Blog Archives

PROFIT ON PAPER, LOSS IN REALITY: Inside Fiji Airways $25 million Deficit. But High Interest Rates Overseas, Fewer Holidays to Fiji? How Global Borrowing Costs Could Shape Fiji Airways's Next SIX MONTHS

31/3/2026

The $25 Million Illusion: Profit in Substance, Loss on Paper

The much-cited $25 million loss reported by Fiji Airways in 2024 was less a reflection of operational weakness than an artefact of accounting distortion.

Beneath the headline figure lay a fundamentally profitable enterprise. The airline generated record revenues of $1.85 billion and, crucially, delivered an operating profit of $23.7 million before non-cash adjustments.

Chairman, Nalin Patel

The decisive factor that tipped the accounts into loss was foreign exchange volatility: the strengthening US dollar inflated the value of Fiji Airways’ US-denominated lease obligations, producing an $83.5 million unrealised translation loss.

This was not cash leaving the business, but an accounting entry required under international financial reporting standards. Layered atop this were structural cost pressures - aircraft lease expenses, fuel volatility, and the re-entry of global competitors suppressing yields.

Yet the core indicators tell a different story: rising passenger volumes, strong cash reserves, and sustained demand across key routes.

In short, Fiji Airways did not lose $25 million in the ordinary commercial sense; it absorbed an accounting hit in a year of expansion, investment, and post-pandemic normalisation.

The distinction is not semantic. It goes to the heart of whether the national carrier is weakening or, in fact, consolidating its long-term position as the economic engine of Fiji’s tourism-dependent economy.

HIGH INTEREST RATES, FEWER HOLIDAYS? HOW GLOBAL BORROWING COSTS COULD SHAPE FIJI AIRWAYS’ NEXT SIX MONTHS

Any forward-looking assessment of Fiji Airways cannot stop at exchange rates, fuel prices, or operational performance. There is another, quieter force working its way through the system, one that does not appear directly in airline accounts but exerts a powerful influence on demand: interest rates in Fiji’s major tourist source markets.

Over the past two years, central banks in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom have raised interest rates sharply in response to inflation. While these decisions are made far from Fiji, their consequences are felt acutely in a tourism-dependent economy. The connection is straightforward, but often overlooked.

When interest rates rise, borrowing becomes more expensive. Mortgage repayments increase, credit card debt becomes costlier, and disposable income shrinks. Households, faced with higher financial commitments, begin to adjust their spending.

And among the first expenditures to be reconsidered is discretionary travel. For Fiji Airways, this matters profoundly.

The Indirect Pressure on Demand

Unlike fuel costs or exchange rates, which affect the airline directly, interest rates operate through behaviour. They shape the decisions of travellers in Sydney, Auckland, and Los Angeles markets that supply a large share of Fiji’s visitors.

When interest rates are high, households delay or shorten holidays, travellers downgrade from premium to economy, advance bookings become more cautious, and price sensitivity increases. The effect is not immediate collapse, but gradual softening. Flights may still be full but yields decline.

The Timing Effect. Why Six Months Matters

Interest rate impacts are rarely instantaneous. They work with a lag. Many travellers book holidays months in advance. Savings buffers and pent-up demand, especially following the COVID-19 period, have so far cushioned the effect of higher borrowing costs. This explains why tourism has remained relatively strong despite rising rates.

But over a six-month horizon, that buffer begins to thin. Fixed-rate mortgages reset at higher levels, savings accumulated during earlier periods are drawn down, and households adjust to a new financial reality. It is at this point that travel decisions become more constrained.

What This Means for Fiji Airways

For Fiji Airways, rising interest rates in source markets translate into three key risks:

1. Softer Demand Growth

Passenger numbers may remain stable, but growth slows. The rapid rebound seen in recent years may not be sustained.

2. Downward Pressure on Fares

Travellers become more price-sensitive, forcing airlines to offer competitive fares. This reduces revenue per seat, even if planes remain full.

3. Shift in Travel Patterns

There might be fewer long-haul trips, shorter stays, and increased reliance on promotions and discounts.

The Interaction With Other Risks

Interest rates do not operate in isolation. They intersect with the other pressures already facing Fiji Airways:

A strong US dollar increases financial liabilities
High fuel prices compress margins
Competition limits pricing power

When combined with weaker consumer spending abroad, these pressures reinforce one another. A full aircraft, under these conditions, does not necessarily translate into strong profitability.

A Structrual Reality For Fiji

For Fiji, the implications extend beyond the airline. Tourism is not simply one sector among many. It is a central pillar of the economy. When interest rate rises in foreign markets, it reduces travel demand, the effects ripple through hotels and resorts, transport services, retail and hospitality, and ultimately government revenue,

Fiji Airways, as the gateway carrier, sits at the front line of this exposure.

The story of Fiji Airways over the next six months will not be written solely in its financial statements. It will be written in mortgage repayments in Sydney, credit card balances in Auckland, and consumer confidence in Los Angeles.

Because in a tourism-dependent economy, the price of money abroad shapes the flow of visitors at home.

Fiji Airways may control its routes and operations but the decision to travel lies with households overseas, and those decisions are now being made in an era of higher interest rates, not to remind us all of the war in the Middle East.

Fiji Airways 2024 Annual Report

GEORGE SPEIGHT. From Coup to Clean & Jerk: The Architect of 2000’s Chaos Now Flexes His ‘Strength’ in Weightlifting Gym. What about Truth and Reconciliation Commission - When will He Lift Up The Veil on 2000?

30/3/2026

There are moments in Fiji’s public life that defy belief, not because they are unfamiliar, but because they expose, yet again, the country’s uneasy relationship with memory, accountability, and consequence.

Here is a man whose name is indelibly tied to the trauma of the 2000 coup, a rupture that left deaths, deep ethnic division, and institutional damage in its wake, and now recast in a scene of physical exertion, hoisting weights as if history itself were something that could be lifted, shrugged off, and quietly set aside.

His defenders will be quick to insist that he has ‘served his time’, that the ledger of justice has been settled and the past should be left where it belongs. That may be legally correct. But law and memory are not the same currency. A prison sentence may satisfy the formal demands of justice; it does not extinguish the historical weight of what occurred, nor the continuing moral questions that linger in its aftermath.

For many Fijians, the images jar. They sit uneasily against the unresolved legacy of that period: the hostages, the mutiny, the loss of life, and the long shadow cast over constitutional governance. Strength, in this context, is no longer a neutral display of muscle and discipline.

It invites a harder question: what does it mean for a society when those associated with its darkest chapters appear to move on, publicly, almost casually, while the moral and political reckoning remains incomplete?

This is not about fitness. It is about memory. And in Fiji, memory has a stubborn way of resurfacing - no matter how heavy the weights, or how rehearsed the performance of moving on.

2000: Tarakinikini and Speight

If Not the Gym, Then the Truth Commission, Speight?

When George Speight resurfaces in public life, the question is no longer about punishment served, but about truth still withheld. For a figure so central to the 2000 coup, the issue is not whether he has lifted enough weights but whether he has lifted the veil.

Should he be before a truth and reconciliation commission? In any serious post-conflict framework, the answer would lean heavily toward yes.

Such bodies are not courts; they exist to establish a full historical record, to hear victims, and to compel, morally if not legally, those responsible to account for their actions in their own words.

If Fiji is to move beyond selective memory, then reconciliation cannot be one-sided. It requires participation from those who shaped the crisis, not just those who suffered it.

RFMF Barracks, 2 November 2024: Shane Stevens, the key figure in the mutiny

EDITORIAL NOTE: Shane Stevens' statement was passed to us while he was still serving his sentence, for inclusion in our book on Bloodbath at the Barracks

CAPTAIN Shane Stevens account of reasons behind the mutiny and his views on Bainimarama's conduct in 2000:

When GS (George Speight) and the CRW (Counter Revolutionary Warfare) conducted the coup on 19th May, 2000, the CRW unit was led by Lt Penaia Baleinamau who after a few days and under the direct orders of Cmdr. Voreqe Bainimarama, supplied logistical support for all CRW security operations inside the parliament complex, including those around the detained MPs.

For example, daily reports were relayed to CL JB in operations; all hot rations were delivered directly from QEB at meal times into parliament for the CRW and the other FMF soldiers there. Extra arms and ordinances were transported in under Police escort from QEB. All soldiers were transported in on shift rotation and all pays carried on unhindered. Insofar as everyone was concerned, Cmdr. VB and his command were always in daily contact with GS and aware of the situation in the parliament complex. At times, GS was transported to brief Cmdr. VB and officers up at QEB officers mess on the progress and direction of the coup and VB even directed officers to support the coup.

This continued until the events of 29th May, 2000 when without the knowledge of GS, the President, Ratu Mara was forcefully removed by a group of senior ex and serving military personnel, including Cmdr. Bainimarama at Dakuibeqa. Cmdr. Bainimarama then proceeded to abrogate the constitution, pronounce himself head of state and duly appointed Ratu Epeli Nailatikau as his PM. That evening a military delegation of acting CMD CL Tuatoka, Lt Cl Etueni Caucau and led by Cl Filipo Tarakinikini entered the parliament complex to present to GS and his group a kamunaga from Cmdr. VB. They conveyed what he had done at Dakuibeqa and specifically that he was in agreement with the coup objectives of GS and later in the speech requested that GS hand over control of the coup to him (VB). He gave his assurances to GS that the objectives of the coup would be fulfilled and the I taukei will be happy.

GS and his group were shocked at the treachery which took place at Dakuibeqa and immediately rejected the kamunaga with the demand that Cmdr. VB and his PM resign immediately and hand power back to the President RT Mara. The delegation returned to camp to convey the message to VB and his “Think Tank” who were not at all happy.

Voreqe refused to step down and consequently it took 56 days for the GS group to force him to relinquish executive power and agree to the terms of the Muanikau Accord. What followed next was another act of treachery by VB and the rest is now history.

During the 56 day conflict between the GS group and VB, the CRW in parliament were led by Maj Ilisoni Ligairi and supported by Lt Baleinamau based up at the CRW complex in QEB. Lt SS sided with VB against the CRW “GS group” and he was not pleased with Baleinamau’s continued support for the operations in parliament. Upon Lt SS’s insistence, Cmdr VB duly promoted him to Cpt and gave him total command of the CRW complex at QEB. LT Baleinamau was stood down, sent home and placed under surveillance. Then on behalf of Cmdr VB, CPT SS proceeded to capture a cache of CRW arms stored at a secret location at Bilo. This caused a fracture in relationships between the CRW and CPT SS who was now being threatened from within.

Towards the end of the 56 days, Lt SS was directly in control of two caches of CRW arms (those in the CRW complex at QEB and the other in the bush at Bilo). However, the third cache of arms was used in parliament under the control of Maj Ligairi. After the signing of the Muanikau Accord and the release of the detained MP’s, Lt CL FT and CPT SS were also given specific orders by Cmdr VB to enter parliament and oversee the return of these arms to the CRW armoury at QEB as per MAccord. Immediately after that, everyone in parliament then dispersed and returned to their homes however a large group was convinced by the QV Takiveikata, to go to Kalabu and await the “qusi ni loaloa” ceremony. QV kept stalling this event to the suspicion of GS and others at the school.

It would become known at this time that when the arms from parliament had entered the gates at QEB, CL JB intercepted them by force and ordered that they be redirected to the main armoury. Later that day, when the CRW soldiers who were at parliament tried to return to the CRW complex to resume their duties as per MA, they were refused entry into the camp. After numerous attempts by Maj Ligairi and GS to speak to Lt JB and Cmdr VB over the phone, there was no response.

After observing that Cmdr VB was directly violating the MA, CPT SS, who was still in possession of the last cache of arms at a secret location in Bilo, refused to return these arms until he had personal guarantees from Cmdr VB that he would honour the conditions of the MA, where specifically all CRW would return to barracks and resume their duties as per normal. After receiving these assurances from Cmdr VB, CPT SS returned the remaining Bilo arms to QEB which was again forcefully commandeered by CL JB to the main armoury. All these sinister acts were viewed with unease by the GS group and MAJ Ligairi with those CRW at Kalabu and served to be an ominous sign of treachery against the MA.

The following day, 13 July, 2000 and after accounting for all of the arms from Bilo, the military proceeded with the arrest of the GS group including the armed raid on the Kalabu district school where Maj Ligairi and other CRW soldiers were arrested, badly assaulted and detained at Nukulau, QEB and the Nabua /CPS police stations. CPT SS viewed this act by Cmdr VB as the ultimate treachery against him but was still in two minds after it was announced that GS group had violated the MA with the revelation of missing arms. However, Maj Ligairi and his group disputed this because they were adamant that with the help and verification of CPT SS and Lt CL FT, all arms from parliament were returned and others (personal arms) were accounted for. The CRW parliament group had kept an immaculate and highly accurate record of all arms used within the complex during the 56 days including their return to QEB.

To validate the “missing arms” claims of Cmdr VB, CPT SS set about with the collaboration of Sgt Morris, the chief armourer at the time to inspect and record the details of all the ‘CRW parliament arms” in the main armoury. He discovered that the chief armourer was well aware that the “missing arms” claims were lies and that all arms were indeed returned and even accounted for. He would later learn from casual remarks by Cmdr VB and senior officers like CL JB that it was a fabricated story for the purpose of dishonouring the Muanikau Accord and they had already set in place a plan to arrest GS and all those in his group once all the arms were returned and accounted for. This was the final act of treachery and was the catalyst for the Nov 1 mutiny.

I have in my possession, the signed and original Chief Armourers report on the audit of all weapons that were returned from the parliament complex at the time. The report concludes that all weapons had been returned and others accounted for and that the so called, “13 missing weapons” were old SLR’s that were never in parliament at any time but kept in the main armoury.

CAPT SS’s account as to the real reason of the mutiny was not to kill Bainimarama but to replace him as he was seen as unfit for duty. At no time during the court martial was CAPT SS allowed to divulge the above information because of how the evidence was presented before the court.

The above statement is a true account by CPT SS and it highlights the fact that Cmdr VB has a history of carrying out treacherous acts so that he can progress his own personal interests and agenda for power. He has no qualms about deceiving people and even those who assume that they are close to him because of their long standing social and working relationships.

FROM CANE FIELDS to CORPORATE FIELDS: Displaced 40 Seaqaqa and Labasa Cane Farmers, an Indo-Fijian leader lecturing Diaspora FEST in India, and Chinese prisoner-turned partner in Fiji's Unequal Land Game

28/3/2026

FROM CANE FIELDS TO CORPORATE FIELDS: Displaced Farmers and Unequal Land Game

In Fiji today, three narratives are unfolding along the same fault line. They do not arise from a single transaction, nor do they share a common lineage. Yet, when read together, they illuminate a deeper and more troubling pattern in the governance of land, the country’s most sensitive and politically charged resource. At one end stand the displaced cane farmers of the north; at the other, a former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister engaged in global Indian diaspora discourse on “inclusive growth”; and threading through both, a corporate relationship between an iTaukei Minister and a convict that began not in a boardroom, but in a prison.

In the cane belts of Labasa and Seaqaqa, some forty farming families have been left without land following the non-renewal of their agricultural leases. These are not recent arrivals or speculative tenants. They are, in many cases, descendants of indentured Indian labourers whose families have cultivated the same plots for generations.

Their lives were built on the fragile but enduring expectation that, so long as they met their obligations, renewal would follow. They planted, harvested, paid rent, and sustained not only their own households but a substantial part of Fiji’s sugar economy. Yet when the leases expired, the system offered them neither continuity nor credible transition. Applications failed, processes stalled, and the land was no longer available. What remained was displacement, economic, social, and, for many, deeply personal.

At precisely the same moment, Fiji’s former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Biman Chand Prasad, was in Bengaluru, India, addressing the Indiaspora Conference. There he spoke of shared values, global partnerships, and the promise of inclusive growth. There is nothing inherently objectionable in such engagement. Indeed, the cultivation of diaspora networks is often prudent statecraft. But the geography of the moment cannot be ignored.

For this crisis is unfolding not in some distant or politically marginal district, but in Labasa, the very region from which Prasad’s own political journey began. The cane fields of the north were not incidental to his rise; they were foundational. They shaped his constituency, informed his public voice, and underwrote his passage into Parliament.

The contrast is therefore not merely political; it is biographical. While the former minister speaks abroad of inclusion, exclusion unfolds at home, on the very ground that once sustained his political credibility. There has been no sustained public reckoning with the lease non-renewals, no clear articulation of how the language of “inclusive growth” accommodates the sudden landlessness of long-settled farming communities. Silence, in this context, does not operate as neutrality. It becomes part of the structure through which these outcomes are normalised.

Running parallel to this is a third narrative, one that would strain credulity were it not so plainly recorded in the corporate register. Ifereimi Vasu, now Minister for iTaukei Affairs, was formerly Commissioner of Prisons. During his tenure, a Chinese national, Jason Zhong, was convicted and imprisoned in Fiji for serious offences involving drugs and sex trafficking. It was within that custodial setting that the two men became acquainted. Ordinarily, such a connection would end at the prison gate, bounded by the institutional logic of punishment and release. In this instance, it did not.

Following Zhong’s release, the relationship transitioned into commerce. Through Qera Mai Lagi Pte Ltd, the former prisoner and his former jailor became business partners in a land-linked enterprise, with Zhong holding a majority share and Vasu a significant minority, both serving as directors.

Over time, the structure evolved. Directors resigned, family members assumed positions, and an additional corporate layer was introduced through a related properties entity. Yet the essential association, the movement from incarceration to partnership, remained the central fact.

None of this, taken in isolation, necessarily breaches the letter of the law. A person who has served a sentence is entitled to reintegrate into society. Corporate partnerships, even between unlikely actors, are not per se unlawful. Lease non-renewal, under Fiji’s land tenure framework, is legally permissible. But legality, in such circumstances, is an incomplete measure. What matters is the pattern of outcomes the system produces.

Set side by side, these three narratives reveal a stark asymmetry. A man who entered Fiji’s prison system for trafficking offences emerges and participates in a land-based enterprise alongside a politically exposed figure. An Indo-Fijian leader from Labasa articulates a vision of inclusion and development on the international stage. Meanwhile, families whose connection to the land is measured not in years but in generations find themselves displaced, their livelihoods extinguished, their future uncertain.

This is not irony in the literary sense; it is inversion in the structural sense. The pathways that one might expect to be difficult - reintegration into economic life after serious criminal conviction - appear navigable when accompanied by proximity to power.

The pathways one might expect to be secure, continued occupation of land long cultivated and productively used, prove precarious, even untenable, in the absence of such proximity.

What emerges, then, is not a single scandal but a dual reality. In one Fiji, land is scarce, leases are fragile, and livelihoods are contingent upon decisions taken elsewhere. In another, land is accessible through corporate structuring, relationships, and the quiet reconfiguration of ownership and control. Both realities operate within the same legal framework. Only one of them consistently produces stability and opportunity.

The question that follows is unavoidable. How did Fiji arrive at a point where a former prisoner could find a pathway into land-based enterprise, an Indo-Fijian political leader could speak of inclusive growth abroad, and the very farmers who sustained that land for generations could be left without it?

Until that question is answered, not with rhetoric, but with structural reform, the language of inclusion will remain precisely that: language. For the farmers of Labasa, it will offer neither land, nor livelihood, nor the security that has now been taken from them.

CHINESE WELCOME: After the 1987 racially motivated coups, Sitiveni Rabuka was happy to welcome Chinese farmers and businessmen into Fiji to replace the Indo-Fijians. They were to come from mainland China and Hong Kong.
'The Chinese would be the best substitute. They are hard workers and have no political ambitions,' he said. What about the Indo-Fijians?
'As far as I am concerned Indians (Indo-Fijians) are welcome to stay and make as much money as they like.'

From Fijileaks Archives

Statement by the Leader of the Opposition – Hon. Inia Seruiratu

I am deeply concerned by reports brought to my Office that more than 40 families in the Labasa and Seaqaqa areas are facing the non-renewal of their land leases by the iTaukei Land Trust Board (TLTB). The majority of those affected are hardworking farmers who have, for years, contributed meaningfully to the economic life of Vanua Levu.

These tenants are not idle occupants of land, they are the very individuals who cultivate it, who ensure productivity, who sustain supply chains and who support livelihoods not only for their own families but for the wider community. Their continued presence on the land is integral to food security, rural stability and economic development in the North.

It is therefore troubling that so many of these tenants now face uncertainty and possible displacement. Of equal concern are reports that many are being asked to pay premiums ranging from $30,000 to $50,000 as a condition for lease renewal. For ordinary farming families, such sums are simply beyond reach and risk effectively excluding them from continued access to the land they have long developed and depended upon.

I am particularly disappointed that the Government has not taken proactive steps to address this issue. There appears to be a clear lack of coordination between the Government and TLTB, as well as insufficient engagement with landowners to ensure that lease renewals are managed in a manner that is fair, transparent and beneficial to all parties.

Landowners must, of course, receive a fair return from their land. However, this must be balanced against the broader national interest of keeping productive land in use and supporting those who have demonstrated commitment to its development. Allowing leases to lapse without viable renewal pathways, or imposing prohibitive financial demands, undermines both economic stability and social cohesion.

I call on the Government to urgently intervene and work collaboratively with TLTB and landowners to find practical, equitable solutions. This includes reviewing the imposition of excessive premiums, improving coordination mechanisms, and ensuring that genuine, longstanding tenants are given a fair opportunity to continue their farming activities. The future of Vanua Levu’s agricultural sector depends on decisions made today. We cannot afford policies or practices that drive farmers off the land and leave productive areas idle.

My Office will continue to monitor this situation closely and advocate for the affected families.

RIP. Ratu Epeli Nailatikau Dies at 84. This Time, Confirmed, No RUMOUR

27/3/2026

RIP. Our friend for over five decades

After the false alarms of 2025 that once had us reluctantly preparing an obituary only to withdraw it hours later, the news that has now emerged is, sadly, the truth. Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, former President of Fiji, long-serving diplomat, and a figure whose life traversed the military, political, and ceremonial corridors of the State, has passed away. This time, there is no need to check, re-check, and hesitate between sources. The confirmation is firm, the moment final. For those who knew him, worked with him, or crossed paths with him across decades of Fiji’s turbulent political history, the passing marks not merely the end of a public life, but the closing of a chapter shaped by loyalty, service, and, at times, the difficult ambiguities of power in post-coup Fiji.

RIP. Ratu Epeli Nailatikau (1941–2026): A Verified Farewell After Earlier False Death Reports

It is with deep respect and sorrow that we announce the passing of former President, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau. While making the announcement, Roko Tui Bau, Ratu Timoci Tavanavanua says Na Turaga Mai Naisogalaca, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau passed away peacefully last night after being admitted to the hospital earlier last night (26/3/2026)

From Fijileaks Archive, 11 September 2025

www.fijileaks.com/home/ratu-epeli-nailatikau-killed-by-rumour-resurrected-by-my-reliable-sources-the-ex-pressie-lives-on-how-i-almost-buried-my-old-friend-before-my-morning-breakfast-until-a-source-bro-late-pressie-is-alive

REHABILITATION OR REPUTATION-LAUNDERING? The Yellow Ribbon Ideal, the Vasu-Zhong Nexus, and the Message to Fiji's Drug Underworld

26/3/2026

The former Prison Commissioner Vasu and former drug and sex trafficker convict Zhong

Francis Kean: Manslaughter convict to Prison Commissioner

2014: Lt Col Vasu, then
Commissioner of Correctional Services

There are few public policies more morally compelling than rehabilitation. The idea that a society can take those who have offended against it, hold them accountable, and then reintegrate them with dignity is central to any humane conception of justice.

The Yellow Ribbon Project, in its original conception, embodies precisely that ethic: that punishment is not the end of citizenship, and that redemption - earned, not assumed - remains possible.

But ideals do not operate in a vacuum. They live or die in their application. And in Fiji today, the question is no longer whether rehabilitation is a noble goal. It is whether it is being selectively invoked, strategically deployed, and ultimately distorted.

The Yellow Ribbon Principle: Redemption With Accountability

At its core, the Yellow Ribbon philosophy rests on three propositions:

That offenders, having served their sentence, should not be permanently excluded from society
That reintegration reduces recidivism and strengthens social stability
That the community itself must participate in giving individuals a second chance

This is not leniency. It is structured reintegration. It presupposes:

Acceptance of wrongdoing
Completion of lawful punishment
Demonstrable reform

Without these elements, the project risks collapsing into something else entirely: not rehabilitation, but absolution without accountability.

The Vasu-Zhong Nexus: Where Principle Meets Power

The controversy surrounding Ifereimi Vasu and his association with Jason Zhong brings this tension into sharp relief. Zhong is not a marginal offender. He is a convicted participant in activities - drug trafficking and sexual exploitation - that have devastating, long-term impacts on individuals and communities. These are not regulatory breaches or minor infractions. They are crimes that destroy families, entrench organised criminal networks, and corrode public trust.

Against that backdrop, the optics, and the substance, of political or institutional embrace become critical. If individuals convicted of such offences are seen to be welcomed into proximity with power, connected to business or state-linked opportunities, and shielded, implicitly or explicitly, by political patronage then the question is unavoidable: Is this rehabilitation or is it reputational laundering under the cover of reform?

The Distortion of Rehabilitation Into Patronage

Rehabilitation, properly understood, is individual and conditional. It does not confer entitlement to influence, access, or advantage. It certainly does not place former offenders in positions where they may intersect with state power or public resources without rigorous scrutiny. When governments, or those within them, appear to embrace such individuals without transparency, three distortions occur:

1. Rehabilitation becomes selective: Not all former offenders are treated equally. Those with connections advance; others remain marginalised.

2. Accountability is diluted: The emphasis shifts from what was done and remedied, to who now stands beside whom.

3. Public confidence erodes: Citizens begin to question whether justice is principled or transactional.

The Signal to Fiji's Drug Economy

The deeper concern is not symbolic. It is practical. Drug trafficking in Fiji is no longer peripheral. It is a growing, entrenched threat affecting urban communities, rural supply chains, youth vulnerability, and cross-border criminal networks. In such a context, the state’s posture matters enormously.

If the visible message becomes that even serious offenders can re-enter elite networks, that proximity to power mitigates stigma, that consequences are, ultimately, negotiable then the deterrent effect of the criminal law is weakened. The message to those engaged in or contemplating similar activity is not subtle: The system may punish but it may also later accommodate.

For a country grappling with the social cost of narcotics and exploitation, that is a dangerous ambiguity.

The Ethical Line: Reintegration Without Privilege

None of this is an argument against rehabilitation. On the contrary, it is an argument for preserving its integrity. A credible Yellow Ribbon framework must insist on a clear boundary: Reintegration into society: yes. Restoration of dignity: yes. Opportunity for lawful livelihood: yes . But preferential access to state-linked opportunities: no. Informal political endorsement: no. Association that blurs accountability: no. Rehabilitation cannot become a shortcut to influence.

Government Responsibility and Public Perception

For any government, the issue is not merely what is done, but how it is seen. Public officials, particularly Cabinet ministers, carry an additional burden: Their associations signal approval. Their networks confer legitimacy. Their silence can be interpreted as consent.

In the case of the Vasu–Zhong nexus, the absence of clear explanation or distancing invites speculation and, more importantly, undermines confidence in the consistency of governance.

What are we normalising?

The Yellow Ribbon ideal asks society to believe in second chances. That belief is fragile. It depends on fairness, transparency, and restraint. When those conditions are compromised, the project risks inversion from a pathway back into society to a pathway back into influence.

Fiji now faces a simple but profound question: Are we rehabilitating individuals or rehabilitating reputations?

Because if the answer is the latter, then the message being sent to victims, to communities, and to those still engaged in criminal enterprise, is not one of justice tempered by mercy.

It is one of inconsistency.

And in the long run, inconsistency is the one thing no legal system can afford.

Aiyaz Khaiyum inspecting prison beds as Francis Kean gives him a guided tour of prison facilities

The experience of Francis Kean provides a stark illustration of how the rhetoric of rehabilitation in Fiji has, at times, been overtaken by the logic of power. The reintegration of offenders in Fiji has often occurred in a penal system where accountability is uneven and institutional boundaries are blurred.

Kean, convicted of manslaughter in 2007 yet retaining naval rank and subsequently rising to senior public office, exemplifies a pattern in which individuals linked to the state, particularly through the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, were not merely rehabilitated but effectively reabsorbed into positions of authority.

This was not confined to Kean alone; the broader 1987, 2000, and 2006 post-coup environment saw soldiers and associated actors implicated in serious abuses reintegrated into the security apparatus with minimal visible accountability. The result was a distortion of the rehabilitative ideal: instead of a structured return to society grounded in contrition and reform, rehabilitation became, in practice, a mechanism through which loyalty and proximity to power could eclipse the gravity of prior conduct.

Padre Epeli Ratabacaca

The pattern is neither confined to the security sphere nor to politically connected individuals. It extends into Fiji’s chiefly and religious institutions, where the language of forgiveness has too often blurred into institutional indulgence.

Chiefs convicted of serious offences have, in some instances, found their way back into the councils of traditional authority, including the Great Council of Chiefs, their status appearing to survive conviction with minimal lasting consequence.

Likewise, cases have been recorded in which church pastors, imprisoned for rape or sexual assault against their own congregants, have later been welcomed back into positions of spiritual leadership.

In both settings, the invocation of cultural respect or Christian forgiveness risks displacing the foundational principles of accountability and protection of the vulnerable. Rehabilitation, properly understood, should restore individuals to society, not reinstate them, without scrutiny, to positions of trust over the very communities they once harmed.

Jo NATA

The critique of the Yellow Ribbon program is not confined to external observers; it has also come from within those who once participated in both its conception and its lived reality.

As my former classmate and later journalist workmate Josefa Nata, himself convicted for his role in the 2000 George Speight coup, has stated, the initiative has, in his view, “outlived its use” and drifted from its original purpose of genuine reintegration.

Speaking publicly, he recalled telling Ifereimi Vasu (then Prison Commissioner) that the programme had effectively become “dead as far as the prisoners are concerned” and reduced to little more than a funding mechanism rather than a vehicle for meaningful reform.

Coming from a figure who has experienced both incarceration and reintegration, the observation carries particular weight: it suggests not only institutional fatigue but a deeper distortion, where the language of rehabilitation risks being retained even as its substance is hollowed out, opening the door to its selective use in legitimising the return of individuals whose reintegration demands far greater scrutiny.

QERA MAI LAGI, Vasu-Zhong Nexus: From Corporate Shell to Political Exposure. How an i-Taukei Minister, a Family Network, and a Convicted Chinese Drug and Sex Trafficker Converge in the Fiji’s Company Register

25/3/2026

QERA MAI LAGI: 'Land from Heaven' and the Reality of OWNERSHIP

A Corporate Structure Demanding Scrutiny

The corporate records of Qera Mai Lagi Pte Ltd and its related entity Qera Mai Lagi Properties Pte Limited reveal a tightly controlled, evolving structure that raises serious questions of governance, beneficial ownership, and political propriety. At the centre of this structure sits Ifereimi Vasu, now Minister for iTaukei Affairs, alongside Jason Zhong, a convicted drug and sex trafficker.

Navakamocea

The documentary trail, when read sequentially, is not merely administrative. It discloses a pattern of incorporation, consolidation, and eventual familial consolidation of control.

The Creation of a Second Layer: Qera Mai Lagi Properties
A second entity emerges, 16 October 2021

QERA MAI LAGI: A Corporate Trail from Partnership to Family Control, and the Questions It Now Raises for a Sitting Coalition Minister

The corporate history of Qera Mai Lagi is, on its face, unremarkable. It begins in 2017 as a private company registered under Fiji’s Companies Act, and it continues, at least formally, as a compliant entity with standard articles, filed returns, and identifiable directors.

Yet when the documents are read together, across time, and in light of the individuals involved, the company’s trajectory reveals something more complex: a movement from direct partnership to layered ownership, and ultimately to familial control, all while the original relationships remain embedded beneath the surface.

Qera Mai Lagi Pte Ltd was registered on 20 October 2017, operating from 175 Rewa Street in Samabula, Suva, a location that would become a constant in its corporate identity. From the outset, the company was closely held. It had no ultimate holding company, no dispersed shareholders, and no indication of external investment.

Instead, it reflected a tightly controlled arrangement between two individuals: Jason Zhong and Ifereimi Vasu. Zhong held the majority stake: 7,000 shares out of 10,000 while Vasu held 3,000 shares. Both men also served as directors, placing them in joint control of the company’s affairs, albeit with Zhong retaining decisive voting power.

At that time, and viewed retrospectively, this arrangement is significant. It was not a passive investment. It was an active corporate partnership between a private businessman, a convicted drug and sex trafficker, and a man who is now Minister for iTaukei Affairs. The legal structure did not conceal this relationship; it recorded it plainly. Zhong and Vasu were, in both ownership and governance terms, co-participants in the same enterprise.

Four years later, in October 2021, a second entity was incorporated: Qera Mai Lagi Properties Pte Limited . This was not an unrelated venture. It was, structurally and legally, an extension of the first company.

The sole shareholder of the new entity was Qera Mai Lagi Pte Ltd itself, thereby creating a layered corporate arrangement in which the 2017 company became the parent and the 2021 company its wholly owned subsidiary.

Once again, Zhong and Vasu appeared at the centre. Zhong was recorded as both director and company secretary, while Vasu remained a director. The addresses remained linked, the control remained concentrated, and the structure now took on a familiar commercial form: assets or operations could be placed in the subsidiary, while ownership remained upstream in the parent.

At this stage, both in the past and in present analysis, the structure carries a dual character. On one hand, it is entirely lawful. Corporate layering of this kind is common, particularly where property or development interests are involved. On the other hand, it introduces opacity. The true economic interests are no longer visible at a single level.

Instead, they must be traced through the parent entity, whose own ownership is limited to two individuals. In such a structure, the distinction between legal ownership and beneficial control becomes more difficult to scrutinise, especially in the absence of detailed disclosures.

The turning point arrives in September 2023. The records show that both Jason Zhong and Ifereimi Vasu ceased to be directors of the original company on 26 September 2023. This was not a gradual transition; it was simultaneous. On the same date, two new directors were appointed: Pita Vasu and Merewai Vosi Vasu, both residing at the same Kinoya address associated with the Vasu family. The shift is immediate and total.

The original directors exit, and family members step in.

In past tense, this appears as a restructuring. In present tense, it reads as a transfer of visible control. The company remains active, the shares remain issued, and the corporate identity remains unchanged. Yet the individuals now appearing on the register are no longer the original partners. Instead, they are members of the Minister’s immediate familial circle.

What is striking, however, is what does not appear to have changed. The shareholding structure, as last recorded, still shows Jason Zhong holding 70 per cent and Ifereimi Vasu holding 30 per cent. There is no accompanying documentation, at least in the materials provided by the Registrar of Companies, indicating that these shares were transferred to the newly appointed directors. There is no record of a change in beneficial ownership, nor any indication that Zhong’s majority stake has been diluted or extinguished. The directors have changed, but the underlying ownership appears to remain intact.

This disconnect between control and ownership is legally significant. It suggests that while formal governance has shifted away from Minister Vasu and his business associate, the economic interests may not have. In company law, the distinction between legal title and beneficial interest is well understood. A director may resign, and another may be appointed, without altering who ultimately benefits from the company’s assets and profits.

Where family members replace an outgoing director, the question inevitably arises: are they acting independently, or are they holding the position on behalf of the original controlling party?

In present analysis, the pattern is difficult to ignore. A company originally controlled by Zhong and Vasu continues to exist. Its subsidiary continues to be owned by it. The Minister is no longer formally a director, yet individuals bearing his name and residing at his address now control the board. Zhong, who was the majority shareholder, disappears from the list of directors but not from the register of members. The structure, therefore, evolves in form but not necessarily in substance.

This raises broader questions that extend beyond corporate compliance. At the time the company was formed and operated under Zhong and Vasu, the relationship was explicit. Today, as the company continues under new directors, that relationship is less visible but arguably still present. If the shareholding remains unchanged, then Minister Vasu retains a 30 per cent interest, and Zhong retains 70 per cent. If the shareholding has changed, then the absence of clear filings becomes its own issue, pointing to potential deficiencies in disclosure.

The legal concerns that arise are not speculative; they are rooted in established principles. Where a public office holder has an interest in a private company, whether direct or indirect, there are obligations of transparency. These include the disclosure of shareholdings, directorships, and any interests that may give rise to a conflict. Where those interests are transferred to family members, the inquiry does not end. The law looks to substance over form. It asks whether the transfer is genuine or whether control has simply been reallocated within a closely connected group.

In the case of Qera Mai Lagi, the past and the present converge in a single question: has there been a genuine disengagement by Ifereimi Vasu from the company, or has there been a restructuring designed to remove his name from the register while leaving the underlying interests intact?

The documents do not answer this conclusively. They show a sequence - formation, partnership, expansion, and then familial substitution but they do not fully disclose the end state of ownership.

Compounding this is the continuing association with Jason Zhong. As the original majority shareholder and co-director, his role was central. If he remains a shareholder, then the company remains linked to him. If he has exited, then the absence of a documented transfer raises its own questions. Either way, the historical fact remains: the company was built as a joint venture between Zhong and Vasu, and that foundational relationship has not been clearly unwound in the records.

What emerges, therefore, is not a single defect but a pattern of opacity. The company is properly registered, yet its ownership is not fully transparent. Its directors have changed, yet its control may not have. Its structure is lawful, yet its implications, particularly in the context of a sitting Minister, are far from neutral.

For Fijians of all races, the significance lies in the continuity beneath the change. The names on the register may have shifted from Zhong and Vasu to members of the Vasu family, but the corporate architecture remains the same. The parent company still owns the subsidiary. The shareholding, on record, still reflects the original partnership. And the address, the relationships, and the history all point back to where the company began.

In the end, Qera Mai Lagi is both a past story and a present one. It was a partnership. It is now a family-controlled entity. It was transparent in its origins. It is less so in its current form. And until the question of beneficial ownership is answered with clarity, it will remain a company whose most important details lie not in what has been filed, but in what has yet to be fully disclosed.

YESTERDAY’S MAN, Today's Problem. How Jone Navakamocea's PAST was tolerated until he turned on his own ITaukei Affairs Minister VASU

24/3/2026

From Fijileaks Archive, 15 April 2025

*POLITICAL TURNCOAT. Navakamocea was State Minister for National Planning in the SDL government of Laisenia Qarase.

*Following the 5 December 2006 coup, he was appointed Minister for Local Government, Urban Development and Utilities in the interim government formed by Commodore Frank Bainimarama.

*Navakamocea was one of a few members of the Qarase government to run and join Bainimarama's interim regime.

*In August 2006, Navakamocea had caused racial storm when he demanded that the term Indo-Fijian be banned, saying it amounted to identity theft by Indo-Fijians.

*He claimed the term Indo-Fijian was created by racist Indo-Fijian academics like Dr Ganesh Chand for the purpose of 'Fijianising" the Indian ethnicity in Fiji at the expense of i-Taukei Fijians.

*However, our sources at the i-Taukei Affairs Board were shocked to see him take the job test in February for the post of Deputy PS Operations.

YESTERDAY’S MAN, TODAY’S TARGET: FROM TOLERATION TO
LEGAL THREAT IN THE NAVAKAMOCEA–VASU COLLISION

THERE was a time when Jone Navakamocea was not a problem to be solved but a figure to be accommodated. His past was known, his views were not hidden, and his political trajectory, marked by shifts across governments, was already part of the public record. Yet he was appointed, elevated, and ultimately entrusted with one of the most sensitive administrative roles in the State: PS in the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs.

That decision now sits in sharp contrast with the present moment. For the same man once accepted as a political insider now finds himself on a collision course with his own Minister, Ifereimi Vasu, facing not only legal threats but disciplinary scrutiny from the Public Service Commission. They were also SODELPA election candidates.

What has changed is not Navakamocea’s past. What has changed is where he has directed it.

A Record That Was Never Concealed

Navakamocea’s political life was never defined by obscurity. He moved through Fiji’s turbulent political landscape with a degree of adaptability that, depending on perspective, could be described either as pragmatism or opportunism. He served in the Qarase government, survived the rupture of the 2006 coup, and re-emerged within the Bainimarama administration - one of the few figures to straddle both eras.

Even then, his views were not without controversy. His objections to the use of the term ‘Indo-Fijian’ were publicly reported as far back as 2006, reflecting a position that many regarded as exclusionary and deeply unsettling in a multi-ethnic society.

Years later, those concerns resurfaced in a more immediate form. Alleged racist social media remarks attributed to him triggered public outrage and a formal investigation by the Public Service Commission, with senior political figures stressing that such comments had no place in government.

None of this was new. None of this was hidden. And yet, it was tolerated.

The Appointment: Familiarity Over Caution

When Navakamocea was appointed as Permanent Secretary for iTaukei Affairs, it was not done in ignorance of his past. By then, he and Vasu shared not only institutional proximity but a political lineage, both having stood as SODELPA election candidates, emerging from the same party ecosystem that now underpins the Coalition Government.

The appointment was therefore not merely administrative. It was relational. It reflected a calculation that whatever controversies surrounded Navakamocea could be contained within the machinery of government. His past, it seemed, was a known quantity, one that could be managed rather than confronted. For a time, that calculation held.

Tolerance as Governance

In the months that followed, there was no decisive rupture. The allegations, the concerns, the unease, they circulated, but they did not dislodge him. Even as the Public Service Commission began examining his remarks, the system absorbed the pressure. This was not an endorsement. It was something more subtle. It was tolerance.

And tolerance in politics is rarely passive. It is an active decision to prioritise stability over confrontation, to accept reputational risk in exchange for continuity. Navakamocea remained in place because, until recently, he had not crossed a line that the system considered intolerable.

The Present Moment: From Insider to Adversary

That line was crossed not in the past, but in the present. In an extraordinary public outburst, Navakamocea turned on his own Minister. He did not merely disagree; he challenged, accused, and threatened. He raised sensitive issues, including Vasu’s association with Jason Zhong, the convicted drug and sex trafficker, and did so not within the confines of internal governance but in the open arena of public discourse.

At that moment, the dynamic shifted irreversibly. The man who had once been tolerated as part of the system became a destabilising force within it.

The Reaction: Swift and Unforgiving

The response was immediate. The Ministry moved to defend itself, issuing a firm denial of the allegations and instructing legal counsel to pursue proceedings. At the same time, Navakamocea’s conduct was referred to the Public Service Commission, triggering formal disciplinary processes.

The language changed. Where there had once been silence, there was now condemnation. Where there had been accommodation, there was now escalation. This is the contrast that defines the present crisis.

What Changed And What Did Not

It is tempting to interpret this as a sudden fall from grace. But that would misunderstand the sequence. Navakamocea’s past did not change. His views did not change. His record did not change. What changed was his position within the political equation.

He was no longer aligned. He was no longer contained. He had become, in effect, an internal critic, one willing to expose and confront rather than comply.

The Irony at the Centre

There is an irony that cannot be ignored. The issues Navakamocea has now raised, particularly those touching on Vasu’s relationship with Zhong, were already in circulation. They had been defended, minimised, or managed at various levels of government.

But it took an insider, a former ally, to bring them into sharp institutional conflict. In doing so, Navakamocea has not only challenged his Minister. He has exposed the limits of the system that once tolerated him.

The Collapse of Political Convenience

Navakamocea was, until very recently, yesterday’s man, controversial but accepted, divisive but accommodated, a figure whose past was weighed and ultimately set aside in the interest of political cohesion.

Today, he is something else entirely. He is a problem. A litigant-in-waiting. A subject of disciplinary proceedings. And, perhaps most significantly, a reminder that in politics, tolerance is rarely permanent. It lasts only as long as it remains convenient.

Once that convenience disappears, the past - so carefully managed - returns with force.
And when it does, it is no longer a footnote.

It becomes the story.

Navakamocea had claimed that the late deposed Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase had endorsed his views on Indo-Fijians in Fiji.

*Navakamoce,did you know that Laisenia Qarase (RIP) was a JEW?

Fijileaks EDITORIAL NOTE:
From Girmit to Identity: Why Indo-Caribbean and Indo-Fijian Endure

The labels “Indo-Caribbean” and “Indo-Fijian” are not casual descriptors but historically grounded identities that emerged from the system of Indian indentured labour, known among the labourers themselves as the girmit (a vernacular rendering of “agreement”).

Between 1834 and 1917, the British Empire transported over a million Indians, largely from present-day Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, to plantation colonies across the Caribbean (such as Trinidad, Guyana, and Suriname), and Mauritius and Fiji, to replace enslaved African labour after abolition, and in the case of Fiji, to protect the iTaukei way of life (chiefs and commoners) from disintegrating under the impact of British colonial rule.

In both regions, the prefix “Indo-” signifies ancestral origin in India, while the suffix - “Caribbean” or “Fijian” - anchors the community in its place of settlement and historical experience. The terminology reflects a dual identity: neither wholly Indian in a contemporary national sense, nor reducible to the broader populations among whom they settled.

Instead, these communities evolved distinct cultural, linguistic, and political identities shaped by plantation life, colonial governance, and post-indenture struggles for land, rights, and representation.

In the Caribbean, “Indo-Caribbean” came into common usage as a way to distinguish descendants of Indian indentured labourers from Afro-Caribbean populations, particularly in societies where race and labour origins structured politics and social hierarchy.

Similarly, in Fiji, “Indo-Fijian” emerged to differentiate the descendants of Indian labourers from the indigenous iTaukei population, especially within a colonial framework that rigidly classified communities along ethnic lines for administrative and political purposes.

Crucially, these terms are not merely imposed colonial categories; they have been internalised and, at times, strategically embraced by the communities themselves. They encapsulate a shared historical memory of displacement, labour exploitation, cultural retention, and adaptation. Language (such as Fiji Hindi or Caribbean Hindustani), religion (Hinduism, Islam, Christianity), and social customs all evolved in these new environments, reinforcing a sense of collective identity distinct from both India and the host societies.

Ultimately, “Indo-Caribbean” and “Indo-Fijian” are products of empire, labour migration, and survival. They endure because they capture a complex truth: that identity, forged in the holds of ships and the fields of sugar plantations, does not dissolve with time but instead adapts, carrying both the memory of India and the reality of new homelands.

MEDIA STATEMENT

The Ministry of iTaukei Affairs notes with serious concern the continued false, malicious, and defamatory allegations made publicly by Mr. Jone Navakamocea against the Honourable Minister and the Ministry.

These allegations are categorically denied.

Following a full assessment of the statements made and their impact on the integrity of the Office of the Minister and the Ministry, we confirm that the matter has now been formally referred to our legal counsel.

Our Instructions to the legal counsels are very clear. That is to vigorously pursue all possible legal avenues and initiate proceedings as soon as practicable against Mr. Navakamocea to ensure that the integrity of our Minister and the Ministry is well protected and to uphold the principles of good governance.

“These legal proceedings will also extend to any individual or party who shares, republishes, or adds to false and defamatory claims.”

The Office of the Minister and the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs will not tolerate baseless attacks, misinformation, or attempts to undermine public institutions through reckless public commentary.

The allegations made are not only untrue, but they are also damaging to the credibility of Government and the trust placed in public office. Any individual who chooses to make such claims must be prepared to substantiate them through the appropriate legal channels.

At the same time, matters relating to Mr. Navakamocea’s conduct, performance, and employment within the civil service have been formally referred to the Public Service Commission. These matters will now proceed strictly in accordance with established disciplinary processes and applicable laws governing the public service.

While the Ministry remains firm in protecting its integrity, we also reaffirm that we welcome constructive feedback, responsible dialogue, and genuine contributions that help strengthen our service delivery to the iTaukei people.

However, baseless allegations and misinformation will not be taken lightly that can have serious repercussions on the trust, faith and confidence that are built through our dedication and commitment to public service.

The Ministry remains focused on its mandate and will not be distracted from delivering critical reforms and outcomes for the iTaukei people.

LOST IN TRANSLATION: Perhaps If the Statutory Declaration Forms Were in ‘Sudh Hindi’, NFP leader Biman Prasad Might Have Declared the Truth About Directorships in Lotus (Fiji) Ltd & Platinum Hotels & Resorts Ltd?

23/3/2026

Other details: Particulars of any other business connections, directorships, transactions or gifts in Fiji or Abroad
सुध हिन्दी अनुवाद: अन्य विवरण: फ़िजी या विदेश में किसी अन्य व्यावसायिक संबंध, निदेशक पद, लेन-देन या उपहार का विवरण

"Sudh"
Hindustani

Responding to Opposition MP Faiyaz Koya's insistence on promoting Fiji Hindi, Prof Prasad said this is not only insulting but a clear attempt to degrade the formal language of Indo-Fijians. Source: Fijilive

There are moments in public life when a national debate collapses under the weight of its own irony. This is one of them. At a time when Biman Chand Prasad is urging that sudh Hindi and iTaukei (Vosa Vakaviti) be made compulsory in schools, one document sits quietly in the background - unchanged, unambiguous, and inconvenient. The statutory declaration he signed in July 2014, and entered Parliament.

It was not written in Fiji Hindi. It was not written in sudh Hindi. It was not written in Vosa Vakaviti. It was written in English. And it required something quite simple to declare: “any other business connections, directorships, transactions or gifts in Fiji or abroad”.

The declaration went further: “the declaration was read over in the English language…and appeared fully to understand the meaning thereof.” Read over. Understood. Certified. Not mistranslated. Not misunderstood, at least on paper. And yet, given where matters now stand, one is tempted to ask: Would things have been different if the form had been:

in sudh Hindi, for linguistic purity?
in Fiji Hindi, for everyday understanding?
or even in Vosa Vakaviti, for national inclusion?

Because somewhere between reading and understanding, something appears to have gone missing. Not language. But disclosure.

The Missing Declarations

On the material now before the public, roles linked to Lotus Construction (Fiji) Ltd, and Platinum Hotels & Resorts Ltd were not declared. The consequences are no longer theoretical. They are before the courts.

Enter the Regulator Barbara Malimali

The matter might have ended there. It did not. In April 2025, the then FICAC Commissioner, Barbara Malimali, closed the entire file. Not on the basis that the declarations were complete. Not on the basis that no disclosure was required. But on the narrow ground that the candidate was not required to declare his superannuation.

Another Language Problem in English?

Which invites a further question, one that no curriculum reform can answer: Would the outcome have been different if the law had been read, not in English but in Vosa Vakaviti? Because the issue before Barbara Maralimali was not pension funds. It was disclosure of business interests: iTukutuku tale eso: Na ivakamacala matailalai ni veiwekani vakabisinisi, itutu ni dairekita, veivoli (transactions) se isolisoli e Viti se mai vei vanua tani

The Wrong Debate

Today, the country is invited to debate formal Hindi vs Fiji Hindi, linguistic dignity. and cultural hierarchy. All of which may be worthy. But none of which addresses the central issue now before the courts: whether the statutory obligation to declare was complied with.

Final Irony.

If the form had been in sudh Hindi, it might have been respected. If it had been in Fiji Hindi, it might have been understood. If it had been in Vosa Vakaviti, it might have been taken seriously.

But it was in English. And according to the declaration itself, it was read and understood by the former Professor at the USP. The problem was never the language of the form. The problem lies in what was left off it, and how it was later explained away.

'Show Us the Auditor-General's Report,' Demanded Politician Who Forgot to Show His Own DIRECTORSHIP in Lotus (Fiji) in 2014 Declaration

7 August 2014, NFP leader and Election Candidate Biman Prasad to Aiyaz Khaiyum: "Why isn't the government showing the Auditor-General's report to the public?"
Fijileaks: In his 28 July 2014 statutory declaration, Biman Prasad did not disclose that he was a 5% shareholder, co-founder, and co-director with his cousin Sunil Chand in Lotus Construction (Fiji) Ltd, and the company was constructing 28 villas in Legalega, Nadi for over $4million, and that he had guaranteed a $1.5million loan from ANZ Bank for the project.

The 2014 Lesson Still Unlearned
This is not the first time language and substance have parted ways. As Fijileaks previously observed in the 2014 election debate with Aiyaz Sayed Khaiyum, Biman Prasad's rhetorical fluency in sudh Hindi ran ahead of factual clarity. The performance was polished. The substance was less so. Eight years later, the pattern appears stubbornly intact.
From Fijileaks archive, 7 August 2014:

A QUESTION FROM 2006 IS STILL RELEVANT IN 2026
Back in 2006, I wrote, perhaps too bluntly for polite society, that those who insist on speaking only in “sudh Hindi”, rather than the living language of Fiji Hindi, might consider packing their bags and contesting elections in Mother India. It was a provocation, yes. But also a point. Because Fiji Hindi is not a corruption of language. It is the language of lived reality, a lingua franca forged across communities and generations.

FROM THE ARCHIVES: VICTOR LAL writing in the Fiji Sun during the 2006 general election campaign:

Fiji Hindi baat bolo, Indo-Fijian politicians!

You are not contesting election to Indian Parliament

By VICTOR LAL

ONE of the most ridiculous and nauseating features of the election campaign is the language usage of Indo-Fijian candidates on the election trail: a pseudo pompous and counterfeit Hindi, as if they are contesting for power in India and not in Fiji.

Several potential voters wrote to me complaining that instead of speaking in the everyday Fiji Hindi to them, the candidates have been making speeches in Shudh (Standard/Correct) Hindi, a language a vast majority of the Indo-Fijian voters hardly understand.

A similar spectacle has been displayed during Question Time and Talk Back programmes on Fiji TV. I decided to watch the appearance of Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi of the Fiji Labour Party, Bimal Prasad of the National Federation Party, Shiu Ram of COIN Party and Dildar Shah of the National Alliance Party on these two programmes.

Again, a pathetic reoccurring pattern, as if Vayeshnoi, who is contesting the Nadroga Indian Communal seat, was reading a script out of the Hindu holy book, the Bhagavad Gita. When, all he was trying to do, was to explain his party’s manifesto (for which there is no Fiji Hindi word).

The other three were equally guilty, and at times I felt sorry for Shiu Ram, who even resorted to English to make his point, instead of opting to speak the language of the Indo-Fijian masses, and over 30 per cent of taukei Fijians – Fiji Hindi.

What is wrong with speaking Fiji Hindi? Are they ashamed of the language of their coolie forefathers? Why are these Indo-Fijian candidates contesting the Indian communal seats when they are by commission or omission, speaking to the voters in the language of ‘Mother India’.

For God’s sake, even Indian candidates, despite belonging to different political parties, speak in the 700 different dialects and languages to their prospective voters in India. A regional aspiring candidate in Madras will be speaking in Madrassi, and even the Communist candidate in Bengal will be pouting his Maoist and Stalinist propaganda in Bengali. The Italian-born Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress Party, also speaks in a Hindi language which is understood by the vast majority of the voters.

More importantly, the candidates in Bihar would be speaking in Bhojpuri or Awadhi, from which the corrupt version of Fiji Hindi has originated in our country. So why can not our own aspiring Indo-Fijian politicians speak the language of their people?.

As Nemani Bainivalu, a University of the South Pacific Hindi graduate, and later a cultural assistant with the National Reconciliation Unit, had once pointed out, only 20 percent of Indo-Fijians can read and write their formal language.

Many Indo-Fijians cannot even read their holy books written in the Khadee Bolee dialect, and pass on religious teachings by word. I am not suggesting that Sudh Hindi be replaced in our education system, or that everyone should be writing novels like Dauka Puran by Professor Subramani of the Department of Literature and Language at the USP.

What I am protesting against is the gibberish Shudh Hindi that is being shoved down the throats of Indo-Fijian voters who are struggling to ‘swallow’ the words. The election message and manifestoes of the political parties would be better understood if the Indo-Fijian candidates resorted to the conversational Fiji Hindi at the hustings. It will also help bring the taukei Fijians into the campaign, especially the 30 per cent who speak the language, and many others who have a smattering command of it.

It must be made very clear to Indo-Fijian candidates that despite the teaching of Shudh Hindi and Urdu in schools, Fiji Hindi is an integral part of the identity and culture of the Indo-Fijian population. It is unique to Indo-Fijians in the world. The day Indo-Fijian politicians kill Fiji Hindi, they will be killing a part of their history and heritage in Fiji.

For no matter where one goes in the world, the moment one hears an Indo-Fijian open his mouth, one immediately asks him: ‘What part of Fiji are you from?’ In a similar vein, India Indians are able to separate us from them solely on the basis of our Fiji Hindi.

If the Indo-Fijian politicians and aspiring candidates are too ashamed to speak to us in the language of our coolie forefathers, they should pack their bags and their manifestoes and take the next Air India flight to India, and wait there for the next general election in that country to practice their Shudh Hindi. We don’t need Indian political impostors in Fiji.

Such candidates and Indo-Fijian leaders do not deserve our sympathy or votes.

Long live FIJI HINDI.

THE REAL IRONY: The irony now is difficult to ignore. A man who dismisses Fiji Hindi as inadequate finds himself entangled not in linguistic confusion, but in legal omission. The statutory forms did not fail him. The language did not fail him. The law was clear.

The question is not whether formal Hindi should be taught. It is whether those who seek to elevate language should first demonstrate clarity, honesty, and completeness in the language of law. Perhaps the problem was never Fiji Hindi. Perhaps the problem was never the language at all.

LOST IN TRANSLATION OR LOST IN JUDGMENT?
If Only the Form Was in Sudh Hindi, Fiji Hindi… or Even Vosa Vakaviti

Colloquial Fiji Hindi (Everyday Fiji Baat) Aur jankari: Fiji ya bides mein koi aur business ke sambandh, director ke pad, len-den ya gift ke baare mein sab jankari

There is something faintly comic, if it were not so constitutionally troubling, about the latest linguistic crusade of Biman Chand Prasad. The NFP leader and former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, now better known for his legal troubles than his economic stewardship, has declared that formal Hindi and iTaukei should be made compulsory in schools, dismissing Fiji Hindi as somehow inferior, even “insulting” to Indo-Fijian heritage.
One is tempted to agree, though perhaps not in the way he intends. Because if the statutory declaration forms had indeed been written in his preferred “sudh Hindi”, it might have spared the nation its current predicament, and the charges he is trying to halt against him.

WHAT A WEEK. A Photograph, Proceeding, and a Question of Restraint. MARTIN DAUBNEY, the Australian lawyer and his former client NAIDU: "What a week. Co-counsel this time. Four years ago I was his CLIENT."

20/3/2026

The image is unremarkable at first glance: two lawyers - Richard Naidu and Martin Daubney - standing together after a week in court. They are on the same side of the case, appearing for Manoa Kamikamica and Biman Prasad. There is nothing improper in that. Counsel work closely, often intensively, and a photograph at the end of a demanding hearing week is, in itself, entirely ordinary.

Indeed, it would be surprising if such a photograph did not exist.

But once the image is placed into the public domain, accompanied by commentary, hashtags, and an open thread of responses, it ceases to be a private memento. It becomes part of the public life of a live case.

That is where the difficulty begins.

The post is framed in a tone that is informal, even celebratory - “what a week” - with references to “contempt” and “injunction”. There is nothing expressly said about the merits, no disclosure of confidential material, no overt attempt to influence the court.

Yet the context matters: these are ongoing High Court proceedings, with rulings pending. In such a setting, the profession has traditionally exercised a degree of restraint, not because it is compelled in every instance by rule, but because the appearance of detachment from the contest is part of counsel’s discipline.

The photograph itself does not undermine that discipline. The surrounding engagement begins to test it.

What is striking is not the image, but the commentary it attracts and the company it keeps. Members of the legal team appear in the thread. More notably, a sitting Minister, Filimoni Vosarogo, joins the exchange, greeted not as a distant public figure but with familiarity - “you were one of my lawyers too”. Again, there is nothing unlawful in this. The legal profession is small; relationships overlap; former clients become colleagues, and colleagues become counsel in shared causes.

But in the midst of active litigation, particularly litigation that already raises questions about institutional independence, the optics shift.

The comments themselves reinforce a tone that edges away from professional neutrality: “keep on fighting”, “good job you and Martin”, “too much power in one pic”. These are the kinds of remarks common to social media, but they sit uneasily when attached to counsel engaged in proceedings that are yet to be determined. They transform the post, however unintentionally, into a public-facing narrative of contest and momentum, rather than a quiet record of professional collaboration.

None of this amounts to misconduct. It does not invalidate proceedings, nor does it establish bias or impropriety. But it does something subtler, and, in a constitutional sense, more important.

It narrows the distance that is ordinarily maintained between the courtroom and the public arena, advocacy and commentary, professional role and social display. In ordinary cases, that may pass without notice. In cases of this magnitude, where the conduct of institutions, the validity of appointments, and the fairness of prosecutions are all under scrutiny, the margin for such narrowing is much smaller.

The photograph, then, is not the problem. It is a reminder.

A reminder that in high-stakes litigation, it is often not what is done, but how it is seen, that carries the greater consequence.

When the Appellate Bench Walks into the Bar Table. MARTIN DAUBNEY KC's Stay Application in Kamikamica-Prasad Raises Bias Concerns But Also Prompts Wider Questions of Consistency before the Fiji High Court

19/3/2026

Battling it out: Martin Daubney and Lavi Rokoika

When the Suva High Court heard Manoa Kamikamica’s stay application, his Australian counsel Martin Daubney advanced a detailed legal argument that the prosecution should not proceed.

His submission, as presented in court, focused on the proposition that the case is affected by conflict of interest, institutional irregularity, and apprehended bias, particularly in light of developments within FICAC and the contested position of Acting Commissioner Lavi Rokoika.

On that basis, the Court was invited to consider whether continuing the prosecution would amount to an abuse of process, warranting a stay.

This is a recognised and serious legal pathway. Where established, it goes to the integrity of the proceedings themselves.

The doctrine relied upon

The argument rests on the well-established principle of apprehended bias. The test is objective: whether a fair-minded and informed observer might reasonably apprehend that the process is not impartial. It is a doctrine concerned not only with actual fairness, but with public confidence in the administration of justice.

A broader question of application

The submissions made in court necessarily invite careful consideration of how that principle is to be applied.

In that context, one structural feature of the present case may prompt wider reflection. Martin Daubney, who appeared for the applicants Manoa Kamikamica (and Biman Prasad), is also listed as a visiting judge on Fiji’s Court of Appeal, the appellate court which ordinarily reviews decisions of the High Court.

There is nothing inherently improper in this arrangement:

Visiting judges are commonly drawn from overseas jurisdictions
Such appointments are often part-time
Established practice requires recusal from any appeal in which the judge has had prior involvement

Accordingly, no issue of automatic disqualification arises.

The question of consistency

However, where a stay application is grounded in perceived institutional conflict, the scope of the principle becomes important.

The doctrine of apprehended bias is objective and general in application. It is not confined to any one category of actor within the justice system.

In that sense, the argument advanced in court may be seen as raising a broader, and more abstract, question: how consistently should standards of perceived independence and institutional separation be applied across different roles within the legal system? This is not a question directed at any individual.

Rather, it reflects the inherent breadth of the doctrine itself, which is concerned with maintaining confidence at all levels of the judicial process.

Institutional context

Fiji’s use of visiting appellate judges is well established and serves an important function in the administration of justice. At the same time, such arrangements necessarily involve individuals who may, in different contexts, occupy both judicial and professional roles.

In most cases, this operates without difficulty, particularly where clear recusal practices are observed.

However, in proceedings where the central issue is perception of institutional integrity, those structural features may attract closer scrutiny.

Conclusion

The High Court will determine the stay application on the legal merits of the submissions made.

Those submissions place the doctrine of apprehended bias at the forefront of the case. In doing so, they also highlight a wider point: that principles relating to perceived fairness and institutional independence are, by their nature, system-wide in application.

How those principles are framed, and the extent to which they are applied consistently, remains an important aspect of maintaining confidence in the administration of justice.

Blurred Lines Beyond the Bench: The Franzi–Malimali Episode in Tuvalu and the Risks When Judicial Boundaries Slip

The need for clear judicial boundaries is not theoretical. Past episodes have shown how quickly public confidence can be shaken when those lines appear to blur. In the widely discussed case involving Justice Norman Franzi and Barbara Malimali, in Tuvalu, concerns arose after it was alleged that social interaction, including drinking, coincided with ongoing proceedings in which Malimali’s client was before the court. The episode served as a reminder that justice depends not only on actual impartiality but on the appearance of independence. For visiting and part-time judges in particular, who may move between professional roles, the obligation to maintain visible and uncompromised boundaries is especially acute. Malimali was banned from Tuvalu.

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