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HANDS tied to Constitution. President Can't Touch Pryde's salary without Tribunal Process. “Consultation” with ACTING A-G is Legally Irrelevant. Constitution doesn't permit the President to act after consulting the A-G

31/7/2025

The President Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu cannot lawfully suspend or stop the salary of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)—such as Christopher Pryde—without following proper constitutional procedures, including referral to a Tribunal.
The President of Fiji has no legal authority to suspend the DPP’s salary unless:
A complaint has been made to the Judicial Services Commission;
The JSC has advised that a tribunal be formed:
A tribunal has been established, and;
A suspension is effected pending the Tribunal’s findings.
*Until then, any attempt to interfere with the DPP’s remuneration would be not only unconstitutional, but also legally indefensible and politically reckless.

No Tribunal, No Power:
Why the President Cannot Lawfully Suspend Pryde’s Salary

In a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law—not the whims of political expediency—even the President is bound by due process. Recent speculation about whether the President can suspend the salary of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Christopher Pryde, must be met with a clear answer grounded in law: no, the President has no such power unless and until a tribunal has been established on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC).

This is not a matter of interpretation or discretion. It is a matter of constitutional obligation. The relevant legal framework is unambiguous.

Constitutional Protections for Independent Office Holders

The 2013 Constitution of Fiji, controversial though it may be in other respects, contains strong structural protections for the independence of certain constitutional offices—including the DPP.

Under Section 117, the DPP:

Is appointed by the President on the advice of the JSC;
Does not take directions from any person, including the President or Prime Minister;
And enjoys secure tenure and remuneration during the term of office.

Moreover, under Section 142, the DPP’s salary is:

Charged to the Consolidated Fund, not subject to annual appropriation; and
Protected from any reduction to the office holder’s disadvantage unless it is part of a general reduction applicable to all public officers.

This means the President cannot unilaterally interfere with the DPP’s salary—not as a form of punishment, coercion, or political pressure.

Removal and Suspension Require a Tribunal – Not Presidential Whim

The only constitutional path to suspending or removing the DPP is found in Section 111, which governs the discipline and removal of high office holders.

That section provides that:

A complaint must first be referred to the Judicial Services Commission;
The JSC must advise the President that the complaint warrants investigation;
The President may then establish a tribunal to inquire into the matter; and
Only after the tribunal is established may the President suspend the office holder, pending the outcome.

In other words, there must be a formal process initiated by the JSC, and a tribunal must be in place before the President can act. There is no provision allowing the President to sidestep this process, much less use financial measures like salary suspension as a tool of informal punishment.

To do so would amount to constructive removal without due process—an act that would not only be constitutionally unlawful but also liable to immediate judicial challenge.

Why It Matters

Allowing the President—or any political authority—to interfere with the salary of the DPP without due process is not a trivial matter. It strikes at the very core of judicial independence, prosecutorial autonomy, and constitutional supremacy.

Christopher Pryde, regardless of the controversies surrounding him, is entitled to the protections of law. If there are legitimate grounds for concern about his conduct or competence, the correct mechanism is a referral to the Judicial Services Commission, not backroom pressure or financial strangulation.

To do otherwise would set a dangerous precedent: that the head of state may punish independent officers without the scrutiny of a tribunal. That is the road to authoritarianism—not accountability.

Conclusion: The Law Is Clear

The President of Fiji has no legal authority to suspend the DPP’s salary unless:

A complaint has been made to the Judicial Services Commission,
The JSC has advised that a tribunal be formed,
A tribunal has been established, and
A suspension is effected pending the tribunal’s findings.

Until then, any attempt to interfere with the DPP’s remuneration would be not only unconstitutional, but also legally indefensible and politically reckless.

Fiji must not return to the days where power trumped law. We must hold the Constitution to its word—especially when it is inconvenient to do so.

Section 117(5) of the Constitution does not support suspension of salary

The “Consultation” with the Acting Attorney-General is Legally Irrelevant.
The Constitution does not require or permit the President to act after consulting the Attorney-General on matters of DPP discipline. The relevant actor is the Judicial Services Commission. Any “consultation” with the AG is politically suspicious and legally immaterial.

Siromi Turaga

*The decision to suspend Christopher Pryde’s salary and other benefits “forthwith until further notice” pursuant to Section 117(5) of the 2013 Constitution, even if made on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) and after consulting the Acting Attorney-General, is not constitutionally correct—unless a tribunal has been instituted under Section 111.

And here’s why:

1. Section 117(5) – Scope and Limitations

Section 117(5) of the 2013 Constitution states:

“The Director of Public Prosecutions may be removed from office by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission, but only for inability to perform the functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and the President must act on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission.

This provision only governs removal, not suspension or alteration of salary.
It does not confer any power to suspend salary or benefits.
It requires a recommendation by the JSC, but even that is for removal, not for financial penalties.

So, Section 117(5) does not support suspension of salary.

2. Proper Process for Suspension – Section 111 Applies

Section 111(1)–(4) of the Constitution applies to disciplinary action (including suspension) for independent constitutional officers like the DPP.

It sets out the following steps:

The President must not act unilaterally.
The JSC must first recommend that the matter be referred to a tribunal.
Only after a tribunal is established, the President may suspend the office holder pending the outcome.
The suspension must be expressly pending the tribunal’s inquiry, and not indefinite or open-ended.

There is no mention of suspending salary or benefits in advance of a tribunal.

Thus, any suspension of salary without a tribunal being established is unlawful and unconstitutional.

3. Section 142 – Salary Protections

Section 142 of the Constitution provides:

“The remuneration and benefits of a holder of a public office… must not be varied to his or her disadvantage after appointment unless as part of a general variation applying to all persons holding public offices.”

Pryde’s salary is protected from reduction unless part of a general, across-the-board variation.
A unilateral or targeted suspension of pay is a breach of this constitutional safeguard.

4. The “Consultation” with the Acting Attorney-General is Legally Irrelevant

The Constitution does not require or permit the President to act after consulting the Attorney-General on matters of DPP discipline.
The relevant actor is the Judicial Services Commission.
Any “consultation” with the AG is politically suspicious and legally immaterial.

Conclusion: The President’s Action is Unlawful

The President’s 25 July 2025 decision to suspend Mr. Pryde’s salary and benefits is invalid because:

Section 117(5) does not authorize suspension of salary.
Section 111 requires a tribunal to be in place before suspension is permitted.
Section 142 prohibits any adverse variation of salary unless part of a general variation.
The suspension is also procedurally flawed, lacking the due process protections expected in constitutional governance.

Response available to Christopher Pryde:

This action is challengeable by judicial review.
Pryde could seek a declaration of invalidity, interim reinstatement of pay, and potentially damages or compensation.
It is also open to the courts to issue a constitutional remedy under Section 44 (enforcement of rights) or under their inherent supervisory jurisdiction.

Chief Justice Salesi Temo Cannot Police the Law While Breaking Its Spirit: The Constitutional Crisis in the Judicial Services Commission
*The only lawful and ethical remedy is for Chief Justice Temo to recuse himself from all matters before the JSC, or for the Judicial Services Commission itself to advise the President to appoint a Tribunal to assess his conduct, pursuant to Section 111

The Judicial Services Commission (JSC) was established to preserve the independence, integrity, and discipline of Fiji’s judicial and legal institutions. But when its Chair, Chief Justice Salesi Temo, has himself been cited in a formal Commission of Inquiry for conduct that undermines those very principles, a constitutional crisis emerges—one that now threatens the legitimacy of every decision the JSC makes under his leadership.

The Commission of Inquiry report by Justice David Ashton Lewis, a fellow judge of the Fiji Supreme Court, raises serious and specific concerns about Chief Justice Temo’s conduct—particularly his involvement in the improper appointment of Barbara Malimali as FICAC Commissioner.

Why Temo’s Chairmanship of the JSC Is Now Constitutionally Indefensible

1. The JSC Cannot Be Credibly Led by a Compromised Chair

The Chief Justice sits at the apex of Fiji’s judiciary. If the person charged with upholding legality and discipline is himself credibly accused of breaching the Constitution, how can the JSC maintain legitimacy?

Temo’s leadership now contaminates every decision the Commission makes—including any ongoing or future consideration of:

Whether to suspend or investigate the Director of Public Prosecutions;
Whether to recommend removal of judges or legal officers;
Whether to assess the legal status of FICAC’s leadership

2. Conflict of Interest: Malimali Was a Beneficiary of Temo’s Misconduct

It is wholly improper for Chief Justice Temo to remain in charge of any matter that touches on FICAC. His prior role in Malimali’s appointment, as found by the Lewis Inquiry, creates an actual and apparent conflict of interest. Any action he takes related to FICAC—or any officer who challenged Malimali—is fatally tainted by bias.

3. Natural Justice and Judicial Accountability

Every person subject to JSC oversight—including Christopher Pryde—has a constitutional right to an impartial disciplinary body. With Temo as Chair, that is impossible. No one should face disciplinary action under the oversight of a judge who himself violated the same rules he now seeks to enforce.

The Path Forward: Recusal or Removal

The only lawful and ethical remedy is for Chief Justice Temo to recuse himself from all matters before the JSC, or for the Judicial Services Commission itself to advise the President to appoint a tribunal to assess his conduct, pursuant to Section 111.

If he refuses, any action taken under his chairmanship may be constitutionally challengeable, including:

Any suspension of the DPP;
Any endorsement of FICAC’s current or former leadership;
Any judicial appointments or promotion.

Fiji Cannot Afford Another Silent Crisis in the Judiciary

When the head of the judiciary participates in an unconstitutional appointment and continues to exercise disciplinary powers without accountability, the entire constitutional architecture begins to collapse from within.

The findings of Justice Lewis should not be buried under political convenience or judicial self-protection. They demand action.

Chief Justice Temo must step aside from the JSC, or be removed—because those who sit in judgment of others must first be able to withstand judgment themselves.

The JSC Cannot Outsource the Constitution. DPP PRYDE is correct in saying the JSC cannot lawfully abdicate its functions to another agency. It must conduct its own assessment and make an independent decision

25/7/2025

In a bold and constitutionally grounded statement, Director of Public Prosecutions Christopher Pryde has reminded the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) of a simple but powerful truth: it is wrong for a constitutional body to delegate its duties to other agencies.

Pryde’s assertion should not be brushed aside. It raises serious concerns about the growing tendency of public institutions to blur constitutional lines—sometimes out of political expediency, sometimes out of institutional convenience, and occasionally out of fear.

But the law is clear: the JSC must carry out its own investigations and make its own decisions when the future of an officeholder like the DPP is at stake. Anything less is a breach of the constitutional trust placed in that body.

A Body Created by the Constitution Must Obey It

The JSC is not an advisory committee. It is a constitutional commission, explicitly entrusted with powers to appoint, suspend, or remove key legal and judicial officers, including the DPP and the Commissioner of FICAC. These are non-delegable responsibilities.

If the JSC is indeed waiting on another agency—be it FICAC, the Public Service Commission, or any police or administrative authority—to decide the fate of the DPP before taking any independent action, then it has effectively outsourced the Constitution.

You Cannot Delegate Judgment

The JSC may seek assistance. It may commission independent legal advice or fact-finding from a retired judge or qualified investigator. What it cannot do, however, is hand over its constitutional duty to act—to investigate, deliberate, and decide—to another institution and then simply endorse that agency’s findings.

That is not independence. That is not constitutionality. And that is not justice.

If this is the path being taken in Pryde’s case, it sets a dangerous precedent. Every future holder of an independent constitutional office could be politically undermined by a process in which the JSC refuses to act unless or until another agency takes the lead—effectively creating a constitutional vacuum where no one takes responsibility.

The Role of the JSC Is to Decide, Not Hide

At its best, the JSC is a constitutional safeguard, ensuring that decisions affecting judicial independence and prosecutorial integrity are made free from political pressure and with direct accountability to the Constitution.

At its worst, the JSC becomes a bystander, hiding behind other institutions and avoiding the hard decisions it was created to make.

Pryde is absolutely right to raise the alarm. Whether one agrees with his legal record or not, his point speaks to a larger truth: constitutional bodies must act constitutionally. There is no room for buck-passing when the rule of law is on the line

The Fijian Public Deserves Better

The people of Fiji deserve to know whether the JSC is doing its job—or whether it is waiting for someone else to do it for them. Transparency, accountability, and constitutional courage are not optional for the JSC. They are its very reason for existing.

If the Commission cannot or will not exercise its judgment independently, then it invites public doubt—not just in the fairness of the process against Pryde, but in the integrity of the constitutional system itself.

We must not allow that to happen.

Fiji’s Institutions in Rapid Decline: Are We Witnessing a Quiet Capture by Ethnic or Tribal Power Structures? Senior positions are increasingly held by individuals from a narrow socio-ethnic band, overwhelmingly iTaukei

24/7/2025

"Across much of post-independence Africa, the rise of “Big Man” politics often coincided with the ethnicisation of the state. Leaders placed loyalists from their own tribe or region into key posts—not merely for trust, but to secure political dominance through institutional control. Over time, these systems became ungovernable: public office was reduced to spoils, accountability dissolved, and institutions collapsed under the weight of loyalty-based, not merit-based, appointments."

Fiji today finds itself in a deeply fragile political and institutional moment. The rule of law appears to be cracking under the weight of patronage, selective accountability, and administrative decay. Decisions that ought to be governed by constitutional integrity and professional independence are instead becoming opaque, arbitrary, or outright farcical.

In this climate, many citizens are beginning to ask uncomfortable but necessary questions—chief among them: has the quiet capture of state institutions along ethnic or tribal lines contributed to our current decline?

To raise this question is not to provoke division or hatred. It is to invite serious constitutional reflection on a pattern that has afflicted many post-colonial states, particularly across Africa, where political and institutional decay is often preceded by the consolidation of power along ethnic, regional, or familial lines—sometimes subtly, sometimes blatantly.

A Troubling Pattern

In Fiji, appointments to key constitutional offices—across the judiciary, law enforcement, prosecutorial bodies, and oversight commissions—have followed a pattern that is difficult to ignore. Senior positions are increasingly held by individuals from a narrow socio-ethnic band, overwhelmingly iTaukei, often with long-standing personal or political ties to the ruling elite. While ethnicity alone should never disqualify one from office, the concentration of power in any single group—without merit-based diversity—raises red flags for the health of constitutional democracy.

What is particularly shocking is the number of iTaukei individuals who were directly involved in or politically aligned with the 1987 and 2000 coups, or who materially benefitted under the racist Qarase government, who have now returned to powerful positions since the Rabuka government came to power in 2022. Many of these individuals were sidelined after the 2006 Bainimarama-led coup, which sought to dismantle ethno-nationalist politics and reshape governance along ostensibly non-racial lines. Their return not only raises concerns about political recycling and impunity, but signals a possible ideological regression—a quiet revival of the very structures that led Fiji into multiple constitutional crises.

The African Parallel

Across much of post-independence Africa, the rise of “Big Man” politics often coincided with the ethnicisation of the state. Leaders placed loyalists from their own tribe or region into key posts—not merely for trust, but to secure political dominance through institutional control. Over time, these systems became ungovernable: public office was reduced to spoils, accountability dissolved, and institutions collapsed under the weight of loyalty-based, not merit-based, appointments.

Fiji is, of course, not Africa. But the mechanisms of decline are not geographically confined. Wherever institutional power is captured by one ethnic faction—regardless of which group it is—the same problems arise: selective justice, rising impunity, the marginalisation of minorities, and the erosion of public confidence in the state.

Ethnicity Must Not Be a Shield

To speak of iTaukei dominance in the judiciary or government is not to attack the iTaukei as a people. The iTaukei have every right to occupy high office based on merit, just as Indo-Fijians, Rotumans, and other communities do. But when high office becomes dominated by one group to the exclusion of others, and when those in power appear to protect each other regardless of wrongdoing, we must ask: is this justice, or is this ethnically-coded impunity?

Constitutional democracy demands vigilance against any form of ethnic capture, whether iTaukei, Indo-Fijian, or otherwise. A truly independent judiciary must reflect not only ethnic balance but institutional courage—able to hold the powerful to account, even when they come from within.

Where Do We Go From Here?

The solution is not to pit one community against another, but to rebuild institutions on the foundations of merit, integrity, and constitutional fidelity. Judicial appointments must be transparent and competitive. Prosecutorial bodies must be empowered to act without fear or favour. Parliament must ensure diversity is reflected not as tokenism, but as a living commitment to multiracial democracy.

Fiji is still young as a constitutional state, but the warning signs are blinking. If we ignore them, we may end up as yet another cautionary tale—where tribal loyalties swallowed national vision, and where justice bowed before identity.

Let us not wait until it is too late.

The sacked Attorney-General Graham Leung had been recommended by Barbara Malimali, the ECF Chair, to replace Ana Mataiciwa as SOE. Leung was interviewed but withdrew after he was exposed as a candidate.
As Attorney-General, Leung endorsed Malimali's appointment as new FICAC Commissioner, informing the COI that he based his decision on the recommendation of the five Electoral Commissioners, led by lawyer and former Senator, Dr Atu Emberson-Bain.
Leung: "I explained to the Acting Chief Justice that faced with the views of five prominent citizens whose credibility I did not doubt against those of a well-known anti-government blogger, I preferred to rely on the endorsement of the Electoral Commissioners. I told the Acting Chief Justice that in light of this development, there was no rational basis upon which I could object to or delay the Judicial Services Commission proceeding to confirm the appointment of Ms Barbara Malimali as Commissioner for the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption."

KC MARTIN DAUBNEY and the COI: Did the sacked Attorney-General Graham LEUNG or His Predecessor (now again A-G) Siromi TURAGA Propose lawyer Daubney, linked to Prasad and Naidu, to chair the COI

21/7/2025

Waqanika

Malimali

Serious questions have emerged following claims by Barbara Malimali's lawyer Tanya Waqanika on her Facebook page that Martin Daubney KC, who previously defended Richard Naidu and represented Finance Minister Biman Prasad through Naidu—was at one point proposed to chair Fiji’s much-anticipated Commission of Inquiry (COI).
If accurate, the claim by Waqanika that Daubney was a preferred candidate to chair the COI raise serious concerns about impartiality and conflicts of interest.
But who made the proposal? Was it the sacked Attorney-General Graham Leung or his predecessor, Siromi Turaga, now A-G?
The timeline remains murky. Turaga served as Attorney-General until his resignation in early 2024, a period during which preparations for a Commission of Inquiry were said to be under Cabinet discussion. Leung, who assumed the AG post later that year, has remained silent on Waqanika’s claim. Neither man has confirmed nor denied whether Daubney’s name was formally proposed, or at what stage in the process the alleged recommendation was made.
*What is undisputed, however, is that Daubney had clear professional ties to two of the most politically exposed figures in Fiji’s current coalition government. In any system governed by the rule of law, prior legal representation—especially in cases involving allegations of impropriety or breaches of public trust—would typically disqualify a person from presiding over an independent investigation touching on similar themes.

From Fijileaks Archive, 22 May 2025

'As NFP Leader, [Biman Prasad] is not an 'office holder' within the meaning of that term in the Act and is therefore not a person who is required to make the 'office holder' disclosures under s24.'
Australian KC Martin Daubney, 22 August 2024 to Richard Naidu and FICAC.

Prasad's legal team chose to ignore s24(2) which required Prasad, as an election candidate along with other candidates, to declare his income, assets, properties, directorships, shares and dividends under the Political Parties Act 2013. He stood for election as an NFP candidate in the 2014, 2018, and 2022 elections. He led the party into elections and signed the Coalition Pact to form the government with PAP and SODELPA.
He began his lies in his first declaration in July 2014 when he did not disclose his Directorship in Lotus Construction (Fiji) Ltd. For TEN years he lied in his declarations for we didn't have his LOTUS FILE until last year, and the Fiji Elections Office relies solely on the candidates to declare truthfully and faithfully their statutory declarations. The FEO will investigate only if someone lodges a complaint against the candidate's declaration on publication.

Prasad's legal team had ignored the then Chief Justice Tony Gates ruling in FICAC v Rabuka* (2018), where the CJ Gates had confirmed that the PARTY LEADER fell under the ambit of an office holder. Gates stated at p63:

'For a party leader not to come within the category 'office holder' would seem odd in view of the importance of such a position in any party. If the party leader is later nominated to be a candidate in the elections he will have to make a similar declaration eg section 24(2). But as the matter stands with the definition of office holder I find it is sufficiently wide to include 'party leader'.

Biman Prasad and his lawyers 'Indian Rope Trick': A long piece of rope is left in a basket and placed in an open field, usually by a fakir* (beggar). The rope levitates, with no external support. A boy assistant, a jamoora, climbs the rope and then descends to the ground.
*Another version has the magician (or his assistant) disappearing after reaching the top of the rope, then reappearing at the ground level.

On 22 August 2024, Prasad's lawyer Richard Naidu of Munro Leys obtained a legal opinion from Martin Daubney KC in Australia, and forwarded it to FICAC. Daubney, who had represented Naidu in his 'Scandalizing the Court' before the Fiji High Court, concluded:
'It is my opinion that Professor Prasad, as NFP Leader, is not an 'office holder' within the meaning of that term in the Act and is therefore not a person who is required to make the 'office holder' disclosures under s24.'
Basically, they were throwing every other political leader under the bus, including NFP's own party candidates who, along with Prasad, were required to declare under the Political Parties Act 2013 their incomes, assets, gifts, properties, directorships, shares, and dividends.

BARBARA MALIMALI: Sacked But Still Spinning. Her theatrical flashing of a Fiji Sun front page blaring “No Deal” — in response to allegations of a hush-hush $2 million compensation arrangement. Flash 'Tuvalu Letter'.

20/7/2025

What she never bothered to flash was far more telling: a diplomatic letter barring her from entering Tuvalu. Yes, Tuvalu — that small, climate-threatened Pacific state apparently had enough of Malimali to slam the door shut on her entirely. Not a peep about that in her media crusades. Selective transparency, anyone?
Whatever the trigger, her sacking marks a long-overdue end to a tenure that began in controversy and stumbled through absurdity. The people of Fiji deserve more than PR stunts and headline-chasing. They deserve a corruption commission led by someone who values facts over theatrics — and who doesn’t need to be reminded that integrity doesn’t come with a photo op.
As for Malimali, she exits the stage with a rolled-up newspaper in one hand, and a diplomatic rebuke in the other. If only she’d shown the country both.

Conflict of Interest: It seems the COI overlooked one crucial detail. One of the panellist's who interviewed and approved Malimali as the new FICAC Commissioner had witnessed her 2022 application for a practising certificate: the acting Chief Magistrate Josaia Waqaivolavola.
*TUVALU TRYST: When Waqaivolavola witnessed her 2022 Application for a Practising Certificate, was he aware that Malimali had been barred from practising law in Tuvalu? Also, he had not declared his conflict of interest

When Message Hurts, Smear the Messenger. We Don’t Know Why One Sadhana Sen Attacked Fijileaks Editor - But Why We Won’t Be Silenced

16/7/2025

I’ve been called many things over the years—some flattering, many not. It comes with the territory when you expose uncomfortable truths and hold those in power to account. But I must confess, I was genuinely taken aback when Sadhana Sen, someone I neither know personally nor have written about directly, decided to publicly call me a “creep” and cast other aspersions on my character. In 2021, I had reproduced an article from her and had credited her as our source that year.

I don’t understand why she attacked me at all. I haven’t written about her. I haven’t insulted her. And I certainly haven’t indulged in personal name-calling. My work has focused on public interest issues—allegations of corruption, abuse of office, constitutional manipulation, and the slow erosion of accountability in Fiji.

If that offends Ms. Sen or those she aligns with, I welcome a robust debate. But what I won’t accept—what no journalist, advocate, or citizen should accept—is being smeared simply for asking difficult questions.

Calling someone a “creep” is not a political argument. It’s not a rebuttal. It’s a cheap insult designed to humiliate and dehumanise. That tactic may win applause in social media echo chambers, but it does nothing for the public discourse. Worse, it chills it.

I’ve spent decades speaking truth to power. I’ve criticised prime ministers, ministers, judges, and generals. I’ve done so using documents, facts, and reason—not personal abuse. That’s how I was raised, and that’s how journalism must function if it’s to have any credibility.

If Ms. Sen disagrees with my reporting, I invite her to show where I’ve been inaccurate. I’ll correct any mistake, as I always have. But if the real problem is that my investigations are getting too close to people she supports - like Biman Prasad - then let’s be honest about that too. Attack the argument, not the man.

Let me be clear: I don’t take personal offence. I take issue with what this moment represents—a shift from reasoned disagreement to personal vilification. That’s not just about me. It’s about all of us who value a free and fearless press.

I won’t be silenced. Not by insults, not by threats, and certainly not by those who think shouting down dissent is a substitute for truth.

Two Chiefs, Two Vanua, One Silent Message: Rabuka’s No-Show in LAU. Rabuka believed it appropriate to be present for Ratu Epenisa Cakobau 'as an individual', then that same logic should have applied to Ratu Ului

10/7/2025

*In i-Taukei culture, the chiefly vanua and the political realm are deeply intertwined. By attending one installation and not the other, Sitiveni Rabuka has done more than express a personal preference — he has reignited historical divisions, and possibly signaled that reconciliation with the Mara legacy is still not on his agenda.

*If national unity is the goal, then reconciling with Lau — and its most iconic political family — may be the most important step Rabuka has yet to take.

*When asked by fijivillage News on why he did not attend the chiefly installation ceremony in Lau, Rabuka says he was invited as an ordinary person but he decided to only send his wife, Sulueti, who is from Tubou. He also says he had no role to play as the Prime Minister in the ceremony and if he held the iTaukei porfolio, it would have been okay to be invited in his official capacity.

When Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka swiftly made his way to Bau in 2023 to pay respects to Ratu Epenisa Cakobau — the newly installed Vunivalu of Bau — he was visibly moved, attentive, and ceremonially present. He did not wait for formal protocol or invitation as Prime Minister.

He went “in his personal capacity,” he said — a show of humility and cultural reverence, or so it seemed.

Fast forward to the recent installation of Ratu Tevita Uluilakeba Mara in Lakeba, Lau — a chiefly succession of no less cultural gravity — and suddenly Rabuka’s reverence for tradition is qualified, conditional, and bureaucratically hesitant.

This time, the same Prime Minister who once invoked the spirits of his vanua to explain political decisions now insists that he wasn’t invited “as Prime Minister,” and therefore opted not to attend at all. A strange form of cultural selectivity for someone who once wrapped himself in the cloth of vanua values.

The question that inevitably follows is: why the double standard?

Both men — Ratu Epenisa and Ratu Ului — are not just high chiefs. They are direct descendants of Fiji’s political and chiefly royalty. They are both central figures in their respective confederacies — Bau and Lau — and both ascend to positions that shape how i-Taukei Fijians perceive power, legacy, and leadership.

Rabuka’s conspicuous absence in Lau doesn’t escape notice. Nor does the long shadow cast by history: Ratu Ului is the son of Fiji’s founding father, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara — a towering figure who lost the 1987 elections to Dr Timoci Bavadra, resulting in Rabuka's 1987 coups. That history remains unresolved in many quarters, especially in Lau, where memories are long and titles sacred.

Was Rabuka’s absence a quiet political snub? A personal discomfort cloaked in protocol? Or does it reflect a deeper inability to reconcile past wrongs with present responsibilities?

Whatever the case, leaders cannot cherry-pick tradition to suit convenience. If Rabuka believed it appropriate to be present for Ratu Epenisa “as an individual,” then that same logic — or at least the courtesy — should have been applied in Lau. To show respect to both chiefs, both confederacies, and all iTaukei who look to these events as moments of national continuity and cultural depth.

To attend one and ignore the other sends a message, intended or not: that some chiefly seats are worthy of presence, and others are not; that some relationships are reconcilable, and others can be left to fester.

If unity, tradition, and reconciliation are more than political slogans, then leadership must be even-handed in respecting the vanua — not only when it’s convenient, but especially when it’s uncomfortable.

Fiji deserves leadership that doesn’t hide behind invitation lists, but stands tall in the face of history — even its most complicated chapters.

*Sitiveni Rabuka’s historical tensions with the Mara family — particularly with the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara — likely played a significant role in his decision not to attend Ratu Tevita Uluilakeba Mara’s installation in Lakeba, even if he claims otherwise.

In May 1987, Sitiveni Rabuka, then a Lieutenant Colonel, staged a military coup to remove Prime Minister Timoci Bavadra, whose multi-ethnic coalition had just defeated the long-dominant Alliance Party led by Ratu Mara. At the time, Ratu Mara was not the target of the coup — he had already lost the election — but Rabuka later re-installed Mara as head of an interim government after the second coup in September 1987.
Over time, Rabuka distanced himself from Mara and began publicly alleging that Ratu Mara had orchestrated or endorsed the coups behind the scenes — a claim Ratu Mara always denied. In his memoirs and interviews, Rabuka has implied that he felt used, or manipulated, by chiefly and political elites, including Ratu Mara.
The Personal Becomes Political
Ratu Tevita Uluilakeba Mara is not just a high chief; he is Ratu Mara’s son. And in many ways, his installation as Tui Nayau and head of the Vuanirewa clan is seen as a restoration of Mara’s legacy in Lau.
Rabuka’s absence from the ceremony, while perhaps defensible on procedural grounds, must be viewed through the lens of this fraught personal and political history.
Attending the installation would have symbolized:
A full-circle gesture of reconciliation with the Mara lineage, and;
An affirmation that the past — however dark — has been transcended.
By choosing not to attend, Rabuka appears to have kept a deliberate distance, reinforcing the perception that old wounds remain unhealed.

*Welcome for Tongan King, But No Show by Rabuka at Lau Installation

FALSE and Self-Serving Allegations to Deflect Legitimate Scrutiny. Biman Prasad, 'Campaign against me orchestrated by Supervisor of Elections, FICAC officials, Chaudhrys, Alexandra Forwood, FFP and VICTOR LAL'.

9/7/2025

Biman Prasad’s claim that I “conspired with others” against him is a baseless and self-serving attempt to discredit the serious, evidence-backed findings concerning his breaches of the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act 2013.

These are not personal allegations—they are the product of documented investigations and independent verification, including an in-depth Fijileaks exposé that revealed multiple statutory breaches beginning as early as his first declaration in 2014.

If there is any conspiracy at play, it is Prasad’s attempt to weaponise the Commission of Inquiry to silence whistleblowers, mislead the public, and shift attention from his own sustained pattern of non-disclosure and misrepresentation.

Evidence of Breaches: Factual and Independently Verified

Contrary to Prasad’s narrative of a vendetta, the key findings against him stem from objective documentary evidence, not political motivation.

The Fijileaks investigation revealed the following material breaches:

2014 False Declaration: Prasad failed to disclose his 5% shareholding in Lotus Construction (Fiji) Ltd, despite this being a registrable financial interest under Section 24 of the Act.

He also failed to declare:

His wife’s beneficial co-ownership of a property on Burerua Street, Suva.
The purchase of two off-plan units from Lotus Construction—one of which was later resold for significant profit.
The actual value of his shares in Lotus, which he declared at $85,000 when the issued capital was significantly higher.

Each of these omissions is individually capable of constituting a breach of the Political Parties Act, which mandates full and accurate disclosure of assets and liabilities.

Independent Media Exposure is Not Conspiracy

The exposure of these facts—especially Fijileaks—does not amount to conspiracy. Prasad’s attempt to reframe media accountability and investigative journalism as a political attack reflects a fundamental misunderstanding (or deliberate distortion) of democratic accountability.

It is a matter of public interest when a senior Minister has:

Repeatedly filed inaccurate declarations to the Elections Office;
Benefited personally or through related parties from undeclared assets;
Evaded scrutiny despite clear statutory obligations.

To describe legitimate reporting and evidence-based accountability efforts as “conspiracy” is a calculated smear tactic aimed at chilling public discourse and undermining lawful oversight.

Shifting Blame to Whistleblowers is a Sign of Guilt, Not Innocence

Rather than confront the facts, Prasad has chosen to attack the messengers. This follows a well-worn pattern used by public figures attempting to avoid scrutiny. It also raises a serious question:

Why has Prasad not publicly corrected his past declarations, even after the breaches were brought to light?
Why did he fail to explain or remedy the 2014 and subsequent omissions if they were innocent or inadvertent?
Why were basic due diligence and legal obligations as a party leader neglected for a decade?

The Facts Stand Alone

Whether or not Prasad chooses to fabricate conspiracies, the documented facts remain:

He failed to disclose material financial interests in multiple declarations.
Those omissions were first exposed not by political rivals, but by independent investigations and public records.
He has never refuted the facts, only maligned those who brought them to light

There is no “conspiracy”—only evidence, law, and a clear pattern of non-compliance.

*In 2014, if we had caught him out, he would have been in PRISON and NOT in Fiji's Parliament. It is still NOT late to Kick Him out of Parliament

When former FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali closed the investigation into Biman Prasad’s superannuation declaration, she was within her power to assess whether a specific legal breach occurred. But when that narrow finding — that the Minister had “breached no law” in relation to a superannuation declaration — was used to shut down all other live complaints against him, she crossed a line from adjudicator to shield.

That one action has caused irreparable harm to the rule of law in Fiji — not because of what it concluded, but because of what it allowed to vanish.

From Superannuation to Silence

The public deserves to understand what happened:

A file was submitted to FICAC alleging that Minister for Finance Biman Prasad failed to disclose superannuation interests in his statutory declarations.
After reviewing that complaint, Commissioner Barbara Malimali closed the file, stating that no law had been breached.
But in doing so, FICAC also buried multiple, unrelated and far more serious allegations, including:
- The $200,000 grant to the Global Girmit Institute (GGI), where his wife was a trustee;
- His failure to declare that trusteeship in his Political Parties Act declaration;
- The lack of public tender for GGI’s funding;
- The Cabinet’s role in approving the allocation, despite the conflict.

These matters — none of which had anything to do with superannuation — have since disappeared from public record and prosecutorial scrutiny.

A Dangerous Precedent for Selective Closure

By allowing a finding on one administrative issue to serve as a blanket closure of all complaints, Malimali set a devastating precedent:

"That a minister can face multiple legal and ethical complaints — and have them all erased by clearing the easiest one first."

No court ruled on the GGI allocation.

No independent legal review addressed the conflict of interest.

No procurement investigation was ever completed.

Malimali simply folded the file, and with it, folded its credibility.

The Public Interest That Was Abandoned

The core issue was never superannuation.

It was this:

A sitting minister allocated public funds to an entity governed by his spouse.
He did not declare that interest in his statutory political disclosures.
The grant was issued without a public tender.
The Cabinet, informed or not, rubber-stamped a conflicted process.

None of these were investigated by Malimali.

Who Benefits From Silence?

It is no coincidence that Biman Prasad has faced no investigation, no charges, no public inquiry, while DPP is actively pursued long-past procurement breaches by former ministers — including Frank Bainimarama, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, and Dr. Neil Sharma — for conduct dating back to 2011.

In those cases, FICAC insisted that procurement law matters, and that even procedural breaches were serious enough to warrant prosecution.

But in the case of a sitting Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister — with a conflict of interest, direct control of the funds, and active Cabinet involvement — the file was closed quietly and completely.

If that is not a double standard, what is?

It is alleged Bainimarama, who is charged with one count of abuse of office, on 13th September 2011, being the Minister of Finance, recklessly abused his position as the Minister of Finance by granting a waiver of tender process without lawful justification for a Ministry of Health Tender CTN 66/2011 in violation of the Procurement Regulation.

Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum is charged with one count of abuse of office and one count of obstructing the course of justice.

ALL NIGHT LONG. FHEC Chairman’s Official KIA Sorento Crashed After Alleged Drinking Binge — Vehicle Now Held by Nasinu Police for Probe

8/7/2025

The official Kia Sorento assigned to Steve Chand, the Chairman of the Fiji Higher Education Commission (FHEC) has allegedly been abused for personal use and was involved in a crash in the early hours of Saturday morning in Cunningham.

Sources allege the incident followed an all-night drinking session hosted by the Chairman. The government vehicle was reportedly being driven by the Chairman’s driver, who had been sent to purchase more alcohol when the accident occurred.

The damaged vehicle is now being held at the Nasinu Police Station as part of an active investigation.

Authorities are being urged to investigate the apparent misuse of public assets and determine whether any charges—administrative or criminal—are warranted.

Further revelations are expected as the case unfolds.

COI Judge David Ashton-Lewis Slaps Down 'Cry Baby' Graham LEUNG: FACE IT - You Didn't Do Your Job as Attorney-General in appointment of Malimali as FICAC Commissioner. Kotobalalavu: 'You failed all FIJIANS.'

7/7/2025

Commission of Inquiry chairperson Justice David Ashton-Lewis has hit back at former Attorney-General Graham Leung’s public rejection of the inquiry’s findings, saying Leung “failed to carry out his job” during the controversial appointment of Barbara Malimali.

Speaking to Radio New Zealand (RNZ) on Saturday; Justice AshtonLewis said Mr Leung did not do his job properly.

The exchanges have opened the can worms in the appointment of Ms Malimali as the Commissioner of Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC).

“Well, of course he would publicly reject the findings because he is adversely named. I never said that he conspired. My point was that he didn’t do his job properly;” Justice Ashton-Lewis said.

” … and both of them (Graham Leung and Chief Justice Salesi Temo) failed when they got word that Malimali had complaints against her for abuse of office currently running in FICAC. They should have gone further and stopped her appointment and said we need to do further investigation in that. Neither of them did.”

Justice Ashton-Lewis defended the Commission’s work against claims that it exceeded its mandate.

“They’ve got to produce evidence of that. Ms [Tanya] Waqanika and Ms Malimali may hold that view. All I can say to them is Ms Mason and myself followed the terms of reference absolutely to the final point,” he said.

“Because the terms of reference were not only about Barbara Malimali’s appointment. I found her appointment to be rushed by all those other name people who wanted to get her in. They wanted cases against most of them themselves and other government people closed or thrown out. So I found that the appointment was rushed.

She was appointed illegally, not according to openness and integrity.

“They can say I was wrong. They can say I was biased. I did my job properly.”

Justice Ashton-Lewis said while he anticipated lawyers involved in the inquiry to file an application in the High Court to have the report quashed, citing alleged breaches of the Commission’s terms of reference, he is adamant that the inquiry adhered fully to its legal scope.

My friendship with veteran civil servant Jioji Kotobalavu spans decades, and I fully endorse his view on Graham Leung. He failed to defend the public interest. I also stand with Prime Minister Rabuka in his decision to remove Leung — a move I believe was both justified and necessary. Both men have shown clarity and conviction in addressing Leung’s conduct, and I share their judgment without hesitation.

I fully support Justice Lewis's blunt rebuke of Graham Leung - he deserved to be called out for failing in his duties as Rabuka's Attorney-General of Fiji.

'Graham Leung cannot have it both ways. He cannot sign off on a judicial appointment, accept the legal gravitas that comes with consultation, and then retreat to the shadows when public scrutiny arrives. The law does not permit it. The public should not tolerate it.
The story, Leung, is not over. It is just the beginning.'

At a recent press conference, Graham Leung downplayed his role in a Judicial Services Commission (JSC) appointment of Barbara Malimali by declaring, “I just signed off. End of story.” He further suggested that his statutory role was merely to be consulted, and that his signature on the JSC form should not be construed as a “ringing endorsement.”

With respect, Leung’s attempt to minimise his legal and constitutional responsibilities is both unconvincing and deeply concerning. Public office is not a matter of passive acquiescence. It is a position of trust and scrutiny—particularly when it involves the administration of justice.

The Law Demands More Than Rubber Stamping

Leung’s claim that the law “only” required consultation is legally superficial. The requirement to consult is not a procedural nicety or tick-box exercise. Jurisprudence from across the Commonwealth, including decisions from the Privy Council and senior courts in Australia, Fiji, and the UK, make it clear that meaningful consultation must be genuine, informed, and active. It is not a perfunctory conversation. Nor is it satisfied by mere silence or passive agreement.

In R (Moseley) v Haringey LBC [2014] UKSC 56, Lord Reed described consultation as requiring a “conscientious consideration” of the issues raised. This standard makes clear that those consulted must be engaged in deliberative judgment, not administrative indifference.

Leung’s language — “I just signed off” — betrays a dereliction of that duty. It is an admission, not a defence.

Signature Carries Legal and Moral Weight

In public law, a signature is not just ink on a form. It represents the conclusion of a legal process in which a public officeholder affirms that due diligence has been exercised, that the process was sound, and that the outcome is within legal bounds. To now suggest that a signature means nothing is to undermine the very foundation of legal responsibility.

Leung’s dismissiveness — “End of story” — flies in the face of accountability. If a judicial appointment later proves controversial, unconstitutional, or unethical, his role cannot be airbrushed out of the narrative.

Accountability Cannot Be Outsourced

Even if the JSC were the primary decision-maker, Leung’s consultative role exists precisely to provide a check on poor or politicised appointments. The fact that the law required his input shows that the legislature anticipated that such appointments should not occur in isolation.

If Leung had concerns but remained silent — or worse, signed off knowing full well the issues — then he is complicit, not exonerated. If he had no concerns, he must now own the consequences. There is no safe middle ground of vague non-responsibility.

A Dangerous Precedent

Leung’s comments set a dangerous precedent for how public officials treat statutory consultation requirements — as hollow formalities. Such thinking breeds impunity. It hollows out safeguards and opens the door to appointments that may be politically driven, procedurally flawed, or legally challengeable.

If the public is to trust institutions like the judiciary — particularly in jurisdictions where judicial independence is fragile — then those who oversee or influence appointments must be held to the highest standard of accountability.

Leung cannot have it both ways. He cannot sign off on a judicial appointment, accept the legal gravitas that comes with consultation, and then retreat to the shadows when public scrutiny arrives. The law does not permit it. The public should not tolerate it.

The story, Leung, is not over. It is just beginning.