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HOOK, Cook and Self-Hooked. Aca Rayawa's Battered Logic and Fried Doctrine: Rayawa's Argument for Temo to close FICAC cases chips away at 2010 Jalal–Tuisolia "Fish & Chips" case he oversaw as the Acting DPP

28/2/2026

Ratu Sakiusa Tuisolia and Patricia Imrana Jalal

"Most of you have heard by now that Justice Priyantha Fernando of the Fiji High Court has “permanently stayed” the 7 Suva City Council charges against Saki and I, on the grounds of abuse of process, limitation of time etc."
Patricia Imrana Jalal,
30 August 2010

"I feel like I have been hounded out of Fiji. Now I hear that the DPP, Capt Rayawa, is appealing the “permanent stay” decision. I have been warned to stay away from Fiji – so stay away, for the moment, I shall. That is the regime’s victory, but I promise you, it is only a temporary one."
Imrana Jalal, August 2010

Former Director of Public Prosecutions Aca Rayawa has called on the Chief Justice to issue an immediate directive preventing court registries from accepting any new charges filed by the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC), citing a recent High Court judgment.

"The DPP (former FICAC lawyer, Captain Aca Rayawa, a military officer), maintains that we tried to sell our fish and chip takeaway without informing the Council!! This, despite there being a large FOR SALE on the shop window, and seven Fiji Times newspaper advertisements, over a 9 month period.
Of course, there is no legal obligation to tell anyone, except our bankers, if we wish to sell our restaurant...Two of the city council charges against me had been improperly “converted” to imprisonable offences under the criminal code."
Imrana Jalal 2010

A Fijileaks Historical Perspective: Aca Rayawa’s recent call for Chief Justice Salesi Temo to direct court registries not to accept criminal charges filed by the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption has reopened an old constitutional question in Fiji’s public law: what happens when the legality of a public appointment is disputed?

Rayawa argues that if the appointment of the FICAC Commissioner is constitutionally defective, the authority exercised under that office is merely de facto rather than de jure. On that basis, he suggests that prosecutions initiated by the Commission should not proceed. In effect, he invites the judiciary to prevent the filing of such cases at the registry stage.

At first glance the argument may appear to rest on constitutional principle. Public power must derive from lawful authority. If an appointment is unlawful, scrutiny is inevitable. Yet the difficulty with Rayawa’s position lies not only in the doctrine he invokes but also in the historical circumstances in which he himself exercised prosecutorial authority.

For the legal system that once sustained his authority now stands squarely against the argument he advances.

Appointment in the Decree Era

Aca Rayawa was appointed Acting Director of Public Prosecutions on 31 December 2009 by the President, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau. The appointment occurred at a time when Fiji was no longer operating under the 1997 Constitution. Earlier that year the Constitution had been abrogated, and the country was being governed through a series of presidential promulgations and military-backed decrees following the political upheavals that followed the 2006 coup.

Under normal constitutional arrangements the Director of Public Prosecutions is appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission and must possess the qualifications required for appointment as a judge. These safeguards exist to ensure that prosecutorial authority remains independent of political influence.

The circumstances surrounding Rayawa’s appointment were markedly different. The constitutional framework governing such appointments was not functioning in its ordinary form. The legal order during that period rested upon executive authority exercised through the decree system that had replaced the earlier constitutional structure.

Despite that unusual setting, prosecutions continued to be brought before the courts. The legal system did not treat those prosecutions as void simply because the constitutional machinery of appointment had been disrupted. Instead, the courts relied upon established principles of public law to preserve the continuity of legal authority. Those principles would later prove decisive in relation to Rayawa himself.

Imrana Jalal, Ratu Sakiusa Tuisolia, and Roma's Hook & Chook Fish and Chips

Rayawa’s tenure as Acting Director of Public Prosecutions coincided with several prosecutions that became the subject of sustained public controversy. Among the most widely discussed were the proceedings involving former Airports Fiji Limited chief executive Sakiusa Tuisolia and his wife, the human rights lawyer Patricia Imrana Jalal.

The allegations concerned regulatory matters connected with a restaurant licence and municipal procedures. What might ordinarily have remained a local administrative dispute developed into extended criminal litigation pursued through several stages of the court system.

At the time Rayawa was not a peripheral participant in those proceedings. He was the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions, and the cases were initiated and pursued under the authority of his office.

The litigation lasted for years and generated widespread criticism within Fiji’s legal community. Jalal herself later wrote publicly about the personal toll of the prosecutions and the distress they caused to her family. The experience, she explained, involved prolonged legal pressure and reputational damage before the proceedings eventually collapsed in the High Court.

The episode became widely cited by critics as an example of the aggressive prosecutorial climate that characterised parts of the Bainimarama-Khaiyum decree era.

Yet during those years the state never argued that prosecutions should be halted because questions might exist about the constitutional pedigree of the prosecutorial authority under which they were brought. On the contrary, the machinery of prosecution continued to operate without interruption under the authority of the Acting DPP.

When Rayawa’s Own Authority Was Tested

The most direct judicial scrutiny of Rayawa’s authority came in the High Court decision in Chaudhry v State in 2014. In that case the defence argued that Rayawa lacked the statutory experience required to hold the office of Acting Director of Public Prosecutions and therefore had no authority to sanction criminal proceedings.

If the argument had succeeded, the prosecution would have collapsed.

Justice Madigan rejected the challenge. The court reaffirmed a central principle of public law: official acts are presumed to be valid unless and until they are set aside by a competent court in appropriate proceedings.

The judgment also relied on the de facto officer doctrine. Under this doctrine, a person who occupies public office and performs its functions with institutional recognition is treated as a lawful office-holder for the purpose of preserving the validity of official acts. Even if defects in appointment are alleged, acts performed while the officer occupies the position remain legally effective.

The doctrine exists for a practical reason. Without it, every prosecution, administrative decision, or judgment could become vulnerable to collapse whenever questions are raised about the legality of an appointment.

In the Chaudhry case the court concluded that Rayawa had at the very least acted as a de facto Acting Director of Public Prosecutions. His sanction of criminal charges therefore remained legally valid.

In other words, the legal system protected the authority under which Rayawa himself had acted.

The Present Aca Rayawa Argument

Rayawa now suggests that criminal proceedings should be halted because the appointment of the FICAC Commissioner may be constitutionally defective.

The difficulty with that reasoning is that it asks the courts to do precisely what they previously refused to do when Rayawa’s own authority was challenged.

The jurisprudence of the High Court is clear. Challenges to the legality of an appointment must be brought in the proper forum through judicial review or constitutional litigation. They cannot be used as collateral devices to derail criminal prosecutions.

Rayawa’s proposal goes further still. It suggests that court registries should refuse to accept charges filed by FICAC. That would effectively place the responsibility for deciding a constitutional question in the hands of administrative officers whose function is purely procedural.

Registries process filings. They do not adjudicate constitutional disputes.

To give them that role would fundamentally alter the functioning of the criminal justice system.

The Contradiction

The paradox is therefore difficult to avoid.

During the decree era Rayawa exercised prosecutorial authority within a legal system that relied heavily on the de facto officer doctrine in order to maintain continuity amid constitutional disruption. The courts preserved the validity of acts performed by those who occupied public office even when the circumstances of appointment were unusual.
Now the same figure argues that prosecutions should be halted because the appointment of a public official may be defective.

If that principle were applied consistently, it would have consequences reaching far beyond the present debate. A considerable portion of Fiji’s recent prosecutorial history, including cases authorised by Rayawa himself, might have been vulnerable to challenge at the moment they were filed.

That is precisely the scenario the courts have repeatedly sought to avoid.

The Lesson of Fiji’s Own Jurisprudence

None of this means that questions about the legality of appointments should be ignored. Constitutional accountability requires that such issues can be examined and, where necessary, corrected.

But the law draws a clear distinction between challenging an appointment and paralysing the justice system.

The first belongs in the courtroom.

The second belongs nowhere in a functioning legal order.

The doctrine that once preserved the authority of the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions during a period of constitutional uncertainty cannot easily be invoked to dismantle the authority of another office-holder today.

That is the difficulty at the heart of Aca Rayawa’s argument.

The legal principle that protected his prosecutions now stands firmly against the position he advances.

"Once, Major Ana Rokomoti (then Chief Registrar, now removed by her own military masters) made me wait 7 hours in the lobby for my passporte to be released. Even after the Judge allowed me to travel, I still had to go back several times a day to attempt to collect my passport. It became a game, on the part of the regime, to make me wait as long as possible." - Jalal, 2010

*In August 2024, Rokomokoti applied for the position of FICAC Commissioner but the JSC controversially selected Barbara Malimali.

*On 12th March 2010, the Acting Director Public Prosecutions Aaca Rayawa filed information against Sakiusa Tuisolia and Patricia Imrana Jalal. Originally Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) instituted actions separately against the two Applicants and later conduct of the prosecution was transferred to Director of Public Prosecutions. Thereafter the two cases filed separately against Ratu Sakiusa Tuisolia and Patricia Imrana Jalal were amalgamated.

FIRST COUNT

Statement of Offence

OPERATING A RESTAURANT WITHOUT A RESTAURANT LICENCE: Contrary to Section 4(1) and 16 of Public Health (Hotels, Restaurant and Refreshment Bars) (Suva) Regulations, Cap. 111.

Particulars of Offence

SAKIUSA TUISOLIA and IMRANA JALAL between the 11th day of July 2008 continuously to the 29th day of July 2008 at Suva in the Central Division conducted a restaurant business, namely ROMA’S HOOK & CHOOK FISH AND CHIPS, at a premises situated at shop 11, Victoria Corner, Gordon Street, Suva without a Restaurant License.

SECOND COUNT

Statement of Offence

FAILING TO DISPLAY REGULATIONS AND RESTAURANT LICENCE IN A PROMINENT PLACE: Contrary to Section 14(1);13(1) and 16 of Public Health (Hotels, Restaurant and Refreshment Bars) (Suva) Regulations, Cap. 111.

Particulars of Offence

SAKIUSA TUISOLIA and IMRANA JALAL between the 11th day of July 2008 continuously to the 29th day of July 2008 at Suva in the Central Division conducted a restaurant business, namely ROMA’S HOOK & CHOOK FISH AND CHIPS, at a premises situated at shop 11, Victoria Corner, Gordon Street, Suva without displaying the relevant Regulations and Restaurant License at a prominent place within the said premises.

THIRD COUNT

Statement of Offence

DISOBEDIENCE OF LAWFUL ORDERS: Contrary to Section 144 of the Penal Code Cap. 17.

Particulars of Offence

SAKIUSA TUISOLIA and IMRANA JALAL between the 29th day of August at Suva in the Central Division continued the conducted of a restaurant business, namely ROMA’S HOOK & CHOOK FISH AND CHIPS, at a premises situated at shop 11, Victoria Corner, Gordon Street, Suva in direct disobedience of a lawful order issued on the 29th day of July 2008 by the Health Inspector of the Suva City Council under the Public Health Act Cap 111 ordering the cessation of the illegal operation of the said restaurant.

FOURTH COUNT

Statement of Offence

OPERATING A RESTAURANT WITHOUT A RESTAURANT LICENCE: Contrary to Section 4(1) and 16 of Public Health (Hotels, Restaurant and Refreshment Bars) (Suva) Regulations, Cap. 111.

Particulars of Offence

SAKIUSA TUISOLIA and IMRANA JALAL between the 5th day of February 2009 continuously to the 4th day of June 2009 at Suva in the Central Division conducted a restaurant business, namely ROMA’S HOOK & CHOOK FISH AND CHIPS, at a premises situated at shop 11, Victoria Corner, Gordon Street, Suva without a Restaurant Licence.

FIFTH COUNT

Statement of Offence

FAILING TO DISPLAY REGULATIONS AND RESTAURANT LICENCE IN A PROMINENT PLACE: Contrary to Section 14(1); 13(1) and 16 of Public Health (Hotels, Restaurant and Refreshment Bars) (Suva) Regulations, Cap. 111.

Particulars of Offence

SAKIUSA TUISOLIA and IMRANA JALAL between the 5th day of February 2009 to the 4th day of June 2009 at Suva in the Central Division conducted a restaurant business, namely ROMA’S HOOK & CHOOK FISH AND CHIPS, at a premises situated at shop 11, Victoria Corner, Gordon Street, Suva without displaying the relevant Regulations and Restaurant Licence at a prominent place within the said premises.

SIXTH COUNT

Statement of Offence

OPERATING A FOOD ESTABLISHMENT WITHOUT A LICENCE: Contrary to Section 16(1) (2) and Schedule 2 of the Food Safety Act of 2003.

Particulars of Offence

SAKIUSA TUISOLIA and IMRANA JALAL between the 5th day of June 2009 continuously to the 29th day of August 2009 at Suva in the Central Division operated a food establishment, namely ROMA’S HOOK AND CHOOK FISH AND CHIPS, at a premises situated at shop 11, Victoria Corner, Gordon Street, Suva without a Licence.

SEVENTH COUNT

Statement of Offence

DISOBEDIENCE OF LAWFUL ORDERS: Contrary to Section 144 of the Penal Code Cap. 17.

Particulars of Offence

SAKIUSA TUISOLIA and IMRANA JALAL on the 11th day of August 2009 at Suva in the Central Division continued the conduct of a restaurant business, namely ROMA’S HOOK & CHOOK FISH AND CHIPS, at a premises situated at shop 11, Victoria Corner, Gordon Street, Suva in direct disobedience of a lawful order issued on the 5th day of August 1009 by the Health Inspector of the Suva City Council ordering the cessation of the illegal operation of the said restaurant.

EIGHTH COUNT

Statement of Offence

GIVING FALSE INFORMATION TO A PUBLIC OFFICER: Contrary to Section 143 of the Penal Code Cap. 17.

Particulars of Offence

SAKIUSA TUISOLIA on the 5th day of August 2009 at Suva in the Central Division gave false information to the Health Inspector of the Suva City Council that he would comply with the Public Health Regulations that he has not complied with since the 11th of July 2008, in order to avoid being prosecuted by the Health Inspector, but instead sold off the illegal business operation situated at shop 11, Victoria Corner, Gordon Street, Suva namely HOOK & CHOOK FISH AND CHIPS to one Richard Chow of Freshet International.

[2] This application has been made by the two applicants urging court that the charges laid against the Applicants be dismissed or permanently stayed upon the following grounds.

(a) The charges were statute barred pursuant to Section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the time the charges were filed,

(b) The Prosecution was wrongly instituted in the name of FICAC and subsequently taken over by the Director of Public Prosecutions in its own name,

(c) That the charges if validly laid within time ought to have been prosecuted by the Local Authority in the Magistrate’s Court,

(d) The charges are contrary to Section 131 and 132 of the Public Health Act,

(e) The charges were laid contrary to Section 33(3) of the Food and Safety Act 2003,

(f) The charges have been brought contrary to Section 65(1) of the Food and Safety Act 2003,

(g) The charges against Ms. Jalal are brought contrary to Section 134 of the Public Health Act,

(h) The charges under Section 144 of the Penal Code are defective and statute barred, and

(i) Continued prosecution of the charges would be an abuse of process.

[3] The court carefully considered the submissions made by counsel on behalf of both parties.

In view of the above reasoning charges in counts 1,2,3,5,6 and 7 are foredoomed to fail and intended proceedings in respect of these counts constitute an abuse of process, as complained by the applicants.

[60] In conclusion, I make order permanently staying proceedings in relation to counts 1,2,3,5,6,and 7 of the information.

[61] Prosecution may proceed with count 4 against both applicants and with count 8 against the 1st applicant.

[62] I make no order as to costs.

Priyantha Fernando
Puisne Judge.

At Suva
19th July 2010.

*On 30 July 2010, Justice Fernado threw out Count 4 and Count 8 against the couple but allowed Count One to proceed against Tuisolia. In the end, all charges fell by the wayside. In October 2010, Rayawa was no longer Acting DPP or with DPP's office. The couple had to rebuild their lives.

The charge of giving false information to a public officer has been dropped against former Airports Fiji Limited CEO Sakiusa Tuisolia.

This morning, DPP lawyer Seini Puamau formally filed the papers stating that there was insufficient evidence against Tuisolia.

The DPP had filed a verbal nolle prosequi on Wednesday and formalised it today.

Tuisolia and his wife Imrama Jalal had been charged with 8 counts relating to their business licence and Health Safety Act related charges and one of disobeying a public official.

However, while his wife had her charges dismissed by the Suva High Court, Tuisolia had to answer to the one count of disobeying a public officer.

Tuisolia was accused of not following the orders of health inspectors with regards to their business known as Roma's Hook and Chook, which he and his wife Imrana Jalal operated as co directors.

LAVI ROKOIKA. Fairness, Good Faith, and Constitutional Transition: Why Consideration of Compensation for Rokoika May Be Legitimate and Just

27/2/2026

Coming Soon: Public Funds, Personal Defence, and Possible Criminal Exposure: $$$ That Will Not Disappear. Malimali-Waqanika Payments

Fijileaks: The debate surrounding the status of Lavi Rokoika as Acting Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) has largely been framed in rigid constitutional terms. Much of the public commentary asserts that if the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) recommends termination of her appointment, the President must act immediately and without condition. Within that framing, any discussion of compensation has been portrayed as improper or constitutionally suspect.

That view, however, conflates constitutional obligation with equitable treatment. A more balanced legal analysis suggests that consideration of compensation for Lavi Rokoika may be both legitimate and fair, particularly given the circumstances under which she accepted the acting role.

Acceptance of Acting Office and Personal Sacrifice

An acting appointment to a high constitutional office is not merely administrative. It involves the assumption of significant authority, public scrutiny, and reputational exposure. When a legal practitioner accepts such an appointment, the decision often carries personal and professional consequences.

Lavi Rokoika accepted the acting position while leaving her husband to manage their law firm, Rokoika & Vakalalabure. That transition was not nominal. For a practitioner at that level, stepping away from private practice can entail loss of income or profit participation, disruption of client relationships, reputational recalibration from private advocate to public prosecutor, and personal and family adjustments.

These are not trivial considerations. They reflect real opportunity cost and professional risk. When the State invites an individual to step into constitutional office, particularly during institutional uncertainty, it implicitly assumes responsibility for fair treatment should circumstances later change.

The Fiji High Court’s Ruling and Institutional Correction

The High Court has ruled that the President’s dismissal of Malimali was unlawful and that appointment and removal power resides exclusively with the JSC. Importantly, the Court did not directly remove Lavi Rokoika. Instead, it remitted the matter to the JSC to determine the status of both office-holders.

This distinction is critical. The Court corrected an unconstitutional act but did not pronounce personal faults on Rokoika. Any termination of her acting tenure would therefore arise from institutional realignment, not misconduct. Where removal flows from constitutional clarification rather than wrongdoing, fairness considerations become particularly salient.

Constitutional Duty and Equitable Implementation

Even if the President is constitutionally bound to act on a JSC recommendation, the existence of that duty does not automatically preclude orderly transitional arrangements. A distinction must be maintained between refusing to comply with a binding constitutional recommendation, and ensuring that implementation does not impose unjust hardship.

If compensation discussions are structured as part of a lawful transition, rather than as a condition for compliance, they are not inherently unconstitutional. Many constitutional systems recognise that removal from office, even when lawful, may be accompanied by
payment in lieu of notice, transitional allowances, and settlement of accrued entitlements. The presence of such arrangements does not undermine constitutional compliance. It reflects administrative fairness.

Good Faith and the De Facto Principle

Lavi Rokoika did not assume office through self-appointment or defiance of constitutional authority. She acted under colour of appointment in circumstances shaped by executive and institutional decisions.

In administrative law, individuals who act in good faith under apparent authority are often protected by doctrines such as the de facto officer principle. While that doctrine primarily safeguards the validity of acts performed in office, it also reflects a broader normative commitment: the law does not penalise those who serve in good faith within complex institutional settings.

If constitutional recalibration now alters the structure within which she served, it would be inequitable for the personal burden to fall exclusively upon her.

Institutional Incentives and Public Service

There is also a broader public interest dimension. Constitutional offices occasionally require capable professionals to step forward during instability or transition. If such individuals face abrupt termination without recognition of professional sacrifice whenever institutional disputes arise, the State risks discouraging qualified candidates from accepting temporary appointments in future.

Fair transitional treatment protects not merely the individual but the credibility of public service.

The present controversy should not be reduced to a binary choice between constitutional obedience and financial indulgence. The Constitution may well require that the JSC’s recommendation be implemented. But constitutional implementation and equitable treatment are not mutually exclusive.

Lavi Rokoika accepted an acting constitutional office at personal and professional cost. She did so in good faith. If institutional correction now requires her tenure to conclude, consideration of compensation may represent not constitutional defiance but principled fairness.

In a constitutional democracy, legality governs power. Fairness governs its exercise. Both principles can, and should, coexist.

Severance Pay
I read on Mai TV online news that the President is now seeking a severance pay for Lavi Rokoika. How can the severance pay be negotiated when Rokoika’s appointment did not follow legal and constitutional process. For the President to even pitch this to JSC - this is unlawful!! How can we as taxpayers pay for someone whose appointment is being legally challenged. To add insult- the President negotiates Rokoika’s severance and yet my client has not received her pay from the date her appointment was illegally revoked by the President himself on the advise of the PM.

LEGAL AMNESIA. From Acting DPP to Legal Commentator: Why ACA Rayawa’s Push, championed by Malimali's lawyer Waqanika, for Chief Justice Salesi TEMO to Block Rokoika-Era Prosecutions Rings Hollow

25/2/2026

Rokoika

Rayawa

Legal Overview: The Rayawa Appointment & the Kunatuba Precedent
In 2008, I revealed in the Fiji Sun* that the FLP leader and then interim Finance Minister in the Bainimarama post-coup Cabinet, Mahendra Chaudhry, was hiding $2 million in a Sydney bank account. As historical records show, despite the arrest, detention, torture and deportation of the late Fiji Sun publisher Russell Hunter for refusing to disclose who within FRCA had provided me with Chaudhry's 300 page tax file, Chaudhry was charged and brought before the Fiji High Court. His lawyers argued that the charging officer - Aca Rawaya - was NOT properly qualified for appointment and therefore lacked lawful authority to sanction or institute proceedings.
Justice Paul Madigan rejected this collateral challenge (Chaudhry v State (Madigan J., 6 March 2014), replying explicitly on the earlier and decisive case of Peniasi Kunatuba* (Shameen J), which established strong presumptions in favour of the validity of official acts, even where appointments are alleged to be flawed.
*What baffles me is that Rayawa is now calling on Temo to issue a directive instructing the courts not to accept any charges, while Tanya Waqanika leads the chorus on Facebook, urging Fiji and the world to take notice of Rawaya's intervention that any charges brought by Lavi Rokoika should be rejected because her appointment was tainted from the outset.

CJ Temo

Rayawa Urges Temo to Bar Rokoika-Linked Cases But Misreads Judicial Power

The Facebook post by Aca Rayawa, quoted by the Fiji Times, argues that, following a judgment by Justice Dane Tuiqereqere, the Chief Justice Salesi Temo should issue a directive instructing court registries not to accept any criminal charges filed by the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption.

The post relies on two main propositions that FICAC failed to comply with constitutional requirements by not properly submitting recommendations to the President; and that under the doctrine of de facto non de jure, FICAC’s Commissioner lacks lawful authority, making prosecutions invalid. On this basis, the post claims that courts should refuse to process FICAC cases.

Legal Context: The Judgment of Justice Tuiqereqere

Justice Tuiqereqere’s judgment questions the legality of certain aspects of FICAC’s leadership appointment process, particularly compliance with constitutional procedures involving presidential approval. Such judgments typically address whether appointments were made lawfully; whether statutory processes were followed; and whether institutional authority is properly constituted.

They do not automatically invalidate all past or future actions of the institution.

The Doctrine of De Facto Authority

The Facebook post relies heavily on the doctrine of de facto non de jure, derived from cases such as Barbados Mills v State, a case in which both Aca Rayawa (for the State) and Barbara Malimali (for one of the defendants) appeared before the court.

In Commonwealth law, the de facto doctrine provides that acts performed by an official who appears to hold office lawfully remain valid, even if the appointment is later found defective. The doctrine exists to protect legal certainty, prevent institutional collapse, and avoid injustice to third parties. In most jurisdictions, this doctrine works against, not in favour of, invalidating prosecutions.

It usually preserves the legality of actions taken by improperly appointed officials.

Powers of the Chief Justice

Under Fiji’s constitutional structure, the Chief Justice oversees administration of courts, issues practice directions on procedure, and ensures efficient court management. However, the Chief Justice does not have power to bar a constitutionally created agency from filing cases; pre-empt judicial determination of legality; and override prosecutorial authority by directive.

Ordering court registries in Fiji to reject FICAC charges would amount to interfering with judicial independence, predetermining legal disputes, usurping the role of trial judges. Such an action would itself likely be unconstitutional.

Role of Court Registries

Court registries perform administrative functions only. They accept filings that comply with formal requirements, do not assess legality or constitutionality, and do not decide validity of prosecutions. Questions about FICAC’s authority must be resolved by judges in open court, not by registry staff.

Legal Analysis: A. On the Validity of FICAC Prosecutions

Even if there were defects in appointment processes, existing prosecutions remain presumptively valid, challenges must be raised by defendants, and courts decide case by case. There is no legal basis for a blanket ban.

On Separation of Powers

The Facebook post’s proposal conflicts with core constitutional principles. Judges decide legality, not administrators. Courts cannot disable investigators wholesale The Rule of Law disputes must be resolved through hearings, not directives. A mass rejection of cases would undermine all three. No precedent supports shutting down prosecutions by administrative order.

What the Law Actually Allows and the Proper Legal Route

If FICAC’s authority is questioned, the lawful process is defendant files constitutional or judicial review challenge; High Court hears evidence and argument; Court determines validity; and ppeals follow if necessary. This preserves due process.

Assessment of the Rawaya Facebook Post

Aca Rayawa correctly highlights constitutional compliance issues; draws attention to judicial scrutiny of appointments; and raises legitimate governance concerns. However, Rayawa misstates the effect of the de facto doctrine; overstates the Chief Justice’s powers; proposes an unconstitutional remedy; and confuses administrative and judicial functions. Overall, the post reflects political and activist frustration more than settled law.

The claim that the Chief Justice can direct registries to reject all FICAC charges is not supported by constitutional or common law principles. Justice Tuiqereqere’s judgment may raise serious questions about appointment processes, but it does not justify shutting down prosecutions wholesale.

Under Fiji’s legal system FICAC’s authority must be tested in court, not nullified by administrative instruction, and resolved through proper judicial proceedings.

Any attempt to block filings by directive would almost certainly be unlawful and vulnerable to immediate constitutional challenge.

Editorial Note: This article below was written on 1 December 2025 but, due to other commitments and unforseen delays, was not published on Fijileaks at the time. It is being released now in the interests of public record and ongoing discussion, and to counter the narrative peddled by Rayawa and Waqanika on their recent Facebook postings

High Court Upholds Authority: Shameem J Reaffirms Presumption of Valid Appointment in Kunutaba, Madigan J in Chaudhry v State

The 2006 High Court ruling in Peniasi Kunatuba v State (HAM0066/2006) remains one of the clearest judicial statements on the constitutional presumption of validity surrounding senior public-office appointments, particularly the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Justice Nazhat Shameem rejected an attempt by the defence to derail an abuse-of-office prosecution by arguing that then-DPP Josaia Naigulevu was not properly qualified for office, and therefore lacked authority to sign the sanction and information initiating the charges.

The defence’s gambit hinged on Section 114 and 130 of the 1997 Constitution, which require the DPP to be a person qualified for appointment as a judge, meaning at least seven years’ post-admission practice as a barrister and solicitor, either in Fiji or another country. The defence insisted Naigulevu had never been admitted to the Fiji Bar, and that his experience as a state counsel could not be treated as post-admission practice.

Shameem J disagreed, firmly.

The prosecution produced the DPP’s letters of appointment, his New Zealand admission certificate, degree documents, and evidence that he had practised law overseas before joining the DPP’s office. Whether his Fiji admission (or lack of it) was relevant to the seven-year requirement was, the judge noted, a matter for proper judicial review, not a criminal trial diversion.

Central to the ruling was the long-standing common law principle omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta — that official acts are presumed valid unless clearly proven otherwise. This presumption applies particularly to public officers acting within their duties. The defence, Shameem J held, had “not discharged its burden” to rebut that presumption.

To clarify, the court did not finally decide whether Naigulevu was, in fact, correctly qualified under constitutional standards. Instead, it held that any challenge to the validity of his appointment had to be brought in the civil jurisdiction via judicial review, not used to invalidate a criminal prosecution already underway.

The bottom line

The DPP was presumed validly appointed. His signature on the sanction and information stood. The criminal case against Kunatuba was allowed to proceed.

Shameem J’s final line says it all: “The pleas are valid. The trial may proceed.”

For Fiji’s legal and political watchers, the judgment is a reminder of how courts navigate qualification challenges involving constitutional office holders, and why such challenges must follow proper procedure, rather than being used as tactical weapons in criminal defence.

Legal Overview: The Rayawa Appointment & the Kunatuba Precedent

The Fiji High Court ruling in Chaudhry v State (Madigan J., 6 March 2014) sets out a critical analysis of how Fiji’s courts treat challenges to a prosecutor’s appointment. Central to the ruling is the argument that Acting DPP Aca Rayawa was not qualified for appointment and therefore could not lawfully sanction or institute proceedings.

Justice Madigan rejected this collateral challenge, grounding his reasoning explicitly in the earlier and decisive case of Peniasi Kunatuba (Shameem J.), which established strong presumptions validating official acts even where appointments are alleged to be flawed.

This overview distills the ruling with specific focus on (1) the legal foundations of Rayawa’s appointment, (2) how the court relied on Kunatuba, and (3) the significance of the de facto officer doctrine in safeguarding prosecutions from technical collapse.

The Challenge to Aca Rayawa’s Appointment

Mahendra Chaudhry’s counsel argued that Rayawa, when he signed the original 2010 information, lacked the required ten years’ experience and was therefore ineligible to be appointed Acting DPP. If true, the defence argued, the prosecution lacked the statutory consent required under section 2(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Exchange Control Act.

The defence attempted a three-step inference: (1) Rayawa was admitted in 2004–05, (2) He did not meet the 10-year requirement of the Administration of Justice Decree or State Service Decree, and therefore (3) his “consent” to prosecute was invalid and the information should be quashed.

Justice Madigan found this chain not only unproven but legally irrelevant given long-standing doctrines on validity of official acts.

The Kunatuba Precedent: Presumption of Regularity

To address the challenge, Madigan invoked the ruling of Shameem J. in Kunatuba where an identical argument had been raised regarding the DPP’s appointment. The court in Kunatuba held Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta. Until proven otherwise, official acts and appointments are presumed valid.

The principle is broad:

Courts must avoid turning criminal trials into collateral inquiries about appointments of DPPs, FICAC officers, police, or statutory officers.
Any challenge to the validity of appointment belongs to the civil courts, not in interlocutory skirmishes inside criminal proceedings.

Madigan directly reproduced this reasoning, emphasising that allowing such challenges would paralyse prosecutions by spawning mini-trials about professional résumés, administrative irregularities, or internal government processes.

The De Facto Officer Doctrine: Strengthening the Shield

Madigan advanced the analysis further by invoking the de facto officer doctrine, a powerful common law rule that validates official acts even when the appointment itself is defective.

Key points highlighted:

A person who acts in an official capacity, is accepted by the public, and appears to hold the office is treated as validly exercising that office.
This protects the public interest and prevents retrospective collapse of official acts, administrative decisions, convictions, or prosecutions.
Authorities from New Zealand, England, and the Fiji Court of Appeal (e.g., Bainimarama v Heffernan) were used to reinforce the point.

Madigan concluded that Rayawa was at minimum a de facto Acting DPP, even if the appointment was technically flawed. Thus “All information and documents he signed were validly performed.”

Effect on the Chaudhry Prosecution

Applying Kunatuba and the de facto doctrine, the Court held:

Rayawa’s signature validly instituted the proceedings.
Section 2(1) of Part II of the Fifth Schedule to the Exchange Control Act was fully satisfied.
The challenge to jurisdiction failed.

Madigan then proceeded to dismiss all other grounds (statutory construction, duplicity), clearing the way for trial.

Legal Significance of the Rayawa–Kunatuba Framework

A. Shielding criminal proceedings from technical sabotage

The ruling confirms that criminal courts will not derail prosecutions over appointment irregularities unless invalidity is definitively established in the proper forum.

B. Ensuring continuity of prosecutorial authority

Even where a DPP or Acting DPP is later shown to lack eligibility, their acts remain operative.

C. Affirmation of institutional stability

Judges emphasise that allowing collateral attacks would invite chaos: every police officer’s appointment, prosecutor’s promotion, or ministerial delegation could become grounds to challenge indictments.

D. Benchmark for future challenges

Anyone attempting to attack prosecutorial authority must do so by:

Bringing a civil proceeding specifically challenging the appointment,
not
Using the criminal case as a platform for collateral review.

Conclusion

Justice Madigan’s ruling re-affirmed that Aca Rayawa’s appointment, valid or not, could not be used to invalidate the prosecution against Chaudhry, because both the Kunatuba presumption and the de facto officer doctrine rendered his official acts legally effective. The decision entrenches a strong barrier against collateral challenges to prosecutorial authority, ensuring that criminal trials proceed on their merits rather than administrative technicalities.

State v Mohammed Saneem: The Judiciary Reaffirms the “Rayawa Principle”: No Collateral Attacks on Prosecutorial Appointments

The Suva Magistrates Court’s ruling in State v Mohammed Saneem [2024] FJMC 40; Criminal Case 324 of 2024 (18 December 2024) is more than a procedural decision on pre-trial issues; it is a reaffirmation of a long-standing judicial doctrine in Fiji: prosecutorial acts remain valid even when the appointment of the DPP or Acting DPP is subsequently impugned. This doctrine, originating in Kunatuba and crystallised in Chaudhry, rests heavily on the case of Aca Rayawa, whose appointment as Acting DPP was found questionable, yet whose decisions were still deemed legally effective.

In this ruling, the court invoked the Rayawa precedent almost verbatim, effectively shutting down a defence attempt to invalidate the charge on the basis that Acting DPP John Rabuku was later declared ineligible for the position by the Supreme Court. The message is unmistakable: criminal courts will not entertain collateral challenges to the validity of appointments to the prosecutorial office, and the de facto officer doctrine remains firmly intact.

Why the Rayawa/Kunatuba Doctrine Matters

The defence’s argument was straightforward:

The Supreme Court’s June 2024 advisory opinion stated that Rabuku was not eligible to hold the office of DPP, and therefore
Any charge he sanctioned, including Saneem’s, must be invalid.

The court’s response was equally direct: this issue is already settled law, and settled against the defence.

The magistrate relied on the Kunatuba ruling and the Rayawa reasoning reproduced in Chaudhry v State. The principle, rooted in the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, is that a person acting in an official capacity is presumed to have been properly appointed, and their official acts are valid unless proven otherwise in the proper forum.

In the Rayawa example, even though there were concerns about his eligibility, everything he signed, sanctioned, or decided as Acting DPP remained legally sound because he was accepted as a de facto office-holder.
The Magistrates Court applies this same principle to Rabuku.

How the Court Applies the Rayawa Doctrine

1. Rabuku acted as de facto DPP
The court notes that Rabuku:

was appointed,
acted in the role,
was accepted by all relevant authorities as Acting DPP, and
made prosecutorial decisions in that capacity.

Therefore, following Rayawa, all his official acts, including sanctioning the charges against Saneem, are legally valid, whether or not his appointment was technically defective.

2. The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion has no retrospective effect
The ruling emphasised that the Supreme Court issued advice, not a mandatory order invalidating past acts. Its opinion does not retroactively void earlier prosecutorial decisions. Rabuku’s prior acts stand untouched.

3. Criminal courts will not intrude into civil/constitutional territory

The court again relied on Justice Shameem’s viewpoint from Kunatuba that criminal courts must be cautious not to wander into matters reserved for civil courts like challenging the legality of appointments of prosecutors or statutory officials.

Allowing such challenges in criminal proceedings, the judgment warns, would open the floodgates to endless litigation over whether every police officer, prosecutor, or statutory authority was “validly appointed,” paralysing the justice system.

4. The presumption of validity prevails

Until a civil court declares otherwise through proper procedure, the appointment stands for the purposes of criminal prosecution. The defence cannot circumvent this through pre-trial motions.

The Larger Significance

The reaffirmation of the Rayawa/Kunatuba/Chaudhry doctrine has important implications:

1. Shielding prosecutions from political turbulence

In Fiji’s politically charged environment, senior public-law appointments are frequently contested. This doctrine protects criminal prosecutions from being derailed every time a constitutional or administrative appointment is challenged.

2. Reinforcing judicial stability and procedural integrity

The judgment underlines consistency in judicial precedent and gives predictability to litigants and prosecutors. It clarifies that the courtroom is not the place to relitigate appointment disputes.

3. Preserving the continuity of the criminal justice system

Had the court accepted the defence position, it could have jeopardised hundreds of pending cases, past prosecutions sanctioned by Rabuku, and the functioning of the DPP’s Office itself.

The ruling avoids that instability.

Conclusion

The Rayawa principle, born out of Kunatuba and affirmed in Chaudhry, once again proved decisive. In State v Saneem, the court dismissed the attack on Acting DPP Rabuku’s authority by holding that all acts performed by a de facto office-holder remain legally valid.

This is a clear signal: Criminal proceedings cannot be weaponised to challenge the legitimacy of appointments. The validity of charges does not hinge on the perfection of the appointing process but on the role actually exercised and accepted at the time. The judgment stands firmly on precedent, ensuring continuity and preventing the criminal justice system from becoming collateral damage in broader political or constitutional disputes.

Establishing the De Facto Doctrine in Judicial Appointments. Insights from Gokaraju Rangaraju v State of Andhra Pradesh, Indian Supreme Court, 15 April 1981

Background

The appellant, Gokaraju Rangaraju, challenged the validity of judgments pronounced by Shri G. Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena, both Additional Sessions Judges, whose appointments were later quashed by the Supreme Court for violating Article 233 of the Constitution. The central question was whether the prior judgments rendered by these judges retained their validity in light of their impermissible appointments.

Key Issues

Effect of invalid judicial appointments on past judgments.
Applicability and limitations of the de facto doctrine in Indian law.
Balancing public policy and legal propriety in judicial proceedings.

Parties Involved:

Appellant: Gokaraju Rangaraju
Respondent: State of Andhra Pradesh

Summary of Judgment

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the judgments pronounced by Shri G. Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena despite their appointments being declared invalid. The court invoked the de facto doctrine, emphasizing that actions performed by these judges in the course of their assumed judicial authority are to be regarded as valid and binding.

This stance is rooted in public policy and the necessity to prevent legal chaos and protect the interests of the public and third parties. Consequently, the appeals challenging the prior judgments were dismissed, reaffirming the principles underpinning the de facto doctrine in the Indian legal system.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court's legal reasoning hinged on the distinction between de facto and de jure authority. The central tenet is that while the appointment of a judge may be procedurally flawed, the actions undertaken in the genuine execution of judicial functions must be respected to prevent legal uncertainty and societal disruption. The court emphasized the following points:

Doctrine of Necessity: The de facto doctrine is essential to maintain the continuity and stability of the judicial system, safeguarding against the annulment of judgments that could lead to chaos and public disillusionment.
Public Policy: Upholding the de facto actions aligns with public policy by ensuring that private rights and public interests are protected from being undermined by technicalities in judicial appointments.
Legal Continuity: The judgments and orders issued by de facto judges carry the same legal weight as those by de jure judges, ensuring that legal processes are not rendered ineffective due to procedural lapses.
Constitutional Provisions: The court referenced Article 71(2) of the Constitution and Section 107(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to illustrate that the legislature recognizes and incorporates the principles underlying the de facto doctrine.
Comparative Jurisprudence: By drawing parallels with international cases, the court underscored the universal applicability and acceptance of the doctrine, reinforcing its validity within the Indian legal framework

Two Men, Two Cases, and Two Very Different Worlds: Why Prasad’s Disclosure Charges Are Not the Same as Kamikamica’s Alleged Perjury

Once again, government operatives and coalition sympathisers want to muddy the waters. The spin machine is already in overdrive: “Everyone is being charged,” “the cases are similar,” “nothing to see here.”

But strip away the political fog, and the two cases now before the courts are worlds apart, legally, morally, and constitutionally.

Prasad: The Economics Professor With a Disclosure Problem

Professor Biman Chand Prasad walked into the Suva Magistrates Court to answer charges that have stalked him for years: false declarations and failure to disclose.

Let’s be clear. These are not trivial slips of memory. These are the very breaches that the Political Parties Act was designed to prevent.

Prasad stands accused of omitting his directorship and other relevant interests from his statutory declarations, documents that the law treats as sacrosanct because they protect the public from precisely the gamesmanship Fiji has seen from politicians for decades.

The allegation?

He filed declarations that were recklessly incomplete, to mislead the public and breach the transparency obligations he publicly champions.

These are regulatory offences. They turn on paperwork, timelines, and corporate records.

Kamikamica: A Minister Accused of Lying Under Oath About a Constitutional Appointment

Now look at Manoa Kamikamica. He is not charged with forgetting a form, omitting a company, or failing to update an asset register. He is charged with perjury. The most direct attack any public official can mount against the justice system. This is not about a filing error. This is not about negligence. This is not about oversight. This is about a senior minister allegedly swearing under oath that he had no role in the appointment of Barbara Malimali as the FICAC Commissioner, and then repeating that same statement to a Commissioner of Inquiry.

If proven, this is a deliberate, knowing deception on a matter central to constitutional accountability. The FICAC Commissioner is not some mid-level bureaucrat. It is a statutory officer who sits at the heart of Fiji’s anti-corruption machinery.

If a minister knowingly misled the inquiry investigating that appointment, the issue is not “bad paperwork.”

It is obstruction of constitutional oversight.

Perjury carries the weight it does for a reason. It tears at the fabric of the rule of law. A democracy cannot function if ministers can lie under oath and expect no consequences.

The Spin Doctors Will Try to Equate Them. Don’t Be Misled

Expect the talking points to appear in synchronised formation:

“They’re all being treated the same.”
“Charges are charges.”
“This is political persecution.”
“It’s just technicalities.”

Nonsense. Legally, the cases are in different universes. Prasad’s case is about reckless omission in a statutory declaration. Kamikamica’s case is about allegedly lying under oath in a matter involving the appointment of the very person meant to police corruption in government. That goes far beyond ethics; it strikes at the core of constitutional governance.

Perjury is not a paperwork offence.

It is a threat to the integrity of judicial and quasi-judicial processes.
I
And Let’s Not Forget the Context

Prasad’s problems stem from years of quiet omissions, cosy arrangements, and concealed corporate relationships finally catching up with him. The public suspected; the documents confirmed.

Kamikamica’s case exploded in the open because a Commissioner of Inquiry forced the country to look directly at how and by whom key accountability positions were filled during a period of political turbulence.

These are not overlapping narratives.

They are two separate crises in honesty, one administrative, one constitutional.

Bottom Line

Prasad is accused of failing to tell the public the whole truth.

Kamikamica is accused of lying under oath about a matter that goes to the heart of state integrity.

One case is about transparency. The other is about the rule of law. Do not let anyone pretend otherwise.

From Fijileaks Archives

Kudos to Rt Aca Rayawa and his post which I have posted below. This is exactly what CJ did when Pulewai did a failed coup at FICAC and unlawfully arrested and detained Barbara Malimalii. CJ issued a directive that all Court registries around the country not accept any charges filed by FICAC under Pulewai’s directive. Having Rokoika continue as Head of FICAC on our taxpayers expense is an attack on the Rule of Law- this tantamounts to an abuse of office & JSC needs to make a stand on the Rule of Law.

Well- all those that partook in that failed coup have all been removed from FICAC. Such is karma.

President’s Ceremonial Role

As per the online article posted below, the President is seeking advise on the JSC recommendations. The provision in the Constitution is clear- the President’s role is ceremonial and he just endorses the recommendations from JSC.

Severance Pay

I read on Mai TV online news that the President is now seeking a severance pay for Lavi Rokoika. How can the severance pay be negotiated when Rokoika’s appointment did not follow legal and constitutional process. For the President to even pitch this to JSC - this is unlawful!! How can we as taxpayers pay for someone whose appointment is being legally challenged.

To add insult- the President negotiates Rokoika’s severance and yet my client has not received her pay from the date her appointment was illegally revoked by the President himself on the advise of the PM.

Revocation of Malimali’s appointment

It is common knowledge that the VAKALALABURE’s are related to the PM & President. I have been reading the online news where PM is saying that “JSC is to deal with Rokoika & he has no business on FICAC”. Thank goodness that PM is finally listening to wise legal counsel- we had to get a court ruling to remind him of his rule.

Our nation has spent an approx $4m and counting on this COI, JR and the continued illegal salary of Rokoika (again funded by taxpayers).

Malimali was suspended on 29/05/25. I met someone on the early morning of 29/05/25 and this person told me that my client was going to be removed. I questioned on the reliability of the information- it was confirmed that Tevita Vakalalabure, Lavi Rokoika, Gilbert Vakalalabure all at the President’s house (with the President that very morning). It was also confirmed that the President gave the directive on the phone to the PM that he was going to revoke Malimali & appoint Rokoika. I communicated immediately to some Govt Ministers and a few others and told them of my briefing. A Govt Minister calls me back and says that JSC were not aware and nor were they informed of any moves to remove Malimali.

I called my client (she had just arrived from overseas travel) and told her to standby as she was going to be fired. She responded as well that JSC had not informed her of anything and the process for her removal is via a tribunal.

Two hours later - a group of close friends of Malimali received a messaged on the same day that Rokoika had walked in with another officer from the President’s office with her letter of suspension (2 hours later). Rokoika plays dumb and says that she was not aware of anything….there is always an unseen witness to every meeting.

We have had coups because the coupsters say that the democratically elected Govt is corrupt. The last coup we had - resulted in 16 years of the rule to FFP. I will never ever allow Fiji to go back to lawlessness as it created instability and brings forth frictions, especially amongst us the itaukeis.

Our silence is our acquiescence. The corruption within FICAC & FSC is open to everyone in our nation and it’s shameful that our leaders continue to support such illegality- Shame on you all!!!

If the President continues on the standoff with the JSC- there are provisions in the Constitution for him to be referred to a a tribunal. I honor his position and his role but I only fear God.

We must vote those that uphold the Rule of Law in the next GE. We deserve better for our nation.

Fijileaks: If one were to accept Aca Rayawa’s present contention that prosecutions initiated by an official whose appointment or authority is constitutionally defective, are null and void, then logical consistency would require that the same principle be applied retrospectively to his own actions.

In 2010, Rayawa signed the charge sheet against Mahendra Chaudhry in his capacity as Acting Director of Public Prosecutions. If it were established that his appointment to that acting office suffered from the kind of constitutional defect he now alleges in respect of others, the inevitable consequence of his argument would be that the Chaudhry prosecution was similarly void ab initio.
That is the unavoidable implication of the position he advances.

Under orthodox Commonwealth constitutional doctrine, however, such an outcome is highly unlikely. Courts have long recognised the de facto officer doctrine: acts performed by a person who appears to hold public office under colour of lawful authority are treated as valid, even if defects in appointment are later identified. The doctrine exists to preserve legal certainty, protect third parties, and prevent institutional paralysis.

Accordingly, if Rayawa now asserts that any prosecutorial act undertaken by an allegedly defective office-holder must automatically collapse, he would be inviting a principle that would operate indiscriminately, including against his own prior exercise of prosecutorial authority.

The law does not generally support such sweeping invalidation. Constitutional defects are ordinarily tested through structured litigation, and remedies are fashioned to avoid chaos. Wholesale nullification of prosecutions is an exceptional outcome reserved for extreme circumstances.

In short, the argument, if pressed to its logical conclusion, would not merely affect contemporary proceedings. It would also cast doubt upon earlier prosecutions conducted under similar institutional arrangements, including those in which Rayawa himself played a central role.

Controversial CV. Why Barbara Malimali Should Have Been Disqualified at the Outset. Unprofessional Conduct, Institutional Attacks on FICAC STAFF, Material Non-Disclosure, and Disparaging "Foreigners at FICAC"

23/2/2026

Two Non-Disclosures, One Duty to Act: Why the Judicial Services Commission Must Suspend BARBARA MALIMALI to protect FICAC

Barbara Malimali’s job application should not have progressed beyond preliminary screening due to serious concerns regarding professionalism, judgment, transparency, and suitability for high public office.

From the outset, Malimali adopted a confrontational and disparaging tone toward the very institution she sought to lead. Rather than demonstrating respect for FICAC, she repeatedly criticised its staff, competence, and operational priorities. Statements suggesting that FICAC lacked capable lawyers, mishandled investigations, and wasted public funds amounted to a public attack on the institution. An applicant for a senior leadership role was expected to demonstrate loyalty, discretion, and institutional confidence. This application did the opposite.

Of particular concern was her repeated criticism of “foreigners” and expatriates who previously worked within related institutions. These comments were inappropriate, divisive, and inconsistent with public service values of inclusiveness and professionalism. Senior officials were required to work within diverse teams and respect international cooperation. Malimali’s remarks demonstrated poor judgment and raised concerns about bias.

The application also contained politically charged commentary and personal opinions on past prosecutions and institutional history. These views were presented without evidence and appeared to be based on personal grievances rather than objective assessment. A judicial or quasi-judicial office demanded neutrality and restraint. This application reflected neither.

Another significant issue was the inclusion of irrelevant personal medical information, specifically the disclosure of blood donation and health records. Such information had no bearing on professional competence or suitability for office. Its inclusion suggested a lack of understanding of appropriate boundaries in formal applications and weakened the credibility of the submission.

The structure and tone of the letter were also problematic. Rather than presenting qualifications, experience, and leadership capacity in a focused and disciplined manner, Malimali devoted substantial space to criticism, speculation, and personal commentary. This detracted from any legitimate professional achievements and created an impression of impulsiveness and poor self-regulation.

Failure to Disclose Professional Sanctions

A major omission in the application was Malimali’s failure to disclose that she had previously been banned from practising law in Tuvalu. This was material information directly relevant to her fitness, integrity, and professional standing. Any applicant for a senior anti-corruption role was expected to make full and frank disclosure of disciplinary or regulatory actions.

The failure to disclose this information raised serious concerns about honesty, transparency, and ethical standards. In itself, this omission should have resulted in automatic disqualification.

Shortlisting, Interview, and Appointment by the JSC

Despite these deficiencies, Malimali was shortlisted, interviewed, and ultimately selected by the JSC to become FICAC Commissioner.

This decision raises serious questions about the robustness and credibility of the selection process. The shortcomings in her application were substantial, visible, and material. They should have been identified and addressed at the screening stage. Instead, they were either missed, overlooked or disregarded.

The fact that an applicant who had attacked the institution, made inappropriate public comments, included irrelevant personal information, and failed to disclose a professional ban was nevertheless appointed reflected systemic weaknesses in vetting, due diligence, and governance.

Post-Removal Conduct and High Court Ruling

Following her removal from office, Malimali sought reinstatement after a High Court ruling found that the termination process was unlawful. While the ruling addressed procedural legality, it did not validate the suitability of her original appointment.

Her attempt to regain the position occurred despite the unresolved concerns arising from her application, including institutional attacks, inappropriate commentary, irrelevant disclosures, and material non-disclosure. This reinforces the perception that due regard had not been given to professional standards and public confidence.

Conclusion

Barbara Malimali’s application failed at the threshold level for the following reasons:

Open attacks on FICAC and its staff
Inappropriate criticism of foreign professionals
Lack of institutional respect and neutrality
Inclusion of irrelevant personal health information
Failure to disclose her ban from legal practice in Tuvalu
Poor judgment and unprofessional tone
Failure to present a focused, merit-based case
Inadequate vetting by the JSC despite clear red flags

For these reasons, her application should have been disqualified at the initial screening stage. The content, omissions, and subsequent handling of her appointment raises serious concerns about integrity, transparency, and governance in senior public office appointments.

Furthermore, there remain FICAC officers currently serving in the office who previously testified against her before the Commission of Inquiry. It is reasonable to expect that they may now feel apprehensive about the prospect of her reinstatement.

SWORN To Last: Why Affidavits Survive Beyond Commission of Inquiry: Continuing Legal Force

SWORN AFFIDAVITS tendered before a Commission of Inquiry do not lose their relevance merely because the Commission has concluded its work or delivered its recommendations. An affidavit is not a political submission or a time-bound opinion; it is a statement made under oath, carrying enduring legal and evidentiary significance. Its probative value survives the lifespan of the Commission precisely because the obligation of truthfulness does not expire with the report. Where new evidence, analysis, or contextual information later emerges, those affidavits must be capable of renewed scrutiny. This is especially so where the affidavits concern matters of public office, integrity, or fitness to hold statutory authority. Subsequent developments may illuminate inconsistencies, omissions, or implications that were not apparent, or not tested, during the Commission’s original proceedings. To suggest that affidavits are rendered inert once a Commission dissolves would undermine the very purpose of sworn evidence. Accountability in public life is not confined to procedural timelines. Affidavits endure as part of the public record, and where fresh analysis raises legitimate questions, they remain not only relevant, but essential to informed oversight and the continuing public interest. Truth Without Expiry.

Why Lands Minister Vosarogo was an Inappropriate Referee for Barbara Malimali’s FICAC Commissioner Application.
Was he aware of the Tuvalu A-G's letter (23 May 2017) to Malimali banning her from practising in Tuvalu?

On 29 September 2017, Filimoni Vosarogo was disciplined and fined for professional misconduct (FJILSC 12 of 2017). Barely five months later, on 16 February 2018, he witnessed Barbara Malimali's declaration supporting her application for a Legal Practitioners Unit Certificate. At the time, Vosarogo was practising under a restricted practising certificate but was legally permitted to perform ordinary professional functions, including witnessing documents. At the disciplinary hearing, Malimali had appeared on his behalf, along with Vosarogo himself.

Summary of the Commission’s Decision in Chief Registrar v Vosarogo

The Fiji Independent Legal Services Commission found that Vosarogo had committed serious professional misconduct involving the management of his trust account. He pleaded guilty to four counts.

Although the misconduct was classified as “very serious”, the Commission accepted that Vosarogo had made substantial efforts towards rehabilitation since March 2016.

Suspension

The Commission ruled that Vosarogo had already effectively served his suspension. His practising certificate was suspended for a total of 10 months and 17 days, backdated to 1 March 2016. Taking into account periods when he was unable to practise, the Commission held that this suspension had been fully served by 29 September 2017.

Restricted Practising Certificate

Vosarogo was placed under a restricted practising certificate for a total period of 20 months and 7 days. From 30 September 2017 until 29 September 2018, he was permitted to practise only under strict conditions, including:

His trust account must be audited at his own expense every three months.
He must submit monthly bank statements to the Chief Registrar.
His law practice must be inspected regularly by a senior lawyer.
Any breach of these conditions would result in immediate suspension.

Fine

The Commission initially considered imposing a fine of about $20,000. However, after taking into accoun the repayment of $14,826.21 to the trust account, and the cost of training undertaken by Vosarogo, the fine was reduced to $3,000, payable by 26 March 2018.

Pro Bono Legal Work

To restore public confidence in the profession, Vosarogo was ordered to undertake five criminal trials for the Legal Aid Commission on a pro bono basis, each lasting no more than five days, and to be completed by September 2018. Failure to complete these cases would result in automatic suspension.

Costs

Vosarogo was ordered to pay $1,500 to the Chief Registrar, and $1,500 to the Commission, towards legal and administrative costs, payable by March 2018.

Warning to the Legal Profession

In his concluding remarks, the Commissioner Thomas Hickie warned all lawyers in Fiji that trust accounts are “sacrosanct”. Practitioners are personally responsible for supervising trust funds. Regular internal checks are essential. Ongoing training in trust account management is vital. The case was described as a serious warning to the profession.

Final Remarks to Vosarogo

Addressing Vosarogo directly, the Commissioner noted that this was his second disciplinary appearance since 2013. He stated that Vosarogo had largely rehabilitated himself and was being given a final opportunity to continue practising under strict supervision.

Using a sporting analogy, the Commissioner warned that Vosarogo was close to “three strikes” and urged him not to squander this chance.

Outcome

In summary, Vosarogo avoided permanent removal from the profession. He was allowed to continue practising. He remained under strict monitoring for at least 12 months. Any further misconduct was likely to result in severe consequences. The judgment closed by noting that the Commission would next hear submissions on the appointment of a senior practitioner to oversee Vosarogo’s practice.

Records show that on 16 February 2018, Vilimone [Filimoni] Vosarogo witnessed Malimali’s application for a practising certificate, the same application in which she was later accused of failing to disclose a Tuvalu banning order. At the time, Vosarogo was practising under a restricted practising certificate but was legally permitted to perform ordinary professional functions, including witnessing documents.

There is no evidence presently before us that he was prohibited from doing so. However, questions may arise as to whether he was aware of the Tuvalu order when he witnessed the application. If he had no knowledge of the alleged non-disclosure, no issue would arise. If he did have knowledge, that could raise regulatory concerns. These are matters that would require factual clarification by the relevant authorities.

Two Non-Disclosures, One Duty to Act: Why the Judicial Services Commission Must Suspend BARBARA MALIMALI to protect FICAC

The legitimacy of constitutional governance rests not merely on the existence of institutions, but on the integrity of those entrusted to lead them. When credible evidence emerges that a senior office-holder has failed on more than one occasion to disclose material facts relating to professional discipline, the issue ceases to be personal. It becomes institutional.

This is no longer a matter of political debate. It is a question of constitutional responsibility.

At issue are two separate alleged non-disclosures by Barbara Malimali, one when she applied for a practising certificate, and the other when she applied to be head of FICAC.
She failed to fully disclose a foreign regulatory ban when applying for a practising certificate; and she failed to disclose the same material fact when applying for appointment as FICAC Commissioner. Individually, either omission would raise serious concern. Together, they disclose a troubling pattern that strikes at the heart of fitness for office.

The Legal Duty of Full and Frank Disclosure

The law imposes a strict obligation of candour upon applicants seeking professional certification or high public office. This is not a mere formality. It is a substantive duty requiring full, accurate, and unambiguous disclosure of all material facts bearing upon character and suitability.

A prior regulatory ban imposed by a foreign jurisdiction is plainly material. It goes directly to professional standing; integrity and ethical conduct; fitness to practise law; and suitability for appointment to a senior prosecutorial role.

The duty is not satisfied by vague reference or partial acknowledgment. Courts across Commonwealth jurisdictions have consistently held that incomplete disclosure amounts to misleading disclosure. Silence, where there is a duty to speak, is legally consequential. Where decision-makers are deprived of critical information, the validity of the decision itself may be called into question.

Repetition and Pattern: Why Two Non-Disclosures Matter

The significance of this matter lies in repetition. The alleged omission did not occur once, under pressure or confusion. It allegedly occurred in two separate applications, made in different contexts, at different times. That repetition fundamentally alters the legal character of the conduct.

In regulatory jurisprudence, repeated non-disclosure is not treated as oversight. It is treated as evidence of deliberate avoidance or, at minimum, reckless disregard for disclosure obligations.

Such a pattern raises profound concerns about honesty; judgment; respect for institutional processes; and adherence to professional ethics.

These are not peripheral considerations. They are foundational to holding public office.

The Heightened Integrity Standard for Anti-Corruption Leadership

The office of FICAC Commissioner is not an ordinary administrative role. It carries coercive powers, prosecutorial discretion, and the authority to investigate corruption at the highest levels of public life.

Public confidence in anti-corruption enforcement depends on the moral authority of the Commissioner. That authority is weakened, if not fatally compromised, where credible allegations suggest the office-holder failed to meet basic standards of transparency in her own applications.

A Commissioner tasked with enforcing accountability must be demonstrably accountable herself.

Anything less erodes institutional legitimacy.

The Constitutional Role of the Judicial Services Commission

The JSC bears constitutional responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of judicial and prosecutorial appointments. Its role is not passive. It is protective. When serious allegations of misconduct arise, the JSC must ensure procedural fairness; protect the credibility of the office concerned; and preserve public confidence in the justice system.

This responsibility is heightened where the allegations concern honesty in securing appointment. Failure to act risks creating the perception that standards apply unevenly, or worse, that they do not apply at all to those in power.

Why Immediate Suspension Is Legally Necessary

Suspension pending investigation is not a finding of guilt. It is a neutral administrative safeguard. Courts and oversight bodies routinely suspend senior officials where there are serious credibility concerns; continued occupation of the office risks institutional harm; and the investigation could be compromised by ongoing authority.

Here, suspension would serve three critical purposes:

Protecting Institutional Integrity. Ensuring that FICAC’s operations are not clouded by doubts about leadership legitimacy.
Preserving Public Confidence. Demonstrating that accountability applies uniformly.
Ensuring an Independent Inquiry. Allowing investigation without perceived or actual interference.

Allowing Barbara Malimali to return to office while allegations of repeated non-disclosure are examined exposes the institution to reputational damage and legal challenge. Every prosecution undertaken under a cloud of integrity concern becomes vulnerable to collateral attack.

The Risk of Inaction

Institutional damage rarely occurs in dramatic bursts. It accumulates through hesitation, delay, and perceived tolerance of questionable conduct. If the JSC does not act decisively, confidence in anti-corruption enforcement will erode; the legitimacy of ongoing investigations may be questioned; and the credibility of the appointment process itself may be undermined.

In constitutional governance, perception matters almost as much as proof. Justice must not only be done; it must be seen to be done.

Conclusion: A Duty That Cannot Be Deferred

This matter is no longer about an individual career. It concerns the integrity of constitutional processes and the credibility of the nation’s anti-corruption framework.

Where there are credible allegations of two separate failures to disclose a material regulatory sanction, once in professional certification and again in application for high public office, the threshold for interim action is plainly met.

The Judicial Services Commission must now initiate a formal investigation; suspend Malimali pending its outcome; and act transparently and decisively in accordance with constitutional duty.

Suspension is not punishment. It is protection of the institution, of the public interest, and of the rule of law

In matters of integrity at the highest levels of public office, hesitation is itself a decision. The law demands better.

LAND HAS EYES. And Lands Minister Filimone Vosarogo must tell us if he knew that Barbara Malimali had been banned from practising law in Tuvalu from May 2017.

Was Chief Justice Temo Right to Appoint Malimali Without Formal References? His decision was based primarily on his personal observation of Malimali’s performance over approximately fifteen years in the criminal courts.

The confirmation by Salesi Temo before the Commission of Inquiry that he did not obtain formal professional references before supporting the appointment of Barbara Malimali as head of FICAC raises serious questions about constitutional governance, administrative propriety, and institutional accountability in Fiji.

According to Temo, his decision was based primarily on his personal observation of Malimali’s performance over approximately fifteen years in the criminal courts. He concluded, on that basis, that she was an appropriate candidate for the role. While professional familiarity is not irrelevant, reliance on it alone falls well short of accepted standards for appointments to high-integrity public office.

The Constitutional Role of the Judicial Services Commission

As Chair of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), the Chief Justice does not act in a personal or informal capacity. The JSC exists to function as an institutional safeguard. Its role is to ensure that appointments to sensitive offices are subjected to independent, structured, and transparent assessment.

In this context, the JSC’s responsibility is not merely to endorse a candidate, but to verify suitability through objective procedures. These normally include written references, character assessments, disclosure of adverse findings, and independent verification of professional history.

The purpose is to protect the integrity of both the appointee and the institution. By dispensing with these mechanisms, the process shifts from institutional scrutiny to individual discretion.

Why Personal Observation Is Not Enough

A senior judge’s long acquaintance with a candidate may provide useful insight into professional competence. However, it cannot substitute for formal vetting. Personal observation is inevitably selective, subjective, limited to courtroom performance, and insulated from confidential or adverse information. Formal references serve a different function. They allow third parties to disclose concerns, verify character, and provide context that may not be visible in public proceedings. Without them, significant risks remain undiscovered.

In governance terms, relying solely on personal impressions weakens the credibility of the appointment.

Administrative Law and Procedural Fairness

Under common-law principles applied in Fiji and comparable Commonwealth jurisdictions, senior public appointments must satisfy basic requirements of procedural fairness and reasonableness.

A lawful appointment process should be transparent, rationally structured, capable of external scrutiny, and based on relevant and sufficient evidence. A decision grounded primarily in “I have observed her work for many years” is vulnerable to challenge as arbitrary and inadequately reasoned. It lacks documentary support and makes meaningful review difficult.

If subjected to judicial scrutiny, such a process would be hard to defend as procedurally robust.

Implications for FICAC’s Independence

FICAC is an anti-corruption agency. Its authority depends not only on statutory powers but on public confidence in the integrity and independence of its leadership. An appointment process that lacks formal vetting creates perceptions of favouritism, suspicions of informality or patronage, institutional vulnerability, and reduced public trust. In a political environment where the independence of oversight bodies is frequently contested, these weaknesses are particularly damaging.

Comparative Commonwealth Practice

In comparable jurisdictions such as New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Singapore, appointments to integrity institutions normally involve multiple written referees, structured interview processes, independent panels, background and disciplinary checks, and formal documentation.A process based largely on personal familiarity would be regarded as inadequate and professionally unacceptable in these systems.

Was Temo Legally Entitled to Proceed This Way?

Formally, the answer depends on the precise wording of Fiji’s constitutional and statutory framework. If the rules do not expressly mandate written references, the process may not be automatically unlawful.

Substantively, however, it falls below constitutional best practice. In practical terms, this means the appointment may not be invalid solely for this reason, but it is weakened in legal, ethical, and institutional terms.It lacks the procedural resilience expected of appointments to sensitive public office.

Consequences for Future Challenges

If Malimali’s appointment is challenged in court, in Parliament, or through public accountability mechanisms, the absence of formal vetting will be a central vulnerability. It may support arguments that the JSC failed to discharge its constitutional duty, the process was procedurally defective, proper safeguards were ignored, and the appointment was insufficiently justified.Such arguments can underpin claims of abuse of discretion or institutional failure.

Conclusion

In constitutional and governance terms, reliance solely on personal observation was not appropriate.

As Chair of the JSC, Temo should have ensured that Malimali’s appointment was supported by formal references, independent verification, and documented assessment. By substituting institutional procedure with personal judgment, he weakened the legitimacy and defensibility of the process.

Conflict of Interest: One of the panellist's who interviewed and approved Malimali as the new FICAC Commissioner had witnessed her 2022 application for a practising certificate: the acting Chief Magistrate Josaia Waqaivolavola.
*TUVALU TRYST: When Waqaivolavola witnessed her 2022 Application for a Practising Certificate, was he aware that Malimali had been barred from practising law in Tuvalu? Also, he had not declared his conflict of interest when he sat on the interview panel

From Fijileaks Archive, 17 June 2025

From Tuvalu Tales to Taxpayer Cash: Calls Grow for Malimali to Pay Back Taxpayers' Money as short-lived FICAC Commissioner plus thousands of dollars that she had ordered FICAC to pay her counsel WAQANIKA

www.fijileaks.com/home/non-disclosure-misrepresentation-and-the-validity-of-appointment-did-barbara-malimalis-ficac-application-survive-the-test-of-candour

From Whistleblowers to Handcuffs: The Charlie Charters Detention and the Dangerous Expansion of FICAC’s Reach and s45 of Crimes Act 2009

21/2/2026

The overnight detention of Charlie Charters is no longer just a developing news story. It is now a constitutional moment.

When I previously argued that publishing whistleblower allegations on Facebook is not a crime, the point was grounded in law, not sentiment.

The events that have unfolded since his airport stop, the reported “deal,” the allegation of aiding and abetting under Section 45 of the Crimes Act 2009, and the reference to Section 13G of the FICAC Act, have only intensified the urgency of that analysis.

At stake is not merely the liberty of one individual.

At stake is whether the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) understands the legal boundaries of its own authority.

Publishing Whistleblower Material Is Not Automatically Criminal

Section 13G of the FICAC Act criminalises the unauthorised disclosure of official information by those bound by the Act, namely insiders. It is directed at internal breaches. It does not, on its face, criminalise third-party publication.

That distinction matters. If a FICAC employee unlawfully leaks confidential material, that employee may face legal consequences. But the person who receives and publishes that material does not automatically become a criminal participant. Democratic legal systems recognise a fundamental separation between the breach of duty by an insider; and the act of publication by an external party. Collapse that distinction, and investigative journalism becomes legally perilous by default.

The Aiding and Abetting Threshold

FICAC now indicates that Charters is being held on suspicion of aiding and abetting a whistleblower under Section 45 of the Crimes Act 2009. Aiding and abetting is not a casual label. It requires intentional assistance, encouragement, or facilitation of an offence. There must be evidence of active involvement, not merely receipt or publication of information.

Passive publication does not meet that standard.

If republication alone constitutes aiding and abetting, then every journalist who publishes leaked material would be exposed to criminal liability. That is not how the doctrine operates in serious criminal jurisprudence.

Unless there is proof of coordination or inducement, the legal footing for such a charge appears precarious.

The Airport “Deal”: A Critical Clue

Charters has stated that he was offered a “deal” at Nadi Airport that would have allowed him to continue his flight to Sydney, but that the terms were unacceptable. This detail cannot be brushed aside.

In the context of an alleged whistleblower breach, there is an obvious inference: investigators were likely seeking cooperation in identifying the internal source. If that is correct, the implications are profound.

Compelling a citizen (or even a publisher) to reveal a source strikes at the heart of press freedom and whistleblower protection. Even where shield laws are not codified, democratic norms strongly discourage coercive extraction of sources.

If detention becomes leverage for source disclosure, whistleblowing collapses.

The mechanism does not need to be formally declared. The pressure itself is sufficient.

Facebook Is Not a Lesser Platform

Some may attempt to diminish the significance of this case by noting that Charters publishes on Facebook rather than through mainstream media outlets.

That argument fails both legally and practically.

Journalistic protection attaches to function, not platform. If an individual gathers information of public interest, assesses its relevance, and publishes it for public scrutiny, the medium is immaterial. Social media has become a primary vehicle for civic reporting and political discourse.

To suggest that Facebook publishing is somehow less deserving of protection is to deny contemporary reality. The law does not, and should not, distinguish between ink on paper and text on a digital screen when constitutional freedoms are implicated.

Detention as Leverage

The manner of Charters’ detention raises its own questions. He was stopped at an airport. He was reportedly offered a conditional arrangement. He was detained overnight. He has not yet been formally charged.

In rule-of-law systems, detention prior to charge is justified by necessity: risk of flight, interference with evidence, or immediate public harm.

Here, the sequence suggests something else — strategic pressure. Detention isolates. It destabilises. It creates urgency. When used in the context of suspected whistleblower leaks, it functions less as prosecution preparation and more as leverage. That distinction is not semantic. It goes to the legitimacy of enforcement power.

Professional Officers, Institutional Direction

Charters has publicly acknowledged that the investigating officers have been professional and considerate. That recognition is important. The issue is not individual conduct on the ground. It is institutional direction and strategic decision-making. Good officers can operate within flawed frameworks. Professional investigators can execute politicised mandates. The concern is systemic, not personal.

The Chilling Effect

Even without a conviction, the message of this episode is unmistakable: Publish sensitive material and you may be detained. Refuse cooperation and you may be arrested. Challenge internal secrecy and you may be pressured. This is the anatomy of a chilling effect.

Whistleblowers will hesitate. Independent publishers will self-censor. Public discourse will narrow. Anti-corruption agencies are meant to expand transparency, not contract it.

A Broader Crisis of Credibility

This case sits against a backdrop of public concerns about selective enforcement, opaque decision-making, and unexplained case closures. When enforcement appears inconsistent, and when procedural shortcuts surface, public trust erodes rapidly.

An anti-corruption body’s authority depends entirely on perceived impartiality. Once citizens suspect that discretion is being exercised unevenly, or that investigative tools are being used to suppress rather than expose, legitimacy begins to fracture. That fracture is difficult to repair.

The Central Question

The issue is no longer whether FICAC should exist. It must. The issue is whether it will operate within clear legal confines or continue stretching its authority into areas that threaten fundamental freedoms.

If Charters actively assisted a criminal breach, that should be proven in court with evidence. If he merely published material provided to him, detention becomes disproportionate and constitutionally troubling. Those are two very different scenarios. The public deserves clarity.

My earlier analysis asserted that publishing whistleblower allegations on Facebook is not a crime. The events surrounding Charlie Charters’ detention have only sharpened that principle.

This moment is larger than one individual. It is about whether enforcement power will be exercised with restraint, precision, and transparency, or with pressure, ambiguity, and institutional defensiveness.

An anti-corruption agency cannot protect public integrity by undermining civil liberty.

If it attempts to do so, it risks becoming the very problem it was created to solve.

As someone with a history of exposing wrong-doing, beginning with the 1982 "Carroll Report" for the Alliance Party on how to cripple NFP-WUF Coalition at the 1982 general election to FLP leader Mahendra Chaudhry, revealing $2 million hidden in a Sydney account, and extending to the leaked murder charge sheet against dictator Frank Bainimarama, I know the importance of transparency.

Without such disclosures, Fiji risks descending into the kind of repression depicted in Animal Farm. Alarmingly, it is already close. GOD, HELP FIJI.

FICAC Must Be Defended But Its Politicisation Must Be Condemned
*In any functioning democracy, an independent anti-corruption agency is not optional. It is foundational. The existence of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) is not merely justified; it is indispensable.

*Corruption corrodes institutions, distorts public trust, and undermines economic and political stability. Without an enforcement body dedicated to investigating abuse of office, illicit enrichment, and maladministration, accountability becomes rhetoric rather than reality.

*Those who argue that FICAC should be dismantled are attacking the wrong target. The problem has never been the existence of FICAC. The problem is what happens when any anti-corruption body becomes politicised.

Facebook Blogger Charlie Charters Detention by FICAC. Lets Face Up: Why Publishing Whistleblower Allegations on FACEBOOK Is Not A Crime FICAC has little basis to criminally charge him for Facebook posts alone

21/2/2026

FB blogger Charters

The detention of Charlie Charters by the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) raises serious legal, constitutional, and democratic concerns. At the centre of the controversy is one fundamental question: on what lawful basis can a citizen be detained for publishing allegations provided by a whistleblower?

So far, no clear answer has been given.

Charters’ alleged “offence” appears to be the publication on social media of leaked information and claims concerning conduct within FICAC, including allegations involving the acting FICAC Commissioner Lavi Rokoika and her husband. These posts, whether uncomfortable, controversial, or politically sensitive, fall squarely within the realm of public-interest speech. In any democratic society governed by the rule of law, such speech is protected unless it clearly violates a specific criminal statute.

To date, no such statute has been publicly identified.

The Limits of Section 13G

Authorities and commentators have pointed to Section 13G of the FICAC Act as a possible legal basis. However, a plain reading of that provision makes its scope clear. It criminalises the unauthorised disclosure of official information by current or former FICAC officers and staff. It is designed to prevent internal leaks by insiders.

It does not apply to journalists, bloggers, whistleblowers outside the institution, or members of the public who receive and publish information.

In other words, Section 13G targets the source of a leak inside FICAC, not the recipient who disseminates it.

If a FICAC employee unlawfully disclosed information, that person may be investigated and charged under the Act. But extending that provision to justify the detention of an outsider has no legal foundation.

Publication Is Not a Crime

Publishing allegations, even serious ones, does not automatically constitute a criminal offence.

In most legal systems, including Fiji’s, the act of reporting or commenting on alleged misconduct by public officials is protected by constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of the media. These protections exist precisely to ensure that matters of public concern can be scrutinised without fear of state retaliation.

If published material is false and damages someone’s reputation, the remedy is civil defamation proceedings. Courts, not police cells, are the proper forum for resolving such disputes.

Defamation is not grounds for arrest.

Similarly, unless there is evidence that Charters fabricated documents, hacked systems, bribed officials, or actively obstructed an investigation, there is no obvious criminal offence involved in receiving and sharing leaked material.

So far, no such allegations have been substantiated.

The Chilling Effect on Whistleblowers and Media

Detaining a Facebook blogger without clearly stating the offence has broader consequences.

It sends a warning to whistleblowers that speaking out may lead to retaliation. It signals to journalists, bloggers, and commentators that reporting on sensitive matters carries personal risk. It encourages self-censorship and silence.

This is how democratic accountability erodes: not through overt bans, but through fear.

When enforcement agencies act without transparency, they undermine public trust. When citizens cannot tell where lawful investigation ends and intimidation begins, the rule of law is weakened.

Due Process and Constitutional Safeguards

Under Fiji’s constitutional framework, any person who is detained must be informed promptly of the reason for their detention and the legal basis for it. Authorities must be able to point to a specific offence and a specific statutory power.

Detention cannot be based on vague suspicion, political discomfort, or institutional embarrassment.

It must be grounded in law.

If an agency believes a crime has been committed, it must charge the individual and present evidence in court. If it cannot do so, continued detention becomes arbitrary.

Arbitrary detention is unlawful.

Public Interest and Accountability

The allegations published by Charters concern potential impropriety within a powerful public institution. Whether those allegations are true or false is a matter that deserves proper investigation, not suppression.

If they are false, they can be disproved. If they are true, the public has a right to know.
Either way, silencing the messenger does not resolve the underlying issues. Transparency, not intimidation, is the proper response.

A Dangerous Precedent

If publishing leaked information becomes grounds for detention, a dangerous precedent is set. Any citizen who shares documents, questions officials, or exposes wrongdoing could be targeted next.

Today it is a Facebook post. Tomorrow it could be an investigative article.

Next week it could be a private message.

Once that line is crossed, no one who speaks critically is truly safe.

Conclusion

Based on publicly available information, there is no clear legal basis for detaining a private citizen solely for publishing whistleblower allegations. Section 13G of the FICAC Act does not apply to outsiders. Defamation is a civil matter. No other offence has been transparently identified.

Until authorities clearly state the law they are relying on and the evidence supporting it, this detention remains deeply troubling.

In a society governed by law, power must answer to principle. Silence enforced by fear is not justice. Accountability enforced by law is.

Anything less is a betrayal of democratic values.

INCITING TO MUTINY. The Arrest of Bainimarama, Sitiveni Qiliho Does Not Bury Section 131. Why Fiji Still Needs a Constitutionally Alert RFMF

19/2/2026

"What must be resisted, firmly and without apology, is the emerging narrative that these arrests somehow “close the chapter” on Section 131 of the Constitution, neutralise the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, and confine it permanently to political irrelevance. The prosecution of two former officials does not repeal the Constitution. It does not suspend history. And it does not erase institutional responsibility. Section 131 remains in force. Its meaning has not changed. And neither has the reality that Fiji’s stability still depends on how that provision is understood, respected, and practised."

Inciting To Mutiny Suspect

The Danger of Turning Prosecution into Political Licence

There is now a real risk that these prosecutions will be weaponised politically. Some will argue that because Bainimarama and Qiliho stand accused, any future reference to Section 131 is illegitimate. That any citizen who speaks about the RFMF’s constitutional role is “inviting mutiny”. That any concern about governance is “sedition”. That any appeal to institutional vigilance is criminal.

This is profoundly dangerous. It converts law enforcement into a tool of intimidation. It transforms civic engagement into a legal hazard. And it teaches citizens that silence is safer than conscience. A society in which people are afraid to invoke their own Constitution is already in constitutional decline.

History offers a brutal warning.

Under Idi Amin Dada, Uganda’s armed forces aligned themselves with ethnic populism and authoritarian power. Once the army chose sides, the fate of Ugandan Asians was sealed. Expulsion, dispossession, and exile followed swiftly. Legal protections collapsed. Courts became irrelevant. Appeals to fairness became meaningless.

Uganda’s tragedy did not begin with decrees. It began when institutions stopped belonging to everyone. Minorities did not flee because of rhetoric alone. They fled because they saw that the state, including its security forces, no longer stood neutrally between citizens and power.

That lesson is not about replicating outcomes. It is about recognising institutional failure early.

When minorities lose confidence that the state will protect them impartially, they stop thinking about rights. They start thinking about exits. They will have no faith in RFMF.

Colonel Viliame Draunibaka

It is alleged that Bainimarama between the 1st of January 2023 and the 31st of July 2023 around Suva, sent viber messages to Brigadier General Manoa Gadai in his attempt to incite him to take over command and overthrow the authority of the Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, Major General Jone Kalouniwai.

For the second count of inciting to mutiny, it is alleged that Bainimarama and Qiliho between the 1st of July 2023 to the 31st of July, 2023 jointly spoke to Lt Colonel Atunaisa Vakatale, Colonel Aseri Rokoura, Colonel Viliame Draunibaka and others, who were senior officers of RFMF in their joint attempt to incite the senior officers to unlawfully arrest and take over the authority of the Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, Major General Jone Kalouniwai.

Colonel Atunaisa Vakatale

Colonel Aseri Rokoura

The Arrest of Bainimarama and Qiliho Does Not Bury Section 131

The arrest and charging of Frank Bainimarama and Sitiveni Qiliho on allegations of inciting mutiny is a serious and consequential development in Fiji’s political and legal life. These are not minor charges. They go to the heart of civil–military relations and constitutional order. They must be tested in open court, on evidence and law, without fear or favour.

That is how the rule of law functions.

But what must be resisted, firmly and without apology, is the emerging narrative that these arrests somehow “close the chapter” on Section 131 of the Constitution, neutralise the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, and confine it permanently to political irrelevance. The prosecution of two former officials does not repeal the Constitution. It does not suspend history. And it does not erase institutional responsibility.

Section 131 remains in force. Its meaning has not changed. And neither has the reality that Fiji’s stability still depends on how that provision is understood, respected, and practised.

Section 131 Was Never Meant to Produce a Silent Military

Section 131 assigns to the RFMF responsibility for the “security, defence and well-being of Fiji and all Fijians.” Those words were not chosen casually. “Well-being” is not limited to territorial defence. It speaks to constitutional stability, social cohesion, and civic peace. “All Fijians” is not a slogan. It is a legal and moral commitment to equality.

This provision was never intended to authorise coups. Nor was it designed to manufacture a mute, disengaged military that retreats into the barracks whenever politics becomes uncomfortable. It was meant to embed the RFMF within the democratic order while recognising that, in Fiji’s particular history, institutional guardianship matters.

To pretend otherwise is to engage in wilful amnesia.

A professional military in a democracy is restrained, lawful, and subordinate to civilian authority. But it is not blind, indifferent, or morally vacant. It is constitutionally literate. It is alert to institutional decay. It understands when social cohesion is under strain. And it remains committed to the integrity of the Republic as a shared civic project.

The Danger of Turning Prosecution into Political Licence

There is now a real risk that these prosecutions will be weaponised. Some will argue that because Bainimarama and Qiliho stand accused, any future reference to Section 131 is illegitimate. That any citizen who speaks about the RFMF’s constitutional role is “inviting mutiny.” Any concern about governance is “sedition”. That any appeal to institutional vigilance is criminal.

This is profoundly dangerous.

It converts law enforcement into a tool of intimidation. It transforms civic engagement into a legal hazard. And it teaches citizens that silence is safer than conscience. A society in which people are afraid to invoke their own Constitution is already in constitutional decline.

Uganda and the Cost of Institutional Alignment

History offers a brutal warning. Under Field-Marshal Idi Amin, Uganda’s armed forces aligned themselves with ethnic populism and authoritarian power. Once the army chose sides, the fate of Ugandan Asians was sealed. Soldiers enforced decrees, intimidated and robbed families, seized property, and ensured that resistance was futile. Legal protections collapsed. Courts became irrelevant. Appeals to fairness became meaningless.

Uganda’s tragedy did not begin with mass expulsions. It began when institutions stopped belonging to everyone. Minorities did not flee merely because of rhetoric. They fled because they saw that the state, including its security forces, no longer stood neutrally between citizens and power.

That lesson is not about predicting identical outcomes. It is about recognising institutional failure early. When minorities lose confidence that the state will protect them impartially, they stop thinking about rights. They start thinking about exits.

Indo-Fijian Anxiety Is Not Paranoia

For many Indo-Fijians, the accelerating iTaukeinisation of public life is not an abstract concern. It is read through history: coups, displacement, constitutional manipulation, and repeated reminders that belonging in Fiji has too often been conditional.

When political language becomes ethnic, when institutions tilt toward majoritarian comfort, and when constitutional safeguards weaken, fear is not irrational. It is empirical.

If the present moment is interpreted as a licence for unchecked nationalism, safe in the belief that the military has been politically neutralised, then Fiji will be storing up long-term instability. No society remains cohesive when one community lives in permanent uncertainty about its future.

The Role of Major-General Kalouniwai Is Now Pivotal

This is why the leadership of Ro Jone Kalouniwai is historically significant. The Commander’s role is not political brokerage. It is institutional stewardship.

It is to ensure that the RFMF remains apolitical, professional, constitutionally literate, loyal to equal citizenship, and resistant to ethnic or partisan capture. Professionalism does not mean disengagement. It means disciplined awareness. It means understanding that exclusionary politics undermines national security as surely as any external threat.

A military loyal to the Constitution must be loyal to its spirit, not merely its text.

Citizens Must Be Free to Appeal to Institutions

There will be moments—there must be moments—when citizens feel compelled to call upon institutions to uphold constitutional norms. That is not sedition. That is democratic citizenship. Questioning whether institutions are fulfilling their mandate is not incitement. It is accountability.

Warning of democratic backsliding is not mutiny. It is civic vigilance. If such speech becomes criminalised, Fiji will have crossed a quiet but decisive threshold: from constitutional democracy to managed silence.

If Nationalism Is Allowed to Harden in Fiji

If this moment is misread, if it becomes a political trophy for aggressive ethno-nationalism, then Fiji will have invited a far more dangerous future.

If majoritarian iTaukei power is exercised without restraint, if institutions retreat into convenient silence, and if constitutional safeguards are hollowed out under cover of “law and order,” then the arrests of two men will mark not democratic progress, but institutional drift.

Democracies rarely collapse dramatically. They decay through complacency, selective enforcement, and the slow silencing of dissent. In such environments, minorities read the signals: in appointments, in rhetoric, in policy choices, in selective outrage, and in institutional timidity. When those signals accumulate, trust evaporates.

Uganda did not fall apart because of one decree. It fell apart because institutions stopped belonging to everyone.

Prosecution Must Not Become Erasure

The courts must do their work. If wrongdoing is proved, consequences must follow. No one is above the law. But prosecution must not become a historical erasure. It must not be used to discredit constitutional debate, intimidate civic engagement, silence minorities, neutralise institutional responsibility, rewrite Section 131 out of relevance.

The Constitution does not belong to governments. It belongs to citizens.

The Real Test of Fiji’s Maturity

The test before Fiji is not whether it can prosecute former leaders. Many countries can do that. The real test is whether it can do so while preserving free constitutional debate, institutional integrity, minority security, equal citizenship, and democratic confidence.

Section 131 remains part of Fiji’s constitutional architecture. The RFMF remains a central institution. And Ro Jone Kalouniwai remains its steward.

None of that disappears because two men are charged.

If Fiji allows fear, opportunism, and ethnic politics to hollow out these foundations, it will not be escaping its past. It will be repeating it, slowly, quietly, and with far greater long-term cost.

History shows that slow collapses are often the hardest to stop. Loyalties shift in Fiji

Yesterday's Bainimarama loyalists are now Tomorrow's State witnesses.
In June 2023, a military delegation, led by Col ATUNAISA VAKATALE, the Commanding Officer of Fiji's largest foot soldiers, and Col ASERI ROKOURA, feted their former military commander at his residence

Looking to RFMF: In December 2022, Rabuka crossed a constitutional red line rhetorically, but did he cross the criminal threshold operationally

People’s Alliance leader Sitiveni Rabuka says his request for the military to intervene in the electoral counting process was denied by Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Commander Major General Ro Jone Kalouniwai.

From Fijileaks Archive, 16 December 2022

“I wish to reassure the people of Fiji that the RFMF will not respond to People’s Alliance (PAP) leader Sitiveni Rabuka’s insistence or any political party, that we intervene under our responsibilities from Section 131.2 of the 2013 Constitution” Kalouniwai said.

“The constitutional responsibility of the RFMF section 131.2 does not make any reference to intervening or getting involved with the electoral processes or management of voting or counting of votes with the assistance of the military,” he said.

Kalouniwai explained that using the military in any form during the electoral process is unconstitutional.

“The RFMF will leave it in the good hands of those responsible of the electoral process under the 2013 constitution.”

The Commander went on to say the constitution has other avenues that the opposition parties can resort to when seeking redress.

“In this instance, I urge any dispute with reference to the electoral process be referred to the Supervisor of Elections, the Electoral Commission and the Court of Disputed Returns. These are the various organisations that deal with all electoral matters.”

The statement comes after a group of opposition party leaders called for a halt to vote counting on Thursday, demanding an audit of the country’s electoral system.

It was triggered by an anomaly in provisional results that was displayed on a Fiji Election Office results app on Wednesday night.

The app was taken offline for several hours and then restarted in the early hours of Thursday showing an almost unassailable lead for the ruling Fiji First Party over all other parties.

Speaking for a group of political parties at a media conference in Suva on Thursday, PAP leader Sitiveni Rabuka said the anomaly raised questions about the integrity of the entire electoral system.

Meanwhile, five political parties have today launched a petition to gather support in their quest to prove the election results are not free and fair.

The People’s Alliance, National Federation Party, Fiji Labor Part, Unity Fiji, and We Unite parties are working a coalition of parties.

PA leader Sitiveni Rabuka says they will be launching the petition in a few days.

The five leaders are also now saying they agree that manual count has been happening but they do not want the use of the results software and also the app.

Where Were Hangmen in 1987, 2000 and 2006? Sandeep Singh's Sudden Love Affair with Gallows. The gallows brigade were nowhere to be seen. What about Rabuka, Speight, Bainimarama for their treasonous coups

15/2/2026

“I don’t care if somebody is killed to save hundreds of our younger generation, I support the death penalty. That should be part of the law. Put the military on the ground and start the drug war.”
This was the strong remark from investment consultant Sandeep Singh during the public consultations on the Counter Narcotics Bill held at the Suva Civic Centre.

Suddenly, Fiji has discovered the death penalty.

At public consultations, on talkback radio, and across social media, a new political fashion has emerged. Faced with drugs, crime, prostitution, and social breakdown, some citizens now insist that only one solution remains: bring back hanging. The argument is delivered with great passion and moral certainty. Executions, we are told, will restore order, discipline society, and save the nation.

It is a simple solution. It is also a dishonest one.

Because before Fiji rushes to resurrect the gallows, there is a question that the new hangmen never answer: where were they when Fiji experienced real treason?

Fiji does not need to imagine what treason looks like. It has lived through it. In 1987, Sitiveni Rabuka overthrew an elected government, suspended the Constitution, and ruled by decree. He did it twice. In any serious constitutional system, that conduct constitutes treason in its clearest legal sense: the unlawful seizure of state power.

In 2000, George Speight and his supporters stormed Parliament and held the government hostage at gunpoint. It was an organised, violent insurrection that paralysed the state and plunged the country into chaos. That, too, was textbook treason.

In 2006, Frank Bainimarama followed in Rabuka and Speight's footsteps.

If hanging is the appropriate response to treason, Fiji should have been building gallows in 1987, 2000 and 2006.

It did not.

There were no mass petitions demanding executions. There were no public campaigns calling for Rabuka, Speight or Bainimarama to be put to death. There were no outraged commentators demanding “maximum punishment”. Instead, there was silence, accommodation, negotiation, and eventually rehabilitation.

Rabuka became Prime Minister. More than once. Speight went to prison and later walked free. The country was urged to reconcile, forgive, and move on.

The gallows brigade was nowhere to be seen.

Why? Because demanding accountability from powerful men is risky. It invites backlash. It threatens careers. It unsettles political alliances. It requires courage.

Demanding executions for drug suspects, by contrast, is safe. They are convenient targets. Calling for their deaths costs nothing. This is not moral courage. It is moral convenience.

Those who now shout “hang them” display extraordinary bravery only when there is no danger involved. They are fierce when confronting the powerless and silent when confronting power. That is not principle. It is performance.

The inconsistency is glaring. If hanging is justified for crimes that damage society, why was it not justified for crimes that destroyed constitutional government? If treason deserves death, why were coup-makers forgiven? If law matters, why did it matter only when the targets were politically harmless?

The answer is uncomfortable but obvious. Fiji has never practised consistent justice. It has practised selective memory.

Coups were treated as unfortunate episodes. Drug crimes are treated as existential threats. Constitutional destruction was excused. Social decay is dramatized. The hierarchy is clear: some crimes are forgivable, others are unforgivable, depending on who commits them.

This selective severity teaches a dangerous lesson. It tells citizens that power matters more than legality. It tells future adventurers that if you succeed in breaking the state, time will protect you. It tells ordinary people that punishment is reserved for the weak. That is not the rule of law. It is the rule of status.

The current enthusiasm for executions is therefore not about public safety. It is about frustration looking for an outlet. It is about anger without analysis. It is about punishing visible symptoms while ignoring structural failures in policing, prosecution, governance, and social policy.

Hanging people will not fix corrupt institutions. It will not improve investigations. It will not strengthen courts. It will not restore trust. It will only satisfy rage for a moment.

Fiji does not need gallows. It needs consistency. It needs credible law enforcement. It needs independent courts. It needs accountability that applies equally to generals, politicians, businessmen, and street criminals.

Until the country is willing to confront its own history honestly, including how it treated coup-makers with indulgence, calls for executions will remain what they are now: noisy, hypocritical, and hollow.

We were soft on treason.

Now we are pretending to be tough on everything else.

That is not justice.

It is confusion dressed up as courage.

"Reviewing the current political landscape, I believe Mr Sitiveni Rabuka is the leader who will best be able to take Fiji forward and bring the changes that Fiji needs at this time. He is humble and compassionate. He is a leader that listens. He has learnt from his past mistakes. He has the experience of being a former head of government. I trust him. The founders of Mr Rabuka’s party give me confidence that if they win a majority of seats in the general elections, Fiji will have a government that is kinder, gentler and more inclusive." Graham Leung

NIKO NAWAIKULA PLAYING WITH FIRE, AGAIN: How Ethno-Nationalism Bogus "Indigenous Rights" and Minority Silence Keep FIJI on the BRINK

14/2/2026

Fiji has been here before. The country remembers the cost, though some now pretend it was never paid.

The renewed campaign against the Commercial Use of Marine Areas (CUMA) Bill, spearheaded by Niko Nawaikula and amplified by familiar ethno-nationalist voices, is not a neutral debate about law. It is a revival of a political script that has already pushed Fiji into catastrophe.

Wrapped in the language of indigenous rights, it repeats the same absolutism, selective history, and mobilisation cues that helped tear the country apart in 2006, and nearly did so from within in 1987.

This is not an argument against scrutiny of CUMA. Laws must be examined, criticised, and improved. But there is a profound difference between reform and recklessness. Fiji cannot afford to forget that difference.

The Lesson of 2006, and Why It Still Matters

The 2006 Qoliqoli Bill did not exist in isolation. It was introduced into a volatile environment where race, land, tribalism, provincialism, and state power were already dangerously entangled. The insistence that anything short of total, unconditional vesting of qoliqoli amounted to betrayal polarised the nation and fed a crisis of legitimacy.

The result was not the empowerment of iTaukei communities. It was a coup, the collapse of democratic governance, years of repression, and deep economic harm, borne most heavily by iTaukei themselves.

To revive that framing today - “absolute ownership or injustice” - is to ignore history. Or worse, to exploit it.

Imported Frameworks That Do Not Fit Fiji

At the centre of the current campaign is a heavy reliance on international indigenous instruments such as UNDRIP and ILO Convention 169. These frameworks were developed for peoples who are politically marginalised minorities in their own states, dispossessed by settler colonialism and excluded from power. The Incas and Aztecs under colonial annihilation, Aboriginal Australians denied land and sovereignty, Adivasis in India marginalised by dominant majorities: these are the paradigmatic cases.

The iTaukei people are not in that position.

In Fiji, iTaukei are the majority population. They own more than 90 per cent of land. Indigenous institutions are constitutionally entrenched. Political power, the public service, and the security forces are overwhelmingly iTaukei-led. To claim that iTaukei require the same restorative framework as colonised minorities elsewhere is not only a poor fit; it is politically incendiary. It transforms a constitutionally powerful majority into a fictional victim class and recasts fellow citizens as intruders.

UNDRIP was never intended to override the authority of a functioning, multi-ethnic state or to justify legal exceptionalism over national resources. When stretched that far, it becomes a weapon, not a rights instrument.

Marine Areas Are Not Land, and No State Governs Them Absolutely

Another sleight of hand is the treatment of qoliqoli as if they were identical to land. They are not. Marine areas implicate navigation rights, environmental protection, international maritime law, national food security, and shared access. No modern state - indigenous-led or otherwise - vests total, unregulated control of its marine spaces without oversight.

The State exists to regulate, enforce, and balance competing interests in the public interest. CUMA, whatever its flaws, reflects an attempt to retain national oversight over commercial marine activity while allowing customary participation. To portray this as an existential assault on indigenous identity is agitation, not analysis.

Power Without Capacity Is Not Justice

There is also a reality the “total control” narrative refuses to confront. Many iTaukei communities are under severe social strain. Drugs, particularly methamphetamine, are devastating families, villages, and youth. Chiefs, churches, police, and health workers all acknowledge it. The victims are overwhelmingly iTaukei.

Against this backdrop, handing over absolute control of vast marine and commercial resources without strong governance is not empowerment; it is exposure. Ownership brings responsibility - regulation, enforcement, transparency, resistance to criminal capture. Drug networks thrive where oversight is weak and authority fragmented. Romanticising custom while ignoring social breakdown does not protect communities; it places them at risk.

Ownership without capacity is not justice. It is negligence.

The Messenger Matters

Context also includes who is delivering the message. Niko Nawaikula is not a detached commentator. He is a former politician who was convicted and jailed for abusing taxpayer-funded travel allowances. That history does not permanently bar him from public debate. But it does matter when he presents himself as a moral authority urging communities to distrust government and “stand up” against the State.

Fiji has seen this pattern before: personal political rehabilitation through ethnic mobilisation. It has never ended well.

The Silence That Enables Extremism

Ethno-nationalism thrives not only because it is shouted loudly, but because it is rarely challenged. For decades, Indo-Fijians, descendants of girmitiya, born in Fiji with no other homeland, have learned to survive by keeping their heads down. Each coup taught the same lesson: protest invites punishment; silence buys survival. That instinct is understandable. It has also been costly.

When Indo-Fijians are labelled vulagis - foreigners in the land of their birth - and Indo-Fijian leaders fail to challenge it decisively, humiliation becomes normalised. Silence is not neutral; it validates the worldview of extremists and teaches them that intimidation works.

The Unspoken Warning from 1987

Fiji came perilously close to tearing itself apart from within in 1987. While the coups were carried out in the name of indigenous supremacy, a fact rarely acknowledged is that a small number of Indo-Fijians, pushed to desperation, briefly decided they would no longer absorb violence passively. The bombs in Suva. The guns in Lautoka.

These were not acts of liberation. They were acts of despair, and they terrified the nation. They remain a warning that systematic humiliation and exclusion do not always remain peaceful. Fiji escaped catastrophe then by luck as much as wisdom. It should not assume restraint is infinite.

Bogus “Indigenous Rights” as Political Weaponry

What is being advanced by Nawaikula is not protection of culture or dignity. It is racial entitlement dressed up as international law. It imports grievance frameworks designed for Incas, Aztecs, Aboriginal Australians, and Adivasis, and applies them to a context where the supposed beneficiaries already hold constitutional dominance.

This is not rights advocacy. It is ethno-nationalism. And history shows what ethno-nationalism produces in Fiji: coups, repression, economic decline, and long-term harm to indigenous people themselves.

Reform Yes, Radicalisation No

None of this argues for complacency. CUMA should be scrutinised. Consultation must be genuine. Customary participation can and should be strengthened. But reform must occur within constitutional order, grounded in Fiji’s history and present realities, not nostalgia or imported absolutes.

Every coup in Fiji has weakened indigenous security, not strengthened it. Every period of instability has harmed iTaukei livelihoods first. The politics of permanent grievance have never delivered dignity or prosperity.

A Final Warning

Fiji cannot afford to relearn the lessons of 1987 and 2006. Total control sold as liberation risks becoming another trigger for division and instability. Indigenous dignity will not be advanced by selective history, borrowed frameworks, or moral posturing from compromised platforms.

Justice in Fiji will be built through strong institutions, honest governance, social healing, and reform rooted in reality. Not by playing with fire, again.

We have already seen where this road leads. And it was not justice.

GET OUT OF OUR PREMISES, Sanatan Dharm Sabha to Pacific Polytech. Was Finance Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and the NFP leader BIMAN Prasad Right to Intervene in a Private Landlord and Tenant Lease Dispute

14/2/2026

"In a constitutional democracy, private disputes must be resolved by law, not by ministerial influence. On that basis, Biman Prasad’s involvement was not institutionally justified and sets an undesirable precedent for political interference in commercial matters."

"This was not an isolated incident. In August 2025, Prasad was also accused of attempting to interfere with the Fiji Higher Education Commission (FHEC) over the release of some $7 million in public funds to Pacific Polytech, despite the institution operating only under a provisional licence and having failed to meet mandatory reporting and compliance deadlines. Instead of allowing the statutory regulator to enforce its own statutory conditions and withhold funding until full accreditation and regulatory requirements were satisfied, Prasad allegedly applied political pressure to secure the release of the money. The episode raised serious questions about favouritism, abuse of office, and the improper use of ministerial power to benefit a private entity, reinforcing concerns that Prasad has repeatedly blurred the line between public duty and private or political interests."

The letter shown documents a commercial tenancy dispute between Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji and Pacific Polytech Ltd (PPL), culminating in a formal demand for eviction in May 2023. Crucially, it records that Biman Prasad, then Deputy Prime Minister, personally intervened in negotiations after a notice of termination had already been issued.

This raises serious questions about the propriety and legitimacy of that intervention.

Background to the Dispute

According to the letter:

A Notice of Termination had already been issued by Sabha, the landlord.
Negotiations were held in early April 2023 following requests from Biman Prasad.
The landlord expressly states it never withdrew the termination.
A proposal and counter-proposal were exchanged but failed.
PPL did not respond to reminders and missed the final deadline to vacate.
By mid-May 2023, the landlord demanded immediate possession and threatened legal action.

In effect, the legal relationship had already reached the enforcement stage when political involvement occurred.

Nature of Biman Prasad’s Intervention

The letter indicates that Biman Prasad, as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, requested negotiations. Meetings were held at the landlord’s headquarters. His involvement was described as informal and based on “respect and courtesy”. The landlord Sabha did not approve the requests made in these discussions.

This suggests that the intervention was not part of any statutory mediation process, court proceeding, or regulatory framework. It was purely political and informal.

Was the Intervention Proper?

From a governance and rule-of-law perspective, several concerns arise.

No Legal Mandate

There is no indication that Biman Prasad was acting under any lawful authority. Commercial tenancy disputes are governed by contract and civil law. They are resolved by negotiation between parties, arbitration (if agreed), or the courts.

A Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister has no formal role in private lease enforcement.

Risk of Undue Influence

When a senior minister intervenes in a private dispute, especially involving eviction and financial obligations, it risks pressuring one party, creating expectations of political favour, and undermining equality before the law. Even if well-intentioned, such involvement can distort bargaining power.

Conflict with Rule of Law Principles

In constitutional systems, ministers are expected to respect institutional boundaries. Private commercial disputes should not be resolved through political channels. Allowing ministers to “broker” outcomes weakens judicial independence, contract certainty, and investor confidence.

Ineffectiveness of Intervention

The letter shows that the intervention did not resolve the dispute. The Sabha, as landlord rejected proposals. Deadlines were missed. Eviction was pursued. This suggests the involvement created delay rather than resolution.

Possible Justifications

Supporters might argue that the intervention was aimed at protecting an educational institution. It sought to avoid disruption to students. It was humanitarian or pragmatic. However, even socially motivated interventions must operate within lawful frameworks, such as formal mediation or government-supported relocation assistance, not informal political pressure.

On the available evidence, Biman Prasad’s intervention appears legally unnecessary, institutionally inappropriate, politically risky, and ultimately ineffective. Sabha, as landlord, had exercised contractual rights. The matter was already on a legal trajectory. Political involvement did not change the outcome and arguably blurred the boundary between state power and private rights.

While Biman Prasad may have acted out of concern for continuity and social impact, the letter demonstrates that his intervention had no legal foundation and did not alter the landlord’s position.

In a constitutional democracy, private disputes must be resolved by law, not by ministerial influence. On that basis, Biman Prasad’s involvement was not institutionally justified and sets an undesirable precedent for political interference in commercial matters. In constitutional systems, ministers are expected to respect institutional boundaries.

Click, Click, Click. From Constitutional Limits to Camera Limits. When Boundaries Allegedly Didn't Apply to Biman Prasad

*Christopher Pryde said the decision to drop the case was made after a comprehensive review of the evidence and defences available to Professor Biman Prasad.
"It had been decided that there was insufficient reliable and credible evidence in the docket for a reasonable prospect of conviction, were the matter to proceed to court. At no time was the evidence assessed with regard to politics or the status of the suspect."

From Fijileaks Archive, 8 June 2023

3 June 2023

Subject: Termination of Pacific Polytechnic Agreement with Sanatan Fiji for Lautoka and Nabua Campuses

Dear Hon. Prime Minister,

Hope this email find you well. This email is in regard to the determination of the rental contract between Pacific Polytechnic (PPL) and Sanatan Fiji for Lautoka and Nabua Campuses.

A 90-days termination notice was given to PPL on 15th February 2023. Sanatan Fiji has given this campuses to PPL on rental for the operation of technical college. PPL was supposed to vacate the premises before 15th May 2023, however they failed to. Reminders were sent to PPL for vacant possession and payment of rental arrears during this 90 day period (letter attached to this email). A notification letter was also given to Fiji Higher Education Commission (letter attached).

16th /17th May Sanatan Fiji had requested PPL to give vacant possession of properties however, PPL refused to do so. Sanatan Fiji tried to negotiate with PPL but there was no positive response.

Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Fiji is faith based organization, we have tried other methods to resolve these issue, but were unsuccessful.

We are left with the last resort to continue with the legal action against PPL/filing of court case.

PPL owes Sanatan Fiji a total of $16000.00 (FJD) for rental arrears. We wish to inform you that Sanatan Fiji is not liable for any business being conducted on our Nabua and Lautoka premises.

This is because a fair 90 day notice was given to PPL to sort out their business. We are humbly requesting you to assist us in the dilemma.

Hope our request is accepted.

Your faithfully
National President
Dhirendra Nand
Sanatan Fiji

<<Previous

*In August 2024, Rokomokoti applied for the position of FICAC Commissioner but the JSC controversially selected Barbara Malimali.

Coming Soon: Public Funds, Personal Defence, and Possible Criminal Exposure: $$$ That Will Not Disappear. Malimali-Waqanika Payments

From Fijileaks Archives

Two Non-Disclosures, One Duty to Act: Why the Judicial Services Commission Must Suspend BARBARA MALIMALI to protect FICAC

SWORN To Last: Why Affidavits Survive Beyond Commission of Inquiry: Continuing Legal Force

*Why Lands Minister Vosarogo was an Inappropriate Referee for Barbara Malimali’s FICAC Commissioner Application.*Was he aware of the Tuvalu A-G's letter (23 May 2017) to Malimali banning her from practising in Tuvalu?

Two Non-Disclosures, One Duty to Act: Why the Judicial Services Commission Must Suspend BARBARA MALIMALI to protect FICAC

From Fijileaks Archive, 17 June 2025

From Tuvalu Tales to Taxpayer Cash: Calls Grow for Malimali to Pay Back Taxpayers' Money as short-lived FICAC Commissioner plus thousands of dollars that she had ordered FICAC to pay her counsel WAQANIKA

​www.fijileaks.com/home/non-disclosure-misrepresentation-and-the-validity-of-appointment-did-barbara-malimalis-ficac-application-survive-the-test-of-candour

The Danger of Turning Prosecution into Political Licence ​

Yesterday's Bainimarama loyalists are now Tomorrow's State witnesses.In June 2023, a military delegation, led by Col ATUNAISA VAKATALE, the Commanding Officer of Fiji's largest foot soldiers, and Col ASERI ROKOURA, feted their former military commander at his residence

Looking to RFMF: In December 2022, Rabuka crossed a constitutional red line rhetorically, but did he cross the criminal threshold operationally

People’s Alliance leader Sitiveni Rabuka says his request for the military to intervene in the electoral counting process was denied by Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Commander Major General Ro Jone Kalouniwai.

From Fijileaks Archive, 16 December 2022

"In a constitutional democracy, private disputes must be resolved by law, not by ministerial influence. On that basis, Biman Prasad’s involvement was not institutionally justified and sets an undesirable precedent for political interference in commercial matters."

Click, Click, Click. From Constitutional Limits to Camera Limits. When Boundaries Allegedly Didn't Apply to Biman Prasad

From Fijileaks Archive, 8 June 2023

Archives

Why Lands Minister Vosarogo was an Inappropriate Referee for Barbara Malimali’s FICAC Commissioner Application.
Was he aware of the Tuvalu A-G's letter (23 May 2017) to Malimali banning her from practising in Tuvalu?

www.fijileaks.com/home/non-disclosure-misrepresentation-and-the-validity-of-appointment-did-barbara-malimalis-ficac-application-survive-the-test-of-candour

The Danger of Turning Prosecution into Political Licence

Yesterday's Bainimarama loyalists are now Tomorrow's State witnesses.
In June 2023, a military delegation, led by Col ATUNAISA VAKATALE, the Commanding Officer of Fiji's largest foot soldiers, and Col ASERI ROKOURA, feted their former military commander at his residence