*The President Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu cannot lawfully suspend or stop the salary of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)—such as Christopher Pryde—without following proper constitutional procedures, including referral to a Tribunal.
*The President of Fiji has no legal authority to suspend the DPP’s salary unless:
*A complaint has been made to the Judicial Services Commission;
*The JSC has advised that a tribunal be formed:
*A tribunal has been established, and;
*A suspension is effected pending the Tribunal’s findings.
*Until then, any attempt to interfere with the DPP’s remuneration would be not only unconstitutional, but also legally indefensible and politically reckless.
 |  |
 No Tribunal, No Power: Why the President Cannot Lawfully Suspend Pryde’s Salary In a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law—not the whims of political expediency—even the President is bound by due process. Recent speculation about whether the President can suspend the salary of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Christopher Pryde, must be met with a clear answer grounded in law: no, the President has no such power unless and until a tribunal has been established on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC). This is not a matter of interpretation or discretion. It is a matter of constitutional obligation. The relevant legal framework is unambiguous. Constitutional Protections for Independent Office Holders |  |
The 2013 Constitution of Fiji, controversial though it may be in other respects, contains strong structural protections for the independence of certain constitutional offices—including the DPP.
Under Section 117, the DPP:
Moreover, under Section 142, the DPP’s salary is:
This means the President cannot unilaterally interfere with the DPP’s salary—not as a form of punishment, coercion, or political pressure.
Removal and Suspension Require a Tribunal – Not Presidential Whim
The only constitutional path to suspending or removing the DPP is found in Section 111, which governs the discipline and removal of high office holders.
That section provides that:
In other words, there must be a formal process initiated by the JSC, and a tribunal must be in place before the President can act. There is no provision allowing the President to sidestep this process, much less use financial measures like salary suspension as a tool of informal punishment.
To do so would amount to constructive removal without due process—an act that would not only be constitutionally unlawful but also liable to immediate judicial challenge.
Why It Matters
Allowing the President—or any political authority—to interfere with the salary of the DPP without due process is not a trivial matter. It strikes at the very core of judicial independence, prosecutorial autonomy, and constitutional supremacy.
Christopher Pryde, regardless of the controversies surrounding him, is entitled to the protections of law. If there are legitimate grounds for concern about his conduct or competence, the correct mechanism is a referral to the Judicial Services Commission, not backroom pressure or financial strangulation.
To do otherwise would set a dangerous precedent: that the head of state may punish independent officers without the scrutiny of a tribunal. That is the road to authoritarianism—not accountability.
Conclusion: The Law Is Clear
The President of Fiji has no legal authority to suspend the DPP’s salary unless:
Until then, any attempt to interfere with the DPP’s remuneration would be not only unconstitutional, but also legally indefensible and politically reckless.
Fiji must not return to the days where power trumped law. We must hold the Constitution to its word—especially when it is inconvenient to do so.
Under Section 117, the DPP:
- Is appointed by the President on the advice of the JSC;
- Does not take directions from any person, including the President or Prime Minister;
- And enjoys secure tenure and remuneration during the term of office.
Moreover, under Section 142, the DPP’s salary is:
- Charged to the Consolidated Fund, not subject to annual appropriation; and
- Protected from any reduction to the office holder’s disadvantage unless it is part of a general reduction applicable to all public officers.
This means the President cannot unilaterally interfere with the DPP’s salary—not as a form of punishment, coercion, or political pressure.
Removal and Suspension Require a Tribunal – Not Presidential Whim
The only constitutional path to suspending or removing the DPP is found in Section 111, which governs the discipline and removal of high office holders.
That section provides that:
- A complaint must first be referred to the Judicial Services Commission;
- The JSC must advise the President that the complaint warrants investigation;
- The President may then establish a tribunal to inquire into the matter; and
- Only after the tribunal is established may the President suspend the office holder, pending the outcome.
In other words, there must be a formal process initiated by the JSC, and a tribunal must be in place before the President can act. There is no provision allowing the President to sidestep this process, much less use financial measures like salary suspension as a tool of informal punishment.
To do so would amount to constructive removal without due process—an act that would not only be constitutionally unlawful but also liable to immediate judicial challenge.
Why It Matters
Allowing the President—or any political authority—to interfere with the salary of the DPP without due process is not a trivial matter. It strikes at the very core of judicial independence, prosecutorial autonomy, and constitutional supremacy.
Christopher Pryde, regardless of the controversies surrounding him, is entitled to the protections of law. If there are legitimate grounds for concern about his conduct or competence, the correct mechanism is a referral to the Judicial Services Commission, not backroom pressure or financial strangulation.
To do otherwise would set a dangerous precedent: that the head of state may punish independent officers without the scrutiny of a tribunal. That is the road to authoritarianism—not accountability.
Conclusion: The Law Is Clear
The President of Fiji has no legal authority to suspend the DPP’s salary unless:
- A complaint has been made to the Judicial Services Commission,
- The JSC has advised that a tribunal be formed,
- A tribunal has been established, and
- A suspension is effected pending the tribunal’s findings.
Until then, any attempt to interfere with the DPP’s remuneration would be not only unconstitutional, but also legally indefensible and politically reckless.
Fiji must not return to the days where power trumped law. We must hold the Constitution to its word—especially when it is inconvenient to do so.
Section 117(5) of the Constitution does not support suspension of salary
The “Consultation” with the Acting Attorney-General is Legally Irrelevant. |  Siromi Turaga |
| *The decision to suspend Christopher Pryde’s salary and other benefits “forthwith until further notice” pursuant to Section 117(5) of the 2013 Constitution, even if made on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) and after consulting the Acting Attorney-General, is not constitutionally correct—unless a tribunal has been instituted under Section 111. And here’s why: 1. Section 117(5) – Scope and Limitations |  |
Section 117(5) of the 2013 Constitution states:
“The Director of Public Prosecutions may be removed from office by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission, but only for inability to perform the functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and the President must act on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission.
So, Section 117(5) does not support suspension of salary.
2. Proper Process for Suspension – Section 111 Applies
Section 111(1)–(4) of the Constitution applies to disciplinary action (including suspension) for independent constitutional officers like the DPP.
It sets out the following steps:
There is no mention of suspending salary or benefits in advance of a tribunal.
Thus, any suspension of salary without a tribunal being established is unlawful and unconstitutional.
3. Section 142 – Salary Protections
Section 142 of the Constitution provides:
“The remuneration and benefits of a holder of a public office… must not be varied to his or her disadvantage after appointment unless as part of a general variation applying to all persons holding public offices.”
4. The “Consultation” with the Acting Attorney-General is Legally Irrelevant
Conclusion: The President’s Action is Unlawful
The President’s 25 July 2025 decision to suspend Mr. Pryde’s salary and benefits is invalid because:
Response available to Christopher Pryde:
“The Director of Public Prosecutions may be removed from office by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission, but only for inability to perform the functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and the President must act on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission.
- This provision only governs removal, not suspension or alteration of salary.
- It does not confer any power to suspend salary or benefits.
- It requires a recommendation by the JSC, but even that is for removal, not for financial penalties.
So, Section 117(5) does not support suspension of salary.
2. Proper Process for Suspension – Section 111 Applies
Section 111(1)–(4) of the Constitution applies to disciplinary action (including suspension) for independent constitutional officers like the DPP.
It sets out the following steps:
- The President must not act unilaterally.
- The JSC must first recommend that the matter be referred to a tribunal.
- Only after a tribunal is established, the President may suspend the office holder pending the outcome.
- The suspension must be expressly pending the tribunal’s inquiry, and not indefinite or open-ended.
There is no mention of suspending salary or benefits in advance of a tribunal.
Thus, any suspension of salary without a tribunal being established is unlawful and unconstitutional.
3. Section 142 – Salary Protections
Section 142 of the Constitution provides:
“The remuneration and benefits of a holder of a public office… must not be varied to his or her disadvantage after appointment unless as part of a general variation applying to all persons holding public offices.”
- Pryde’s salary is protected from reduction unless part of a general, across-the-board variation.
- A unilateral or targeted suspension of pay is a breach of this constitutional safeguard.
4. The “Consultation” with the Acting Attorney-General is Legally Irrelevant
- The Constitution does not require or permit the President to act after consulting the Attorney-General on matters of DPP discipline.
- The relevant actor is the Judicial Services Commission.
- Any “consultation” with the AG is politically suspicious and legally immaterial.
Conclusion: The President’s Action is Unlawful
The President’s 25 July 2025 decision to suspend Mr. Pryde’s salary and benefits is invalid because:
- Section 117(5) does not authorize suspension of salary.
- Section 111 requires a tribunal to be in place before suspension is permitted.
- Section 142 prohibits any adverse variation of salary unless part of a general variation.
- The suspension is also procedurally flawed, lacking the due process protections expected in constitutional governance.
Response available to Christopher Pryde:
- This action is challengeable by judicial review.
- Pryde could seek a declaration of invalidity, interim reinstatement of pay, and potentially damages or compensation.
- It is also open to the courts to issue a constitutional remedy under Section 44 (enforcement of rights) or under their inherent supervisory jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Salesi Temo Cannot Police the Law While Breaking Its Spirit: The Constitutional Crisis in the Judicial Services Commission
*The only lawful and ethical remedy is for Chief Justice Temo to recuse himself from all matters before the JSC, or for the Judicial Services Commission itself to advise the President to appoint a Tribunal to assess his conduct, pursuant to Section 111
The Judicial Services Commission (JSC) was established to preserve the independence, integrity, and discipline of Fiji’s judicial and legal institutions. But when its Chair, Chief Justice Salesi Temo, has himself been cited in a formal Commission of Inquiry for conduct that undermines those very principles, a constitutional crisis emerges—one that now threatens the legitimacy of every decision the JSC makes under his leadership.
The Commission of Inquiry report by Justice David Ashton Lewis, a fellow judge of the Fiji Supreme Court, raises serious and specific concerns about Chief Justice Temo’s conduct—particularly his involvement in the improper appointment of Barbara Malimali as FICAC Commissioner.
Why Temo’s Chairmanship of the JSC Is Now Constitutionally Indefensible
1. The JSC Cannot Be Credibly Led by a Compromised Chair
The Chief Justice sits at the apex of Fiji’s judiciary. If the person charged with upholding legality and discipline is himself credibly accused of breaching the Constitution, how can the JSC maintain legitimacy?
Temo’s leadership now contaminates every decision the Commission makes—including any ongoing or future consideration of:
2. Conflict of Interest: Malimali Was a Beneficiary of Temo’s Misconduct
It is wholly improper for Chief Justice Temo to remain in charge of any matter that touches on FICAC. His prior role in Malimali’s appointment, as found by the Lewis Inquiry, creates an actual and apparent conflict of interest. Any action he takes related to FICAC—or any officer who challenged Malimali—is fatally tainted by bias.
3. Natural Justice and Judicial Accountability
Every person subject to JSC oversight—including Christopher Pryde—has a constitutional right to an impartial disciplinary body. With Temo as Chair, that is impossible. No one should face disciplinary action under the oversight of a judge who himself violated the same rules he now seeks to enforce.
The Path Forward: Recusal or Removal
The only lawful and ethical remedy is for Chief Justice Temo to recuse himself from all matters before the JSC, or for the Judicial Services Commission itself to advise the President to appoint a tribunal to assess his conduct, pursuant to Section 111.
If he refuses, any action taken under his chairmanship may be constitutionally challengeable, including:
Fiji Cannot Afford Another Silent Crisis in the Judiciary
When the head of the judiciary participates in an unconstitutional appointment and continues to exercise disciplinary powers without accountability, the entire constitutional architecture begins to collapse from within.
The findings of Justice Lewis should not be buried under political convenience or judicial self-protection. They demand action.
Chief Justice Temo must step aside from the JSC, or be removed—because those who sit in judgment of others must first be able to withstand judgment themselves.
The Commission of Inquiry report by Justice David Ashton Lewis, a fellow judge of the Fiji Supreme Court, raises serious and specific concerns about Chief Justice Temo’s conduct—particularly his involvement in the improper appointment of Barbara Malimali as FICAC Commissioner.
Why Temo’s Chairmanship of the JSC Is Now Constitutionally Indefensible
1. The JSC Cannot Be Credibly Led by a Compromised Chair
The Chief Justice sits at the apex of Fiji’s judiciary. If the person charged with upholding legality and discipline is himself credibly accused of breaching the Constitution, how can the JSC maintain legitimacy?
Temo’s leadership now contaminates every decision the Commission makes—including any ongoing or future consideration of:
- Whether to suspend or investigate the Director of Public Prosecutions;
- Whether to recommend removal of judges or legal officers;
- Whether to assess the legal status of FICAC’s leadership
2. Conflict of Interest: Malimali Was a Beneficiary of Temo’s Misconduct
It is wholly improper for Chief Justice Temo to remain in charge of any matter that touches on FICAC. His prior role in Malimali’s appointment, as found by the Lewis Inquiry, creates an actual and apparent conflict of interest. Any action he takes related to FICAC—or any officer who challenged Malimali—is fatally tainted by bias.
3. Natural Justice and Judicial Accountability
Every person subject to JSC oversight—including Christopher Pryde—has a constitutional right to an impartial disciplinary body. With Temo as Chair, that is impossible. No one should face disciplinary action under the oversight of a judge who himself violated the same rules he now seeks to enforce.
The Path Forward: Recusal or Removal
The only lawful and ethical remedy is for Chief Justice Temo to recuse himself from all matters before the JSC, or for the Judicial Services Commission itself to advise the President to appoint a tribunal to assess his conduct, pursuant to Section 111.
If he refuses, any action taken under his chairmanship may be constitutionally challengeable, including:
- Any suspension of the DPP;
- Any endorsement of FICAC’s current or former leadership;
- Any judicial appointments or promotion.
Fiji Cannot Afford Another Silent Crisis in the Judiciary
When the head of the judiciary participates in an unconstitutional appointment and continues to exercise disciplinary powers without accountability, the entire constitutional architecture begins to collapse from within.
The findings of Justice Lewis should not be buried under political convenience or judicial self-protection. They demand action.
Chief Justice Temo must step aside from the JSC, or be removed—because those who sit in judgment of others must first be able to withstand judgment themselves.
 |  |
