*As one of the complainants whose material is identified in the recent Fiji High Court judgment, I have deliberately refrained from commenting on the merits of the Platinum Hotels case before the Suva Magistrates Court. That restraint does not prevent me from reporting on separate matters or submitting further complaints arising from my continuing examination of Biman Prasad's statutory declarations from 2014 to 2024. |  |
Since NFP leader Biman Chand Prasad was charged by the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, I have made no public comment on the merits of the criminal case concerning Platinum Hotels and Resorts Pte Limited.
That silence has been deliberate.
I am one of the complainants whose material was placed before FICAC. My name now appears three times in the High Court judgment delivered on 21 September 2026.
In those circumstances, it would be inappropriate for me to conduct a parallel public trial, assess the strength of evidence that remains before the Magistrates’ Court, or express an opinion on whether Prasad is guilty or innocent.
Those questions belong to the Suva Magistrates’ Court.
Prasad has pleaded not guilty and remains entitled to the presumption of innocence. Nothing in this article should be read as expressing any view on the eventual outcome of his trial.
The High Court judgment, however, is a public document. It concerns a separate and important legal question: whether FICAC’s handling of disclosure was so prejudicial, oppressive or improper that the prosecution should be brought permanently to an end without the Magistrates’ Court determining the charge.
Justice Thushara Rajasinghe decided that it should not.
What Prasad asked the High Court to do
Prasad applied for a permanent stay of Criminal Action No. MACD 08/2025.
A permanent stay would have ended the prosecution, not because the Magistrates’ Court had heard all the evidence and found the charge unproved, but because the process surrounding the prosecution was said to have become irreparably unfair.
Prasad is charged with one count of failing to comply with statutory disclosure requirements under section 24(5), read with section 24(1B)(d), of the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act 2013.
There is also an alternative count of providing false information in a statutory declaration under section 27(1)(c).
The allegation concerns Prasad’s 2015 declaration and his alleged failure to disclose his directorship in Platinum Hotels and Resorts Pte Limited.
Those allegations remain allegations. The High Court was not asked to determine whether they were true.
The stay application was built principally upon alleged failures by FICAC to disclose material to the defence.
Prasad’s lawyers argued that FICAC had deliberately withheld material that could assist the defence; that its conduct was oppressive and prejudicial; and that it breached Prasad’s constitutional right to a fair trial. They submitted that the prosecution’s conduct, when viewed cumulatively, amounted to an abuse of the Court’s process.
The defence relied upon several matters.
These included the delayed disclosure of two statements described in the judgment as the “NFP statements”, the timing of an application to amend the charge, the recording and delivery of a statement from former Supervisor of Elections Mohammed Saneem, the late service of a statement by investigating officer Asenaca Niumataiwalu, and the disclosure of my complaint.
Why my name appears in the judgment
My name first appears in paragraph 4, where the judge summarises the allegations contained in an affidavit filed in support of Prasad’s application.
One of the matters alleged was: “Deliberately withholding from the Applicant the Complaint of Mr. Victor Lal, despite the Court’s order, which was disclosed only after several requests.”
That was an allegation advanced on behalf of Prasad. It was not a finding by the High Court that FICAC had deliberately concealed my complaint.
This distinction is essential.
My name appears again in paragraph 25. By that stage, the judge was considering whether delayed disclosure had caused any continuing prejudice to Prasad’s defence.
The judge recorded that the prosecution had already disclosed the two NFP statements and my complaint, as requested by Prasad. He observed that the prosecution’s first witness was still giving evidence-in-chief. Prasad therefore remained able to study the documents and instruct his lawyers before the cross-examination of that witness began.
My name appears for the third time in paragraph 26.
Again, the judge was recording the defence argument. Prasad’s counsel Richard Naidu contended that the cumulative effect of the delayed disclosure of the NFP statements and my complaint, together with other aspects of FICAC’s conduct, established bad faith and deliberate tactical action intended to disadvantage Prasad.
The Court did not accept that conclusion.
The judgment does not examine the contents of my complaint. It does not decide whether anything stated in it is true or false. It makes no finding against me, nor does it criticise my conduct.
My complaint entered the High Court proceedings because Prasad’s lawyers relied upon the timing of its disclosure as part of their wider allegation of prosecutorial unfairness.
That is the full legal significance of the references to my name in this judgment.
The exceptional remedy of a permanent stay
Justice Rajasinghe emphasised that permanently stopping a criminal prosecution is an exceptional remedy, reserved for the clearest cases.
The Court adopted the two-limbed test previously discussed in Takiveikata v State and in an earlier 2026 High Court judgment involving Prasad.
A permanent stay may be justified where:
Under the first limb, the central question was whether Prasad could still receive a fair trial without his defence being impaired.
Under the second, the question was wider. It concerned the integrity of the administration of justice and whether the prosecution had misused the processes of the Court.
A permanent stay is not ordinarily imposed to punish a prosecutor for errors. It is imposed where the damage is so serious that the trial cannot fairly continue, or where allowing it to continue would itself bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
That is a high threshold. Justice Rajasinghe found that it had not been crossed.
FICAC’s duty of disclosure
The most important part of the judgment may be its discussion of prosecutorial disclosure.
Relying upon the House of Lords decision in R v Brown and the Canadian Supreme Court judgment in R v Stinchcombe, Justice Rajasinghe affirmed that a prosecutor’s duty extends beyond evidence supporting the prosecution.
Material must also be disclosed where it may undermine the prosecution’s case or assist the defence.
This obligation is fundamental to a fair trial. An accused person must know the case to be answered and must receive materially relevant information held by the investigating and prosecuting authorities.
The judgment records a concerning admission.
FICAC investigating officer Asenaca Niumataiwalu deposed that she had not understood that disclosure extended to material that could assist the defence or undermine the prosecution.
She maintained that the two NFP statements had not been deliberately concealed. Once she understood the wider duty, she and her team leader reviewed the investigative materials and identified the statements as disclosable.
Those materials included witness statements, draft statements, investigators’ notebooks, search-warrant material, seized documents, electronic records and correspondence.
The High Court accepted that there was no evidence establishing deliberate concealment or a tactical attempt to disadvantage Prasad.
Nevertheless, Justice Rajasinghe made a significant observation. He found that prosecution counsel appeared to lack awareness of the duty of disclosure and had therefore failed properly to advise the investigators about the material that needed to be identified and disclosed.
That is hardly a ringing endorsement of the prosecution’s management of disclosure. A court need not permanently stop a prosecution before concerns about prosecutorial competence become legitimate matters of public interest. The duty of disclosure should be understood from the beginning of an investigation and applied systematically, not discovered in the middle of a trial.
But poor handling, lack of awareness or delayed disclosure does not automatically produce a permanent stay. The legal question remains whether the accused has suffered prejudice that can no longer be repaired.
The two NFP statements
Prasad’s lawyers placed particular importance upon statements attributed to Kamal Iyer and Dalip Kumar.
The defence argued that the statements related directly to the meaning of “office holder”, which is an element of the offence alleged against Prasad. It also expressed concern that the statements might later be used to challenge the credibility of defence witnesses.
The High Court drew a careful distinction.
The prosecution must disclose material that may assist the defence or undermine the prosecution. But, following R v Brown, it does not ordinarily have a common-law duty to disclose material relevant only to the credibility of a prospective defence witness.
Justice Rajasinghe deliberately avoided deciding what the NFP statements contained or whether the Magistrate’s ruling concerning them was correct.
Instead, he considered both possibilities.
If the statements concerned only the credibility of defence witnesses, the prosecution may not have been obliged to disclose them under the common-law rule discussed in Brown.
If, on the other hand, they could assist Prasad’s defence or undermine the prosecution case, the delay still had not caused irreparable prejudice. They had been disclosed while the first prosecution witness was still giving evidence-in-chief.
The defence therefore had time to examine the statements and use them appropriately.
The same practical conclusion applied to my complaint. It had been disclosed, and Prasad could instruct his lawyers about it before cross-examination began.
No finding of bad faith
Prasad’s lawyers urged the Court to consider the cumulative effect of FICAC’s conduct rather than examining each incident in isolation.
They cited the delayed disclosure, the investigator’s misunderstanding of the disclosure obligation, the prosecutor’s refusal to answer questions about the NFP statements, the amendment of the charge, and the timing of other witness statements.
Justice Rajasinghe found no evidence supporting an inference that FICAC had engaged in a deliberate tactical manoeuvre or acted in bad faith.
He was concerned about the manner in which the disclosure exercise had been conducted. He nevertheless concluded that the prosecutor’s failure to participate in the later review did not amount to deliberate or mala fide conduct, or an abuse of process requiring the “excessive and exorbitant step” of terminating the prosecution.
The judge also rejected the argument based upon the amendment of the charge.
Section 182 of the Criminal Procedure Act permits a magistrate to amend a defective charge before the prosecution case closes. The Magistrate had adjourned the trial after allowing the amendment, providing Prasad with additional time to prepare. There was no submission that the time allowed was insufficient.
As for the delayed delivery of Niumataiwalu’s statement before the voir dire hearing, the judge accepted that it might have created difficulties and required defence counsel to work additional hours. But that inconvenience did not render the trial incapable of being conducted fairly.
What the judgment decides, and what it does not
The High Court ultimately found that the cumulative effect of FICAC’s conduct did not prevent a fair trial or impair Prasad’s defence.
Nor did it amount to such a gross and unconscionable abuse of process that continuing the prosecution would offend the recognised purposes of criminal justice.
The application for a permanent stay was therefore refused and dismissed.
The judgment decides only that the prosecution may continue.
It does not decide that Prasad committed either alleged offence. It does not validate every step taken by FICAC. It does not determine the meaning of “office holder”. It does not determine the contents or weight of the two NFP statements. It does not rule upon the truth or evidential value of my complaint. It does not resolve the Platinum Hotels allegation.
Those issues remain for the Magistrates’ Court, subject to the evidence, legal submissions and any further applications made by the parties.
The High Court also declined to discuss the timing of the general election, which is due before February 2027 and which Prasad intends to contest. Justice Rajasinghe noted that the criminal trial had already begun.
The prosecution does not silence all further journalism
My restraint concerning the Platinum prosecution does not prevent me from reporting upon every other matter involving Prasad.
He remains the leader of a parliamentary political party, a Member of Parliament and a person seeking to contest the next general election. His public statements, political decisions, party policies, parliamentary conduct and statutory obligations remain matters of legitimate public interest.
The existence of one criminal prosecution cannot place every other aspect of a politician’s public life beyond journalistic scrutiny.
I may continue examining public records, including electoral declarations and documents made available by the Fijian Elections Office. I may put questions to Prasad, the Supervisor of Elections, Parliament, FICAC and other relevant authorities. I may report their answers, or record fairly that no answer was received.
But such reporting must be kept separate from the live Platinum proceeding.
I am not prevented from filing further complaints.
Nor does the pending prosecution prevent me from submitting further complaints arising from my analysis of Prasad’s statutory declarations covering the period from 2014 to 2024.
My original complaint does not exhaust every question arising from those declarations.
The High Court judgment contains no order restraining me from examining other publicly available declarations, identifying apparent inconsistencies or omissions, seeking explanations, or referring new material to the appropriate authority.
If my continuing analysis reveals a separate matter that appears to warrant examination, I remain entitled to place that material before FICAC, the Fijian Elections Office or another authority with jurisdiction.
Why is continued restraint necessary? As the person whose complaint is now expressly identified in a court judgment, I must maintain the distinction between explaining what the High Court has decided and arguing the underlying criminal case in public.
I will continue to report accurately from public documents. I will continue to examine Prasad’s statutory declarations from 2014 to 2024. I will continue to put questions to him and to the responsible public authorities.
Where the documentary evidence appears to disclose a separate matter requiring official examination, I reserve the right to submit a further complaint.
But I will not offer an opinion on Prasad’s guilt or innocence while the Platinum case remains before the Magistrates’ Court.
That is not an abandonment of journalism. Nor does it amount to surrendering my right to bring apparently relevant material to the attention of the appropriate authorities.
It is recognition that investigative journalism, lawful complaints, the presumption of innocence and the proper administration of justice must coexist.
The High Court has decided that Prasad can still receive a fair trial.
The task of determining the Platinum charge now returns to the Suva Magistrates Court in which it belongs.
Judgment: Prasad v Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. HAM 30 of 2026, High Court at Suva, judgment delivered 21 September 2026.
Read Link: https://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2026/599.pdf
That silence has been deliberate.
I am one of the complainants whose material was placed before FICAC. My name now appears three times in the High Court judgment delivered on 21 September 2026.
In those circumstances, it would be inappropriate for me to conduct a parallel public trial, assess the strength of evidence that remains before the Magistrates’ Court, or express an opinion on whether Prasad is guilty or innocent.
Those questions belong to the Suva Magistrates’ Court.
Prasad has pleaded not guilty and remains entitled to the presumption of innocence. Nothing in this article should be read as expressing any view on the eventual outcome of his trial.
The High Court judgment, however, is a public document. It concerns a separate and important legal question: whether FICAC’s handling of disclosure was so prejudicial, oppressive or improper that the prosecution should be brought permanently to an end without the Magistrates’ Court determining the charge.
Justice Thushara Rajasinghe decided that it should not.
What Prasad asked the High Court to do
Prasad applied for a permanent stay of Criminal Action No. MACD 08/2025.
A permanent stay would have ended the prosecution, not because the Magistrates’ Court had heard all the evidence and found the charge unproved, but because the process surrounding the prosecution was said to have become irreparably unfair.
Prasad is charged with one count of failing to comply with statutory disclosure requirements under section 24(5), read with section 24(1B)(d), of the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act 2013.
There is also an alternative count of providing false information in a statutory declaration under section 27(1)(c).
The allegation concerns Prasad’s 2015 declaration and his alleged failure to disclose his directorship in Platinum Hotels and Resorts Pte Limited.
Those allegations remain allegations. The High Court was not asked to determine whether they were true.
The stay application was built principally upon alleged failures by FICAC to disclose material to the defence.
Prasad’s lawyers argued that FICAC had deliberately withheld material that could assist the defence; that its conduct was oppressive and prejudicial; and that it breached Prasad’s constitutional right to a fair trial. They submitted that the prosecution’s conduct, when viewed cumulatively, amounted to an abuse of the Court’s process.
The defence relied upon several matters.
These included the delayed disclosure of two statements described in the judgment as the “NFP statements”, the timing of an application to amend the charge, the recording and delivery of a statement from former Supervisor of Elections Mohammed Saneem, the late service of a statement by investigating officer Asenaca Niumataiwalu, and the disclosure of my complaint.
Why my name appears in the judgment
My name first appears in paragraph 4, where the judge summarises the allegations contained in an affidavit filed in support of Prasad’s application.
One of the matters alleged was: “Deliberately withholding from the Applicant the Complaint of Mr. Victor Lal, despite the Court’s order, which was disclosed only after several requests.”
That was an allegation advanced on behalf of Prasad. It was not a finding by the High Court that FICAC had deliberately concealed my complaint.
This distinction is essential.
My name appears again in paragraph 25. By that stage, the judge was considering whether delayed disclosure had caused any continuing prejudice to Prasad’s defence.
The judge recorded that the prosecution had already disclosed the two NFP statements and my complaint, as requested by Prasad. He observed that the prosecution’s first witness was still giving evidence-in-chief. Prasad therefore remained able to study the documents and instruct his lawyers before the cross-examination of that witness began.
My name appears for the third time in paragraph 26.
Again, the judge was recording the defence argument. Prasad’s counsel Richard Naidu contended that the cumulative effect of the delayed disclosure of the NFP statements and my complaint, together with other aspects of FICAC’s conduct, established bad faith and deliberate tactical action intended to disadvantage Prasad.
The Court did not accept that conclusion.
The judgment does not examine the contents of my complaint. It does not decide whether anything stated in it is true or false. It makes no finding against me, nor does it criticise my conduct.
My complaint entered the High Court proceedings because Prasad’s lawyers relied upon the timing of its disclosure as part of their wider allegation of prosecutorial unfairness.
That is the full legal significance of the references to my name in this judgment.
The exceptional remedy of a permanent stay
Justice Rajasinghe emphasised that permanently stopping a criminal prosecution is an exceptional remedy, reserved for the clearest cases.
The Court adopted the two-limbed test previously discussed in Takiveikata v State and in an earlier 2026 High Court judgment involving Prasad.
A permanent stay may be justified where:
- a fair trial can no longer be held; or
- the conduct of the executive is so wrong that allowing the prosecution to continue would affront the conscience of the Court.
Under the first limb, the central question was whether Prasad could still receive a fair trial without his defence being impaired.
Under the second, the question was wider. It concerned the integrity of the administration of justice and whether the prosecution had misused the processes of the Court.
A permanent stay is not ordinarily imposed to punish a prosecutor for errors. It is imposed where the damage is so serious that the trial cannot fairly continue, or where allowing it to continue would itself bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
That is a high threshold. Justice Rajasinghe found that it had not been crossed.
FICAC’s duty of disclosure
The most important part of the judgment may be its discussion of prosecutorial disclosure.
Relying upon the House of Lords decision in R v Brown and the Canadian Supreme Court judgment in R v Stinchcombe, Justice Rajasinghe affirmed that a prosecutor’s duty extends beyond evidence supporting the prosecution.
Material must also be disclosed where it may undermine the prosecution’s case or assist the defence.
This obligation is fundamental to a fair trial. An accused person must know the case to be answered and must receive materially relevant information held by the investigating and prosecuting authorities.
The judgment records a concerning admission.
FICAC investigating officer Asenaca Niumataiwalu deposed that she had not understood that disclosure extended to material that could assist the defence or undermine the prosecution.
She maintained that the two NFP statements had not been deliberately concealed. Once she understood the wider duty, she and her team leader reviewed the investigative materials and identified the statements as disclosable.
Those materials included witness statements, draft statements, investigators’ notebooks, search-warrant material, seized documents, electronic records and correspondence.
The High Court accepted that there was no evidence establishing deliberate concealment or a tactical attempt to disadvantage Prasad.
Nevertheless, Justice Rajasinghe made a significant observation. He found that prosecution counsel appeared to lack awareness of the duty of disclosure and had therefore failed properly to advise the investigators about the material that needed to be identified and disclosed.
That is hardly a ringing endorsement of the prosecution’s management of disclosure. A court need not permanently stop a prosecution before concerns about prosecutorial competence become legitimate matters of public interest. The duty of disclosure should be understood from the beginning of an investigation and applied systematically, not discovered in the middle of a trial.
But poor handling, lack of awareness or delayed disclosure does not automatically produce a permanent stay. The legal question remains whether the accused has suffered prejudice that can no longer be repaired.
The two NFP statements
Prasad’s lawyers placed particular importance upon statements attributed to Kamal Iyer and Dalip Kumar.
The defence argued that the statements related directly to the meaning of “office holder”, which is an element of the offence alleged against Prasad. It also expressed concern that the statements might later be used to challenge the credibility of defence witnesses.
The High Court drew a careful distinction.
The prosecution must disclose material that may assist the defence or undermine the prosecution. But, following R v Brown, it does not ordinarily have a common-law duty to disclose material relevant only to the credibility of a prospective defence witness.
Justice Rajasinghe deliberately avoided deciding what the NFP statements contained or whether the Magistrate’s ruling concerning them was correct.
Instead, he considered both possibilities.
If the statements concerned only the credibility of defence witnesses, the prosecution may not have been obliged to disclose them under the common-law rule discussed in Brown.
If, on the other hand, they could assist Prasad’s defence or undermine the prosecution case, the delay still had not caused irreparable prejudice. They had been disclosed while the first prosecution witness was still giving evidence-in-chief.
The defence therefore had time to examine the statements and use them appropriately.
The same practical conclusion applied to my complaint. It had been disclosed, and Prasad could instruct his lawyers about it before cross-examination began.
No finding of bad faith
Prasad’s lawyers urged the Court to consider the cumulative effect of FICAC’s conduct rather than examining each incident in isolation.
They cited the delayed disclosure, the investigator’s misunderstanding of the disclosure obligation, the prosecutor’s refusal to answer questions about the NFP statements, the amendment of the charge, and the timing of other witness statements.
Justice Rajasinghe found no evidence supporting an inference that FICAC had engaged in a deliberate tactical manoeuvre or acted in bad faith.
He was concerned about the manner in which the disclosure exercise had been conducted. He nevertheless concluded that the prosecutor’s failure to participate in the later review did not amount to deliberate or mala fide conduct, or an abuse of process requiring the “excessive and exorbitant step” of terminating the prosecution.
The judge also rejected the argument based upon the amendment of the charge.
Section 182 of the Criminal Procedure Act permits a magistrate to amend a defective charge before the prosecution case closes. The Magistrate had adjourned the trial after allowing the amendment, providing Prasad with additional time to prepare. There was no submission that the time allowed was insufficient.
As for the delayed delivery of Niumataiwalu’s statement before the voir dire hearing, the judge accepted that it might have created difficulties and required defence counsel to work additional hours. But that inconvenience did not render the trial incapable of being conducted fairly.
What the judgment decides, and what it does not
The High Court ultimately found that the cumulative effect of FICAC’s conduct did not prevent a fair trial or impair Prasad’s defence.
Nor did it amount to such a gross and unconscionable abuse of process that continuing the prosecution would offend the recognised purposes of criminal justice.
The application for a permanent stay was therefore refused and dismissed.
The judgment decides only that the prosecution may continue.
It does not decide that Prasad committed either alleged offence. It does not validate every step taken by FICAC. It does not determine the meaning of “office holder”. It does not determine the contents or weight of the two NFP statements. It does not rule upon the truth or evidential value of my complaint. It does not resolve the Platinum Hotels allegation.
Those issues remain for the Magistrates’ Court, subject to the evidence, legal submissions and any further applications made by the parties.
The High Court also declined to discuss the timing of the general election, which is due before February 2027 and which Prasad intends to contest. Justice Rajasinghe noted that the criminal trial had already begun.
The prosecution does not silence all further journalism
My restraint concerning the Platinum prosecution does not prevent me from reporting upon every other matter involving Prasad.
He remains the leader of a parliamentary political party, a Member of Parliament and a person seeking to contest the next general election. His public statements, political decisions, party policies, parliamentary conduct and statutory obligations remain matters of legitimate public interest.
The existence of one criminal prosecution cannot place every other aspect of a politician’s public life beyond journalistic scrutiny.
I may continue examining public records, including electoral declarations and documents made available by the Fijian Elections Office. I may put questions to Prasad, the Supervisor of Elections, Parliament, FICAC and other relevant authorities. I may report their answers, or record fairly that no answer was received.
But such reporting must be kept separate from the live Platinum proceeding.
I am not prevented from filing further complaints.
Nor does the pending prosecution prevent me from submitting further complaints arising from my analysis of Prasad’s statutory declarations covering the period from 2014 to 2024.
My original complaint does not exhaust every question arising from those declarations.
The High Court judgment contains no order restraining me from examining other publicly available declarations, identifying apparent inconsistencies or omissions, seeking explanations, or referring new material to the appropriate authority.
If my continuing analysis reveals a separate matter that appears to warrant examination, I remain entitled to place that material before FICAC, the Fijian Elections Office or another authority with jurisdiction.
Why is continued restraint necessary? As the person whose complaint is now expressly identified in a court judgment, I must maintain the distinction between explaining what the High Court has decided and arguing the underlying criminal case in public.
I will continue to report accurately from public documents. I will continue to examine Prasad’s statutory declarations from 2014 to 2024. I will continue to put questions to him and to the responsible public authorities.
Where the documentary evidence appears to disclose a separate matter requiring official examination, I reserve the right to submit a further complaint.
But I will not offer an opinion on Prasad’s guilt or innocence while the Platinum case remains before the Magistrates’ Court.
That is not an abandonment of journalism. Nor does it amount to surrendering my right to bring apparently relevant material to the attention of the appropriate authorities.
It is recognition that investigative journalism, lawful complaints, the presumption of innocence and the proper administration of justice must coexist.
The High Court has decided that Prasad can still receive a fair trial.
The task of determining the Platinum charge now returns to the Suva Magistrates Court in which it belongs.
Judgment: Prasad v Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. HAM 30 of 2026, High Court at Suva, judgment delivered 21 September 2026.
Read Link: https://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2026/599.pdf
