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HAPPY NEW YEAR 2026, Fiji. Blow-Out Year Ahead for NFP leader BIMAN PRASAD: Fijileaks to Resume With Hard-Hitting Revelations on PRASAD

31/12/2025

How Prasad's cousin and business partner Sunil Chand Accidentally Triggered the Exposure of Prasad’s 2014 False Declaration

There is a special irony in politics when those who rush to silence critics inadvertently confirm the very misconduct they seek to bury.

That is precisely what has now happened in the case of the NFP leader and former Finance Minister Biman Prasad, his hidden interests in Lotus Construction (Fiji) Pte Ltd, and the legal letter sent by Sunil Chand’s lawyers in Australia.

In trying to shut down a complaint published on Fijileaks, Chand provided the evidence that proves the complaint was justified all along, and in doing so triggered the forensic scrutiny that now implicates the former Finance Minister in submitting a false declaration to the Fiji Elections Office in July 2014, and in subsequent years until 2024.

WHO OWNS THE REPORT AFTER AN INQUIRY ENDS? The COI Case and Fiji's Growing Accountability Crisis. The law allows that Justice Lewis as author of the COI Report MUST be heard to counter ambush by litigants

27/12/2025

Justice Ashton-Lewis was not a mere courier delivering a document to the President. He conducted hearings, assessed evidence, made findings of fact, and drew conclusions affecting the integrity of public office. Functus officio* does not erase authorship, extinguish standing, or impose silence. Finality of decision does not require the disappearance of the decision-maker.

Justice David Ashton-Lewis

*What is now being advanced is a distorted version of the doctrine: that once functus, a commissioner may not explain the process, may not defend the report, and may not be represented in court when the inquiry is attacked. There is no authority for that proposition. If it were correct, any inquiry could be ambushed the moment it reports, attacked without reply and restrained without defence. Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality.

Hemendra Nagin representing Justice Ashton-Lewis, Solicitor-General Ropate Green and JSC lawyer Isireli Fa

"Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality."

The Fiji High Court hearing scheduled for 31 December is being presented as a dispute over legal representation. That framing understates what is at stake.

The case before the Court raises a deeper constitutional question: whether an independent Commission of Inquiry in Fiji retains legal life after it reports, or whether it is absorbed, managed, and neutralised once its findings become inconvenient.

At the centre of the dispute is the Commission of Inquiry into the aborted appointment of former FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali. The Commission was not established by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), as some have suggested. It was appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, under executive authority.

The JSC was not the author of the inquiry; it was one of the institutions affected by its conclusions. That distinction matters, because it exposes the true nature of the litigation now before the Court.

The JSC’s uneasy role

Having neither commissioned the inquiry nor appointed its Chair, the Judicial Service Commission now seeks to restrain the use of the COI report. This is not an internal procedural correction. It is a constitutional body reacting to findings produced by an external accountability mechanism over which it had no control.

The JSC’s position is therefore not supervisory but defensive. Constitutional bodies do not enjoy a right to disown independent inquiries merely because the outcome is uncomfortable.

The Solicitor-General’s claim, and its danger

The Solicitor-General Ropate Green argues that once the COI report was submitted to the President, jurisdiction, including legal representation, shifted entirely to the State. At first glance, the argument appears administratively neat. Constitutionally, it is troubling.

If accepted, it would mean that the Executive may commission an inquiry, receive its findings, and then assume complete control over how those findings are defended, explained, deployed, or quietly set aside. Under such a doctrine, a Commission of Inquiry would have no independent legal existence beyond the moment of delivery. That is not accountability. It is absorption.

The distortion of functus officio before the Fiji High Court

Central to the attempt to sideline the Chair of the Commission is reliance on the doctrine of functus officio. Justice David Ashton-Lewis has himself acknowledged that the Commission is functus: its task is complete, its findings are final, and the inquiry cannot be reopened.

That is orthodox law.

But functus officio has limits. It prevents the re-exercise of decision-making power; it does not erase authorship, extinguish standing, or impose silence. Finality of decision does not require the disappearance of the decision-maker.

What is now being advanced is a distorted version of the doctrine: that once functus, a commissioner may not explain the process, may not defend the report, and may not be represented in court when the inquiry is attacked.

There is no authority for that proposition. If it were correct, any inquiry could be ambushed the moment it reports, attacked without reply and restrained without defence. Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality.

Natural justice, and the fatal contradiction

Those challenging the COI have not confined themselves to jurisdictional or technical objections. They rely heavily on natural justice, asserting that they were not consulted, not heard, or not given an opportunity to respond before adverse findings were made.

Once that argument is raised, the process of the inquiry itself becomes the issue. Natural justice claims cannot be assessed in the abstract. The Court must know:

who was notified,
who was invited to participate,
what opportunities were extended,
what was declined or ignored,
and why particular procedural choices were made.

Only one person can explain those matters authoritatively: Justice David Ashton-Lewis, the Chair of the Commission of Inquiry

Here lies the challengers’ fatal inconsistency. They allege procedural unfairness, yet seek to silence the very person who designed and conducted the process. They invoke natural justice while opposing the participation of the decision-maker whose conduct is under attack.

That position is untenable. Natural justice cannot be tested by excluding the author of the process. To do so would itself offend the principles of fairness the challengers claim to defend.

Justice Ashton-Lewis is not reopening the inquiry or revisiting findings. He is explaining how fairness was applied, why certain steps were taken, and what opportunities were afforded. That is not the exercise of power; it is the defence of process.

Why the Chair’s involvement remains constitutionally necessary

Justice Ashton-Lewis was not a mere courier delivering a document to the President. He conducted hearings, assessed evidence, made findings of fact, and drew conclusions affecting the integrity of public office.

The moment those findings were challenged, restrained, or sidelined, natural justice required that the author be heard. Representation in court is not a continuation of the inquiry; it is a safeguard against procedural ambush.

To deny that right would permit executive and institutional actors to attack an inquiry while denying the public a full account of how it was conducted.

The wider constitutional risk

This case reveals a deeper problem in Fiji’s governance culture: the instinct to manage outcomes rather than confront findings. When independent processes expose uncomfortable truths, the response is not reform but containment through settlements, jurisdictional disputes, and the creative misuse of legal doctrine.

If the Court accepts that a Commission of Inquiry effectively ceases to exist once it reports, future inquiries will be reduced to performative exercises: useful for appearances, expendable in substance.

That would mark a serious retreat from constitutional accountability.

What the Court must decide

The Court is not being asked to choose between lawyers. It is being asked to decide whether Commissions of Inquiry in Fiji are:

independent accountability mechanisms that retain legal standing when challenged, or
temporary devices whose findings can be absorbed and controlled by the Executive once delivered.

The answer will define whether truth in Fiji has a life beyond political convenience. The Constitution demands the former. Political comfort prefers the latter.

On 31 December, the Fiji High Court must decide who owns the Report after an inquiry ends, and whether truth in Fiji still matters once it becomes inconvenient.

Can the JSC and the State lawfully settle without Justice Ashton-Lewis?

Yes, procedurally they can attempt to settle but the settlement has sharp legal limits and cannot do what many assume it can.

Justice David Ashton-Lewis was appointed to chair the Commission of Inquiry (COI). In law, the COI itself is not a permanent legal person. Once it delivers its report, it effectively dissolves. The appointing authority is the President acting on executive advice, represented in court by the State (Attorney-General / Solicitor-General).

On that narrow basis:

The JSC and the State can agree to discontinue or settle the judicial review proceedings.
Justice Ashton-Lewis’s consent is not legally required to end the litigation.

However, and this is the critical point, they cannot lawfully “settle away” the truth, legality, or consequences of the COI report.

A settlement can:

stop the court from ruling on the validity of the COI report;
withdraw or abandon the JSC’s challenge.

A settlement cannot:

convert contested findings into legal nullities;
erase historical facts;
bind third parties not before the court;
shield individuals from criminal or disciplinary consequences.

Justice Ashton-Lewis may not be a party to the settlement, but his findings do not evaporate simply because the litigants walk away. They remain a public document unless formally quashed by a court.

That is why the court is cautious: it is being asked, in effect, to endorse a settlement that may have constitutional and public-interest consequences far beyond the parties before it.

What happens to police investigations launched because of the COI?

They are entirely unaffected. This point is legally clear and often misunderstood. Police investigations are grounded in:

criminal law,
evidence,
reasonable suspicion,
and statutory duty.

They are not dependent on:

the survival of a COI report,
the outcome of judicial review proceedings,
or any settlement between state institutions.

Even if:

the COI report were withdrawn,
criticised,
or declared flawed, any police investigation already commenced remains lawful and must proceed on its own merits.

Why? Because:

A COI report is not evidence in the criminal law sense.
It is an investigative trigger, not a prosecutorial foundation.
Once police have independent material, witness statements, documents, or admissions, the inquiry has done its job.

Put bluntly, criminal liability does not depend on the comfort level of the JSC or the acting Attorney-General. Any attempt, explicit or implicit, to use a civil settlement to:

discourage police,
delay investigations,
or suggest matters are now “resolved” would itself raise serious rule-of-law concerns.

What if police investigations relied heavily on the COI findings?

Even then, the legal position does not change. Police may:

reassess evidence,
discard flawed aspects,
proceed on independently verifiable material.

What they cannot do is lawfully abandon an investigation solely because the JSC and the State have settled a judicial review case.

If they did, that decision would itself be vulnerable to challenge as:

improper purpose,
abdication of duty,
or external interference.

The Bigger Picture (Why This Matters)

This is precisely why the settlement is so controversial. If the COI findings are wrong, they should be tested and struck down by a court; the findings are right, they should stand and be acted upon.

A settlement does neither. It freezes the law in an ambiguous space where:

no court ruling exists,
political actors declare closure,
and complainants and investigators are left navigating uncertainty.

But legally, one thing remains firm.

Police investigations, prosecutorial discretion, and criminal accountability cannot be bargained away, with or without Justice David Ashton-Lewis.

From Fijileaks Archive, 23 October 2025

‘Fake News’ for Thee, Not for Me: How Power Decides Truth in Fiji. BEN Padarath faces travel restrictions, strict bail after Tabuya & Biman Prasad allegedly report him to Police. Who dictates Fake News narrative in Fiji?

26/12/2025

In Fiji, fake news has become a dangerous phrase. It is no longer just a descriptor of false information; it is increasingly a trigger for police action, detention, prosecution, and the curtailment of liberty. But recent events expose an uncomfortable truth: who gets accused of fake news, and who gets away with calling the truth fake, depends on where power sits.

At the centre of this contradiction are three names: Lynda Tabuya, Biman Prasad, and an FLP member and political activist Ben Padarath.

Taken together, their cases reveal not just inconsistency, but a deep credibility crisis in how “fake news” is being policed in Fiji.

When ‘Fake News’ Was NOT a Lie, And Nothing Happened

In January 2024, Fijians woke up to explosive allegations involving Cabinet ministers, a Melbourne hotel room, sex, drugs, and explicit text messages. One of the ministers named was Lynda Tabuya. Her response was swift and unequivocal. “It is fake news.”

That denial was carried prominently by regional media, including Radio New Zealand. There was no ambiguity. No hedging. The claim was absolute: the messages were fabricated. They were not.

Padarath

It later emerged that the messages were authentic. The political fallout followed. Tabuya was stripped of her position as deputy leader of the People’s Alliance Party, an internal political sanction, not a legal one. There was no police investigation into whether the public had been misled. No inquiry into whether branding true material as “fake news” had caused harm. There is no suggestion of criminal liability.

The episode was treated as a political embarrassment, not a legal problem.

Fast Forward: Fake News as a Criminal Weapon

Now consider what happened next.

Seven months ago, political activist Ben Padarath was arrested, detained, and interrogated for five days over alleged online content. He was released without charge. No explanation was given.

Months later, the State has returned. Padarath was re-arrested, detained overnight, rushed to Suva, and charged under the Online Safety Act for allegedly reproducing fake news on Facebook. He was produced in court without disclosures. The charge particulars were not read or served. When questioned, the prosecution offered no explanation.

Padarath was granted bail but only after surrendering his travel documents. The complainants? Lynda Tabuya and Biman Chand Prasad.

This is where the system breaks down.

The Unanswered Question

How does a Cabinet minister who publicly branded true information as fake news become a complainant against a political activist accused of spreading fake news?

Legally, she can file a complaint. Procedurally, police can receive it. But substantively, the contradiction is glaring, and corrosive. If “fake news” is a harm the criminal law must address, then false claims of fake news by those in power cannot be treated as irrelevant. If they are, the law is not protecting the truth. It is protecting status.

Selective Truth, Selective Enforcement

The problem is not that Tabuya was not charged. The criminal law should not be used to prosecute every public lie. The problem is selectivity. That is not neutral enforcement. It is directional enforcement.

Courts around the Commonwealth have long warned that laws regulating speech must be applied with extreme caution, especially where political expression is involved. When enforcement consistently flows downwards, against critics, activists, and private citizens, while stopping short at the doors of Cabinet, the chilling effect is real.

People stop speaking not because they are wrong, but because they are afraid.

Enter Biman Prasad: Delay for Power, Pressure for Critics

The contrast sharpens further when placed alongside the case of Biman Prasad, charged with lying in a statutory declaration.

A false statutory declaration is a serious integrity offence. It is sworn. It is deliberate. It goes to the heart of democratic accountability. Crucially, it is a pure statutory offence with no limitation period. Parliament designed it that way.

Yet Prasad’s lawyer Richard Naidu has argued that the charge is unfair because it is “ten years old”. Compare that with Padarath:

detained and grilled,
released without charge,
then charged seven months later,
for expressive conduct.

If delay is said to undermine fairness for a Cabinet minister accused of a timeless statutory offence, how can it be dismissed in a speech-based case revived after prior detention?

The answer, increasingly, appears to be, because one man holds power, and the other does not.

Bail That Tells a Story

Then there is bail.

Padarath is treated as a flight risk. His passport is taken. Prasad, with international connections and routine overseas travel, moves freely.

Bail is meant to manage risk, not hierarchy. When restrictions correlate more closely with political vulnerability than with objective risk, the system signals its priorities, loudly.

What This Is Really About

This is not about defending falsehoods. It is not about excusing misconduct. It is about who gets to define truth, and who pays the price when that definition is challenged.

When a minister can falsely call something “fake news” with no legal scrutiny, and later rely on the same label to trigger criminal proceedings against a critic, the law loses moral authority.

The Online Safety Act was not enacted to shield politicians from embarrassment. It was not designed to become a selective truth-enforcement mechanism. Used this way, it ceases to be a safeguard and becomes a warning.

The Question Fiji Must Answer

Fiji now faces a simple but uncomfortable question: is “fake news” a genuine legal concern or a convenient label, applied only when power is challenged?

If the answer depends on who is speaking, then the issue is no longer misinformation. It is misuse of law.

And when that happens, it is not activists who endanger democracy. It is the system meant to protect it.

Editor's Note: I place this note on record in the interests of transparency. I have long-standing personal knowledge of all three public figures discussed in this article. In particular, I have known Ben Padarath since childhood. His father was a former editor and publisher of the old Fiji Sun in the 1980s, and during that period I often looked after Ben Padarath after school hours.

That prior familiarity does not shape the facts or legal analysis set out above, which are drawn from court proceedings, public records, and contemporaneous reporting. I disclose it simply to make clear that this commentary is grounded in the record and in principle, not in personal favour or animus. For completeness, I add that Ben Padarath has, over the years, continued to refer to me as “Uncle Vic”, a reflection of long-standing familiarity arising from his childhood, not of any political alignment or involvement in the matters discussed. This personal detail is disclosed solely in the interests of transparency.

The leader of the National Federation Party and Member of Parliament, Professor Biman Prasad, has pleaded not guilty to the charges laid against him by FICAC.

Professor Prasad has been charged with two counts of failing to comply with statutory disclosure requirements.

He is also charged with providing false information in a statutory declaration, after he allegedly recklessly submitted a declaration that omitted his directorship, rendering the document materially false.

Defence lawyer Richard Naidu told the court that there had been some delays on the part of the judge regarding the permanent stay application to be heard in the High Court.

Naidu also requested that the mention be set for the end of January, and the court has approved this.

Professor Prasad will be travelling overseas on the 20th of this month and is expected to return on the 27th, FICAC did not object to his travel.

The matter has been set for mention on 26 January 2026.

It was revealed that on or about 30th December 2015, in Suva, Prasad, as an officeholder of the registered National Federation Party under the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act 2013, allegedly failed to comply with Section 24(1) (b) (iv) by omitting to declare his directorship in Platinum Hotels & Resorts Pte Limited in his annual declaration of assets, liabilities, and income submitted to the Registrar of Political Parties.

Prasad is also charged with providing false information in a statutory declaration, having allegedly recklessly submitted a declaration omitting his directorship, which rendered it materially false.

GO FUND HIM: Help Reverend Akuila Yabaki Walk Tall Again. Support a Fearless Voice Who Stood Against 1987 Coups and Bravely Condemned the violent and racist Taukei Movement leaders as "Klaus Barbies of Fiji"

16/12/2025

*Reverend Yabaki now urgently requires hip replacement surgery to address a serious medical condition that has significantly impaired his mobility and quality of life.

*We appeal especially to Indo-Fijians to stand with Reverend Yabaki, a man who, at great personal risk, spoke out against the racist violence of the 1987 coups, and he never stopped speaking out again in 2000 and 2006 for the dignity and rights of all the peoples of Fiji

Reverend Yabaki now urgently requires hip replacement surgery to address a serious medical condition that has significantly impaired his mobility and quality of life. Without this surgery, his condition is expected to worsen, further limiting his independence and daily functioning.
The combined costs of surgery, hospital care, medication, and post-operative rehabilitation are well beyond what his family can meet on their own.
*The family is seeking compassionate financial support for Reverend Yabaki, a highly respected human rights advocate, Methodist clergyman, and former Executive Director of the Citizens Constitutional Forum

As Minister for Internal Security, Mr Rabuka had extraordinary range of powers, which violated international standards of human rights, including the detention of any person for two years; order restriction of movement, freedom of expression, employment, residence or activity; prohibit the printing, publication, sale, issue, circulation or possession of any written material, and prohibit its communication through word of mouth etc.

And yet Mr Rabuka was free to publish his book “No Other Way”. But no criticism of his book was permitted, and one USP Indo-Fijian lecturer who dared to criticise it, was detained and severely beaten up. - VICTOR LAL

Klaus Barbie

Reverend Akuila Yabaki described the Taukei Movement leaders as the “Klaus Barbies of Fiji” to convey, in stark moral terms, the nature and consequences of the terror unleashed after the 1987 coups.

He was drawing a deliberate parallel with Klaus Barbie, the Nazi “Butcher of Lyon,” not to sensationalise history, but to warn Fiji about a pattern of organised brutality:

Midnight raids and intimidation of civilians
Targeting of women, children, and families, particularly within the Indo-Fijian community
Racialised violence and fear used as a political weapon
Impunity for perpetrators, shielded by power, uniforms, and nationalist rhetoric

Yabaki’s warning was prophetic. He argued that every act of tolerated abuse, every silence in the face of terror, allowed future abusers to grow bolder - just as post-war Europe had learned too late that cruelty thrives when societies look away.

His message was not anti-Taukei; it was anti-racism, anti-torture, and anti-terror, aimed at saving Fiji from moral collapse.

By invoking Klaus Barbie, Yabaki was saying this plainly: when racism, violence, and intimidation are normalised in the name of nationalism, Fiji risks creating its own monsters.

He paid a personal price for speaking this truth in 1987, and again in 2000 and 2006, but he never retreated.

He spoke not for one race, but for the conscience of Fiji itself.

THE MEANING OF “KLAUS BARBIE”

Klaus Barbie was not invoked lightly.

He was the Nazi “Butcher of Lyon,” a man whose name became shorthand for state-backed cruelty - midnight arrests, torture, terrorised families, and a system that rewarded brutality while demanding silence from everyone else.

When Reverend Akuila Yabaki warned in 1987 that Fiji risked producing its own “Klaus Barbies,” he was issuing a moral alarm, not an insult. He meant this: when racist violence is tolerated, when intimidation becomes political currency, and when victims are told to endure quietly, monsters are being trained in plain sight.

History teaches that terror does not begin with mass graves. It begins with shrugs, excuses, and fear.

WHY “THE BUTCHER OF LYON” MATTERED

Klaus Barbie earned the name “the Butcher of Lyon” because, as head of the Gestapo in the French city of Lyon during the Second World War, he personally ordered, supervised, and participated in torture, deportations, and executions.

Men, women, and children were dragged from their homes in midnight raids, beaten, broken, and sent to death camps. Fear was his method; silence was his goal.

After the war, Barbie did not face justice immediately. He escaped accountability for decades, sheltered by Cold War politics, living comfortably in Bolivia under a false name while survivors waited and the dead remained unavenged.

It was only in 1987, the same year Fiji fell under the shadow of its own coup, that Barbie was finally extradited to France.

At his trial, the world heard again the voices of victims. Barbie was convicted of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment, where he died in prison in 1991.

That history is why the name mattered. “Butcher of Lyon” is not about exaggeration; it is about what happens when terror is normalised and justice delayed.

Reverend Akuila Yabaki’s warning was simple and devastating: if brutality is excused in the present, it will demand judgment in the future.

Please click link below to make a generous donation

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BRITAIN's BREXIT Referendum Bill and Fiji's NATIONAL Referendum Bill. UK Gave Voters a BALLOT. Fiji Gives Them a NOOSE and a RULEBOOK

15/12/2025

When Britain held the Brexit referendum in 2016, the country tore itself apart politically but not legally.

People argued, campaigned, knocked on doors, filled newspapers, flooded social media, and spent millions persuading voters. All of it was lawful. That is the point.

The British referendum was conducted under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The law did not tell people what they could say. It did not tell them where they could speak. It did not criminalise persuasion. It regulated money, transparency, and fairness but not opinion.

Under British law, campaigning was not a privilege granted by the state. It was a right. Citizens did not need permission to urge a “Leave” or “Remain” vote.

Newspapers did not clear headlines with the government. Civil society groups did not consult ministers before educating voters. Door-to-door canvassing was routine. Private homes were not off-limits to political discussion.

Contrast that with Fiji’s National Referendum Bill 2025

Under this Bill, publishing material “in connection with” the referendum may be a criminal offence unless authorised. Persuading someone how to vote may be unlawful. Visiting a private home “for any purpose” related to the referendum may be illegal.

And when civil society asked for clarity, the response from government was not reassurance, but advice to consult the Attorney-General to avoid “miscommunication”.

That is not how Britain ran Brexit. It is not how any serious democracy runs a referendum.

In the UK, the state did not act as gatekeeper of debate. The Electoral Commission was independent. Ministers campaigned openly. Citizens argued freely. The courts would never tolerate a law that banned persuasion or outlawed political discussion in private homes. Such a law would be struck down immediately.

The irony is obvious. Britain trusted its citizens with too much freedom and lived with the consequences. Fiji proposes to trust its citizens with so little freedom that the result risks being legally and morally tainted before the first vote is cast.

A referendum is not an administrative exercise. It is a collective act of political will. The legitimacy of the outcome depends on how freely people were allowed to think, speak, argue, and persuade before polling day.

Brexit showed what happens when debate is unrestrained. Fiji’s Bill shows something else entirely: fear of debate itself. And a referendum conducted in fear is not democratic consent. It is managed compliance.

That is the difference.

The Brexit referendum legislation was not drafted by a politician or a political party lawyer.

Who drafted the Brexit Referendum Legislation?

The European Union Referendum Act 2015 was drafted by the UK Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC).

The OPC is a permanent, non-political body of specialist legislative drafters
Its lawyers are civil servants, independent of ministers
Their job is to translate government policy into precise, legally coherent legislation that will withstand judicial scrutiny

Who sponsored it politically

The Bill was introduced to Parliament by the Conservative government
It was sponsored in the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary (Philip Hammond) and other ministers
But ministers do not draft the law. They instruct the OPC on policy objectives

Why this matters (especially for Fiji)
The OPC has:

centuries of drafting tradition
strict internal standards on clarity, legality, and rights-compatibility
a drafting culture that assumes political speech is free unless expressly and narrowly limited.

That is why the Brexit Act:

did not criminalise persuasion
did not restrict door-to-door campaigning
did not regulate opinion or advocacy
left speech regulation to general law, and spending to electoral law

Any UK drafter proposing provisions like Fiji’s sections 22 and 23 would have been stopped inside the drafting office, long before Parliament.

Brexit was legislated by:

professional, independent parliamentary drafters
operating in a system that treats free political debate as non-negotiable

That institutional difference, not culture, not politics, explains why Britain could hold a referendum like Brexit, and why Fiji’s Bill looks so alien by comparison.

Amendment Wanted: Fearless MP Required to table our Amendment Bill

NATIONAL REFERENDUM (AMENDMENT) BILL 2025

A Bill
to amend the National Referendum Act 2025 to safeguard freedom of expression and lawful civic participation in referendum processes.

ENACTED

by the Parliament of the Republic of Fiji

1. Short title and commencement

This Act may be cited as the National Referendum (Amendment) Act 2025.
This Act comes into force on the date of its assent.

2. Replacement of section 22

The National Referendum Act 2025 is amended by repealing section 22 and substituting the following--

22. Referendum advocacy and publication

A person may publish, distribute, or otherwise communicate any material expressing support for or opposition to a referendum proposal.
No offence is committed merely because such material is intended to persuade persons to vote in a particular manner.
Subsection (1) does not apply to material that

(a) falsely purports to be issued by, or on behalf of, the Electoral Commission; or
(b) is published or distributed using public funds otherwise than in accordance with this Act.

The Electoral Commission may issue non-binding guidelines relating to transparency and good practice in referendum advocacy.”

3. Replacement of section 23

The National Referendum Act 2025 is amended by repealing section 23 and substituting the following:

23. Lawful campaign activities

For the avoidance of doubt, the following activities are lawful for the purposes of a referendum--
(a) campaigning for or against a referendum proposal;
(b) persuading a person how to vote;
(c) distributing referendum-related materials;
(d) holding meetings, including in private premises with the consent of the occupier;
(e) peaceful door-to-door canvassing.

A person commits an offence only if that person, in connection with a referendum:
(a) uses force, threats, intimidation, or undue influence to influence how another person votes;
(b) knowingly provides false information relating to voting procedures or the casting or counting of votes; or
(c) falsely represents that the person is acting on behalf of the Electoral Commission.

Nothing in this section authorises entry onto private premises without the consent of the occupier.”

4. Consequential amendments

Any reference in the National Referendum Act 2025 to an offence under sections 22 or 23 is to be read as a reference to sections 22 or 23 as replaced by this Act.

Explanatory Note (not part of the Act)

This Bill amends sections 22 and 23 of the National Referendum Act 2025 to remove criminal liability for ordinary advocacy, persuasion, and civic participation in referendum processes, while retaining offences necessary to protect the integrity of the referendum. The amendments align the Act with constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and political participation.

National Referendum (Amendment) Bill 2025

Mr Speaker, Sir

I rise to move that the National Referendum (Amendment) Bill 2025 be now read a second time.

This Bill is narrow, focused, and necessary. It does not seek to frustrate a referendum. It seeks to protect it.

At the heart of this amendment is a simple principle: a referendum on constitutional matters must be conducted in an environment of free, open, and lawful debate. If citizens fear prosecution for persuading others, distributing materials, or discussing the issue in private homes, then the referendum may be orderly but it will not be legitimate.

Mr Speaker, the existing sections 22 and 23 of the principal Act have raised serious and reasonable concern across civil society, the legal profession, and the public. Those concerns are not about policy outcomes. They are about process, clarity, and constitutional compatibility.

As currently drafted, those provisions risk criminalising ordinary civic activity, including persuasion, advocacy, and peaceful engagement through vague and overly broad language. They also vest excessive discretion in enforcement authorities, creating uncertainty about what conduct is lawful and what is not.

This Amendment Bill resolves that problem directly.

First, it affirms the right of citizens to campaign, persuade, and express opinions for or against a referendum proposal. It makes clear that persuasion, by itself, is not a crime.

Second, it draws a clear and lawful boundary around criminal conduct. Fraud, impersonation of the Electoral Commission, intimidation, coercion, and the misuse of public funds remain offences. These are the behaviours that genuinely undermine referendum integrity.

Third, it protects private homes and private association, making clear that meetings and discussions are lawful where there is consent, and that no provision authorises entry without consent.

Mr Speaker, this approach is consistent with our Constitution, particularly the guarantees of freedom of expression, thought, and political participation. It is also consistent with international democratic practice. Referendum laws in established democracies regulate money and deception not opinion.

Importantly, this Bill does not weaken the Electoral Commission. It strengthens public confidence in the process by removing ambiguity and fear. A referendum conducted under clear, fair, and rights-respecting rules is far more likely to command respect, whatever the outcome.

Mr Speaker, constitutional change demands the highest standard of democratic legitimacy. That legitimacy cannot be achieved through silence, restraint, or managed debate. It can only be achieved through trust in the people.

This Amendment Bill ensures that trust is reflected in law.

I commend the Bill to the House.

Anticipated Government Objections and Responses

Objection 1: The Bill is necessary to prevent misinformation and protect voters

Response:

No one disputes the need to protect voters from deception. That is precisely why this Amendment Bill preserves offences relating to fraud, impersonation of the Electoral Commission, and knowingly false information about voting procedures.

What the amendment removes is the criminalisation of opinion and persuasion. Misinformation is addressed through targeted offences. Broad bans on advocacy do not stop falsehoods; they suppress lawful speech and create confusion.

Objection 2: Restrictions are needed to ensure order and public safety

Response:

Existing laws already address public order, intimidation, harassment, and unlawful assembly. There is no evidence that ordinary referendum campaigning creates a unique public safety risk requiring special criminal restrictions on speech.

Order is best maintained through clear law and consistent enforcement, not through vague prohibitions that leave citizens unsure of what is permitted.

Objection 3: Allowing persuasion risks undue influence over vulnerable voters

Response:

Persuasion is not undue influence. Undue influence involves coercion, threats, or exploitation, all of which remain criminal offences under the amendment.

To prohibit persuasion because some persuasion may be unethical is to prohibit democracy itself. The proper response to bad arguments is better arguments, not criminal law.

Objection 4: The amendments weaken the authority of the Electoral Commission

Response:

On the contrary, the amendments strengthen the Commission by clearly defining its role. The Commission remains protected against impersonation and misuse of public funds and retains the power to issue guidance.

What the amendments remove is any perception that the Commission or the executive licenses political speech. That perception undermines, rather than enhances, institutional credibility.

Objection 5: The Bill is already constitutional and will withstand challenge

Response:

Constitutionality is not determined by confidence alone. Laws affecting political speech are subject to the highest level of scrutiny.

The breadth and ambiguity of the current sections create unnecessary litigation risk. These amendments reduce that risk and protect the referendum from post-vote legal challenges that could undermine its outcome.

Objection 6: This amendment will allow well-funded groups to dominate the debate

Response:

That concern relates to campaign finance, not speech. If spending dominance is the issue, the solution lies in spending caps, disclosure, and transparency and not in criminalising speech by everyone.

Silencing all to restrain a few is neither fair nor effective.

Objection 7: This is an attempt to delay or derail the referendum

Response:

This amendment does not delay the referendum. It ensures that when it occurs, it is conducted lawfully and credibly.

A referendum vulnerable to legal challenge is far more likely to be delayed after the fact. Preventing that risk now is prudent governance.

The choice before the House is not between control and chaos. It is between clear, constitutional law and avoidable legal risk.

These amendments protect voters, protect institutions, and protect the legitimacy of the referendum itself.

NATIONAL REFERENDUM BILL. Even If the DRAFTING Is Fixed, the BILL Remains Constitutionally Dangerous. We broadly agree with RICHARD Naidu's FB comments on drafting weaknesses but Bill must be redrafted

14/12/2025

"In any functioning democracy, the Attorney-General does not license debate. The people do. Referendums are not acts of executive grace. They are moments of popular sovereignty. And popular sovereignty cannot exist where speech is rationed, monitored, or chilled by the threat of prosecution. If these provisions remain, Fiji risks staging a referendum in form but not in substance, a vote without voice, choice without conversation, democracy without freedom. That is not reform. It is regression dressed up as participation. And it is precisely the kind of law that should never reach the statute book without being torn apart in public debate - loudly, freely, and without asking permission."

Richard Naidu’s reading of the National Referendum Bill is largely correct. The Bill is confused, internally inconsistent, and drafted in a way that risks criminalising ordinary civic participation. Where the concern deepens is not merely in poor drafting, but in what the Bill reveals about the government’s approach to public constitutional debate.

As Naidu points out, section 22 is drafted so broadly that it could capture core political speech, including paid newspaper advertisements or printed material expressing a view on how people should vote. Whether social media posts are included is unclear. That uncertainty is itself a problem. Laws regulating political speech must be precise. Vague criminal offences invite selective enforcement and chill lawful expression.

Section 23 illustrates the problem even more starkly. Section 23(1) appears to allow campaigning while prohibiting persuasion. In any democratic system, that distinction is meaningless. Campaigning is persuasion. A law that attempts to separate the two cannot be applied coherently and places citizens at risk of prosecution for ordinary political discussion.

Section 23(2) goes further by prohibiting visits to private homes “for any purpose in connection with” the referendum. This provision would criminalise door-to-door canvassing, civil society voter education, and even voluntary discussions in private homes. It intrudes into private association and private speech, areas traditionally afforded the highest level of protection.

Equally troubling is the government’s response to civil society concerns, suggesting that public commentary should be cleared through the Attorney-General’s Office to avoid “miscommunication.”

This is not a clarification mechanism; it is executive control over political speech. It undermines public confidence and reinforces the chilling effect created by the Bill itself.
A referendum on the Constitution is not an ordinary regulatory exercise. It is the moment when citizens must be free to debate, persuade, organise, and disagree without fear of criminal sanction.

A law that restricts those freedoms does not protect the referendum process. It weakens it.

Dialogue Fiji has consistently argued that legitimacy comes from participation, clarity, and trust in the public. The National Referendum Bill, as currently drafted, moves in the opposite direction. Even if well-intentioned, it risks delegitimising the very outcome it seeks to regulate.

Imported Democracy? The Real Origins of Fiji’s Referendum Controls

Fijileaks: When critics describe Fiji’s proposed referendum provisions as “cut and paste authoritarianism”, they are aiming at the wrong target. The language may feel heavy-handed, unfamiliar, even alarming but it is not exotic, nor is it uniquely despotic. Much of it is recognisably borrowed from mainstream common-law democracies. What is distinctive is not the source of the ideas, but the way they have been assembled and entrenched.

At the heart of the controversy are two features: controls on money and influence in referendum campaigns, and provisions that appear to treat participation not merely as a right, but as a civic obligation backed by sanction. Both have well-established pedigrees elsewhere.

Take spending and campaign regulation first. The fear that wealthy interests can overwhelm public debate in a referendum is hardly a Fijian invention. In the United Kingdom, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 was enacted precisely to prevent financial muscle from distorting democratic choice. It imposes strict spending limits, regulates campaign organisations, requires donor disclosure, and criminalises breaches.

Similar regimes exist in New Zealand under the Referendums Act and the Electoral Act, where advertising, funding and “undue influence” are tightly policed. These are not emergency measures in fragile states; they are routine features of mature democracies.

The second feature - language implying compulsory participation - points most clearly to Australia. Since 1924, Australians have been legally required to vote in federal elections, and the obligation extends to constitutional referendums under section 128 of the Australian Constitution. Failure to vote without a valid excuse is an offence, typically punished by a modest fine. This system has long been defended on democratic grounds: higher participation, greater legitimacy, and reduced capture by organised minorities. Whether one agrees with that philosophy or not, it is impossible to describe it as despotic.

So where does the unease come from?

The answer lies in structure rather than substance. In most democracies, these controls sit in ordinary legislation. They can be amended, refined, challenged in court, and adapted to political reality. Fiji’s approach appears to do something different: it constitutionalises the enforcement machinery itself. Rules that elsewhere belong to electoral law are elevated into entrenched constitutional provisions, insulated from easy revision and combined with unusually high thresholds for change.

That fusion is rare. It reflects not foreign tyranny but domestic anxiety, an understandable fear of manipulation, money politics, and challenges to legitimacy following a history of coups and constitutional rupture. The result is a framework that borrows familiar democratic tools but deploys them in an illiberal way.

Calling this “cut and paste from dictatorships” misses the point. The intellectual lineage runs through Canberra, Wellington and Westminster, not Pyongyang or Tehran.

The real question is whether mechanisms designed to protect democratic choice should themselves be locked beyond democratic reach.

That is a debate worth having. But it should be conducted on the basis of accuracy, not caricature.

When "Mischief" Means Dissent: The Referendum Bill and Fiji's Shrinking Democratic Space

The exchange between Acting Attorney-General Siromi Turaga and Dialogue Fiji over the proposed Referendum Bill 2025 is more than a policy disagreement. It exposes a fundamental clash over how far the state may go in controlling political speech, and whether Fiji is drifting toward a managed democracy where participation is permitted only on government terms.

At the centre of the dispute is Turaga’s claim that Dialogue Fiji, and its executive director Nilesh Lal, are engaging in “mischief” by publicly criticising the Bill and allegedly seeking to compel or influence government action. Dialogue Fiji, in turn, argues that the Bill criminalises the very essence of democratic participation: persuading fellow citizens how to vote.

What the Coalition Government Says Through Acting Attorney-General

Turaga insists the Referendum Bill does not prohibit public discussion. According to him, the Bill merely ensures that referendums are conducted in a fair, transparent, and orderly manner, consistent with constitutional requirements, existing electoral laws, and international practice. He argues that offence provisions are neither novel nor excessive, and that any potentially restrictive clauses will be scrutinised through the Parliamentary Standing Committee process, where civil society, media, and the public may make submissions.

He further downplays Dialogue Fiji’s standing, describing it as just one of many civil society organisations, administered by few people and lacking broad reach. Parliament, he says, should not be “pushed” by small organisations, and remains the proper forum for democratic decision-making. In his framing, responsible dialogue is welcome, but pressure politics from outside Parliament is not.

What Dialogue Fiji Says Through its Executive Director Nilesh Lal

Dialogue Fiji’s rebuttal is blunt: the text of the Bill contradicts the government’s assurances. In particular, it points to Section 23, which makes it a criminal offence to “endeavour to persuade or dissuade” another person from voting in a particular way.

Lal argues this is not a minor or technical restriction but a direct criminalisation of referendum advocacy itself.

Dialogue Fiji rejects the claim that the Bill aligns with international practice. Lal notes that in established democracies such as Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Switzerland, and others, citizens are free to campaign, persuade, and argue for or against referendum questions before, during, and after votes. While short “blackout” periods immediately before polling are common, a permanent and blanket ban on persuasion is, he argues, unprecedented in its severity.

The organisation also criticises provisions granting the Supervisor of Elections a monopoly over referendum-related materials, while banning citizens from using banners, badges, advertisements, or symbols. In Dialogue Fiji’s view, this hands the state disproportionate control over the information environment and undermines political equality.

This dispute goes beyond the technicalities of electoral law. At stake is the meaning of democratic participation itself. A referendum, by definition, is a collective act of persuasion: citizens arguing with one another about constitutional futures, national direction, and shared values. To criminalise persuasion is to hollow out the process while preserving its outward form.

Turaga’s dismissal of Dialogue Fiji as a marginal or minion actor is also revealing. Democratic systems do not condition the legitimacy of speech on the size, popularity, or “reach” of the speaker. Civil society exists precisely to challenge power, raise uncomfortable questions, and mobilise debate outside Parliament.

The government’s reliance on parliamentary committee review as a safeguard rings hollow if the core defect is structural rather than technical. As Dialogue Fiji argues, the problem is not drafting detail but democratic principle.

The Larger Pattern and the Referendum Bill

Seen in context, the Referendum Bill fits a broader pattern in Fiji’s post-2013 constitutional order: expansive executive discretion, strong regulatory control over political processes, and an intolerance of unscripted civic engagement.

Labeling criticism as “mischief” reframes dissent as irresponsibility, and participation as something to be managed rather than exercised.

A Message to Coalition government and acting Attorney-General Turaga

If the government truly does not intend to criminalise public expression on referendum issues, the solution is simple: amend the Bill so that persuasion is explicitly protected, not penalised.

Until then, Dialogue Fiji’s critique cannot be dismissed as mischief. It is a warning that Fiji risks turning one of democracy’s most direct tools into a tightly policed ritual, stripped of its democratic soul.

The Lal Paradox: Advocating National Dialogue While Avoiding One

Dialogue Fiji’s executive director, Nilesh Lal, has perfected a curious form of civic engagement. Despite positioning himself and his organisation as guardians of national dialogue, Lal has consistently failed to respond to direct, substantive correspondence from Fijileaks on issues of clear national importance.

Our emails remain unanswered. Our requests for engagement are met with silence.

Whether this silence is born of arrogance, caution, or an aversion to internal scrutiny is ultimately known only to him. What is clear, however, is that selective engagement is not dialogue. It is gatekeeping. One does not advance democratic discourse by choosing which voices are worthy of response, particularly when those voices raise uncomfortable but legitimate questions about law, governance, and constitutional process.

The irony is difficult to ignore. Dialogue Fiji regularly urges transparency, consultation, and inclusiveness and yet its director appears unwilling to engage in basic professional communication with Fijileaks that has, for better or worse, played a central role in exposing matters of public interest in Fiji for decades.

The only thing we appear to share in common is a surname: Lal. Beyond that coincidence, the contrast is stark. Dialogue requires engagement, not silence; courage, not curatorship; and accountability not only from the government, but from those who claim to speak in the public interest.

Silence, in moments that demand clarity, is itself a statement, and not a neutral one.

NEXT INSTALMENT: Why Britain Could Hold Brexit Referendum and Fiji Cannot Hold a Referendum Like This

SODELPA’s Shock Over Tanya Waqanika Charge Misses the Core Issue. The law places clear limits on political expressions by public officers in order to uphold neutrality and public confidence in the Statutory bodies

13/12/2025

The recent media release from the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA) stating that it is “shocked” that former member Tanya Waqanika has been charged by the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) focuses on sentiment rather than substance.

It is important to clarify what has actually occurred and why the charge is a matter of public record, not merely a political surprise.

On 11 December 2025, lawyer and former SODELPA MP Tanya Waqanika appeared in court after being charged by FICAC with an alleged breach of the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act 2013.

Specifically, she is accused of contravening Section 14(7) of that Act by publicly indicating opposition to a registered political party while serving as a public officer. In her case, as a board member of Investment Fiji and Telecom Fiji Limited, when she posted comments on social media dated 19 April 2024 that reportedly opposed SODELPA.

The law places clear limits on political expressions by public officers in certain contexts in order to uphold neutrality and public confidence in statutory bodies. Board members of statutory entities like Investment Fiji and Telecom Fiji have defined duties and standards they must meet, including restrictions on political activity specified in the Political Parties Act. The essence of the charge is that, as a public officer, Waqanika was subject to those rules and is alleged to have breached them, and that is a statutory question, not a partisan one.

SODELPA’s statement frames the matter as if the charge itself is unexpected or an affront, but that perspective overlooks the legal framework in question. The Political Parties Act is designed to regulate how public officeholders engage with party politics to prevent conflicts of interest and maintain institutional integrity. Whether one supports freedom of speech in principle or not, the specific provisions of the Act were in force at the relevant time and form the basis for FICAC’s action.

Furthermore, SODELPA notes it did not itself make a complaint in this case, yet FICAC prosecutes offences on behalf of the public interest when there is reasonable cause. The fact that a political party did not lodge the initial complaint does not negate the statutory authority of FICAC to investigate and charge alleged offences.

It is also worth noting that in court the defence has signalled an intention to challenge the proceedings, including filing a stay application in the High Court. Such procedural moves are not uncommon in criminal cases and are part of the ordinary legal process rather than an admission of error or illegitimacy on the part of the prosecuting authority.

In summary, the charge against Waqanika arises from a specific statutory scheme regulating political activity by public officers. Public debate about whether those rules are appropriate is one thing; disregarding the fact that the charging decision is grounded in existing law is another.

Statements of “shock” from a political party do not alter the legal context in which this matter is being litigated.

Takayawa

While confirming to the Fiji Times, that she had been questioned by FICAC, Tanya Waqanika was careful to specifically identify former SODELPA general secretary Viliame Takayawa as the complainant, noting that the investigation arose from a complaint he lodged over a social media post she made last year.

According to the Fiji Times report: "Ms Waqanika said she was taken in after Supervisor of Elections Ana Mataiciwa referred the complaint, lodged by former SODELPA general secretary Viliame Takayawa, to FICAC.

“Basically, it was in regards to a Facebook post that I did last year and the complainant was Viliame Takayawa, the former general secretary for SODELPA,” she said.

“My post was on April 16th or April 19th of last year and it had to do with the demise of SODELPA following the annual general meeting and what could happen with the Coalition because by then, Aseri (Radrodro) was not a Cabinet minister.

“The interview went well and I was told I had breached Section 14D of the Fijian Political Parties Act 2013 that ‘a public officer shall not publicly indicate support for or opposition to any proposed political party”.

Ms Waqanika said she told FICAC she didn’t see herself supporting or opposing SODELPA.

“All I said is the demise of Sodelpa. And everybody talks about it,” she said.

As we recently pointed out, Waqanika was already under scrutiny by the late SODELPA MP Dr Mere Samisioni. In private emails to Fijileaks, she protested that Waqanika was breaching the statutory board rules and improperly interfering in political party matters. She was seeking a legal opinion on the issue and was even prepared to raise the matter with Takayawa for further legal action.
It remains unclear whether Takayawa acted on Dr Samisoni's concerns by reporting Waqanika to FICAC, which has now charged her and brought her before the courts.
The timing of those charges, however, is not a matter for Fijileaks t*o speculate upon or pursue. She, however, has attacked FICAC in her latest Facebook post (read below).

SPEAKING WHILE CHARGED: IS TANYA WAQANIKA HELPING HER CASE OR HURTING IT?

There is a difference between being angry and being right.

Tanya Waqanika’s most recent Facebook post has struck a nerve but the harder question, the one her supporters are avoiding, is whether she was right to make such sweeping allegations publicly while both she and Deputy Prime Minister Manoa Kamikamica remain before the courts.

The answer is not comfortable.

Waqanika is entitled to her opinion. Being charged does not strip a citizen of the right to speak. But criminal proceedings are not conducted in a vacuum, and neither are lawyers ordinary defendants.

Once charges are laid, the rules tighten. Courts expect restraint. Prosecutors expect silence. And lawyers are held to a higher standard than the rest of the public, whether they like it or not.

What Waqanika did was not simply protest her innocence. She went much further. She alleged that prosecutors were instructed to charge Kamikamica despite knowing there was no evidence. She claimed multiple legal opinions were ignored. She suggested fear inside FICAC, and the misuse of state power to punish those perceived as threats.

Those are not casual remarks. They are allegations of serious misconduct, made publicly, while cases are live, and without any affidavit, application, or formal complaint to accompany them.

That is where the problem lies.

Courts do not appreciate criminal cases being tried on Facebook. Nor do they welcome accused persons, especially lawyers, narrating alleged internal prosecutorial conversations in public while proceedings are still underway. Even if such claims are true, the timing and forum matter.

There is also the question of fairness to others. Waqanika is not a party to the Kamikamica case, yet she has publicly commented on it in a way that goes to the heart of the prosecution’s integrity.

Kamikamica himself has largely stayed silent. His defence, if any, belongs in court, not on someone else’s timeline.

For a lawyer, this is dangerous ground. The legal profession expects grievances about prosecutors and judges to be raised formally, not aired emotionally online. Regulators are less concerned with whether a lawyer “felt compelled” to speak than with whether she chose the proper avenue.

Facebook is not a protected forum. It offers no privilege, no immunity, and no procedural safeguards. Allegations made there carry defamation risk, disciplinary risk, and the possibility of being cited back against the speaker later.

None of this means Waqanika is lying. It means she may have spoken at the wrong time, in the wrong place, and in the wrong way.

If FICAC truly ignored legal advice and pushed through a case it knew was weak, that is a matter for judicial scrutiny. If prosecutors were pressured or fearful, that demands investigation. But those processes begin with sworn evidence, not social media posts.

There is also a strategic reality. Judges tend to be unimpressed by accused persons who litigate in public while insisting on fairness in court. Silence is not an admission of guilt; sometimes it is self-preservation.

Waqanika’s post reads less like a legal submission and more like a warning shot, a line drawn in the sand. It may resonate politically. It may even turn out to be vindicated. But legally, it complicates her own position.

In Fiji, whistleblowers often pay a price. But so do those who confuse whistleblowing with public venting while cases are live.

If what she says is true, it will surface eventually through proper channels. The danger is that by speaking too early, and too freely, she has given her critics ammunition and shifted attention away from the conduct she wants examined.

The law is unforgiving in that way.

Being right is not always enough. Timing, method, and restraint matter just as much.

And for a lawyer facing charges, they matter more than anything else.

PHOTO Ops, Smiles and Silence: How Long Before Convicted Coupist, Ethno-Nationalist, and Racist George Speight Comes Clean on the 2000 COUP? Always Available for Dessert, Roti & Curry But
Never for the Truth

From Fijileaks Archives

DPP Pryde Issues Statement Alleging Fijian Government Agents Carried Out Surveillance in NZ. His Extradition Case Set for 27 March. FICAC to use process server after officer was unable to locate Pryde at his home

12/12/2025

"Tony, Tony..."

NZ MP Hamish Campbell

DPP Christopher Pryde Issues Public Statement Alleging Fijian Government Agents Carried Out Covert Surveillance outside his residence in New Zealand

The Director of Public Prosecutions Christopher Pryde has issued a public statement alleging that agents of the Fijian government carried out covert surveillance outside his private home in Christchurch, New Zealand, while he was out of town attending his mother’s funeral.

In the statement, dated 12 December 2025, Pryde recounts that on 18 November 2025 he was informed by his neighbour that three men had been sitting for a prolonged period in a vehicle parked outside his house the previous day.

One of the men, identifying himself only as “Tony”, approached the neighbour and questioned him about Pryde’s whereabouts, as well as asking personal questions concerning Pryde’s wife and daughter. According to Pryde, when the neighbour challenged the men about their identity, “Tony” confirmed that they were agents of the Fijian government and asked that Pryde not be told of the encounter.

The neighbour later observed the men leaving the area and was sufficiently alarmed to raise the matter with the local Member of Parliament, Hamish Campbell. Pryde states that he subsequently visited the MP’s office himself and, on advice from parliamentary staff, lodged a formal complaint with New Zealand Police.

Pryde says he was deeply disturbed that foreign government officials appeared to be conducting surveillance and questioning civilians on New Zealand soil, without any apparent legal authority or notification to New Zealand authorities.

In his statement, Pryde emphasises that his dispute with the Fijian government is civil and contractual, relating to salary and entitlements, and is currently before the courts in Fiji. He also notes that although Fiji’s anti-corruption agency, FICAC, reportedly filed charges against him in his absence in July 2025, he has received no official notification or correspondence.

Pryde further states that the charges are based on an investigation file previously held by the Judicial Services Commission for more than two years and that the same allegations were dismissed by a three-judge tribunal, which found no evidential basis to sustain them. Following that ruling, Pryde was formally reinstated as Director of Public Prosecutions on 7 January 2025 by the President of Fiji.

However, Pryde says that on 10 January 2025, he was informed by Acting DPP Nancy Tikoisuva that the file had been reopened and complaints lodged against him with both FICAC and the Judicial Services Commission. He categorically denies any wrongdoing and states that the JSC has refused to deal with the complaints, despite its constitutional obligations.

Pryde also states that he has declined to return to Fiji without written assurances that he would not again be suspended without due process, warning that such action would deprive him of income and force him to defend himself yet again.

In the closing section of his statement, Pryde raises a series of unanswered questions: whether the Christchurch incident was connected to the revived FICAC charges; whether the New Zealand government was aware that Fijian state agents were operating covertly in the country; and who within the Fijian government authorised the operation.

He concludes by warning that such conduct would not be tolerated if carried out by larger foreign powers and questions why Fiji should be allowed to act with apparent impunity in a friendly sovereign state.

The extradition case involving Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Christopher Pryde, has been adjourned to March 27 as the court awaits confirmation that he has been properly served with disclosures.

The matter was called before Magistrate Yogesh Prasad in Suva.

Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) lawyer Lillian Mausio told the court that an investigating officer was sent to New Zealand to personally serve Mr Pryde. However, the officer found that he was not at his residence. Source: Fiji Sun

Director of Public Prosecutions, Christopher Pryde's extradition case will be called again on March 27th to check on the progress of service of disclosures.

The case was called before Magistrate Yogesh Prasad this morning (12 December).

FICAC Counsel, Lillian Mausio informed the court that they have sent an investigating officer to New Zealand to serve Pryde but he was not home. Mausio says they will be handing it over to a process officer in New Zealand.

Magistrate Parasad stated that even though FICAC has no objection to him presiding over the case, he still needs to hear Pryde's side as Pryde was his superior in the DPP's Office.

Pryde faces one count of abuse of office, where it is alleged that while serving as the DPP, he approved and received four gratuity payments amounting to $138,445.05 without obtaining the necessary approvals from the Office of the President and the Judicial Services Commission.

In the alternative, he is charged with causing a loss, on the basis that he dishonestly caused financial loss to the Office of the DPP by accepting these unauthorised payments.

FICAC says Pryde also faces a second count of abuse of office, where it is alleged that he approved and received eight reimbursements totalling $47,053.03 for airfares for his wife and child, despite knowing they did not reside with him in Fiji, which is contrary to the conditions of his employment contract and in breach of procurement policy.

They say in the alternative, he is charged with obtaining a financial advantage, for knowingly receiving payments to which he was not entitled.

FICAC says the third count is causing a loss, where it is alleged that on or about 16th September 2022, Pryde was reimbursed $7,828.56 for unused air tickets.

They add although the airline refunded him directly, Pryde allegedly failed to return the amount to the Office of the DPP. Source: Fijivillage News

PERMANENT STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE PIPEPLINE: As TANYA Waqanika charged by FICAC, her lawyer, former FICAC Commissioner Malimali, tells Magistrate they are going to High Court for stay application

11/12/2025

The Timing Indicates Tactical Abuse, NOT Genuine Constitutional Concern. The pattern from Manoa Kamikamica, Biman Prasad, and now Tanya Waqanika, speak for itself. The Fijians see the permanent stay applications as an attempt to undermine criminal accountability through procedural manoeuvring. Publicly, they have become a scandal because they reinforce the perception that powerful defendants do not want their day in court.
As a principal complainant against Biman Prasad following three years of meticulous examination of his statutory declarations, he should be facing multiple charges, which FICAC was planning on 5 September 2024.
As for Waqanika, we are surprised it took so long to charge her, so the Court could rule on statutory board applications and political meddlings.
Now, her lawyer Malimali wants a permanent stay of proceedings.
The late SODELPA MP and businesswoman Dr Mere Samisoni had raised the conflict way back in 2023 and 2024 to Fijileaks.
Sadly, Waqanika and I have been on very cordial and familial terms for years against the repressive Bainimarama-Khaiyum regime.
When she was dismissed as a Fiji TV executive in the wake of the Rugby Sevens broadcasting scandal involving Khaiyum, Fijileaks even acted as a conduit to support her case, publishing highly confidential documents to back up her complaints.
*We believe Waqanika should fight the charges rather than attempting to obtain a stay of proceedings on the grounds that the Acting FICAC Commissioner's appointment is allegedly illegal, and therefore she could not sanction the charges against her (Waqanika).

Waqanika

Prominent lawyer Tanya Waqanika has been charged by FICAC in relation to a Facebook post on April 19th last year.

She appeared before Magistrate Sufia Hamza this afternoon.

The charge is brought under Section 14(7) of the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act 2013.

Waqanika is charged by FICAC for allegedly breaching Section 14 of the Political Parties Act.

It is alleged that on or about 19 April 2024, while serving as a public officer, namely a Board Member of Investment Fiji and Telecom Fiji Limited, Waqanika publicly indicated opposition to the political party SODELPA.

FICAC Counsel Joseph Work informed the court that first phase disclosures have been served and sought 7 days to prepare and file the second phase disclosures.

Waqanika's lawyer, Barbara Malimali acknowledged receipt of the first phase disclosures and informed the court that they will be filing an application for stay proceedings in the High Court.

Resident Magistrate Hamza granted Waqanika a non-cash bail bond of $2,500 for each of her two sureties.

She has been ordered to report to the FICAC Office in Suva at the end of each month, not to reoffend, not to change her residential address and not to interfere with prosecution witnesses.

Waqanika is a former SODELPA MP and is also the lawyer for former FICAC Commissioner, Barbara Malimali in the case challenging the Commission of Inquiry report into the appointment of Malimali as FICAC Commissioner.

The matter has been adjourned to the 26th of January next year.

From Fijileaks Achive, 19 April 2024

I was quite amused when I read the Sodelpa’s media release (issued early this week) issued by the General Secretary, Viliame Takayawa, that the Management Board had unanimously endorsed the Party Leasership of Radrodro.

The definition of unanimous means “everyone in agreement”. It is a fact that the endorsement of Radrodro as PL by the MB was not unanimous - the Sodelpa Youths and the Western Sodelpa MB did not endorse Radrodros appointment. There were 2 or 3 other MB reps representing their respective constituents who also did not agree.
It’s important that the party members on the MB or any board for that matter, must voice their opinions. With the new appointments of some Sodelpa MB members, I wonder whether they realize that the fate of the nation is in their hands as their continued “silence on the board is acquiescine”.

I am grateful that my tau, Seremaia Tuiteci, is the vocal voice that’s leading the charge (on behalf of the Western Sodelpa MBs) against the decision to remove Hon Gavoka. I would like to see the Sodelpa Western party members to turn up in numbers at tomorrow’s AGM and vote against the unconstitutional removal of Hon Gavoka- come and support your Deputy Prime Minister and put an end to this madness and mayhem. Your vote and support for Hon Gavoka is a support for the Coalition Government.

Tomorrow’s outcome can create instability to the Coalition & this is what concerns me.

For Radrodro to say that he respects that MB’s decision and that he is a party man and is happy/content being a back bencher is just utter BS!!!. It is common knowledge that the couple now control the MB- after all, the President and the 3 VPs are their appointments . Whoever controls the Management Board, controls the Party and what I am witnessing is a total disregard for “what is for the greater good for that nation”.

Something tells me that the Radrodros are not looking at 2026, they are looking at destabilizing the Coalition asap. His only chance to get back into Cabinet (despite the Hon PM confirming that he will not reinstate) is not with this Coalition Govt but with the Opposition. You do not need a snap election to change the Govt - all it needs is the Sodelpa MB issuing a party directive to their sitting MPs to vote for FFP & the Opposition walks casually across the floor & becomes the Govt ( of course you will need a Vote of No Confidence for this to succeed). That’s how easy it is to destabilize the Coalition.

The Coalition should be alert. The mere fact that the MB has given a directive to Hon Gavoka to relinquish the Ministry of Education portfolio shows the recklessness, stupidity & lack of understanding of the 2013 Fiji Constitution where it clearly states that only the PM appoints and removes Ministers.

As long as the Radrodros have control of the party, they will keep pushing to have Aseri back in Cabinet. Quite frankly, I do not know the facts behind the FNU saga and had the matter been handled properly & confidentiality, there would have been some hope of him being reinstated back as the Minister. Too late now, the horse has bolted.

The only one that benefits from the unconstitutional removal of Hon Gavoka are the Radrodro couple. The party does not benefit now and ever as his party leadership means the demise of Sodelpa. The couple are seen as FFP supporters & they will always be labeled by me as the Judases of Sodelpa.

I respect everyone’s decision to support a party, I have friends/ family members who are FFP party members and there is absolutely nothing wrong in their democratic decision to support their party. What I detest are the Judases- they sit with you, dine with you, wink at you and all along, they do not support what is the greater good for the nation but what is beneficial to themselves only.

Like many who have left the party, we can only pray that common sense prevails tomorrow.

From Fijileaks, 3 January 2023

CHRISTMAS PAIN, NOT CHEER: RFMF Soldiers Slam Surprise SALARY Deductions. Finance Strikes Out Of The Blue. Salary deductions begin, Soldiers Left FUMING While Authorities Allegedly Look The Other Way

11/12/2025

PAY DECISION BLINDSIDES FORCES, PROMPTING INTERNAL TURMOIL, OUTRAGE AT RFMF BARRACKS

Without warning, the Finance team has suddenly started deducting PAYE from officers’ salaries, and the backlash from the ranks has been immediate.

Soldiers are furious, demanding answers, yet their complaints are being quietly ignored.

The trigger behind these surprise deductions is straightforward: once an officer’s total taxable income for the year exceeds $30,000, PAYE becomes mandatory.

Many officers only crossed this threshold recently because taxable allowances bumped up their cumulative income late in the year. That is when the tax system stepped in but Finance failed to warn anyone.

Why the deductions look so harsh

Here’s what soldiers were not told:

PAYE is calculated on year-to-date income, not just the latest pay.
When a soldier crosses $30,000 late in the year, the system recalculates all tax owed since January, and then tries to recover the entire outstanding amount in the remaining few pays.
Income above $50,000 is taxed at 20%, not 18%, making the deductions even heavier.

Example

A soldier earns $15,000 in the first six months: no tax.
Later receives a large taxable allowance: total income jumps to $35,000.

PAYE owed:

$30,000 tax-free
$5,000 × 18% = $900
If only two pay cycles remain, the system deducts $450 per pay, leaving officers shocked by the sudden hit to their salaries

If the full amount cannot be recovered before year-end, the officer will end up with a tax payable case, and will be notified separately.

Soldiers to Administrative Heads and Payroll Officers: Please brief us

The soldiers are urgently asking all Administrative Heads to explain this clearly to them.

The confusion is real, the frustration is growing, and silence from those responsible is only making matters worse.

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