*The Fijian public deserves to know: is he advancing democracy, or destabilising it?
“Is it that some senior staff in the Fiji Elections Office are opposed to introducing the proposed system given that it would require more work from them than required by the Bainimarama/Sayed-Khaiyum system that they have implemented for the last three national elections?”
Prof Narsey stressed that the Fiji Electoral Commission remains the “superior authority” and has the prerogative to bring in new staff if current officers are reluctant to implement the proposed People’s Open List System (POLCS).
“If necessary, [it] could appoint additional new staff more amenable to implementing the democratic changes.”
Why the FEO is being targeted
In a recent Fiji Times column, Narsey publicly questioned why the Electoral Law Reform Report has not yet been tabled in Parliament and implicitly suggested that some senior staff in the FEO are resisting reforms because “it would require more work from them than required by the Bainimarama/Sayed-Khaiyum system.”
Let’s examine that claim:
- It assumes that FEO staff are inert bureaucrats refusing reform for comfort’s sake.
- It implies a conspiracy: that the system is being kept in place not for voters, but for vested party or individual advantage.
- It bypasses due process and places the FEO on the defensive.
- More dangerously, it sets the stage for dismantling institutions under the guise of “progress”.
Targeting the FEO is risky. It is the pillar of electoral management. When you weaken it, you weaken the very architecture of democracy.
The so-called “alternative electoral system” under the spotlight
Narsey, as part of the review team, publicly released details of the proposed “Proportional Open List Constituency System” (POLCS) which would see Fiji divided into 25 constituencies, each electing two MPs (one open, one reserved for women) plus additional seats for party proportionality.
On paper the model sounds inclusive. But scratch beneath the surface:
- Two MPs per constituency (one open, one reserved) might sound fair but may reduce local accountability if not implemented properly.
- The “open list” concept presumes parties will behave ethically. But in the Fijian context of clientelism, how realistic is that presumption?
- The system would require much more detailed voter education, operational capacity and administrative cost; ironically, the very tasks that Narsey accuses the FEO of resisting.
- It creates a parallel narrative: the “old system” is broken, so we need this new system now. But change rushed is change brittle.
Narsey’s logic is self-contradictory
He accuses FEO staff of being unwilling to do extra work. But the POLCS proposal demands more from them: more complex ballots, more seats, more lists, more proportional allocations. If the system is so burdensome for FEO under the current model, why assume they’ll handle a more demanding system better?
He accuses political self-interest of delaying reform, and then suggests FEO’s resistance is part of that interest.
But the FEO is not the adversary to political parties; it is the instrument of public trust.
His framing flips that relationship: public institution equals enemy of reform, specialist academic equals saviour of democracy.
What’s missing in the narrative
Narsey’s public commentary gives two big omissions:
First, cost.
No transparent cost-benefit analysis of how the new system will be financed, what budget increases are required, how much voter confusion might increase.
Second, transition risk.
Overhauling the electoral system mid-cycle (or too close to an election) creates serious risk of administrative failure, delays, and litigation.
Yet Narsey’s narrative dismisses such concerns as “resistance”.
The danger for democracy
When you assemble the pieces:
- Attack the institution (FEO)
- Propose a sweeping new system (POLCS)
- Imply the current system is rigged for insiders
- Demand rapid implementation under pressure
What you have is a blueprint for institutional capture. Under the banner of “reform” you can weaken oversight, bypass checks, and create an environment where future abuse is easier.
As someone involved in electoral oversight, Narsey should know better: good reforms take time, transparency and buy-in.
The Fijian voters deserve clean, incremental reform grounded in consultation.
They do not deserve grand announcements that delegitimise independent institutions and push through sweeping change without full transparency.
Wadan Narsey should answer the following:
- On what legal basis is FEO being labelled as obstructive? Provide evidence, not implication.
- How will the POLCS model avoid the disadvantages and costs you assume are negligible?
- Why should the public trust a system that criticises the current institution yet demands far greater complexity?
Let us treat the FEO not as the enemy of democracy, but as its front-line defender.
And let us treat electoral system change not as a virtue in itself, but as the means to a more transparent, fair and stable democracy.
***BAN CONVICTED POLITICIANS From Contesting Elections, Full Stop!
In response to the allegations made by the Professor Prasad, the Acting Supervisor Mataiciwa reiterates Section 18 of the Electoral Act 2014 which states that if the Electoral Commission or the Supervisor becomes aware at any time of the probable commission of an election related criminal offence including any criminal offence prescribed in the Act, it must immediately report the matter in writing to FICAC, and all election officials must fully cooperate in the investigation of any election related offence.
Mataiciwa says her office received the complaint, the complaints process was followed, and after assessment, powers under Section 18 of the Act was invoked, requesting FICAC to investigate a 'probable' breach.
She says this must not be misconstrued as finding Professor Prasad guilty of any offence.
Mataiciwa says this underscores her dedication to upholding independence, electoral integrity, and transparency.
She says in respect of FICAC’s statutory role to investigate probable breaches to the three existing electoral laws, all enquiries regarding the complaint should be directed to FICAC.
Professor Prasad says according to the front-page report, the FEO has referred a complaint against him to FICAC for investigation.
He says he is surprised to read this.
The Deputy Prime Minister says the FEO has not put these allegations to him for response or comment.
He says he does not see how the Acting Registrar of Political Parties and Supervisor of Elections could reach the view that there was a case for FICAC to investigate without first asking for answers from him.
Professor Prasad says his lawyers will be writing separately to her on this.
He also says nobody from the Fiji Sun contacted him for his comment on the news published today.
The Deputy Prime Minister says the report stated that he said “this is not a good time” when he was supposedly contacted by a journalist to comment on the news.
Professor Prasad says this is unethical and irresponsible.
He says this is also absolutely false and a concoction.
His lawyers will also be writing to the Fiji Sun on this issue.
We have sought comments from the Acting Registrar of Parties, Ana Mataiciwa and the Fiji Sun.
She Had No Discretion Once a Probable Breach Was Identified
Section 18 of the Electoral Act 2014 imposed a mandatory duty:
- If the SoE became aware of the probable commission of an offence under the elections or political finance laws,
- She had to immediately report the matter in writing to FICAC.
This was a compulsory statutory obligation, not a matter of administrative choice or political preference.
Once the complaint revealed credible grounds, the SoE was legally prohibited from interviewing Prasad or giving him a chance to explain himself before referring the matter.
Thus, Prasad’s complaint that he had not been approached beforehand was legally unfounded.
The Referral Did Not Amount to Any Finding of Guilt
Mataiciwa correctly clarified that the referral:
- Did not find Prasad guilty,
- Did not reach any determination on the merits,
- Simply passed the matter to the agency legally authorised to conduct investigations: FICAC.
- Abuse of office,
- Failure to carry out a statutory duty,
- Compromising the independence of the FEO and FICAC.
The Referral Demonstrated Institutional Independence
Mataiciwa’s statement stressed independence, integrity, and transparency.
Given that the complaint targeted a sitting Deputy Prime Minister, the FEO’s willingness to refer the matter indicated that:
- The FEO was functioning independently,
- The SoE was applying the law uniformly,
- FICAC retained exclusive jurisdiction over election-related corruption matters.
Responsibility Shifted Fully to FICAC
Mataiciwa made it clear that once the referral was made, the file was entirely FICAC’s responsibility.
Under the relevant Acts:
- Only FICAC could investigate,
- Only FICAC could recommend charges,
- The DPP would decide whether prosecution proceeded.
Prasad’s Public Reaction Was Legally Weak
Prasad’s argument that he should have been consulted before referral was contrary to the law.
It suggested either a misunderstanding of the statutory scheme or an attempt to re-frame the SoE’s mandatory obligations as discretionary.
His claim of being “surprised” implied wrongdoing by the FEO, which Mataiciwa’s detailed statutory explanation effectively dismantled.
If anything, Prasad’s reaction signalled:
- Political discomfort,
- An inaccurate interpretation of the law,
- A possible attempt to push back against an independent constitutional office.
Mataiciwa delivered a precise, confident, and legally grounded response.
Her interpretation of Section 18 was correct.
Her actions aligned with her statutory duty.
Her clarification that the referral did not imply guilt reinforced due process and institutional independence.
By challenging her actions publicly, Prasad may have attempted to place political pressure on the FEO but Mataiciwa’s statement demonstrated that the law, not politics, governed her decision.
