned conduct examined within the COI process.

The ODPP decision therefore means one thing only: the COI has failed as a vehicle for criminal prosecution.

Nothing more should be read into it.

Why Our Biman Prasad File Is Not Affected

Our file concerning BIMAN PRASAD does not arise from the Commission of Inquiry.

It is not based on opinions, witness impressions, or compelled testimony.

It is based on:

statutory declaration forms personally signed by him;
omissions and false statements capable of objective proof;
company, land, and transaction records; and
repetition of the same omissions across multiple declaration years.

Legally, that distinction is decisive.

What the ODPP Decision Does Not Say

The ODPP decision does not state that:

Biman Prasad complied with statutory declaration laws;
his declarations were accurate or complete;
declaration breaches were investigated and dismissed; or
future complaints are barred.

Our file was not one of the 12 files. It was not assessed by the ODPP. It was not part of the KC’s opinion.

There is therefore no legal clearance, no immunity, and no closure in relation to that matter.

A Point Readers Should Keep in Mind

Each statutory declaration is a personal legal act.
Each year stands on its own.
Each omission rises or falls on documentary proof.

A Commission of Inquiry cannot erase that obligation, and a prosecutorial decision on unrelated files cannot pre-empt it

In closing, what has ended is the criminal life of the Commission of Inquiry.

What has not ended, and has not even been formally tested, is whether a sitting MP and former Deputy Prime Minister and former Finance Minister repeatedly breached statutory declaration laws over multiple years.

Our work on that question remains intact, unaffected, and unresolved.

And until it is answered in law, it remains a live issue - no matter how loudly some may wish to declare otherwise.

FROM COMMISSION TO COLLAPSE: THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ODPP - KC OPINION ON THE DAVID ASHTON-LEWIS COI

The ODPP Press Release: What Has Actually Occurred

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions has now formally confirmed that all twelve investigation files referred by the Fiji Police Force, each arising from and populated by persons named in the Justice David Ashton-Lewis Commission of Inquiry, do not disclose sufficient evidence to sustain any criminal charge.

Crucially, this was not a unilateral prosecutorial assessment. The ODPP conducted its own internal review, and commissioned an independent external legal opinion from Ian Lloyd KC, a senior Australian King's Counsel.

The KC’s conclusion is unequivocal: there is insufficient evidence to sustain any criminal charges against those recommended in the Ashton-Lewis COI report.

This opinion was adopted by the ODPP. The legal consequence is plain: every person named in the COI for possible criminal liability has now been cleared at the prosecutorial threshold.

What This Means for the Ashton-Lewis Commission of Inquiry Itself?

The Ashton-Lewis COI recommended ten potential criminal charges, including against Barbara Malimali.

However, a Commission of Inquiry:

Is not a court;
Does not apply criminal standards of proof; and
Operates under statutory compulsion and immunity regimes that often render its evidence inadmissible in criminal proceedings.

The KC's opinion, and its adoption by the ODPP, means that:

None of the COI’s criminal recommendations survive prosecutorial scrutiny;
The COI findings now sit exclusively in the political and administrative domain;
The COI has no operative criminal consequence.

In effect, the COI’s criminal limb has collapsed.

SHREE Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji LETTER that should have shut Pacific Polytech DOWN, and Regulators who looked the other way

16/1/2026

On 28 March 2023, a formal letter landed on the desk of the Fiji Higher Education Commission (FHEC). It was not anonymous. It was not ambiguous. It was not a rumour. It came on the official letterhead of the Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji, signed by its Executive Director, and it carried a message that should have triggered immediate regulatory action.

Pacific Polytechnic Limited no longer had the legal right to operate from Sanatan-owned premises. The lease had been terminated on 15 February 2023. A 90-day eviction notice had been issued. Sanatan Fiji expressly disclaimed any responsibility for Pacific Polytech’s continued operations on its properties.

In plain language: Pacific Polytech had lost its lawful campus.

Under any credible regulatory system, that should have been the end of the matter, at least temporarily. Accreditation should have been reviewed. Enrolments frozen. Grants suspended. Students protected. Instead, nothing happened. Or worse: things continued as if the letter never existed.

This is not a technical oversight. It is a textbook case of regulatory failure.

A letter that changed everything - on paper

Approved premises are not a minor box-ticking requirement for tertiary institutions. They are foundational. Without lawful occupation of approved campuses, an institution cannot lawfully deliver accredited programmes. That is not a discretionary matter. It is a condition of registration.

The Sanatan letter explicitly notified FHEC that Pacific Polytech’s agreement to use the Nabua and Lautoka campuses had been terminated, effective 15 February 2023, with eviction to follow in May. From that moment, Pacific Polytech’s continued operation at those locations was legally precarious at best and unlawful at worst.

The letter was not written to Pacific Polytech. It was written directly to the regulator. That matters. Once FHEC was notified, the Commission acquired actual knowledge. From that point on, inaction was no longer ignorance. It was acquiescence.

What should have happened but did not

Upon receiving the letter, FHEC should have immediately required Pacific Polytech to demonstrate one of two things: either that the termination notice was invalid, or that it had secured alternative, approved premises. Failing that, FHEC should have suspended programme delivery pending compliance.

That is standard regulatory practice. It exists to protect students, public funds, and the integrity of the accreditation system. None of it appears to have been done.

There is no public record of an urgent compliance audit. No show-cause notice. No suspension of enrolments. No warning to students. No notification to funding agencies. Silence.

If Pacific Polytech continued teaching after May 2023 without approved premises, as appears to be the case, then it did so in breach of core accreditation conditions. That breach was known to the regulator.

The money question no one wants to answer

The most serious issue is not merely accreditation. It is money.

Public grants, TVET funding, skills development subsidies, all of these depend on an institution being compliant and properly registered. Once FHEC was notified that Pacific Polytech had lost its lawful campus, any further public funding should have been immediately suspended pending verification.

If grants continued to flow after March 2023, the question is unavoidable: on what legal basis?

Public funds paid to a non-compliant institution are not just an administrative problem. They may constitute unlawful expenditure. Officials who authorised payments with knowledge of non-compliance may face scrutiny not only from the Auditor-General but potentially from anti-corruption authorities, depending on what they knew and when.

The Sanatan letter creates a documentary trail that is difficult to wish away. It fixes a date. It fixes knowledge. It fixes responsibility.

Students caught in the middle

Lost in the bureaucratic evasions are the students. If Pacific Polytech continued enrolling students or delivering programmes after losing its lawful premises, those students were entitled to know. They were entitled to clarity about accreditation, recognition, and the legitimacy of their qualifications.

If they were not told - if enrolments continued under the assumption of full compliance - then the issue becomes one of misrepresentation. Students may have paid fees, taken loans, or committed years of their lives based on assurances that were no longer true.

Regulators exist to prevent precisely this kind of harm. When regulators fail, students pay the price.

Regulatory failure, not administrative error

This is not a case of a missing form or a delayed inspection. It is a case where a regulator was explicitly told that a core condition of accreditation no longer existed, and appears to have done nothing.

If FHEC did act, it should produce the paper trail: the notices, the audits, the decisions, the funding suspensions. If it did not act, the public is entitled to ask why. Was there political pressure? Institutional favouritism? Simple incompetence? Or something worse?

What cannot be credibly claimed is ignorance.

The broader accountability question

The Pacific Polytech episode exposes a deeper problem in Fiji’s tertiary education oversight: enforcement without fear or favour. Rules that exist only on paper are worse than no rules at all. They create the illusion of regulation while enabling abuse.

A regulator that receives a termination notice and allows business as usual is not regulating. It is enabling.

The Sanatan letter should have triggered a reckoning. Instead, it was buried.

Now it deserves daylight.

The questions are straightforward and demand answers: Did Pacific Polytech continue operating after losing its lawful premises? Did it continue receiving public funds? Did the regulator know? And if so, who decided to look the other way?

Until those questions are answered, this is not just a story about one institution. It is a story about the integrity, or lack of it, of Fiji’s regulatory state.

NEXT INSTALMENT: When Power Overeached the Law: Why former Finance Minister Biman Prasad Had No Business Intervening in a Private Eviction Dispute

3 June 2023

Subject: Termination of Pacific Polytechnic Agreement with Sanatan Fiji for Lautoka and Nabua Campuses

Dear Hon. Prime Minister,

Hope this email find you well. This email is in regard to the determination of the rental contract between Pacific Polytechnic (PPL) and Sanatan Fiji for Lautoka and Nabua Campuses.

A 90-days termination notice was given to PPL on 15th February 2023. Sanatan Fiji has given this campuses to PPL on rental for the operation of technical college. PPL was supposed to vacate the premises before 15th May 2023, however they failed to. Reminders were sent to PPL for vacant possession and payment of rental arrears during this 90 day period (letter attached to this email). A notification letter was also given to Fiji Higher Education Commission (letter attached).

16th /17th May Sanatan Fiji had requested PPL to give vacant possession of properties however, PPL refused to do so. Sanatan Fiji tried to negotiate with PPL but there was no positive response.

Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Fiji is faith based organization, we have tried other methods to resolve these issue, but were unsuccessful.

We are left with the last resort to continue with the legal action against PPL/filing of court case.

PPL owes Sanatan Fiji a total of $16000.00 (FJD) for rental arrears. We wish to inform you that Sanatan Fiji is not liable for any business being conducted on our Nabua and Lautoka premises.

This is because a fair 90 day notice was given to PPL to sort out their business. We are humbly requesting you to assist us in the dilemma.

Hope our request is accepted.

Your faithfully
National President
Dhirendra Nand
Sanatan Fiji

Acting Appointments and Legal Accountability: A Response to Claims Advanced by Waqanika and Others that if Rokoika's appointment is ruled illegal, she could be held criminally responsible for decisions at FICAC

12/1/2026

"Acting appointments are a routine feature of public administration and are expressly recognised by constitutional and administrative law. An individual who assumes an office under apparent authority, and performs its functions in good faith, is treated in law as a lawful office-holder unless and until a court rules otherwise. A later finding that an appointment was procedurally defective does not retroactively criminalise the conduct of the acting office-holder. Nor does it convert that individual into a legal trespasser from the date of appointment."

A recent Facebook post by Tanya Waqanika concerning developments at the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) advances a claim that warrants correction. In referring to commentary by Niko Nawaikula and Charlie Charters, the post suggests that Lavi Rokoika will be personally and criminally liable for any decision taken in her Acting capacity, on the premise that her appointment is unlawful.

That assertion is legally unsound.

This response addresses the claim directly, without entering into political debate or the merits of ongoing litigation.

The Context of the Claim

Waqanika’s post links several matters: the timing of the advertisement for a substantive FICAC Commissioner; the pending delivery of judgment in Barbara Malimali's judicial review; and public criticism by Nawaikula and Charters regarding the appointment process.

From these circumstances, the post advances the conclusion that the Acting Commissioner will be exposed to personal and criminal liability for “everything and anything” sanctioned in that role.

This conclusion does not follow from the premises.

Acting Appointments and Apparent Authority

Acting appointments are a routine feature of public administration and are expressly recognised by constitutional and administrative law. An individual who assumes an office under apparent authority, and performs its functions in good faith, is treated in law as a lawful office-holder unless and until a court rules otherwise.

A later finding that an appointment was procedurally defective does not retroactively criminalise the conduct of the acting office-holder. Nor does it convert that individual into a legal trespasser from the date of appointment.

The De Facto Officer Principle

The suggestion that personal or criminal liability automatically follows from an allegedly unlawful appointment ignores the well-established de facto officer doctrine. Under this principle, acts performed by a person exercising the functions of an office under colour of authority remain legally effective and are not treated as nullities.

The doctrine exists to protect:

institutional continuity,
public confidence in official acts, and
individuals who rely on decisions made by public authorities.

Absent proof of bad faith, corruption, or knowing abuse of power, the office-holder is not personally exposed merely because the appointment process is later impugned.

Criminal Liability: A Category Error

Neither Waqanika’s post nor the commentary she references identifies any statutory offence that would render an Acting FICAC Commissioner criminally liable simply for performing the functions of the office. Criminal responsibility arises only where:

Parliament has defined an offence;
the prohibited conduct is proved; and
the required mental element is established.

There is no offence in Fiji law, or in any comparable common-law jurisdiction, consisting of “acting pursuant to an invalid appointment”. To suggest otherwise is to conflate administrative unlawfulness with criminal culpability, a distinction the law does not recognise.

Civil Liability Lies With the State, Not the Successor

To the extent that Barbara Maimali seeks reinstatement, compensation, or damages in her judicial review, such remedies, if granted, would lie against the State. They do not create derivative personal liability for a successor acting office-holder who had no role in the impugned termination or appointment process.

Personal civil liability arises only in cases of misfeasance in public office or comparable wrongdoing, requiring proof of malice or deliberate abuse of power. No such conduct is alleged in relation to the routine exercise of statutory functions by the Acting Commissioner.

The Risk of Misleading Public Discourse

By invoking the authority of Nawaikula and Charters without distinguishing political criticism from settled legal principle, the post risks misleading the public as to the nature of legal accountability. Public law does not operate by implication, assumption, or moral outrage; it operates through defined doctrines, evidentiary standards, and judicial determination.

Claims of automatic personal or criminal liability undermine, rather than advance, respect for the rule of law.

Conclusion

Disputes over appointments to constitutional offices are properly resolved by courts through judicial review. Until such time, an acting office-holder exercising statutory powers under apparent authority does not incur personal or criminal liability merely because the legality of the appointment is contested.

The law does not support the claim advanced by Waqanika or attributed to others in her post. To assert otherwise is to misstate settled principles of public and criminal law.

When Counsel Speaks Outside the Courtroom on FACEBOOK:
The Limits of Advocacy During Active Judicial Review

Public confidence in the administration of justice depends not only on what happens in court, but also on the restraint exercised by those who appear before it.

That principle is tested when counsel in an active case uses public platforms to comment on the supposed legal consequences for others whose positions depend on the outcome of the very proceedings in which counsel is engaged.

This issue has arisen following public commentary by Tanya Waqanika, who is acting for Barbara Malimali in judicial review proceedings before the Fiji High Court. The proceedings challenge Ms Malimali’s removal and the process by which she was replaced by Lavi Rokoika.

Waqanika’s commentary does not merely explain the existence of the litigation or the relief sought. It extends to asserted personal and criminal consequences for Rokoika arising from her continued exercise of the office of Acting Commissioner while the case remains before the court.

That raises serious questions of professional propriety.

Advocacy and restraint

Lawyers are not prohibited from commenting publicly while a case is on foot. However, they are subject to a higher standard than politicians or private commentators. Their paramount duty is to the court and to the administration of justice, and that duty extends beyond the courtroom.

It is one thing for counsel to outline procedural facts or to correct public misinformation. It is quite another to assert, or imply, that a named individual (Lavi Rokoika) particularly a successor office-holder whose authority is directly in issue, faces personal or criminal liability depending on how the litigation is resolved.

Such commentary risks converting public explanation into surrogate advocacy.

Pressure by implication

When counsel publicly frames the consequences of litigation in terms of legal exposure for a successor, the effect is not neutral. Statements suggesting personal or criminal liability may reasonably be perceived as pressure on the office-holder to act, or refrain from acting, in ways that advantage the litigant’s position

In this case, any alleged consequences for Rokoika depend entirely on matters yet to be determined by the court: whether the termination of Malimali was lawful, whether the replacement process was valid, and whether any legal consequences flow from those findings. To present such consequences as real or impending while the court is seized of the issues is to pre-empt the judicial process.

Misstating legal accountability

There is a further difficulty. The proposition that an acting office-holder incurs personal or criminal liability merely by performing statutory functions under a contested appointment is not supported by established public or criminal law. Liability of that kind arises only where there is bad faith, corruption, or deliberate abuse of power - not from the mere fact of acting under an appointment later challenged in court.

Advancing such claims publicly while litigating the appointment itself risks misleading the public and heightening institutional uncertainty.

Sub judice in substance, if not in name

Although Fiji does not apply sub judice rules with rigid formality, the underlying principle remains intact: public commentary must not create a real risk of interfering with the administration of justice. Lawyers, by virtue of their professional role, are expected to exercise particular caution.

Commentary attributing adverse legal consequences to a non-party whose position is directly affected by the pending proceedings sits uneasily with that obligation.

The proper forum

Arguments about the legality of appointments and the consequences that may follow belong in affidavits, submissions, and judgments. Courts exist precisely to determine contested legal issues. Public commentary should not be used to dramatise or amplify disputes that are properly before the judiciary.

Conclusion

The issue here is not freedom of expression, nor the right of counsel to defend a client. It is the boundary between legitimate explanation and improper pressure.

When counsel in an active judicial review publicly asserts legal consequences for a successor office-holder whose authority is in issue, that boundary is at risk of being crossed.

Professional restraint in such circumstances is not optional. It is an essential safeguard of the rule of law.

COI Report. Discrediting the Inquiry is the Last Refuge of Those Named in the Record. We reported BIMAN PRASAD to FICAC in April 2024. We say, 'Malimali should be charged with Abuse of Office over Prasad FILE'

10/1/2026

As founder and editor of Fijileaks, I reported Biman Prasad to FICAC as far back as April 2024. I did not do so casually. I supplied documents, evidence, timelines, and declarations. I copied in the Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, and other relevant authorities. The material was detailed, sourced, and capable of sustaining charges.

When Barbara Malimali briefly became FICAC Commissioner, the same material was before her. Instead of advancing the investigation, she closed Prasad’s entire file. On the evidence, that decision alone raises serious questions of abuse of office and perverting the course of justice.

More troubling still is what happened on 5 September 2024, when lawyers whisked Malimali out of FICAC as investigators were preparing to charge Prasad that very afternoon. If that removal - directly or indirectly - interfered with an active anti-corruption process, then that conduct itself demands scrutiny.

This is why the current attempts to discredit the Commission of Inquiry ring hollow. The Commission did not invent these facts. Many of them were already on the record, reported, documented, and ignored. The inquiry merely forced them into the open, where they could no longer be quietly buried.

You can dispute the Commission’s conclusions. That is legitimate.

But stop pretending nothing was revealed.

And stop interfering if you were never a party to the wrongdoing in the first place.

The facts are now public. That - not bias, not politics - is what unsettles so many.

COI Frightened Them Because the Evidence Was Never Meant to Surface

Background to the Arrest and Investigation

Francis Puleiwai, Acting Deputy Commissioner of FICAC, explained at the start of the meeting that Malimali had been under investigation since April 2024, and that investigators had gathered sufficient evidence to warrant an interview and possible charges:

“The investigation for Ms. Malimali was ongoing since April… The team was ready to proceed. The interview was supposed to commence this morning and thereafter the team are ready to charge her as well.”

She further clarified that, under the Constitution, she possessed the same powers as the Commissioner and was lawfully exercising them:

“Under the Constitution the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner we both have the same powers. I’m exercising my right… to carry out due diligence and complete the investigation.”

Despite this, the meeting quickly descended into a series of interventions aimed at derailing the investigation and preventing charges.

Alleged Interference by Chief Registrar Tomasi Bainivalu

Tomasi Bainivalu, the Chief Registrar, immediately questioned FICAC’s authority to arrest Malimali and urged caution, while simultaneously suggesting that the investigation be halted:

“I do not know what power you have to arrest your own Commissioner… Why so fast overnight? Is it birthed from bitterness?… I’m not here to interfere with your work, but what is the right and best way?”

Most significantly, Bainivalu relayed what he described as instructions from the Chief Justice Salesi Temo:

“Just when she left… the Chair called again to CJ… and I remember he did say that on the phone… don’t accept any charge… this is the beginning of that dialogue.”

This statement is deeply concerning. If accurate, it indicates that a senior judicial officer sought to prevent the filing of a criminal charge, potentially amounting to judicial interference in an active investigation. It is one of the clearest indicators in the transcript of a potential attempt to pervert the course of justice, because it suggests coordination between the judiciary and external actors to prevent a criminal charge from ever reaching the courts.

Alleged Pressure and Threats from Senior Lawyer Amani Bale

Amani Bale, a senior lawyer, made some of the most direct and threatening interventions. He demanded that the suspect be released:

“I ask that you release her and she be released immediately and let the JSC go and convince…”

He also attempted to intimidate investigators by threatening their professional futures:

“What you have done now will spoil your careers but that’s your choice.”

Bale repeatedly asserted that pursuing charges would be futile because the courts would refuse to entertain them:

“You heard very clearly that Court would not accept it… if you go to Court it won’t accept your charges.”

These statements constitute clear attempts to pressure investigators into abandoning their lawful duties.

Alleged Misuse of Authority by Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society

Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society, argued that because Malimali had been appointed Commissioner, investigators were now obliged to obey her instructions, even though she was the subject of their investigation:

“She is now the substantive Commissioner under the law… you have to follow her direction right or wrong… If she directs you to stop this right now, what would you guys do?”

He further warned that continuing with the investigation would provoke institutional conflict:

“Continuing down this path is going to end up in a stand-off between this organisation and the Court… That will undermine confidence in the whole justice system.”

Such statements are significant because they explicitly suggest that institutional power, rather than law, should dictate the outcome of a criminal investigation.

Alleged Attempts by Senior Lawyer Laurel Vaurasi to Dissuade Investigators

Laurel Vaurasi, a senior practitioner, echoed similar arguments, warning that continuing the investigation could place FICAC “outside the law”:

“If you continue to keep her… the Court will listen to her application but not yours… Standing by your conviction has to be based on law… Otherwise, you are now operating outside the law.”

Her remarks were calculated to sow doubt about the legality of the investigation and discourage investigators from proceeding. While more subtle, Vaurasi's language is part of intimidation and pressure aimed at halting a criminal process. Even indirect attempts, by invoking consequences and urging withdrawal, can amount to perversion if they are intended to derail an investigation.

Alleged Conduct of Barbara Malimali – Initiating External Interference

It is understood that Barbara Malimali herself telephoned Wylie Clarke, while she was under active investigation and/or under arrest, to seek his assistance. If proven, this demonstrates that Malimali herself initiated efforts to interfere with the investigation.

The transcript also shows that her supporters repeatedly invoked her appointment as Commissioner as a shield against prosecution, implying that investigators were now subordinate to her, even though the investigation predated her appointment and concerned her own conduct.

Pattern of Coordinated Obstruction

When viewed collectively, the statements above reveal a pattern of coordinated conduct by senior figures, including judicial officers and members of the legal profession, aimed at obstructing a criminal investigation. This includes:

Relaying instructions allegedly from the Chief Justice not to accept charges.
Issuing threats to investigators’ careers.
Misrepresenting the legal effect of the suspect’s appointment.
Demanding her immediate release.
Warning of institutional retaliation if the investigation continued.
Soliciting external assistance from professional associations to intervene.

The content and tone of the meeting make clear that these were not mere opinions or legal debates.They were calculated acts intended to discourage, prevent, or defeat the course of justice.
Contrast: FICAC Investigation Team (Puleiwai, Saumi, Bokini Ratu)
These officers largely resisted pressure and emphasised:

The investigation had been ongoing since April.
Evidence existed to support charges.
They were acting under constitutional powers and the rule of law.

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY IS NOT A GAG ORDER: Why SPEAKING UP Twice Is Not a Crime, and Why Fiji’s Accountability System Depends on It Fijians can take the same FACTS to the Police, to FICAC, or to the DPP

5/1/2026

Fijileaks has reviewed both the audio recording and the transcript of the meeting held at FICAC headquarters on 5 September 2024 in relation to the release of Barbara Malimali following her arrest. Having considered these materials, we take the view that any current or prospective proceedings before the Fiji High Court concerning the Commission of Inquiry report should not operate to delay, compromise, or pre-empt the continuation of lawful police investigations arising from the events of that day.

Matters of potential criminal responsibility fall within the statutory mandate of the Fiji Police Force and must be addressed independently and in accordance with due process. The existence of parallel legal challenges does not, of itself, negate the public interest in a full and proper police inquiry.

There is a dangerous idea quietly circulating in Fiji’s public discourse and on social media that once a witness, participant or an individual has raised allegations before a Commission of Inquiry, they are somehow spent, morally, legally, or procedurally barred from ever taking the same facts to the police, to FICAC, or to prosecutors.

That idea is wrong in law, wrong in principle, and corrosive to accountability. A Commission of Inquiry is not a courtroom. It is not a trial. It does not convict, acquit, or immunise anyone. And it does not silence the very citizens it calls upon to speak.

If Fiji allows the fiction to take hold that “you already said that at the COI, therefore you can’t complain again,” then Commissions of Inquiry will become what authoritarian systems quietly hope they are: pressure-release valves that absorb dissent and neutralise consequences.

A Commission of Inquiry Does Not Exhaust Criminal Accountability

Under Fiji law, and under every common law system, a Commission of Inquiry is inquisitorial and advisory, not determinative. Its function is to inquire, gather facts, and make recommendations. It does not apply criminal standards of proof. It does not determine guilt. It does not issue charges.

That is the exclusive domain of the Fiji Police, FICAC and the Office of the DPP.

Anyone who gives evidence to a Commission of Inquiry is participating in a fact-finding exercise, often at the invitation, or compulsion, of the COI. That participation does not cancel the right, or civic duty, to later report suspected crimes to criminal authorities.

There is no double jeopardy here. There is no res judicata. There is no legal doctrine that says that once a COI has heard you, the criminal law is closed.

Findings or Silence Do Not Bind Prosecutors

Equally important is what a Commission of Inquiry cannot do. It cannot bind the police.
It cannot bind FICAC. It cannot bind the DPP.

Even where a COI makes findings adverse to a complainant, or declines to make findings at all, those conclusions do not foreclose criminal investigation. Criminal authorities are entitled, and obliged, to apply their own statutory tests, consider their own evidence, and act on their own discretion.

This is especially critical in Fiji, where COIs have often been constrained by:

narrow terms of reference,
limited forensic capacity,
political sensitivities, or
an explicit focus on governance or policy rather than criminal liability.

To suggest that a COI’s silence equals exoneration is to misunderstand both law and logic.

Why Re-Complaining Is Often Necessary, Not Abusive

In many cases, a subsequent complaint is not repetition. It is completion. Often, new documents surface after a COI concludes, witnesses only come forward later, financial or corporate records were never subpoenaed, or the COI deliberately avoided criminal findings.

In other cases, complainants only later appreciate that the facts they disclosed amount to specific statutory offences, not just ethical or administrative failures.

If Fijians were barred from acting on that realisation, accountability would depend entirely on the political will of whoever drafted the COI’s terms of reference. That is not justice; that is containment.

The Real Risk: Turning COIs into Accountability Graveyards

The most troubling implication of the “you already complained” argument is this: it turns Commissions of Inquiry into dead ends. Under that logic, the State could:

Call a Commission of Inquiry,
Invite or compel citizens to testify,
Issue a report, and
Quietly ensure that no criminal consequences ever follow, while telling complainants they have already “had their say.”

That is not transparency. It is procedural exhaustion by design.

In a small society like Fiji, where power is concentrated and whistleblowers already face real risks, such a doctrine would be chilling. It would reward silence, punish persistence, and protect impunity.

There Are Limits but They Are Narrow

This is not to say that anything goes. Authorities are entitled to decline complaints that are vexatious, malicious, purely repetitive without evidence, or clearly intended to harass.

But that is a high threshold, and it is applied case by case. It is not triggered simply because a Commission of Inquiry once heard similar facts.

Nor does the law require complainants to pretend the COI never happened. On the contrary, the responsible course is to disclose it openly, explain why criminal scrutiny remains necessary, and frame allegations in clear legal terms.

Basically, a Commission of Inquiry is not a gag order. It is not a plea bargain. It is not an amnesty. Citizens and non-citizens do not surrender their right to seek criminal accountability when they participate in one.

If Fiji is serious about integrity, then it must reject the lazy, and dangerous, idea that truth spoken once cannot be spoken again. Accountability is not duplication. It is persistence.

And in a country still reckoning with its constitutional and institutional past, persistence is not a nuisance. It is a necessity.

UPPING THE PRESSURE: Our Emails, Our Rights: Being Complainants Against Biman Prasad Doesn't Stop at Malimali's Blood PressureFrom Fijileaks Archive:

Assets Declared Before They Existed: Just Another Administrative Miracle. We remain, patiently, waiting for an explanation

Economics Professor, Senior Lawyer, Two Signatures - Zero Alarm Bells (2018-2019)

From Fijileaks Archives

DE-REGISTRATION had not harmed GGI's relationship with DONORS and FUNDERS, operating out of Chicken Darbha (Coop), resembling more like the Indian Coolie Depot

Puleiwai to Rabuka: 'I stood my ground. The system did not.'

From Fijileaks Archives

When Counsel Speaks Outside the Courtroom on FACEBOOK: ​The Limits of Advocacy During Active Judicial Review

COI Frightened Them Because the Evidence Was Never Meant to Surface

Archives

UPPING THE PRESSURE: Our Emails, Our Rights: Being Complainants Against Biman Prasad Doesn't Stop at Malimali's Blood Pressure
From Fijileaks Archive:

When Counsel Speaks Outside the Courtroom on FACEBOOK:
The Limits of Advocacy During Active Judicial Review