Narsey's Ghost in the Electoral Slot Machine. Leaked Electoral Roadmap That Looks Like His Old FIGHT: 71 MPs, 25 Reserved Women's SEATS, Open Lists. Is this Backdoor Formula to Gift Prasad His 15 Seat Dream?

Biman’s 15-Seat Dream and Fatiaki–Narsey–Nabou Blueprint to Engineer NFP's Survival and Trap Sitiveni Rabuka and PAP

At a recent private dinner, National Federation Party leader and Finance Minister Biman Prasad reportedly assured his host that NFP would remain in coalition with Sitiveni Rabuka’s People’s Alliance Party (PAP) to fight the next election.

With striking confidence, he added that under the new electoral system being crafted, NFP would win 15 seats.

Wadan Narsey

That boast is no idle brag. It aligns perfectly with the leaked electoral reform report chaired by former Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki and co-authored by former NFP MP Professor Wadan Narsey, a plan that guarantees NFP’s survival, and locks Sitiveni Rabuka into perpetual coalition dependence.
​

• Seini Nabou, former NFP General Secretary and failed candidate, is tied to the reform discourse, embedding NFP’s political machinery into the project.

The Blueprint: Serving 15 Seats on a Plate

• 25 Constituencies, each electing two MPs:
  • One Open Seat (any candidate).
  • One Reserved Seat for Women (RSW).
• 50 MPs chosen by First-Past-the-Post (FPTP).
• 21 MPs chosen from a national “Open List” of losing Open Seat candidates, distributed proportionally to parties.
• 5% threshold: parties failing to cross this barrier are excluded.
• De-registration rule: if a party is deregistered, all its MPs lose their seats.
• Other proposals: PM term limits, caretaker government rules, blackout reforms, a Referendum Act, and even a revived Senate.

Total Parliament: 71 MPs

For NFP, this system is a gift: it can secure a handful of seats in Indo-Fijian constituencies, then use the losers’ list to parachute failed candidates back into Parliament until it reaches Biman Prasad's ’s magic number of 15 seats.

---

Rabuka, Don’t Swallow Political Leftovers: A Recipe Cooked by NFP Chefs for Their Own Survival

Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and his People’s Alliance Party (PAP) now face a critical fork in the political road. On one side is the temptation of a shiny new electoral formula cooked up by Wadan Narsey, Daniel Fatiaki, and Seini Nabou.

​On the other side is the path of democratic clarity, simplicity, and stability.

---

If Rabuka swallows the Narsey–Nabou–Fatiaki concoction, he risks choking on Fiji’s future, and on his own government.

Why Rabuka and PAP should reject it.

1. It Dilutes PAP’s Strength
   PAP is the only party with possible wider reach. The new system would deliberately chop that advantage into fragmented constituencies, ensuring Rabuka can never command a majority again.
2. It Revives Old Instability
   Fiji lived through the coalition chaos of 1999–2006: unstable governments, endless bargaining, opportunistic defections. That instability paved the way for Bainimarama’s 2006 coup. Why would Rabuka want to reopen that door?
3. It Hands NFP a Free Lunch
   The losers’ list ensures that even rejected candidates re-enter Parliament. NFP doesn’t need to persuade voters, the formulas do the work. Biman Prasad gets his 15 seats, served hot.

The Bigger Picture: Legitimacy and Strategy

Yes, Fiji faces a legitimacy crisis after the de-registration of FijiFirst. Yes, the 2013 Constitution’s 75% amendment hurdle is almost impossible to meet. But urgency must not be an excuse for partisan hacks disguised as constitutional housekeeping.

Rabuka, more than anyone, knows the dangers of elite-engineered electoral systems. In 1997, the Joint Parliamentary Committee weakened the Reeves Commission’s inclusive proposals. The result? A flawed system that collapsed under stress. The last thing Fiji needs is a repeat performance - this time cooked up in NFP’s kitchen.

What Rabuka and PAP Should Do Instead

1. Reject Partisan Recipes
   Don’t let NFP insiders dictate the system. Any reform must be transparently led, not family-and-party stitched.
2. Defend Stability
   Fiji needs proportionality, yes but not losers sneaking back and endless coalitions. Keep elections simple, proportional, and voter-driven.
3. Mainstream Women, Don’t Ghettoise Them
   Require party lists to alternate male/female candidates, rather than stuffing women into parallel reserved seats.
4. Trust Voters, Not Elites
   Fiji’s people can handle one clear ballot. They don’t need mathematicians in the backroom cooking their outcomes.

The Sarcastic Truth

This so-called reform is no act of democratic generosity. It’s a cynical banquet where:

• Narsey is the chef,
• Fatiaki is the waiter,
• Nabou sets the table, and
• Biman Prasad gets to eat 15 hot seats while everyone else fights for scraps.

If Sitiveni Rabuka and PAP accept this political meal, they will find themselves dining on cold leftovers, while NFP walks away with the feast.​

Electoral Commission Proposes Hybrid Constituency Model with Gender Quota: A Step Forward or Recycling Old Flaws?

​Extract from Executive Summary (Right)
​
Structure: 

• 25 local constituencies, modeled after the 1997 Constitution.
• Each constituency has two seats: 
• ​​​Open Seat (OS); 
• Reserved Seat for Women (RSW).

Voting System:

• Voters get two ballot papers (one for OS, one for RSW).
• MPs elected via first-past-the-post (FPTP).
• 25 MPs from OS + 25 MPs from RSW = 50 MPs total.​

Threshold:

• A 5% eligibility threshold applies to both constituencies and parties.

Open List System:

• Unsuccessful OS candidates (not RSW) may be placed on the Open List for parties.
• Ranking of unsuccessful OS candidates is adjusted by a “standardization process” to equalize vote weight across constituencies of different sizes.

Standardization:

• Votes are adjusted mathematically to counterbalance unequal voter populations in constituencies.

Fijileaks Analysis:

• Gender Representation:
  The Reserved Seat for Women (RSW) attempts to enforce gender balance, a corrective response to male-dominated parliaments. However, confining women to separate “reserved seats” risks entrenching tokenism rather than integrating gender parity across all political contests.
• System Complexity:
  While FPTP is simple at constituency level, the Open List plus Standardization introduces layers of complexity. Voters may struggle to understand how losing candidates are recycled into proportional representation, undermining transparency and public confidence.

​​NOTE: Just as the current d'Hondt system has produced MPs with only a few hundred votes through the recyling of losing candidates, the Fatiaki-Narsey-Nabou proposal risks repeating the same democratic deficit. By allowing rejected candidates a second entry point through proportional redistribution, their proposed system entrenches indirect pathways to parliament rather than strengthening voter choice.
​

• Threshold:
  The 5% cutoff may exclude smaller parties and independents, consolidating power among larger, well-funded parties.
• Exclusion of Women from Open List Recycling:
  Restricting “losing candidates” from RSW seats from entering the Open List penalizes women disproportionately. Male candidates have a second chance pathway; women do not. This undermines the equality the system claims to promote.
• Resemblance to 1997 System:
  While borrowing from the 1997 model, the proposal fails to address Fiji’s historical problems:
  • Fragmentation (too many micro-constituencies).
  • Disproportionality (FPTP exaggerates winners).
  • Ethnic and gender segmentation (reinforced instead of transcended).

​
Critique

1. Tokenistic Gender Quotas: Segregating women into reserved contests risks sidelining them, rather than mainstreaming equality.
2. Voter Confusion: Two ballots, dual counting methods, and mathematical “standardization” are likely to alienate ordinary voters.
3. Structural Inequality: Excluding RSW losers from the Open List creates a gendered disadvantage.
4. Entrenchment of Big Parties: The 5% threshold and party-centric Open List recycling marginalize smaller players and independents.
5. Backward-Looking Design: Instead of learning from the weaknesses of the 1997 Constitution and subsequent electoral failures, this model recycles them with 'lipstick cosmetic' updates.

​Overall Judgment:
​
The proposal reflects a well-meaning but flawed compromise. While it tries to balance constituency representation, gender quotas, and proportionality, it risks perpetuating tokenism, voter confusion, and party dominance.

​A more effective model would integrate women equally into all contests, simplify the vote-to-seat translation, and avoid recycling losing candidates into Parliament through backdoor formulas.

Proposed Electoral Reform Risks Entrenching Tokenism While Weakening Democratic Accountability
Extract from Summary Two (Right)

The report outlines recommendations for Fiji’s electoral system:

Parliament Size & Composition

• Total 71 MPs.
• 25 Open Seats (including 5 maritime seats).
• 25 Reserved Seats for Women (RSWs).
• 21 Open List Seats (to ensure proportionality nationally).

​
Electoral System

• Proportional open list constituency system (POLCS).
• Dual-member constituencies with one open seat plus one reserved seat for women.
• Temporary measure of 25 reserved seats for women.

Other Recommendations
​

• 5% electoral threshold applies both nationally and to constituencies.
• Two ballot papers (one for open seat, one for party list).
• Political parties lose all seats if de-registered.
• Candidate qualifications include: declaration not relying on 2013 Constitution immunities; mandatory negative drug test.

---

Fijileaks Analysis

• Inclusivity vs Tokenism:
  The 25 reserved seats for women appear progressive on the surface, but risk reducing women’s representation to a fixed quota rather than allowing genuine competitiveness. By pairing each open seat with a reserved women’s seat, women may be symbolically included while constrained within a parallel track.
• Maritime Representation:
  Recognition of 5 (FIVE) maritime constituencies addresses historical under-representation, but only as a subset of the 25 open seats, meaning real weight is limited.
• Threshold Issue:
  A 5% threshold at both constituency and national level could marginalize small or new parties, potentially centralizing power in a few dominant blocs, contradicting the proportional representation principle.
• Party De-registration:
  Forcing vacation of seats if a party is de-registered is a blunt tool that penalizes voters and MPs rather than party leadership. This risks undermining the independence of MPs and concentrates control in party machinery.
• Candidate Disqualifications:
  • The requirement for a declaration renouncing immunity under the 2013 Constitution is politically loaded, clearly aimed at disqualifying certain figures rather than setting neutral eligibility standards.
  • The mandatory drug test requirement is unusual, stigmatizing, and arguably disproportionate in relation to parliamentary competence.
• Structural Design:
  The proposal tries to blend constituency accountability (open seats) with national proportionality (list seats), but layering reserved seats, thresholds, and dual-seat constituencies risks producing a confusing, over-engineered system that voters may not fully understand.

Critique

• The reforms appear more engineered for political management than for democratic strengthening.
• Women’s representation is framed as a temporary fix, but structured in a way that risks ghettoizing women candidates rather than mainstreaming gender parity.
• The 5% dual threshold and party de-registration penalties risk consolidating elite party control, undermining voter choice and representative accountability.
• The attempt to introduce proportionality while clinging to constituency dualism creates unnecessary complexity and opacity.
• Candidate qualification requirements veer into politically motivated exclusions, undermining fairness.

In short, these reforms create the appearance of inclusivity and fairness (through women’s seats, maritime seats, and proportionality), but in reality, they risk entrenching tokenism, central party control, and political exclusion, while leaving Fiji with a complex and fragile electoral system.

Electoral and Constitutional Reform Roadmap: A Patchwork or a Coherent Vision?

The document (on the right) outlines proposed reforms under three categories:
Voting and Counting

• Extended early voting.
• Adoption of First Past the Post for constituency seats.
• Vote counting at constituency-level centres.​

Legislation

• A new Referendum Act modeled on Vanuatu’s.
• Government-funded constituency offices.
• Removal of the “black-out period” and reducing the 300m radius restriction at polling venues.

Constitutional Amendment (Roadmap)

• Caretaker government provisions.
• Prime Minister term limits and compulsory retirement age.
• Regulation of early announcement of election dates.
• Entrenching the Constituency Boundaries Commission.
• Creating a new, non-politically appointed Senate for cross-cutting issues.

​Fijileaks Analysis

​Voting and Counting Reforms:
​
Moving to First Past the Post reverses proportional representation trends and could distort representation, especially in diverse societies. Constituency-level counting may improve transparency but risks fragmentation of results and logistical bottlenecks.

​Legislative Reforms:

• A Referendum Act could enhance participatory democracy, but reliance on Vanuatu’s model may ignore Fiji’s unique context. (Was Daniel Fatiaki, who served on the Vanuatu Judicial bench after being removed as Chief Justice in Fiji, influential in inserting the Vanuatu Model?)
• Government-funded constituency offices risk becoming incumbency perks unless tightly regulated.
• Removing the “black-out period” (time where campaigning is banned before voting) could fuel voter manipulation and disinformation in the final hours before polling.

Constitutional Amendments:

• Caretaker government provisions are essential to avoid abuse of incumbency during elections.
• Prime Ministerial term limits are a major accountability reform, but a compulsory retirement age risks age discrimination and narrowing the talent pool.
• Entrenching the Boundaries Commission safeguards against gerrymandering.
• A non-political Senate could introduce expertise and cross-cutting perspectives, but may create legitimacy gaps if unelected representatives wield too much influence.

​Fijileaks Critique
​
The proposals appear piecemeal rather than a coherent roadmap. They mix sound democratic reforms (term limits, caretaker provisions, boundaries entrenchment) with regressive or problematic measures (First Past the Post, scrapping blackout periods).

​Key flaws:

• Representation risk: FPTP undermines inclusivity in a multi-ethnic society.
• Accountability gap: Government-funded constituency offices risk becoming political patronage centres.
• Legitimacy concerns: A non-elected Senate could be viewed as elitist or anti-democratic unless transparently constituted.
• Comparative borrowing: Copying Vanuatu’s referendum model without tailoring to Fiji’s history of coups and contested legitimacy may be naïve.

The roadmap mixes valuable checks on executive power with measures that could entrench incumbency and weaken representative democracy. It needs consolidation into a principled reform package that prioritises transparency, inclusivity, and legitimacy over political expediency.

Engineering Power Balance: How the Electoral Roadmap Could Favour Finance Minister Biman Prasad and NFP

*Wadan Narsey (pictured with Biman Prasad) was a Member of Parliament and Shadow Finance Minister for NFP between 1996 and 1999.
*Seini Nabou is former NFP general secretary and failed NFP candidate in the 2022 general election.
*Dr John Fatiaki, the brother of Daniel Fatiaki, failed to win seat in 2022.
*We are not saying these links influenced the recommendations in the Electoral Roadmap, but our overall analysis concludes that NFP stands as its greatest beneficiary with Sitiveni Rabuka and PAP neutered in future elections.

1. First Past the Post (FPTP) Counting for Constituency Seats

• Who benefits?
  Small but geographically concentrated parties like NFP.
• Why?
  Under proportional representation (PR), NFP struggles because its total national vote share is small. But under FPTP, a concentrated vote in certain Indo-Fijian constituencies could allow NFP to secure seats far beyond its national vote weight.
• Impact on Sitiveni Rabuka and PAP:
  PAP relies on broader, less concentrated indigenous support. FPTP could fragment indigenous votes among PAP, SODELPA, and independents, weakening Rabuka.

2. Constituency-Level Counting & Funded Constituency Offices

• Who benefits?
  NFP MPs, who could dominate certain constituencies and then use state-funded offices as patronage machines to entrench local dominance.
• Impact on Rabuka and PAP:
  PAP, as a larger party with broader but thinner spread support, may gain less from constituency-level patronage.

3. Removal of the Black-Out Period

• Who benefits?
  NFP, with disciplined campaign machinery and strong links to Indo-Fijian media networks, could campaign until the last minute, keeping its voters mobilised.
• Impact on Rabuka and PAP:
  PAP’s rural base is more vulnerable to last-minute misinformation and intimidation without blackout safeguards.

4. Prime Ministerial Term Limit and Compulsory Retirement Age

• Who benefits?
  Indirectly NFP, because:
  • Rabuka (already older) could be forced out earlier, destabilising PAP leadership.
  • Opens door for power-broker roles where a smaller coalition partner (like NFP) can extract leverage in leadership transitions.

5. Entrenching the Constituency Boundaries Commission

• Who benefits?
  Potentially NFP if boundaries are drawn to preserve Indo-Fijian concentration. Once entrenched, boundaries become harder for future governments (like PAP) to change.

6. New Non-Politically Appointed Senate

• Who benefits?
  A Senate “representative of cross-cutting issues” could be used to insert technocrats aligned with NFP’s ideology (economic liberalism, Indo-Fijian professional elites, NGO sector).
• Impact on Rabuka and PAP:
  Weakens majority rule, restrains PAP if it gains dominance, and gives NFP a backdoor veto through Senate influence.

Strategic Effect
Put together, the roadmap dilutes Rabuka’s power base and enhances NFP’s leverage:

• Rabuka/PAP: Fragmented by FPTP, weakened by compulsory retirement, and limited by Senate oversight.
• NFP/Biman Prasad: Gains concentrated seats under FPTP, entrenches presence via funded offices, and secures a Senate pathway to influence policy far beyond their numbers.

Critique
The allegations that this roadmap is designed for Biman Prasad and NFP as kingmakers have merit:

• Several proposals (FPTP, constituency offices, scrapping blackout) disproportionately advantage small but concentrated parties like NFP.
• The Senate proposal would institutionalise a power-broker chamber where NFP-friendly elites could restrain PAP majorities.
• Term limits and retirement rules appear personally tailored to Rabuka’s age and tenure.

While dressed up as neutral “electoral reform,” the roadmap reads like a political engineering project, one that stabilises NFP’s long-term influence and neuters Rabuka’s ability to dominate, ensuring coalition politics where NFP can act as a permanent broker.
To be continued