As debate intensifies over the constitutional role of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF), I revisit a remarkable constitutional analysis prepared by the Legal Division of New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and transmitted to the Qarase Government by New Zealand's High Commissioner to Fiji, Michael Green.
It is one of hundreds of confidential Cabinet and RFMF papers, legal opinions, constitutional memoranda and diplomatic correspondence entrusted to me by the late Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and members of his deposed SDL Government following the military coup of 5 December 2006. Despite our profound differences over many of his Government's policies, some of which I regarded as racially divisive and fundamentally inconsistent with my own vision of Fiji as an equal, multiracial democracy, Qarase nevertheless believed I would be the best person to preserve and chronicle these papers for posterity. The NZ government's legal department's analysis concluded that the sweeping constitutional responsibility conferred upon the RFMF by Section 94(3) of the 1990 Constitution did not survive the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, a constitutional settlement later reversed by Section 131(2) of the 2013 Constitution.
It is one of hundreds of confidential Cabinet and RFMF papers, legal opinions, constitutional memoranda and diplomatic correspondence entrusted to me by the late Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and members of his deposed SDL Government following the military coup of 5 December 2006. Despite our profound differences over many of his Government's policies, some of which I regarded as racially divisive and fundamentally inconsistent with my own vision of Fiji as an equal, multiracial democracy, Qarase nevertheless believed I would be the best person to preserve and chronicle these papers for posterity. The NZ government's legal department's analysis concluded that the sweeping constitutional responsibility conferred upon the RFMF by Section 94(3) of the 1990 Constitution did not survive the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, a constitutional settlement later reversed by Section 131(2) of the 2013 Constitution.
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 | "History has an uncanny habit of returning to unfinished constitutional arguments." VICTOR LAL |  |
Laisenia Qarase As Fiji once again debates the constitutional role of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) during the current review of the 2013 Constitution, I have returned to one of the most remarkable documents among the hundreds of confidential Cabinet and RFMF papers, legal opinions, constitutional memoranda and diplomatic correspondence entrusted to me by the late Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and members of his deposed SDL Government following the military coup of 5 December 2006.
Those papers were never simply the records of a fallen government. They constitute a constitutional time capsule, preserving legal advice, diplomatic exchanges, Cabinet deliberations and military assessments from one of the defining moments in Fiji's modern political history.
Qarase and several of his ministers believed these documents should survive the coup and remain available for future generations seeking to understand how Fiji's constitutional order unravelled.
Despite our profound differences over many of his Government's policies, some of which I regarded as racially divisive and fundamentally inconsistent with my own vision of Fiji as an equal, multiracial democracy, Qarase nevertheless believed I would be the best person to preserve and chronicle these papers for posterity.
We had been close friends long before he entered politics. Our friendship survived the sometimes bitter political disagreements that later emerged, strengthened in no small measure by our mutual friend, the late Dr Mere Samisoni, one of Qarase's closest political colleagues.
Among the archive is a constitutional document whose significance has only increased with the passage of time.
It is a letter from Michael Green, then New Zealand's High Commissioner to Fiji, transmitting a constitutional analysis prepared by the Legal Division of New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Green served as New Zealand's High Commissioner to Fiji from late 2004 until his expulsion by the post-coup interim government in June 2007.
Nearly two decades later, the issues addressed in that legal opinion have returned to the forefront of Fiji's constitutional debate.
The question confronting New Zealand's legal advisers was deceptively simple: Did the Republic of Fiji Military Forces retain the sweeping constitutional responsibility contained in Section 94(3) of the 1990 Constitution after the adoption of the 1997 Constitution?
Green left no doubt that he was transmitting, not originating, the legal reasoning.
In his covering letter to the Vice-President (acting President) Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, he wrote: "Our Ministry's Legal Division had commented on the proposition... that there may be a constitutional basis for the assertion by the RFMF Commander of broader powers than are normally considered proper in relations between the civil and military authorities. Their analysis concludes that this is not the case. I set out below for your consideration their line of argument."
Those words matter.
They establish that what follows was not simply the personal opinion of a foreign diplomat. It was the considered constitutional analysis of New Zealand's Legal Division, conveyed through the High Commissioner to Fiji's Vice-President during one of the most critical constitutional crises in the country's history.
Its conclusion was unequivocal.
Under the 1997 Constitution, the military no longer possessed the sweeping constitutional responsibility conferred by Section 94(3) of coupist Sitiveni Rabuka's 1990 Constitution.
History, however, would later take a dramatic constitutional turn.
The Controversial Legacy of Section 94(3)
Everything begins with one provision of the 1990 Constitution.
Section 94(3) declared: "It shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and its peoples."
Those words would become among the most controversial in Fiji's constitutional history.
Unlike the constitutions of most Westminster democracies, the provision appeared to assign the military an independent constitutional responsibility extending beyond defending the State against external threats.
Its language was remarkably broad. It did not merely refer to defence. It spoke of the nation's "security, defence and well-being." Over time, Section 94(3) came to be cited as constitutional justification for military intervention in Fiji's political affairs.
Whether Parliament originally intended such a consequence remains open to debate. Its constitutional significance, however, is beyond question.
The Reeves Commission Wanted It Removed
The Legal Division's analysis begins with the work of the Reeves Constitutional Review Commission, whose recommendations ultimately produced the 1997 Constitution.
The Commission noted that numerous submissions opposed Section 94(3), arguing that it assigned to the military responsibilities more properly exercised by elected civilian government.
The Reeves Commission agreed. It recommended that Section 94(3) be repealed. Its reasoning reflected orthodox Westminster constitutional principles.
The military exists to defend the State. It should remain subordinate to Parliament and the elected Government. Its functions should be defined by legislation enacted by Parliament, not by an entrenched constitutional provision capable of being interpreted as giving the armed forces an independent responsibility to determine the nation's "well-being."
The recommendation represented a deliberate constitutional choice.
Instead of recognising the military as an autonomous constitutional guardian, the Reeves Commission sought to reaffirm civilian supremacy.
What the 1997 Constitution Actually Did
The Legal Division then turned to the text of the 1997 Constitution itself. Section 112 continued the existence of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces. It dealt with the continued establishment of the RFMF; the appointment of the Commander; the Commander's authority over appointments, discipline and removals; and Parliament's power to legislate concerning the armed forces.
What it did not contain proved far more significant. The sweeping constitutional language of Section 94(3) had disappeared. There was no equivalent provision assigning the military responsibility for the "security, defence and well-being" of Fiji.
The Legal Division rejected any suggestion that Section 112 somehow carried Section 94(3) into the new constitutional order merely because it preserved the existence of the military. Its reasoning was straightforward. The continuation clause preserved the institution. It did not preserve every constitutional responsibility previously attached to that institution.
Indeed, the omission of Section 94(3) reflected Parliament's deliberate decision to create a different constitutional framework. The opinion's conclusion could hardly have been clearer. The 1997 Constitution did not carry forward Section 94(3).
As the Legal Division observed: "Section 94 is not one of them." In other words, the military's extraordinary constitutional mandate under the 1990 Constitution had ceased to exist.
Parliament Was Intended to Define the Military's Role
The Legal Division's analysis identified another constitutional feature that deserves renewed attention. Under the 1997 Constitution, Parliament, not the Constitution itself, was expected to define the functions of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces through legislation.
That distinction was fundamental. It reflected the orthodox Westminster constitutional principle that the armed forces remain subordinate to elected civilian authority. The military exists to defend the nation.
It does not independently determine the national interest, interpret constitutional crises or assume political responsibilities beyond those conferred by law. Those responsibilities belong to Parliament and the elected Government.
In the view of New Zealand's Legal Division, the framers of the 1997 Constitution had consciously abandoned the broader constitutional philosophy embodied in Section 94(3) of the 1990 Constitution.
The Republic of Fiji Military Forces Act
The Legal Division also examined the Republic of Fiji Military Forces Act. It noted that the legislation assigned the Forces responsibility for, "the defence of Fiji, with the maintenance of order and with such other duties as may from time to time be defined by the Minister."
That language is significant. It reflects the ordinary statutory responsibilities expected of professional armed forces operating under civilian control.
There was no statutory equivalent of the broad constitutional responsibility contained in Section 94(3).
Accordingly, the Legal Division concluded that while the RFMF undoubtedly continued to exist and retained important statutory functions, it possessed no independent constitutional mandate comparable to that conferred by the 1990 Constitution.
The distinction lay at the heart of the opinion. The military was a constitutionally recognised institution. It was not, under the 1997 Constitution, an autonomous constitutional guardian empowered to determine the nation's political or constitutional direction.
The Constitutional Philosophy of 1997
Read as a whole, the Legal Division's opinion was not simply an exercise in textual interpretation. It identified a deliberate constitutional philosophy underpinning the 1997 Constitution. That philosophy rested upon several principles.
First, Parliament, not the military, was constitutionally supreme. Secondly, the armed forces remained subordinate to elected civilian government. Thirdly, the military's powers were to be defined by legislation rather than by an expansive constitutional mandate.
Finally, constitutional disputes were to be resolved through democratic institutions and the courts, not by unilateral intervention by the armed forces.
Whether one agrees with every aspect of that interpretation is almost beside the point.
What matters is that, in early 2007, New Zealand's Legal Division considered this to be the proper constitutional reading of the 1997 Constitution.
Then Came the 2013 Constitution
History, however, took a dramatically different course.
Following the military coup of 5 December 2006, the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution and the promulgation of the 2013 Constitution, Fiji's constitutional architecture underwent a profound transformation.
Section 131(2) now provides: "It shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and all Fijians."
The similarity to Section 94(3) of the 1990 Constitution is unmistakable. The words "its peoples" became "all Fijians."
Otherwise, the constitutional principle was effectively restored.
The very responsibility which New Zealand's Legal Division had concluded disappeared with the adoption of the 1997 Constitution reappeared in the constitutional text.
In effect, the constitutional settlement reached after the Reeves Commission was reversed.
The RFMF once again acquired an express constitutional responsibility extending beyond the traditional functions of an armed force.
A Constitutional Circle Completed
There is an unmistakable historical irony.
The Reeves Commission recommended deleting Section 94(3) because many submissions argued that it conferred upon the military responsibilities inconsistent with parliamentary democracy.
The 1997 Constitution reflected that recommendation by omitting the provision.
The 2013 Constitution restored almost exactly the same constitutional language.
Whether that restoration strengthened Fiji's constitutional order or fundamentally altered the balance between civilian government and the military remains a matter of continuing debate.
But one fact cannot seriously be disputed. The constitutional philosophy of the 2013 Constitution differs fundamentally from that of the 1997 Constitution.
Why This Forgotten Legal Opinion Matters Today
Some readers may ask why a legal opinion prepared nearly twenty years ago deserves renewed attention.
The answer is simple. The opinion provides contemporary evidence that respected constitutional lawyers within New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs understood the 1997 Constitution as having deliberately removed the military's sweeping constitutional guardianship role.
That historical understanding has become highly relevant once again. Today's constitutional debate is no longer merely about the wording of Section 131(2).
It concerns two competing constitutional philosophies. One places the Republic of Fiji Military Forces within a constitutional framework in which Parliament defines its powers and civilian authority remains paramount.
The other expressly confers upon the military an overarching constitutional responsibility for the security, defence and well-being of the nation.
Those are fundamentally different constitutional models.
The current constitutional review therefore presents Fiji with an opportunity to decide which constitutional tradition it wishes to embrace.
A Forgotten Opinion Returns to the National Conversation
For almost two decades, this constitutional opinion remained among the hundreds of Cabinet papers, RFMF documents, legal opinions and diplomatic correspondence entrusted to me by the late Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and members of his deposed SDL Government following the military coup of 5 December 2006.
I have preserved these papers not because I agreed with everything the Qarase Government stood for. I did not because history deserves to be preserved in all its complexity.
Many of Qarase's policies attracted my strongest criticism, and I regarded some of them as discriminatory and racially divisive. Yet our friendship, which long predated his entry into politics, endured despite those profound disagreements. He believed that I would preserve these documents faithfully, even where they challenged my own views.
This forgotten legal opinion is one such document.
It does not answer every constitutional question confronting Fiji today.
Nor should it be regarded as the final word.
What it does demonstrate is that, at one of the most turbulent moments in Fiji's constitutional history, New Zealand's own legal advisers concluded that the 1997 Constitution had deliberately removed the military's sweeping constitutional responsibility inherited from the 1990 Constitution.
The framers of the 2013 Constitution chose a different path by restoring, in substance, that very mandate through Section 131(2).
That is not merely an historical curiosity. It is one of the central constitutional questions now confronting the Constitution Review Commission and, ultimately, the people of Fiji.
Whatever conclusions the Commission eventually reaches, this forgotten legal opinion from the Qarase Papers deserves to form part of the national conversation.
For it reminds us that the constitutional role of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces has never been beyond debate.
It was debated before the 2006 coup.
It was debated in the aftermath of the coup.
And nearly two decades later, it remains one of the defining constitutional questions facing Fiji.
There is one final chapter to this story. During a meeting with the late Sir Paul Reeves in Oxford, he explained to me personally why the Reeves Commission insisted that Section 94(3) had to go. His reasoning sheds further light on today's constitutional debate. That remarkable conversation deserves a separate article, and I shall revisit it in another instalment.
Those papers were never simply the records of a fallen government. They constitute a constitutional time capsule, preserving legal advice, diplomatic exchanges, Cabinet deliberations and military assessments from one of the defining moments in Fiji's modern political history.
Qarase and several of his ministers believed these documents should survive the coup and remain available for future generations seeking to understand how Fiji's constitutional order unravelled.
Despite our profound differences over many of his Government's policies, some of which I regarded as racially divisive and fundamentally inconsistent with my own vision of Fiji as an equal, multiracial democracy, Qarase nevertheless believed I would be the best person to preserve and chronicle these papers for posterity.
We had been close friends long before he entered politics. Our friendship survived the sometimes bitter political disagreements that later emerged, strengthened in no small measure by our mutual friend, the late Dr Mere Samisoni, one of Qarase's closest political colleagues.
Among the archive is a constitutional document whose significance has only increased with the passage of time.
It is a letter from Michael Green, then New Zealand's High Commissioner to Fiji, transmitting a constitutional analysis prepared by the Legal Division of New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Green served as New Zealand's High Commissioner to Fiji from late 2004 until his expulsion by the post-coup interim government in June 2007.
Nearly two decades later, the issues addressed in that legal opinion have returned to the forefront of Fiji's constitutional debate.
The question confronting New Zealand's legal advisers was deceptively simple: Did the Republic of Fiji Military Forces retain the sweeping constitutional responsibility contained in Section 94(3) of the 1990 Constitution after the adoption of the 1997 Constitution?
Green left no doubt that he was transmitting, not originating, the legal reasoning.
In his covering letter to the Vice-President (acting President) Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, he wrote: "Our Ministry's Legal Division had commented on the proposition... that there may be a constitutional basis for the assertion by the RFMF Commander of broader powers than are normally considered proper in relations between the civil and military authorities. Their analysis concludes that this is not the case. I set out below for your consideration their line of argument."
Those words matter.
They establish that what follows was not simply the personal opinion of a foreign diplomat. It was the considered constitutional analysis of New Zealand's Legal Division, conveyed through the High Commissioner to Fiji's Vice-President during one of the most critical constitutional crises in the country's history.
Its conclusion was unequivocal.
Under the 1997 Constitution, the military no longer possessed the sweeping constitutional responsibility conferred by Section 94(3) of coupist Sitiveni Rabuka's 1990 Constitution.
History, however, would later take a dramatic constitutional turn.
The Controversial Legacy of Section 94(3)
Everything begins with one provision of the 1990 Constitution.
Section 94(3) declared: "It shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and its peoples."
Those words would become among the most controversial in Fiji's constitutional history.
Unlike the constitutions of most Westminster democracies, the provision appeared to assign the military an independent constitutional responsibility extending beyond defending the State against external threats.
Its language was remarkably broad. It did not merely refer to defence. It spoke of the nation's "security, defence and well-being." Over time, Section 94(3) came to be cited as constitutional justification for military intervention in Fiji's political affairs.
Whether Parliament originally intended such a consequence remains open to debate. Its constitutional significance, however, is beyond question.
The Reeves Commission Wanted It Removed
The Legal Division's analysis begins with the work of the Reeves Constitutional Review Commission, whose recommendations ultimately produced the 1997 Constitution.
The Commission noted that numerous submissions opposed Section 94(3), arguing that it assigned to the military responsibilities more properly exercised by elected civilian government.
The Reeves Commission agreed. It recommended that Section 94(3) be repealed. Its reasoning reflected orthodox Westminster constitutional principles.
The military exists to defend the State. It should remain subordinate to Parliament and the elected Government. Its functions should be defined by legislation enacted by Parliament, not by an entrenched constitutional provision capable of being interpreted as giving the armed forces an independent responsibility to determine the nation's "well-being."
The recommendation represented a deliberate constitutional choice.
Instead of recognising the military as an autonomous constitutional guardian, the Reeves Commission sought to reaffirm civilian supremacy.
What the 1997 Constitution Actually Did
The Legal Division then turned to the text of the 1997 Constitution itself. Section 112 continued the existence of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces. It dealt with the continued establishment of the RFMF; the appointment of the Commander; the Commander's authority over appointments, discipline and removals; and Parliament's power to legislate concerning the armed forces.
What it did not contain proved far more significant. The sweeping constitutional language of Section 94(3) had disappeared. There was no equivalent provision assigning the military responsibility for the "security, defence and well-being" of Fiji.
The Legal Division rejected any suggestion that Section 112 somehow carried Section 94(3) into the new constitutional order merely because it preserved the existence of the military. Its reasoning was straightforward. The continuation clause preserved the institution. It did not preserve every constitutional responsibility previously attached to that institution.
Indeed, the omission of Section 94(3) reflected Parliament's deliberate decision to create a different constitutional framework. The opinion's conclusion could hardly have been clearer. The 1997 Constitution did not carry forward Section 94(3).
As the Legal Division observed: "Section 94 is not one of them." In other words, the military's extraordinary constitutional mandate under the 1990 Constitution had ceased to exist.
Parliament Was Intended to Define the Military's Role
The Legal Division's analysis identified another constitutional feature that deserves renewed attention. Under the 1997 Constitution, Parliament, not the Constitution itself, was expected to define the functions of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces through legislation.
That distinction was fundamental. It reflected the orthodox Westminster constitutional principle that the armed forces remain subordinate to elected civilian authority. The military exists to defend the nation.
It does not independently determine the national interest, interpret constitutional crises or assume political responsibilities beyond those conferred by law. Those responsibilities belong to Parliament and the elected Government.
In the view of New Zealand's Legal Division, the framers of the 1997 Constitution had consciously abandoned the broader constitutional philosophy embodied in Section 94(3) of the 1990 Constitution.
The Republic of Fiji Military Forces Act
The Legal Division also examined the Republic of Fiji Military Forces Act. It noted that the legislation assigned the Forces responsibility for, "the defence of Fiji, with the maintenance of order and with such other duties as may from time to time be defined by the Minister."
That language is significant. It reflects the ordinary statutory responsibilities expected of professional armed forces operating under civilian control.
There was no statutory equivalent of the broad constitutional responsibility contained in Section 94(3).
Accordingly, the Legal Division concluded that while the RFMF undoubtedly continued to exist and retained important statutory functions, it possessed no independent constitutional mandate comparable to that conferred by the 1990 Constitution.
The distinction lay at the heart of the opinion. The military was a constitutionally recognised institution. It was not, under the 1997 Constitution, an autonomous constitutional guardian empowered to determine the nation's political or constitutional direction.
The Constitutional Philosophy of 1997
Read as a whole, the Legal Division's opinion was not simply an exercise in textual interpretation. It identified a deliberate constitutional philosophy underpinning the 1997 Constitution. That philosophy rested upon several principles.
First, Parliament, not the military, was constitutionally supreme. Secondly, the armed forces remained subordinate to elected civilian government. Thirdly, the military's powers were to be defined by legislation rather than by an expansive constitutional mandate.
Finally, constitutional disputes were to be resolved through democratic institutions and the courts, not by unilateral intervention by the armed forces.
Whether one agrees with every aspect of that interpretation is almost beside the point.
What matters is that, in early 2007, New Zealand's Legal Division considered this to be the proper constitutional reading of the 1997 Constitution.
Then Came the 2013 Constitution
History, however, took a dramatically different course.
Following the military coup of 5 December 2006, the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution and the promulgation of the 2013 Constitution, Fiji's constitutional architecture underwent a profound transformation.
Section 131(2) now provides: "It shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and all Fijians."
The similarity to Section 94(3) of the 1990 Constitution is unmistakable. The words "its peoples" became "all Fijians."
Otherwise, the constitutional principle was effectively restored.
The very responsibility which New Zealand's Legal Division had concluded disappeared with the adoption of the 1997 Constitution reappeared in the constitutional text.
In effect, the constitutional settlement reached after the Reeves Commission was reversed.
The RFMF once again acquired an express constitutional responsibility extending beyond the traditional functions of an armed force.
A Constitutional Circle Completed
There is an unmistakable historical irony.
The Reeves Commission recommended deleting Section 94(3) because many submissions argued that it conferred upon the military responsibilities inconsistent with parliamentary democracy.
The 1997 Constitution reflected that recommendation by omitting the provision.
The 2013 Constitution restored almost exactly the same constitutional language.
Whether that restoration strengthened Fiji's constitutional order or fundamentally altered the balance between civilian government and the military remains a matter of continuing debate.
But one fact cannot seriously be disputed. The constitutional philosophy of the 2013 Constitution differs fundamentally from that of the 1997 Constitution.
Why This Forgotten Legal Opinion Matters Today
Some readers may ask why a legal opinion prepared nearly twenty years ago deserves renewed attention.
The answer is simple. The opinion provides contemporary evidence that respected constitutional lawyers within New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs understood the 1997 Constitution as having deliberately removed the military's sweeping constitutional guardianship role.
That historical understanding has become highly relevant once again. Today's constitutional debate is no longer merely about the wording of Section 131(2).
It concerns two competing constitutional philosophies. One places the Republic of Fiji Military Forces within a constitutional framework in which Parliament defines its powers and civilian authority remains paramount.
The other expressly confers upon the military an overarching constitutional responsibility for the security, defence and well-being of the nation.
Those are fundamentally different constitutional models.
The current constitutional review therefore presents Fiji with an opportunity to decide which constitutional tradition it wishes to embrace.
A Forgotten Opinion Returns to the National Conversation
For almost two decades, this constitutional opinion remained among the hundreds of Cabinet papers, RFMF documents, legal opinions and diplomatic correspondence entrusted to me by the late Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and members of his deposed SDL Government following the military coup of 5 December 2006.
I have preserved these papers not because I agreed with everything the Qarase Government stood for. I did not because history deserves to be preserved in all its complexity.
Many of Qarase's policies attracted my strongest criticism, and I regarded some of them as discriminatory and racially divisive. Yet our friendship, which long predated his entry into politics, endured despite those profound disagreements. He believed that I would preserve these documents faithfully, even where they challenged my own views.
This forgotten legal opinion is one such document.
It does not answer every constitutional question confronting Fiji today.
Nor should it be regarded as the final word.
What it does demonstrate is that, at one of the most turbulent moments in Fiji's constitutional history, New Zealand's own legal advisers concluded that the 1997 Constitution had deliberately removed the military's sweeping constitutional responsibility inherited from the 1990 Constitution.
The framers of the 2013 Constitution chose a different path by restoring, in substance, that very mandate through Section 131(2).
That is not merely an historical curiosity. It is one of the central constitutional questions now confronting the Constitution Review Commission and, ultimately, the people of Fiji.
Whatever conclusions the Commission eventually reaches, this forgotten legal opinion from the Qarase Papers deserves to form part of the national conversation.
For it reminds us that the constitutional role of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces has never been beyond debate.
It was debated before the 2006 coup.
It was debated in the aftermath of the coup.
And nearly two decades later, it remains one of the defining constitutional questions facing Fiji.
There is one final chapter to this story. During a meeting with the late Sir Paul Reeves in Oxford, he explained to me personally why the Reeves Commission insisted that Section 94(3) had to go. His reasoning sheds further light on today's constitutional debate. That remarkable conversation deserves a separate article, and I shall revisit it in another instalment.
The Qarase Papers : Document No. 1: New Zealand Legal Division Opinion on Section 94(3) of the 1997 Constitution
The "Oxford St" Tent Diaries: Watching Fiji Chase the Future by Arguing About the Past
From the comfort of my tent pitched on "Oxford St in London", or so National Federation Party leader Biman Chand Prasad insists is my permanent address, I have remained an amused spectator, quietly chuckling every time Fiji's political establishment descends into yet another existential struggle over the nation's future. Governments come and go, constitutions are written and rewritten, old slogans are discarded for new ones, and each generation confidently declares that it has finally found the formula to save Fiji. Yet, somehow, the same arguments, the same anxieties and the same contests for power keep returning, dressed in different constitutional clothing. Watching from my mythical tent on "Oxford St", I sometimes wonder whether Fiji's greatest constitutional constant is not change itself, but the country's extraordinary ability to keep relitigating the same political battles. I must retreat into my "TENT".
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