 The Fiji High Court’s decision ordering the release of the full transcripts and audio recordings from the Commission of Inquiry (COI) into the appointment of Barbara Malimali as Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption has been welcomed by the lawyers who fought for disclosure. Yet in reality, their courtroom success may prove to be little more than a Pyrrhic victory. Justice Dane Tuiqereqere directed the Office of the Attorney-General to provide the transcripts and recordings of the inquiry proceedings so that the court and the parties in the judicial review case can properly examine the evidence underlying the COI’s findings. The court accepted that the transcripts were critical to assessing the factual foundation of the inquiry and the claims being advanced in the proceedings. |    |
The applicants, including Barbara Malimali, former Attorney-General Graham Leung and others, had argued that only a redacted version of the COI report had been released and that the underlying evidence presented to the inquiry had never been disclosed. Their lawyers maintained that access to the full record was essential for the judicial review proceedings now scheduled to be heard in April.
In legal terms, the ruling represents an important affirmation of a basic principle: courts must have access to the evidentiary record that underpins contested decisions. Justice Tuiqereqere himself observed during the proceedings that it would be impossible for the court to properly discharge its duty without seeing the transcripts.
Yet the practical significance of the ruling may be far less dramatic than the lawyers now celebrating it might imagine.
Why the Victory May Be Pyrrhic
For one simple reason: the most controversial evidence may already exist outside the official channels that the parties are now seeking to access.
Fijileaks is already in possession of the transcript and audio recording of the 5 September 2024 session of the inquiry. That material, if examined objectively, raises serious questions about the conduct of several individuals who appeared before the Commission. In our view, the record contains statements and exchanges that go far beyond mere administrative irregularities and instead point toward potential criminal liability.
In other words, the evidence already available suggests that the real issue is not access to transcripts. The real issue is whether the material already in circulation warrants investigation and possible prosecution.
The Unanswered Question: Which Eleven Files Were Closed?
Complicating matters further is the decision of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to close eleven files that had reportedly been reviewed in connection with the inquiry.
The DPP’s decision was apparently based on advice provided by Australian King’s Counsel Ian Lloyd, who was asked to review certain matters arising from the inquiry. However, neither the public nor the complainants know precisely which cases were included in that review.
Without transparency about the specific files examined by Lloyd KC, the public is effectively being asked to accept a prosecutorial decision in a vacuum.
That is not how accountability works in a functioning democracy.
If eleven files were reviewed and subsequently closed, the public has a legitimate right to know: What allegations those files contained. What evidence was examined. What legal reasoning led to the conclusion that no charges should be laid.
Until those questions are answered, the closure of those files cannot reasonably be treated as the final word on the matter.
The Limits of the COI Process
The situation also highlights a deeper structural issue. Evidence given before a commission of inquiry is generally not admissible in criminal proceedings except in limited circumstances. That principle exists to encourage candid testimony before commissions.
But that does not mean that evidence uncovered by a commission cannot trigger criminal investigations. On the contrary, commissions of inquiry often serve precisely that purpose - uncovering facts that require further investigation by police or prosecutorial authorities.
If the evidence recorded on 5 September, and elsewhere in the inquiry, raises credible grounds to suspect criminal conduct, then the proper course is not to bury the matter behind legal technicalities but to subject it to independent investigation.
Transparency Is the Only Way Forward
The High Court’s ruling therefore represents only the beginning of a longer process.
The release of the transcripts will allow the parties in the judicial review proceedings to argue about whether the COI’s findings were justified. But that legal battle addresses only one dimension of the affair: the validity of the inquiry itself.
The more fundamental question, whether the evidence disclosed by the inquiry warrants criminal scrutiny, remains unresolved.
Until the public knows exactly which files were reviewed by Ian Lloyd KC and why the Director of Public Prosecutions concluded that no charges should follow, claims that the matter has been “closed” cannot be accepted at face value.
Indeed, the very transcripts now being celebrated by the lawyers may yet reopen questions that the authorities believed they had already put to rest.
If anything, the High Court’s order may ultimately achieve the opposite of what its proponents expect.
Instead of ending the controversy surrounding the COI, it may simply expose the full evidentiary record to public scrutiny, and with it, revive the question that has never truly gone away: Whether the events revealed by the inquiry demand not merely judicial review, but criminal accountability.
In legal terms, the ruling represents an important affirmation of a basic principle: courts must have access to the evidentiary record that underpins contested decisions. Justice Tuiqereqere himself observed during the proceedings that it would be impossible for the court to properly discharge its duty without seeing the transcripts.
Yet the practical significance of the ruling may be far less dramatic than the lawyers now celebrating it might imagine.
Why the Victory May Be Pyrrhic
For one simple reason: the most controversial evidence may already exist outside the official channels that the parties are now seeking to access.
Fijileaks is already in possession of the transcript and audio recording of the 5 September 2024 session of the inquiry. That material, if examined objectively, raises serious questions about the conduct of several individuals who appeared before the Commission. In our view, the record contains statements and exchanges that go far beyond mere administrative irregularities and instead point toward potential criminal liability.
In other words, the evidence already available suggests that the real issue is not access to transcripts. The real issue is whether the material already in circulation warrants investigation and possible prosecution.
The Unanswered Question: Which Eleven Files Were Closed?
Complicating matters further is the decision of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to close eleven files that had reportedly been reviewed in connection with the inquiry.
The DPP’s decision was apparently based on advice provided by Australian King’s Counsel Ian Lloyd, who was asked to review certain matters arising from the inquiry. However, neither the public nor the complainants know precisely which cases were included in that review.
Without transparency about the specific files examined by Lloyd KC, the public is effectively being asked to accept a prosecutorial decision in a vacuum.
That is not how accountability works in a functioning democracy.
If eleven files were reviewed and subsequently closed, the public has a legitimate right to know: What allegations those files contained. What evidence was examined. What legal reasoning led to the conclusion that no charges should be laid.
Until those questions are answered, the closure of those files cannot reasonably be treated as the final word on the matter.
The Limits of the COI Process
The situation also highlights a deeper structural issue. Evidence given before a commission of inquiry is generally not admissible in criminal proceedings except in limited circumstances. That principle exists to encourage candid testimony before commissions.
But that does not mean that evidence uncovered by a commission cannot trigger criminal investigations. On the contrary, commissions of inquiry often serve precisely that purpose - uncovering facts that require further investigation by police or prosecutorial authorities.
If the evidence recorded on 5 September, and elsewhere in the inquiry, raises credible grounds to suspect criminal conduct, then the proper course is not to bury the matter behind legal technicalities but to subject it to independent investigation.
Transparency Is the Only Way Forward
The High Court’s ruling therefore represents only the beginning of a longer process.
The release of the transcripts will allow the parties in the judicial review proceedings to argue about whether the COI’s findings were justified. But that legal battle addresses only one dimension of the affair: the validity of the inquiry itself.
The more fundamental question, whether the evidence disclosed by the inquiry warrants criminal scrutiny, remains unresolved.
Until the public knows exactly which files were reviewed by Ian Lloyd KC and why the Director of Public Prosecutions concluded that no charges should follow, claims that the matter has been “closed” cannot be accepted at face value.
Indeed, the very transcripts now being celebrated by the lawyers may yet reopen questions that the authorities believed they had already put to rest.
If anything, the High Court’s order may ultimately achieve the opposite of what its proponents expect.
Instead of ending the controversy surrounding the COI, it may simply expose the full evidentiary record to public scrutiny, and with it, revive the question that has never truly gone away: Whether the events revealed by the inquiry demand not merely judicial review, but criminal accountability.
From Fijileaks Archives, 10 January 2026
Background to the Arrest and Investigation, 5 September 2024
Francis Puleiwai, Acting Deputy Commissioner of FICAC, explained at the start of the meeting that Malimali had been under investigation since April 2024, and that investigators had gathered sufficient evidence to warrant an interview and possible charges:
“The investigation for Ms. Malimali was ongoing since April… The team was ready to proceed. The interview was supposed to commence this morning and thereafter the team are ready to charge her as well.”
She further clarified that, under the Constitution, she possessed the same powers as the Commissioner and was lawfully exercising them:
“Under the Constitution the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner we both have the same powers. I’m exercising my right… to carry out due diligence and complete the investigation.”
Despite this, the meeting quickly descended into a series of interventions aimed at derailing the investigation and preventing charges.
Alleged Interference by Chief Registrar Tomasi Bainivalu
Tomasi Bainivalu, the Chief Registrar, immediately questioned FICAC’s authority to arrest Malimali and urged caution, while simultaneously suggesting that the investigation be halted:
“I do not know what power you have to arrest your own Commissioner… Why so fast overnight? Is it birthed from bitterness?… I’m not here to interfere with your work, but what is the right and best way?”
Most significantly, Bainivalu relayed what he described as instructions from the Chief Justice Salesi Temo:
“Just when she left… the Chair called again to CJ… and I remember he did say that on the phone… don’t accept any charge… this is the beginning of that dialogue.”
This statement is deeply concerning. If accurate, it indicates that a senior judicial officer sought to prevent the filing of a criminal charge, potentially amounting to judicial interference in an active investigation. It is one of the clearest indicators in the transcript of a potential attempt to pervert the course of justice, because it suggests coordination between the judiciary and external actors to prevent a criminal charge from ever reaching the courts.
Alleged Pressure and Threats from Senior Lawyer Amani Bale
Amani Bale, a senior lawyer, made some of the most direct and threatening interventions. He demanded that the suspect be released:
“I ask that you release her and she be released immediately and let the JSC go and convince…”
He also attempted to intimidate investigators by threatening their professional futures:
“What you have done now will spoil your careers but that’s your choice.”
Bale repeatedly asserted that pursuing charges would be futile because the courts would refuse to entertain them:
“You heard very clearly that Court would not accept it… if you go to Court it won’t accept your charges.”
These statements constitute clear attempts to pressure investigators into abandoning their lawful duties.
Alleged Misuse of Authority by Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society
Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society, argued that because Malimali had been appointed Commissioner, investigators were now obliged to obey her instructions, even though she was the subject of their investigation:
“She is now the substantive Commissioner under the law… you have to follow her direction right or wrong… If she directs you to stop this right now, what would you guys do?”
He further warned that continuing with the investigation would provoke institutional conflict:
“Continuing down this path is going to end up in a stand-off between this organisation and the Court… That will undermine confidence in the whole justice system.”
Such statements are significant because they explicitly suggest that institutional power, rather than law, should dictate the outcome of a criminal investigation.
Alleged Attempts by Senior Lawyer Laurel Vaurasi to Dissuade Investigators
Laurel Vaurasi, a senior practitioner, echoed similar arguments, warning that continuing the investigation could place FICAC “outside the law”:
“If you continue to keep her… the Court will listen to her application but not yours… Standing by your conviction has to be based on law… Otherwise, you are now operating outside the law.”
Her remarks were calculated to sow doubt about the legality of the investigation and discourage investigators from proceeding. While more subtle, Vaurasi's language is part of intimidation and pressure aimed at halting a criminal process. Even indirect attempts, by invoking consequences and urging withdrawal, can amount to perversion if they are intended to derail an investigation.
Alleged Conduct of Barbara Malimali – Initiating External Interference
It is understood that Barbara Malimali herself telephoned Wylie Clarke, while she was under active investigation and/or under arrest, to seek his assistance. If proven, this demonstrates that Malimali herself initiated efforts to interfere with the investigation.
The transcript also shows that her supporters repeatedly invoked her appointment as Commissioner as a shield against prosecution, implying that investigators were now subordinate to her, even though the investigation predated her appointment and concerned her own conduct.
Pattern of Coordinated Obstruction
When viewed collectively, the statements above reveal a pattern of coordinated conduct by senior figures, including judicial officers and members of the legal profession, aimed at obstructing a criminal investigation. This includes:
The content and tone of the meeting make clear that these were not mere opinions or legal debates.They were calculated acts intended to discourage, prevent, or defeat the course of justice.
Contrast: FICAC Investigation Team (Puleiwai, Saumi, Bokini Ratu). These officers largely resisted pressure and emphasised:
Francis Puleiwai, Acting Deputy Commissioner of FICAC, explained at the start of the meeting that Malimali had been under investigation since April 2024, and that investigators had gathered sufficient evidence to warrant an interview and possible charges:
“The investigation for Ms. Malimali was ongoing since April… The team was ready to proceed. The interview was supposed to commence this morning and thereafter the team are ready to charge her as well.”
She further clarified that, under the Constitution, she possessed the same powers as the Commissioner and was lawfully exercising them:
“Under the Constitution the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner we both have the same powers. I’m exercising my right… to carry out due diligence and complete the investigation.”
Despite this, the meeting quickly descended into a series of interventions aimed at derailing the investigation and preventing charges.
Alleged Interference by Chief Registrar Tomasi Bainivalu
Tomasi Bainivalu, the Chief Registrar, immediately questioned FICAC’s authority to arrest Malimali and urged caution, while simultaneously suggesting that the investigation be halted:
“I do not know what power you have to arrest your own Commissioner… Why so fast overnight? Is it birthed from bitterness?… I’m not here to interfere with your work, but what is the right and best way?”
Most significantly, Bainivalu relayed what he described as instructions from the Chief Justice Salesi Temo:
“Just when she left… the Chair called again to CJ… and I remember he did say that on the phone… don’t accept any charge… this is the beginning of that dialogue.”
This statement is deeply concerning. If accurate, it indicates that a senior judicial officer sought to prevent the filing of a criminal charge, potentially amounting to judicial interference in an active investigation. It is one of the clearest indicators in the transcript of a potential attempt to pervert the course of justice, because it suggests coordination between the judiciary and external actors to prevent a criminal charge from ever reaching the courts.
Alleged Pressure and Threats from Senior Lawyer Amani Bale
Amani Bale, a senior lawyer, made some of the most direct and threatening interventions. He demanded that the suspect be released:
“I ask that you release her and she be released immediately and let the JSC go and convince…”
He also attempted to intimidate investigators by threatening their professional futures:
“What you have done now will spoil your careers but that’s your choice.”
Bale repeatedly asserted that pursuing charges would be futile because the courts would refuse to entertain them:
“You heard very clearly that Court would not accept it… if you go to Court it won’t accept your charges.”
These statements constitute clear attempts to pressure investigators into abandoning their lawful duties.
Alleged Misuse of Authority by Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society
Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society, argued that because Malimali had been appointed Commissioner, investigators were now obliged to obey her instructions, even though she was the subject of their investigation:
“She is now the substantive Commissioner under the law… you have to follow her direction right or wrong… If she directs you to stop this right now, what would you guys do?”
He further warned that continuing with the investigation would provoke institutional conflict:
“Continuing down this path is going to end up in a stand-off between this organisation and the Court… That will undermine confidence in the whole justice system.”
Such statements are significant because they explicitly suggest that institutional power, rather than law, should dictate the outcome of a criminal investigation.
Alleged Attempts by Senior Lawyer Laurel Vaurasi to Dissuade Investigators
Laurel Vaurasi, a senior practitioner, echoed similar arguments, warning that continuing the investigation could place FICAC “outside the law”:
“If you continue to keep her… the Court will listen to her application but not yours… Standing by your conviction has to be based on law… Otherwise, you are now operating outside the law.”
Her remarks were calculated to sow doubt about the legality of the investigation and discourage investigators from proceeding. While more subtle, Vaurasi's language is part of intimidation and pressure aimed at halting a criminal process. Even indirect attempts, by invoking consequences and urging withdrawal, can amount to perversion if they are intended to derail an investigation.
Alleged Conduct of Barbara Malimali – Initiating External Interference
It is understood that Barbara Malimali herself telephoned Wylie Clarke, while she was under active investigation and/or under arrest, to seek his assistance. If proven, this demonstrates that Malimali herself initiated efforts to interfere with the investigation.
The transcript also shows that her supporters repeatedly invoked her appointment as Commissioner as a shield against prosecution, implying that investigators were now subordinate to her, even though the investigation predated her appointment and concerned her own conduct.
Pattern of Coordinated Obstruction
When viewed collectively, the statements above reveal a pattern of coordinated conduct by senior figures, including judicial officers and members of the legal profession, aimed at obstructing a criminal investigation. This includes:
- Relaying instructions allegedly from the Chief Justice not to accept charges.
- Issuing threats to investigators’ careers.
- Misrepresenting the legal effect of the suspect’s appointment.
- Demanding her immediate release.
- Warning of institutional retaliation if the investigation continued.
- Soliciting external assistance from professional associations to intervene.
The content and tone of the meeting make clear that these were not mere opinions or legal debates.They were calculated acts intended to discourage, prevent, or defeat the course of justice.
Contrast: FICAC Investigation Team (Puleiwai, Saumi, Bokini Ratu). These officers largely resisted pressure and emphasised:
- The investigation had been ongoing since April.
- Evidence existed to support charges.
- They were acting under constitutional powers and the rule of law.
From Fijileaks Archive, 27 December 2025
The Fiji High Court hearing scheduled for 31 December is being presented as a dispute over legal representation. That framing understates what is at stake.
The case before the Court raises a deeper constitutional question: whether an independent Commission of Inquiry in Fiji retains legal life after it reports, or whether it is absorbed, managed, and neutralised once its findings become inconvenient.
At the centre of the dispute is the Commission of Inquiry into the aborted appointment of former FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali. The Commission was not established by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), as some have suggested. It was appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, under executive authority.
The JSC was not the author of the inquiry; it was one of the institutions affected by its conclusions. That distinction matters, because it exposes the true nature of the litigation now before the Court.
The JSC’s uneasy role
Having neither commissioned the inquiry nor appointed its Chair, the Judicial Service Commission now seeks to restrain the use of the COI report. This is not an internal procedural correction. It is a constitutional body reacting to findings produced by an external accountability mechanism over which it had no control.
The JSC’s position is therefore not supervisory but defensive. Constitutional bodies do not enjoy a right to disown independent inquiries merely because the outcome is uncomfortable.
The Solicitor-General’s claim, and its danger
The Solicitor-General Ropate Green argues that once the COI report was submitted to the President, jurisdiction, including legal representation, shifted entirely to the State. At first glance, the argument appears administratively neat. Constitutionally, it is troubling.
If accepted, it would mean that the Executive may commission an inquiry, receive its findings, and then assume complete control over how those findings are defended, explained, deployed, or quietly set aside. Under such a doctrine, a Commission of Inquiry would have no independent legal existence beyond the moment of delivery. That is not accountability. It is absorption.
The distortion of functus officio before the Fiji High Court
Central to the attempt to sideline the Chair of the Commission is reliance on the doctrine of functus officio. Justice David Ashton-Lewis has himself acknowledged that the Commission is functus: its task is complete, its findings are final, and the inquiry cannot be reopened.
That is orthodox law.
But functus officio has limits. It prevents the re-exercise of decision-making power; it does not erase authorship, extinguish standing, or impose silence. Finality of decision does not require the disappearance of the decision-maker.
What is now being advanced is a distorted version of the doctrine: that once functus, a commissioner may not explain the process, may not defend the report, and may not be represented in court when the inquiry is attacked.
There is no authority for that proposition. If it were correct, any inquiry could be ambushed the moment it reports, attacked without reply and restrained without defence. Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality.
Natural justice, and the fatal contradiction
Those challenging the COI have not confined themselves to jurisdictional or technical objections. They rely heavily on natural justice, asserting that they were not consulted, not heard, or not given an opportunity to respond before adverse findings were made.
Once that argument is raised, the process of the inquiry itself becomes the issue. Natural justice claims cannot be assessed in the abstract. The Court must know:
Only one person can explain those matters authoritatively: Justice David Ashton-Lewis, the Chair of the Commission of Inquiry
Here lies the challengers’ fatal inconsistency. They allege procedural unfairness, yet seek to silence the very person who designed and conducted the process. They invoke natural justice while opposing the participation of the decision-maker whose conduct is under attack.
That position is untenable. Natural justice cannot be tested by excluding the author of the process. To do so would itself offend the principles of fairness the challengers claim to defend.
Justice Ashton-Lewis is not reopening the inquiry or revisiting findings. He is explaining how fairness was applied, why certain steps were taken, and what opportunities were afforded. That is not the exercise of power; it is the defence of process.
Why the Chair’s involvement remains constitutionally necessary
Justice Ashton-Lewis was not a mere courier delivering a document to the President. He conducted hearings, assessed evidence, made findings of fact, and drew conclusions affecting the integrity of public office.
The moment those findings were challenged, restrained, or sidelined, natural justice required that the author be heard. Representation in court is not a continuation of the inquiry; it is a safeguard against procedural ambush.
To deny that right would permit executive and institutional actors to attack an inquiry while denying the public a full account of how it was conducted.
The case before the Court raises a deeper constitutional question: whether an independent Commission of Inquiry in Fiji retains legal life after it reports, or whether it is absorbed, managed, and neutralised once its findings become inconvenient.
At the centre of the dispute is the Commission of Inquiry into the aborted appointment of former FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali. The Commission was not established by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), as some have suggested. It was appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, under executive authority.
The JSC was not the author of the inquiry; it was one of the institutions affected by its conclusions. That distinction matters, because it exposes the true nature of the litigation now before the Court.
The JSC’s uneasy role
Having neither commissioned the inquiry nor appointed its Chair, the Judicial Service Commission now seeks to restrain the use of the COI report. This is not an internal procedural correction. It is a constitutional body reacting to findings produced by an external accountability mechanism over which it had no control.
The JSC’s position is therefore not supervisory but defensive. Constitutional bodies do not enjoy a right to disown independent inquiries merely because the outcome is uncomfortable.
The Solicitor-General’s claim, and its danger
The Solicitor-General Ropate Green argues that once the COI report was submitted to the President, jurisdiction, including legal representation, shifted entirely to the State. At first glance, the argument appears administratively neat. Constitutionally, it is troubling.
If accepted, it would mean that the Executive may commission an inquiry, receive its findings, and then assume complete control over how those findings are defended, explained, deployed, or quietly set aside. Under such a doctrine, a Commission of Inquiry would have no independent legal existence beyond the moment of delivery. That is not accountability. It is absorption.
The distortion of functus officio before the Fiji High Court
Central to the attempt to sideline the Chair of the Commission is reliance on the doctrine of functus officio. Justice David Ashton-Lewis has himself acknowledged that the Commission is functus: its task is complete, its findings are final, and the inquiry cannot be reopened.
That is orthodox law.
But functus officio has limits. It prevents the re-exercise of decision-making power; it does not erase authorship, extinguish standing, or impose silence. Finality of decision does not require the disappearance of the decision-maker.
What is now being advanced is a distorted version of the doctrine: that once functus, a commissioner may not explain the process, may not defend the report, and may not be represented in court when the inquiry is attacked.
There is no authority for that proposition. If it were correct, any inquiry could be ambushed the moment it reports, attacked without reply and restrained without defence. Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality.
Natural justice, and the fatal contradiction
Those challenging the COI have not confined themselves to jurisdictional or technical objections. They rely heavily on natural justice, asserting that they were not consulted, not heard, or not given an opportunity to respond before adverse findings were made.
Once that argument is raised, the process of the inquiry itself becomes the issue. Natural justice claims cannot be assessed in the abstract. The Court must know:
- who was notified,
- who was invited to participate,
- what opportunities were extended,
- what was declined or ignored,
- and why particular procedural choices were made.
Only one person can explain those matters authoritatively: Justice David Ashton-Lewis, the Chair of the Commission of Inquiry
Here lies the challengers’ fatal inconsistency. They allege procedural unfairness, yet seek to silence the very person who designed and conducted the process. They invoke natural justice while opposing the participation of the decision-maker whose conduct is under attack.
That position is untenable. Natural justice cannot be tested by excluding the author of the process. To do so would itself offend the principles of fairness the challengers claim to defend.
Justice Ashton-Lewis is not reopening the inquiry or revisiting findings. He is explaining how fairness was applied, why certain steps were taken, and what opportunities were afforded. That is not the exercise of power; it is the defence of process.
Why the Chair’s involvement remains constitutionally necessary
Justice Ashton-Lewis was not a mere courier delivering a document to the President. He conducted hearings, assessed evidence, made findings of fact, and drew conclusions affecting the integrity of public office.
The moment those findings were challenged, restrained, or sidelined, natural justice required that the author be heard. Representation in court is not a continuation of the inquiry; it is a safeguard against procedural ambush.
To deny that right would permit executive and institutional actors to attack an inquiry while denying the public a full account of how it was conducted.
