By WADAN NARSEY |  |
Fijileaks: It is one of the stranger spectacles in Fiji’s ongoing constitutional theatre. The Electoral Commission’s chair, none other than former Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki, presides over an electoral reform debate where Section 53 of the 2013 Constitution looms like a thundercloud.
*And yet, in all the public cheer-leading for Wadan Narsey's “hybrid constituencies” and “popular loser” lists, not a whisper is heard about the fact that Section 53 makes such proposals legally impossible.
*Did Fatiaki, a man who once occupied the highest judicial office in the land, simply skim past Section 53? Or did he imagine the voters wouldn’t notice that the Constitution mandates one thing and the Electoral Commissioner Wadan Narsey is busy recommending another?
The Unyielding Text of Section 53
Narsey’s argument rests on a hope that the Commission can creatively interpret the Constitution. But section 53 is explicit, categorical, and leaves no interpretive wiggle room. The voting system is locked as multi-member, open-list proportional representation.
Until a referendum overturns it, that lock will hold. Any claim to the contrary is not reformist ingenuity. It is constitutional wishful thinking.
*And yet, in all the public cheer-leading for Wadan Narsey's “hybrid constituencies” and “popular loser” lists, not a whisper is heard about the fact that Section 53 makes such proposals legally impossible.
*Did Fatiaki, a man who once occupied the highest judicial office in the land, simply skim past Section 53? Or did he imagine the voters wouldn’t notice that the Constitution mandates one thing and the Electoral Commissioner Wadan Narsey is busy recommending another?
The Unyielding Text of Section 53
Narsey’s argument rests on a hope that the Commission can creatively interpret the Constitution. But section 53 is explicit, categorical, and leaves no interpretive wiggle room. The voting system is locked as multi-member, open-list proportional representation.
Until a referendum overturns it, that lock will hold. Any claim to the contrary is not reformist ingenuity. It is constitutional wishful thinking.
 |  |
From Fellow Traveller to Silent Stranger: How Narsey Mislaid His Friends after NFP & Prasad went into Coalition
Once upon a time, Wadan Narsey and I were fellow travellers. When a few outlets would touch him, I gave him (including Biman Prasad) space on Fijileaks (since September 2012). I reproduced Narseys blogs, his essays, his Fiji Times columns. I carried his words to audiences he could not otherwise reach.
And then, curiously, when the National Federation Party and its leader Biman Prasad climbed into coalition with Sitiveni Rabuka, he vanished. No more emails. No more exchanges. No more courtesy. No more leaks. He cut all contact as though friendship and shared battles were disposable.
Now, he resurfaces in the Fiji Times (13 September) with a bold prescription for Fiji’s electoral future: “open constituencies,” “popular loser” lists, and clever hybrids that supposedly fix our “democratic deficit.”
Only one snag: Section 53 of the 2013 Constitution makes every one of his proposals impossible.
Section 53, the Wall Nobody Can Pretend Away
The Constitution isn’t ambiguous. It requires:
That’s not a drafting suggestion. It’s a lock. Single-member seats, constituency carve-ups, and “popular losers” are not allowed. Full stop. Unless there’s a referendum, and Fiji has no law to conduct one, Section 53 rules the field.
Fatiaki’s Silence, Narsey’s Noise
My old friend Daniel Fatiaki, former Chief Justice and now chair of the Electoral Commission, surely knows this. Yet the Commission has pushed along as if Section 53 were optional. Silence where there should be certainty.
Narsey, meanwhile, fills the gap with noise, an economist moonlighting as a constitutional engineer. And he did it without so much as a courtesy copy to Fatiaki, leaving his old colleague to look complicit in promoting reforms that the Constitution blocks.
From Space Given to Silence Returned
What stings most is not Narsey’s poor constitutional arithmetic. It is the silence. I gave him space on Fijileaks when others would not. I published his words, stood by his arguments, and opened the door for his voice. And when it suited him, when political alliances shifted, he closed the door behind him, cut contact, bolted into thin air.
Once upon a time, Wadan Narsey and I were fellow travellers. When a few outlets would touch him, I gave him (including Biman Prasad) space on Fijileaks (since September 2012). I reproduced Narseys blogs, his essays, his Fiji Times columns. I carried his words to audiences he could not otherwise reach.
And then, curiously, when the National Federation Party and its leader Biman Prasad climbed into coalition with Sitiveni Rabuka, he vanished. No more emails. No more exchanges. No more courtesy. No more leaks. He cut all contact as though friendship and shared battles were disposable.
Now, he resurfaces in the Fiji Times (13 September) with a bold prescription for Fiji’s electoral future: “open constituencies,” “popular loser” lists, and clever hybrids that supposedly fix our “democratic deficit.”
Only one snag: Section 53 of the 2013 Constitution makes every one of his proposals impossible.
Section 53, the Wall Nobody Can Pretend Away
The Constitution isn’t ambiguous. It requires:
- A multi-member open list system of proportional representation,
- Seat allocation based strictly on total votes cast, and
- Electoral laws that conform to internationally recognised open-list proportional systems.
That’s not a drafting suggestion. It’s a lock. Single-member seats, constituency carve-ups, and “popular losers” are not allowed. Full stop. Unless there’s a referendum, and Fiji has no law to conduct one, Section 53 rules the field.
Fatiaki’s Silence, Narsey’s Noise
My old friend Daniel Fatiaki, former Chief Justice and now chair of the Electoral Commission, surely knows this. Yet the Commission has pushed along as if Section 53 were optional. Silence where there should be certainty.
Narsey, meanwhile, fills the gap with noise, an economist moonlighting as a constitutional engineer. And he did it without so much as a courtesy copy to Fatiaki, leaving his old colleague to look complicit in promoting reforms that the Constitution blocks.
From Space Given to Silence Returned
What stings most is not Narsey’s poor constitutional arithmetic. It is the silence. I gave him space on Fijileaks when others would not. I published his words, stood by his arguments, and opened the door for his voice. And when it suited him, when political alliances shifted, he closed the door behind him, cut contact, bolted into thin air.
My Old Friend Daniel Fatiaki Must Have Mislaid His Glasses
Daniel Fatiaki and I go back nearly forty-five years, to the days when he was a fresh-faced prosecutor in the DPP’s office and I was cutting my teeth as a young court reporter at the original Fiji Sun. Ours has been a friendship for decades, forged in courtrooms, and over countless grog bowls. Which is why I say this with a mix of fondness and exasperation: Daniel, old friend, you didn’t read Section 53.
And Wadan Narsey didn’t bother to copy you in before blasting his latest constitutional brainstorm into the Fiji Times. It’s all there in black and white. Section 53 of the 2013 Constitution: elections must be held by multi-member open list proportional representation. Seats must be awarded in strict proportion to votes. Any electoral law must comply with internationally recognised open-list methods.
In other words, no single-member seats, no geographic carve-ups, no “popular losers.” All the tinkering in the world cannot change that unless the Constitution itself is amended by a referendum, a referendum that Fiji has no law to even conduct.
So today we watch the spectacle:
And the 2013 Constitution of Fiji, sitting there all along, laughing at them both.
Daniel Fatiaki and I go back nearly forty-five years, to the days when he was a fresh-faced prosecutor in the DPP’s office and I was cutting my teeth as a young court reporter at the original Fiji Sun. Ours has been a friendship for decades, forged in courtrooms, and over countless grog bowls. Which is why I say this with a mix of fondness and exasperation: Daniel, old friend, you didn’t read Section 53.
And Wadan Narsey didn’t bother to copy you in before blasting his latest constitutional brainstorm into the Fiji Times. It’s all there in black and white. Section 53 of the 2013 Constitution: elections must be held by multi-member open list proportional representation. Seats must be awarded in strict proportion to votes. Any electoral law must comply with internationally recognised open-list methods.
In other words, no single-member seats, no geographic carve-ups, no “popular losers.” All the tinkering in the world cannot change that unless the Constitution itself is amended by a referendum, a referendum that Fiji has no law to even conduct.
So today we watch the spectacle:
- Fatiaki, my friend of forty-five years, apparently without his reading glasses, letting Section 53 pass unnoticed.
- Narsey, once a fellow traveller, now a silent stranger, preaching impossible reforms in the pages of the Fiji Times.
And the 2013 Constitution of Fiji, sitting there all along, laughing at them both.
Fiji’s Electoral Crossroads: Why Talk of Single-Member Seats is Constitutionally Impossible Without a Referendum
The renewed debate on Fiji’s democratic “deficit”, highlighted in Wadan Narsey’s recent piece (Fiji Times, 13 September 2025), has reignited calls for electoral reform, including a shift towards single-member constituencies. Yet beneath the political rhetoric lies an unmovable legal reality: Fiji’s current constitutional framework makes such a change not merely difficult but impossible without a national referendum.
The Supreme Court’s Position: 2013 Constitution is Binding
The Fiji Supreme Court has already ruled that the 2013 Constitution is valid and binding. In doing so, it confirmed that the only method to alter its core provisions is through a referendum requiring strict voting thresholds. Parliament alone cannot unilaterally amend electoral rules that are entrenched in the Constitution.
This judicial clarity means that proposals for “single-member electorates” are, for now, purely theoretical. Without a referendum framework in place, political parties cannot credibly promise change to voters.
Section 53: The Lock on Proportional Representation
At the heart of the matter is section 53 of the 2013 Constitution. It mandates a multi-member, open-list system of proportional representation based on a single national electoral roll. Each voter has one vote of equal value, and seats are distributed proportionately among parties and independents who cross the 5% threshold.
This design is deliberate: it eliminates constituency boundaries, prevents ethnic gerrymandering, and forces parties to appeal across Fiji’s electorate rather than retreating into communal silos. Any move towards single-member seats would require the repeal or wholesale amendment of section 53 and related provisions.
Ethnicity, Gender, and Representation: Speculative Terrain
Advocates for single-member electorates often claim such a system would better reflect Fiji’s ethnic demographics. But such claims rest on assumptions about how electoral boundaries would be drawn, how parties would field candidates, and how communities would vote. Without clear boundary laws or demographic modelling, such assertions are conjectural.
Similarly, suggestions that women’s representation could be improved through reserved single-member seats would collide directly with Fiji’s Bill of Rights. To constitutionally guarantee women-only electorates would require a further amendment enshrining gender-based political privileges. This would be no small undertaking and would raise thorny questions about the number, location, and qualifications of such seats.
The Missing Piece: No Referendum Law
Perhaps the most glaring gap is that Fiji has no legislation to conduct a referendum. While the Constitution requires one for amendments to fundamental provisions such as section 53, there is no enabling law setting out procedures, timelines, voter thresholds, or administrative oversight. Until Parliament passes such legislation, the entire conversation about constitutional reform remains academic.
Electoral Timetable Pressures
Adding to the urgency, section 54 of the Constitution requires the Electoral Commission to review the composition of Parliament at least one year before the next general election. This review must adjust the number of seats to keep pace with population changes.
Yet it is already September 2025, and no reform report has been tabled in Parliament. With time running out before the next election cycle, the political class faces a stark choice: either maintain the proportional system or begin the complex, time-consuming process of legislating a referendum and drafting constitutional amendments.
Pragmatists vs. Purists
Narsey frames the debate as one between pragmatists, who argue that proportional representation prevents ethnic fragmentation and provides stability, and purists, who lament Fiji’s democratic deficit under the current system. While the purists may dream of “truer” representation through single-member constituencies, the constitutional barriers are towering.
The pragmatists, for now, hold the stronger ground: change is not only politically fraught but constitutionally frozen. Unless Parliament summons the will to legislate for a referendum, and Fiji’s voters deliver the required majority, section 53 will remain the unyielding cornerstone of the electoral system.
Conclusion: A Debate Without a Mechanism
The irony of Fiji’s electoral reform debate is that it has become untethered from legal reality. Single-member constituencies cannot even be considered without first establishing the machinery for a referendum. Parliament, constrained by the Supreme Court’s ruling and by the absence of a referendum law, cannot act alone.
Until those basic steps are taken, calls for reform will remain rhetorical exercises. Fiji’s democracy may indeed face deficits but addressing them will require more than political debate. It will require the painstaking legal work of building a pathway for constitutional change.
Additional Analysis and Implications
Here are things to think through, given what Narsey argues and what we have noted:
Interpretive Flexibility in the 2013 Constitution
Section 53 is blunt and leaves no interpretive room:
So when Narsey argues that the Electoral Law Reform Commission can “creatively” engineer constituency-style representation within the Constitution, he overlooks that s.53 expressly locks in multi-member proportionality. A “single member” model or any pseudo-first-past-the-post element is simply unconstitutional unless repealed.
And repeal requires:
Conclusion:
In short, any attempt to reintroduce constituencies, hybrid systems, or single-member models under the 2013 Constitution runs directly into the hard wall of section 53, which entrenches open-list proportional representation with multi-member seats.
Unless and until that section is repealed through both a two-thirds parliamentary majority and a national referendum, Fiji’s electoral system is constitutionally locked into proportionality. Reformers must therefore engage honestly with the constitutional amendment process rather than suggest workarounds that are, in legal effect, unconstitutional.
And so much for Narsey’s “pragmatism v purists” headline, there is nothing “pragmatic” about selling constitutional impossibilities as if they were options.
The renewed debate on Fiji’s democratic “deficit”, highlighted in Wadan Narsey’s recent piece (Fiji Times, 13 September 2025), has reignited calls for electoral reform, including a shift towards single-member constituencies. Yet beneath the political rhetoric lies an unmovable legal reality: Fiji’s current constitutional framework makes such a change not merely difficult but impossible without a national referendum.
The Supreme Court’s Position: 2013 Constitution is Binding
The Fiji Supreme Court has already ruled that the 2013 Constitution is valid and binding. In doing so, it confirmed that the only method to alter its core provisions is through a referendum requiring strict voting thresholds. Parliament alone cannot unilaterally amend electoral rules that are entrenched in the Constitution.
This judicial clarity means that proposals for “single-member electorates” are, for now, purely theoretical. Without a referendum framework in place, political parties cannot credibly promise change to voters.
Section 53: The Lock on Proportional Representation
At the heart of the matter is section 53 of the 2013 Constitution. It mandates a multi-member, open-list system of proportional representation based on a single national electoral roll. Each voter has one vote of equal value, and seats are distributed proportionately among parties and independents who cross the 5% threshold.
This design is deliberate: it eliminates constituency boundaries, prevents ethnic gerrymandering, and forces parties to appeal across Fiji’s electorate rather than retreating into communal silos. Any move towards single-member seats would require the repeal or wholesale amendment of section 53 and related provisions.
Ethnicity, Gender, and Representation: Speculative Terrain
Advocates for single-member electorates often claim such a system would better reflect Fiji’s ethnic demographics. But such claims rest on assumptions about how electoral boundaries would be drawn, how parties would field candidates, and how communities would vote. Without clear boundary laws or demographic modelling, such assertions are conjectural.
Similarly, suggestions that women’s representation could be improved through reserved single-member seats would collide directly with Fiji’s Bill of Rights. To constitutionally guarantee women-only electorates would require a further amendment enshrining gender-based political privileges. This would be no small undertaking and would raise thorny questions about the number, location, and qualifications of such seats.
The Missing Piece: No Referendum Law
Perhaps the most glaring gap is that Fiji has no legislation to conduct a referendum. While the Constitution requires one for amendments to fundamental provisions such as section 53, there is no enabling law setting out procedures, timelines, voter thresholds, or administrative oversight. Until Parliament passes such legislation, the entire conversation about constitutional reform remains academic.
Electoral Timetable Pressures
Adding to the urgency, section 54 of the Constitution requires the Electoral Commission to review the composition of Parliament at least one year before the next general election. This review must adjust the number of seats to keep pace with population changes.
Yet it is already September 2025, and no reform report has been tabled in Parliament. With time running out before the next election cycle, the political class faces a stark choice: either maintain the proportional system or begin the complex, time-consuming process of legislating a referendum and drafting constitutional amendments.
Pragmatists vs. Purists
Narsey frames the debate as one between pragmatists, who argue that proportional representation prevents ethnic fragmentation and provides stability, and purists, who lament Fiji’s democratic deficit under the current system. While the purists may dream of “truer” representation through single-member constituencies, the constitutional barriers are towering.
The pragmatists, for now, hold the stronger ground: change is not only politically fraught but constitutionally frozen. Unless Parliament summons the will to legislate for a referendum, and Fiji’s voters deliver the required majority, section 53 will remain the unyielding cornerstone of the electoral system.
Conclusion: A Debate Without a Mechanism
The irony of Fiji’s electoral reform debate is that it has become untethered from legal reality. Single-member constituencies cannot even be considered without first establishing the machinery for a referendum. Parliament, constrained by the Supreme Court’s ruling and by the absence of a referendum law, cannot act alone.
Until those basic steps are taken, calls for reform will remain rhetorical exercises. Fiji’s democracy may indeed face deficits but addressing them will require more than political debate. It will require the painstaking legal work of building a pathway for constitutional change.
Additional Analysis and Implications
Here are things to think through, given what Narsey argues and what we have noted:
Interpretive Flexibility in the 2013 Constitution
- While s.53 is explicit about proportional representation and a national roll, there appears to be interpretive space: the Constitution requires only one electoral roll, not one single constituency. Narsey (via the Commission) sees scope for defining multiple local or regional constituencies within the proportional framework, as long as proportionality is preserved (e.g. via complementary lists or “popular loser” lists).
- This means a possible hybrid model: some constituencies with local MPs plus a list component to ensure proportionality. That might be more achievable than full single-member seat abolition and looks more constitutionally safe.
- There is some ambiguity over what “referendum majority” standard is required. The 2013 Constitution seems to demand 75% of registered voters in a referendum for constitutional changes. But the Supreme Court, as per Narsey’s summary, suggests a lower threshold (50% of those voting? or of registered voters?) for certain types of amendments. This could be clarified in future legal contest. Narsey presents the Supreme Court’s suggested procedure.
- One of Narsey’s main concerns is legitimacy: that Parliament which does not reflect the will of the people lacks moral authority to push through major constitutional changes. This connects with our point about democratic deficit.
- There is also the timetable pressure: with the next general election due in 2026-27, and the Commission’s report already submitted, there is limited time to debate, legislate, and if needed, prepare for a referendum.
- The proposal for reserved seats for women (not separate electorates by sex, but seats reserved within the system) is interesting. It attempts to address gender representation without creating segregated electoral rolls.
- Ethnic representation is also discussed: ensuring that both major ethnic groups will continue to have strong representation under proportional rules, and no ethnic group would be marginalised under the proposed system, with regionally distributed constituencies helping ensure local representation.
- Even if constitutionally possible, there is a political risk: parties/MPs who benefit from the current system may resist changes that reduce their advantage (e.g. “Superman effect” or large party dominance, where local favorite candidates are overshadowed by party lists).
- Also, the drafting of legislation that implements reforms (without violating constitutional constraints) will be complex. Definitions of constituencies, how to do proportional balancing, how to handle thresholds, how to conduct the referendum, etc.
Section 53 is blunt and leaves no interpretive room:
- Elections must be conducted “by a multi-member open list system of proportional representation”.
- Seats must be awarded in proportion to total votes for each party or independent.
- A written law may only prescribe rules that accord with an internationally accepted method of awarding seats within an open list proportional system.
- You cannot carve Fiji into single-member constituencies without tearing out section 53.
- You cannot bolt on “popular loser” lists or “hybrid constituencies” unless they still amount to open-list proportional representation.
- You cannot re-introduce geographic seats as the determinant of representation; at most you can tinker with the way candidates are presented on the ballot.
So when Narsey argues that the Electoral Law Reform Commission can “creatively” engineer constituency-style representation within the Constitution, he overlooks that s.53 expressly locks in multi-member proportionality. A “single member” model or any pseudo-first-past-the-post element is simply unconstitutional unless repealed.
And repeal requires:
- Two-thirds of MPs, and
- A referendum for which no enabling legislation yet exists.
Conclusion:
In short, any attempt to reintroduce constituencies, hybrid systems, or single-member models under the 2013 Constitution runs directly into the hard wall of section 53, which entrenches open-list proportional representation with multi-member seats.
Unless and until that section is repealed through both a two-thirds parliamentary majority and a national referendum, Fiji’s electoral system is constitutionally locked into proportionality. Reformers must therefore engage honestly with the constitutional amendment process rather than suggest workarounds that are, in legal effect, unconstitutional.
And so much for Narsey’s “pragmatism v purists” headline, there is nothing “pragmatic” about selling constitutional impossibilities as if they were options.
The Debate Wadan Missed: Why Section 53 Locks the Door on Constituency Politics.
The article by Wadan Narsey in The Fiji Times does not mention s.53 of the 2013 Constitution. So while Narsey talks about the pragmatists vs purists debate, Fijileaks is essentially saying: “Look, 'old fellow traveller', regardless of opinion, the Constitution itself (s.53) makes single-member electorates impossible without a referendum.” We have taken Narsey's political commentary into legal and constitutional detail.
We explicitly cite s.53 of the 2013 Constitution, pointing out that it entrenches multi-member, open-list proportional representation, which by design excludes single-member electorates. We explain that changing this system is not something Parliament can do on its own; it requires a referendum, and we further note the absence of legislation to conduct such a referendum. We also invoke s.54, showing how the Electoral Commission is bound to review Parliament’s composition in terms of proportional representation, not constituencies.
So where Narsey highlights the political debate, we ground his argument in the legal mechanics of the Constitution. We are effectively saying: “Whatever Narsey or others may want, the constitutional text itself makes single-member electorates impossible without a referendum.”
Narsey’s point is that Fiji’s electoral system is not set in stone politically; it’s part of an ongoing debate between stability (pragmatists) and representativeness (purists). The legal analysis of s.53 actually reinforces this: it shows that the only pathway for change is through a referendum. That makes Narsey’s debate real and meaningful, because the people - not Parliament alone - must ultimately decide whether they want constituencies back. His call for open discussion fits with the Constitution’s demand for direct popular consent. In this sense, the constitutional entrenchment of proportional representation makes the public debate unavoidable, which is what Narsey was encouraging.
At the same time, the legal analysis also undercuts Narsey’s argument. While he frames the debate as one between purists and pragmatists, the cold constitutional reality is that purists cannot win without a referendum, and there is currently no law to conduct one. This means the political debate he wants is, at least for now, academic. Parliament cannot simply decide to change the system, nor can political will alone deliver single-member constituencies. Unless enabling referendum legislation is passed, and unless the people vote in favour, Narsey’s purist vision remains impossible. His article doesn’t acknowledge this hard legal barrier, which makes it seem incomplete.
So the two readings go hand-in-hand: Narsey provides the political framing, but the s.53 analysis delivers the constitutional reality check.
And without confronting section 53, the debate risks drifting into abstraction.
This does not mean Narsey’s analysis is irrelevant. In fact, his call for dialogue between pragmatists and purists gains force precisely because of section 53. If change is ever to come, it must be by direct appeal to the people, and the people must be persuaded why constituencies matter. But without acknowledging the legal barrier of section 53, any discussion risks misleading the public into thinking Parliament can act on its own. It cannot.
The real debate, then, is not just whether pragmatists or purists are right in principle. It is whether Fiji is willing to embrace the referendum mechanism the Constitution demands, and whether political leaders have the courage to legislate for it. Until then, section 53 remains the silent but immovable obstacle, the clause Wadan Narsey did not mention, but which none of us can afford to ignore.
The article by Wadan Narsey in The Fiji Times does not mention s.53 of the 2013 Constitution. So while Narsey talks about the pragmatists vs purists debate, Fijileaks is essentially saying: “Look, 'old fellow traveller', regardless of opinion, the Constitution itself (s.53) makes single-member electorates impossible without a referendum.” We have taken Narsey's political commentary into legal and constitutional detail.
We explicitly cite s.53 of the 2013 Constitution, pointing out that it entrenches multi-member, open-list proportional representation, which by design excludes single-member electorates. We explain that changing this system is not something Parliament can do on its own; it requires a referendum, and we further note the absence of legislation to conduct such a referendum. We also invoke s.54, showing how the Electoral Commission is bound to review Parliament’s composition in terms of proportional representation, not constituencies.
So where Narsey highlights the political debate, we ground his argument in the legal mechanics of the Constitution. We are effectively saying: “Whatever Narsey or others may want, the constitutional text itself makes single-member electorates impossible without a referendum.”
Narsey’s point is that Fiji’s electoral system is not set in stone politically; it’s part of an ongoing debate between stability (pragmatists) and representativeness (purists). The legal analysis of s.53 actually reinforces this: it shows that the only pathway for change is through a referendum. That makes Narsey’s debate real and meaningful, because the people - not Parliament alone - must ultimately decide whether they want constituencies back. His call for open discussion fits with the Constitution’s demand for direct popular consent. In this sense, the constitutional entrenchment of proportional representation makes the public debate unavoidable, which is what Narsey was encouraging.
At the same time, the legal analysis also undercuts Narsey’s argument. While he frames the debate as one between purists and pragmatists, the cold constitutional reality is that purists cannot win without a referendum, and there is currently no law to conduct one. This means the political debate he wants is, at least for now, academic. Parliament cannot simply decide to change the system, nor can political will alone deliver single-member constituencies. Unless enabling referendum legislation is passed, and unless the people vote in favour, Narsey’s purist vision remains impossible. His article doesn’t acknowledge this hard legal barrier, which makes it seem incomplete.
So the two readings go hand-in-hand: Narsey provides the political framing, but the s.53 analysis delivers the constitutional reality check.
And without confronting section 53, the debate risks drifting into abstraction.
This does not mean Narsey’s analysis is irrelevant. In fact, his call for dialogue between pragmatists and purists gains force precisely because of section 53. If change is ever to come, it must be by direct appeal to the people, and the people must be persuaded why constituencies matter. But without acknowledging the legal barrier of section 53, any discussion risks misleading the public into thinking Parliament can act on its own. It cannot.
The real debate, then, is not just whether pragmatists or purists are right in principle. It is whether Fiji is willing to embrace the referendum mechanism the Constitution demands, and whether political leaders have the courage to legislate for it. Until then, section 53 remains the silent but immovable obstacle, the clause Wadan Narsey did not mention, but which none of us can afford to ignore.
Over the last two weeks we have had at least two commentaries on the Supreme Court “Opinion” on questions posed to it by the Coalition Government.
The first (“That Constitution case”, September 6, 2025) was by Munro Leys lawyer Richard Naidu, his law firm also the lawyer for National Federation Party to the Supreme Court sittings. While Richard is usually clear in his writings, his latest article meanders as he delicately avoids revealing his personal views on tricky issues, except for a sentence or two at the end, supporting the Supreme Court Opinion.
The second interesting commentary was by Professor Jon Fraenkel (“The sad death of Fiji’s 1997 Constitution”, September 9, 2025), pretty clear and to the point about the origins of Fiji’s constitutions. While mourning the death of the 1997 Constitution, he asked could Fiji still retain its “multi-racial” co-operation while correcting the existing electoral faults?
Neither article addressed the elephant hiding in the room that Nilesh Lal (CEO of Dialogue Fiji) has cogently pointed out in his article “Fiji’s Parliament, does it still reflect the will of the people?” (Fiji Times August 24, 2025).
Nilesh asks the Fiji public: can the currently constituted Fiji Parliament make constitutional changes with genuine democratic legitimacy that is at the heart of the Supreme Court Opinion?
I would further ask: should not constitutional changes therefore be left till after the 2026/27 election based on the new Electoral System which was recommended two months ago by the independent Fiji Electoral Laws Reform Commission, chaired by former Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki and comprising Fatiaki, Professor Narsey, Nabou and Brookes?
To recap the Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court fully recognised that in 2006, the Bainimarama coup treasonously removed the Qarase Government democratically elected under the 1997 Constitution, approved by both Houses of Parliament and the GCC.
The Bainimarama government imposed its 2013 Constitution without the extensive public consultations that had been undertaken for the 1997 Constitution or the Yash Ghai Draft Constitution (rejected by the Bainimarama government), without any Parliamentary approval or Referendum.
The 2013 Constitution stipulates rigid rules for amendments: that any change to the 2013 Constitution must require a 75 per cent majority in Parliament and the approval of 75 per cent of registered voters in a referendum.
What the public know is that while the Bainimarama government controlled Parliament for eight years from 2014 to 2022 it never submitted its 2013 Constitution to Parliament for approval.
What the public know is that while the Bainimarama government oversaw elections in 2014, 2018 and 2022, it never implemented a referendum on the 2013 Constitution.
Nevertheless, FFP had a clear pattern of reducing voter turnouts and reducing voter support.
FFP in the elections of:
2014 59 per cent of votes with 85 per cent turnout (i.e support of 50 per cent of registered voters)
2018 50 per cent of votes with 72 per cent turnout (i.e. support of 36 per cent of registered voters)
2022 43 per cent of votes with 68 per cent turnout. (i.e. support of 29 per cent of registered voters).
So while FFP formed government after the 2014 and 2018 elections, they had nowhere near 75 per cent of the MPs in Parliament.
Also it was virtually impossible for FijiFirst party to ever obtain the support of 75 per cent of registered voters: since the best it got was 50 per cent in 2014, and reducing thereafter to 29 per cent in the 2022 elections.
There was therefore no way that the FFP could have obtained approval of the 2013 Constitution according to its own rules for any amendments — requiring three quarters of the MPs in Parliament and 75 per cent of all registered voters.
So the creator of the 2013 Constitution (you know who) told the people of Fiji: “to change a single line of the Constitution I am giving you, you must follow two rules which I never followed myself. Ha ha ha.”
What a sick joke. Except it is no joke for the people of Fiji.
The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court ruled that:
(a) it could only give an opinion on the questions posed to it if they assumed that the 2013 Constitution was still “effective” i.e. conversely, that the 1997 Constitution was not effective.
(b) despite the “democracy deficit” in the 2013 Constitution, the Supreme Court must respect the “common law of Fiji” — which comprised judge-made law stretching back in time, guiding all of Fiji’s relations in contract, tort, property, trusts, equity and statutory interpretations- the foundations of a “lawful” society.
(c) the people of Fiji had not mounted popular objections to the Bainimarama military government between 2006 and 2014.
(d) on the contrary, the people of Fiji had taken part in three general elections in 2014, 2018 and 2022, with Multinational Observer Groups concluding that the elections were generally credible, despite many deficiencies.
(e) the people and businesses of Fiji and the “Government of the Day” had conducted their business for 13 years (eight under the Bainimarama government and three under the Coalition Government) without any protest against the 2013 Constitution. The Supreme Court opined that these would all be thrown into disarray if the 2013 Constitution were now to be declared as not in existence.
The Supreme Court therefore ruled that the 2013 Constitution had to be recognised as being the “effective” “common law” of Fiji. Pragmatism had reigned supreme over purity of origin.
But it was only because of this victory of pragmatism over idealistic purity, that allowed the Supreme Court to declare that it could now give its opinion on the other questions posed to it by the Coalition Government, particularly the conditions ss 159 and 160 for amendment by parliament.
The conditions for amendments
Following extensive discussions, the Supreme Court concluded that “the right to self-determination of the people of Fiji … includes the right to shape their own constitution as they see fit from time to time”.
While it should not be “easy” for Parliament to amend the constitution, neither should it be totally difficult. The Supreme Court therefore ruled that any amendments could be made with
(a) two thirds (66 per cent) of the Parliament
(b) 50 per cent of a referendum vote conducted by the Electoral Commission.
The Supreme Court decided not to recommend the removal of the “immunity” provisions of the 2013 Constitution that stretched back to the events of the 1987 coup, the 2000 coup and mutiny and the 2006 coup. Hmmmm. Was there any conflict of interest for any of the Supreme Court judges giving the Opinion?
The “Democracy Deficit” in current Parliament
It is surprising that despite the Supreme Court Opinion on the need for parliamentary approval by a majority of two thirds of all MPs, there has been no discussion of the current less than “democratic” representation in Parliament.
The one exception has been an excellent article “Fiji’s Parliament, does it still reflect the will of the people?” (Fiji Times August 24, 2025) by Nilesh Lal (CEO of Dialogue Fiji.
Nilesh Lal points out the fine balance in Parliament after the 2022 elections, between the FFP (26 seats out of 55/with 43 per cent of vote) and the other three parties (PAP, NFP and SODELPA) who just managed to form government by 1 vote on the floor.
But then following the deregistration of FFP and departure of Bainimarama and Khaiyum from Parliament, the then Speaker (current President) made the astonishing ruling allowed the 26 FFP MPs to join any party. Nine of them gave their support to Rabuka, giving Government a totally inflated and artificial majority.
As Nilesh notes, “Fiji’s current Parliament no longer reflects the will of the people as expressed in the last election … without any new election to justify it. The Rabuka-led government today wields power far beyond its electoral mandate … a power obtained through backroom deals and opportunism rather than the ballot box …. [it] can even push through profound changes (like constitutional amendments or major policy reversals) that voters never consented to at the polls. This disconnect strikes at the heart of democratic legitimacy.”
The Fiji public must therefore ask: should this current Parliament be allowed push through constitutional changes or should there be fresh elections first, as are supposed to happen in any case in 2026/2027 under a reformed Electoral System?
Luckily for Fiji, the 2013 Constitution also defined a new electoral system with one national constituency, with proportionality and a 5 per cent rule for parties to qualify for Parliament, greatly criticised by the public. The Coalition Government rightly set out to reform this badly flawed electoral system, with its many democratic deficits.
Electoral Law Reform 2025 and a more democratic Parliament?
In February 2025, Rabuka’s Coalition Government through the Ministry of Justice and the Fiji Law Reform Commission appointed a four-person commission to advise on reform of the much criticised electoral system.
The website of the FLRC today states:
“The final report, titled Fiji Law Reform Commission Electoral Law Review 2025: An Electoral System FOR the People FROM the People, was officially presented to the Acting Attorney-General, Hon. Siromi Turaga, on 8 July 2025. The report marks a significant milestone in Fiji’s journey toward electoral reform and democratic enhancement. The review was conducted with support from the Ministry of Justice, Electoral Commission, Ministry of Women, Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development, Ministry of iTaukei Affairs, Ministry of Information, and the Fijian Elections Office. It included a four-month nationwide consultation across all four divisions and Rotuma. The process featured simulations with political parties, outreach in places of worship, villages, and universities, and materials translated into Vosa Vakaviti, Hindi, and Rotuman — demonstrating Fiji’s commitment to inclusive and participatory policymaking. The Final Report will be made publicly available in due course.”
While I am not at liberty to reveal the report’s details, there have been many media reports on views expressed at these nation-wide consultations (all fully documented in the report with appendices of the Verbatim records) which clearly hint at the contents.
Throughout the country there were many criticisms of the existing one constituency electoral system with its “sudoku” style ballot paper with just hundreds of numbers, not names or pictures or party symbols.
The salient criticisms were: there was no direct link between voters in any area with their MP; the “Superman” effect allowed MPs into parliament with minimal votes while far more popular candidates could not enter parliament because of the 5 per cent threshold; local candidates could not get votes because they were effectively competing with every other candidate in the election (thank you Sukha Singh); effectively no MP could be rejected at the next election for not serving their “constituency”; effectively thousands of voters were disenfranchised, representing more than four MPs in Parliament (the current PM was elected by a margin of one); there was a general desire for more women MPs; and many others (such as removing the climate of fear at election time, all addressed in the detailed changes to the legislations”.
Many sensible voices from the public called for throwing the 2013 Constitution into the dustbin of history, given its dastardly origins.
But the Supreme Court Opinion very pragmatically ruled that the 2013 Constitution is effectively in existence.
While the Electoral Law Reform Commissioners had no inkling of the Supreme Court’s likely Opinion in September, I can reveal that the proposed Electoral System 2025, is in fact abiding by the 2013 Constitution requirements while making radical changes wanted by the Fiji public to strengthen democracy at all levels. In other words, the proposed new 2025 Electoral System is within the bounds of the 2013 Constitution.
Genuine democracy to come?
The proposed system will have numerous “open” constituencies as in the 1997 Constitution in which all ethnic groups will vote and stand as candidates equally.
This draws on Professor Jon Fraenkel’s astute observation that the LITERAL text of the 2013 Constitution only requires ONE ELECTORAL ROLL, NOT ONE CONSTITUENCY.
The FELRC saw the possibility that each local constituency can be easily defined by the Elections Office allocating “polling venues” which are stated in the Voter ID Cards, so no re-registration will be required. This exercise has indeed been easily conducted by the Fiji Elections Office technical staff with the assistance of FELRC Commissioners Daniel Faitiaki and Seini Nabou.
What will the current MPs think?
I suspect many of the current MPs in Parliament will be relieved if they can go and campaign with their personal local constituencies for the next election, instead of relying on some “Superman” who is no longer allowed to stand or simply does not get the hoped for support at the next election.
With no ethnic constituencies, the Proposed 2025 Electoral System will maintain all the benefits of strict proportionality through a List for “popular losers” at the constituency level, with the proportionality complementary to the constituency results.
This proportionality is of course one of the benefits of the current 2013 Electoral System (bar the 5 per cent threshold effect).
One crucial benefit of proportionality in coup-prone Fiji is that given Fiji’s population composition, 63 per cent of the MPs in Parliament will be elected by the iTaukei voters (63 per cent of the total number of voters); likewise, 33 per cent of the MPs in Parliament will be elected by Indo-Fijian voters (33 per cent of the total).
Neither of the major ethnic groups can be marginalised as they were under the 1997 Electoral System, certainly not the iTaukei. I suspect that the 33 per cent of the Indo-Fijian elected MPs will be “king-makers” as currently.
The regionally distributed constituencies will also ensure that all local communities (even small island groups) will have their local MPs in Parliament to serve and be accountable for their local needs or pay the price at the next election. Voters will not have to depend on some distant “Superman”.
While there will be no ethnic constituencies there will be many constituencies reserved for women (but voted for by both men and women) satisfying Fiji’s international CEDAW commitments (reflecting the calls by women’s organisations).
The proposed 2025 Electoral System will not have the “Superman Effect” which Nilesh Lal (CEO of Dialogue Fiji) has correctly (but only lately) criticised since the 5 per cent threshold (which is in the 2013 Constitution) will apply only at the constituency level, with minimal effect.
Government needs Parliamentary Approval
With the Report of the Fiji Electoral Law Reform Commission completed and delivered on 8 July 2025, it would seem that it has every chance of being implemented by the Rabuka Government before the next election which is due in 2026 or before February 2027.
With a totally democratic freshly elected Parliament, the parties will in all probability comprise the same current ones (probably with increased numbers) plus those of the parties of Mr Mahendra Chaudhry and Mr Savenaca Narube (who have been previously unfairly excluded by the 5 per cent threshold rule).
The next Government will then have every democratic authority to propose any amendments to the 2013 Constitution.
I hope that one amendment, also popularly called for by the public, can be the re-establishment of an Upper House in which the GCC could be properly represented.
That would provide a very necessary “checks and balance” mechanism for the elected House of Representatives (the Lower House in the 1997 Constitution), which the current younger generation of voters (post 2006) have no inkling of the value of.
Sitiveni Rabuka will have then come full circle, again, as he did with the assistance of Mr Jai Ram Reddy with the 1997 Constitution.
PROFESSOR WADAN NARSEY is a former Professor of Economics at The University of the South Pacific. The views expressed are his and not of the three other FELRC Members (Daniel Fatiaki, Seni Nabou and Deidre Brookes) nor does it reflect the views of this newspaper. Source: The Fiji Times.
The first (“That Constitution case”, September 6, 2025) was by Munro Leys lawyer Richard Naidu, his law firm also the lawyer for National Federation Party to the Supreme Court sittings. While Richard is usually clear in his writings, his latest article meanders as he delicately avoids revealing his personal views on tricky issues, except for a sentence or two at the end, supporting the Supreme Court Opinion.
The second interesting commentary was by Professor Jon Fraenkel (“The sad death of Fiji’s 1997 Constitution”, September 9, 2025), pretty clear and to the point about the origins of Fiji’s constitutions. While mourning the death of the 1997 Constitution, he asked could Fiji still retain its “multi-racial” co-operation while correcting the existing electoral faults?
Neither article addressed the elephant hiding in the room that Nilesh Lal (CEO of Dialogue Fiji) has cogently pointed out in his article “Fiji’s Parliament, does it still reflect the will of the people?” (Fiji Times August 24, 2025).
Nilesh asks the Fiji public: can the currently constituted Fiji Parliament make constitutional changes with genuine democratic legitimacy that is at the heart of the Supreme Court Opinion?
I would further ask: should not constitutional changes therefore be left till after the 2026/27 election based on the new Electoral System which was recommended two months ago by the independent Fiji Electoral Laws Reform Commission, chaired by former Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki and comprising Fatiaki, Professor Narsey, Nabou and Brookes?
To recap the Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court fully recognised that in 2006, the Bainimarama coup treasonously removed the Qarase Government democratically elected under the 1997 Constitution, approved by both Houses of Parliament and the GCC.
The Bainimarama government imposed its 2013 Constitution without the extensive public consultations that had been undertaken for the 1997 Constitution or the Yash Ghai Draft Constitution (rejected by the Bainimarama government), without any Parliamentary approval or Referendum.
The 2013 Constitution stipulates rigid rules for amendments: that any change to the 2013 Constitution must require a 75 per cent majority in Parliament and the approval of 75 per cent of registered voters in a referendum.
What the public know is that while the Bainimarama government controlled Parliament for eight years from 2014 to 2022 it never submitted its 2013 Constitution to Parliament for approval.
What the public know is that while the Bainimarama government oversaw elections in 2014, 2018 and 2022, it never implemented a referendum on the 2013 Constitution.
Nevertheless, FFP had a clear pattern of reducing voter turnouts and reducing voter support.
FFP in the elections of:
2014 59 per cent of votes with 85 per cent turnout (i.e support of 50 per cent of registered voters)
2018 50 per cent of votes with 72 per cent turnout (i.e. support of 36 per cent of registered voters)
2022 43 per cent of votes with 68 per cent turnout. (i.e. support of 29 per cent of registered voters).
So while FFP formed government after the 2014 and 2018 elections, they had nowhere near 75 per cent of the MPs in Parliament.
Also it was virtually impossible for FijiFirst party to ever obtain the support of 75 per cent of registered voters: since the best it got was 50 per cent in 2014, and reducing thereafter to 29 per cent in the 2022 elections.
There was therefore no way that the FFP could have obtained approval of the 2013 Constitution according to its own rules for any amendments — requiring three quarters of the MPs in Parliament and 75 per cent of all registered voters.
So the creator of the 2013 Constitution (you know who) told the people of Fiji: “to change a single line of the Constitution I am giving you, you must follow two rules which I never followed myself. Ha ha ha.”
What a sick joke. Except it is no joke for the people of Fiji.
The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court ruled that:
(a) it could only give an opinion on the questions posed to it if they assumed that the 2013 Constitution was still “effective” i.e. conversely, that the 1997 Constitution was not effective.
(b) despite the “democracy deficit” in the 2013 Constitution, the Supreme Court must respect the “common law of Fiji” — which comprised judge-made law stretching back in time, guiding all of Fiji’s relations in contract, tort, property, trusts, equity and statutory interpretations- the foundations of a “lawful” society.
(c) the people of Fiji had not mounted popular objections to the Bainimarama military government between 2006 and 2014.
(d) on the contrary, the people of Fiji had taken part in three general elections in 2014, 2018 and 2022, with Multinational Observer Groups concluding that the elections were generally credible, despite many deficiencies.
(e) the people and businesses of Fiji and the “Government of the Day” had conducted their business for 13 years (eight under the Bainimarama government and three under the Coalition Government) without any protest against the 2013 Constitution. The Supreme Court opined that these would all be thrown into disarray if the 2013 Constitution were now to be declared as not in existence.
The Supreme Court therefore ruled that the 2013 Constitution had to be recognised as being the “effective” “common law” of Fiji. Pragmatism had reigned supreme over purity of origin.
But it was only because of this victory of pragmatism over idealistic purity, that allowed the Supreme Court to declare that it could now give its opinion on the other questions posed to it by the Coalition Government, particularly the conditions ss 159 and 160 for amendment by parliament.
The conditions for amendments
Following extensive discussions, the Supreme Court concluded that “the right to self-determination of the people of Fiji … includes the right to shape their own constitution as they see fit from time to time”.
While it should not be “easy” for Parliament to amend the constitution, neither should it be totally difficult. The Supreme Court therefore ruled that any amendments could be made with
(a) two thirds (66 per cent) of the Parliament
(b) 50 per cent of a referendum vote conducted by the Electoral Commission.
The Supreme Court decided not to recommend the removal of the “immunity” provisions of the 2013 Constitution that stretched back to the events of the 1987 coup, the 2000 coup and mutiny and the 2006 coup. Hmmmm. Was there any conflict of interest for any of the Supreme Court judges giving the Opinion?
The “Democracy Deficit” in current Parliament
It is surprising that despite the Supreme Court Opinion on the need for parliamentary approval by a majority of two thirds of all MPs, there has been no discussion of the current less than “democratic” representation in Parliament.
The one exception has been an excellent article “Fiji’s Parliament, does it still reflect the will of the people?” (Fiji Times August 24, 2025) by Nilesh Lal (CEO of Dialogue Fiji.
Nilesh Lal points out the fine balance in Parliament after the 2022 elections, between the FFP (26 seats out of 55/with 43 per cent of vote) and the other three parties (PAP, NFP and SODELPA) who just managed to form government by 1 vote on the floor.
But then following the deregistration of FFP and departure of Bainimarama and Khaiyum from Parliament, the then Speaker (current President) made the astonishing ruling allowed the 26 FFP MPs to join any party. Nine of them gave their support to Rabuka, giving Government a totally inflated and artificial majority.
As Nilesh notes, “Fiji’s current Parliament no longer reflects the will of the people as expressed in the last election … without any new election to justify it. The Rabuka-led government today wields power far beyond its electoral mandate … a power obtained through backroom deals and opportunism rather than the ballot box …. [it] can even push through profound changes (like constitutional amendments or major policy reversals) that voters never consented to at the polls. This disconnect strikes at the heart of democratic legitimacy.”
The Fiji public must therefore ask: should this current Parliament be allowed push through constitutional changes or should there be fresh elections first, as are supposed to happen in any case in 2026/2027 under a reformed Electoral System?
Luckily for Fiji, the 2013 Constitution also defined a new electoral system with one national constituency, with proportionality and a 5 per cent rule for parties to qualify for Parliament, greatly criticised by the public. The Coalition Government rightly set out to reform this badly flawed electoral system, with its many democratic deficits.
Electoral Law Reform 2025 and a more democratic Parliament?
In February 2025, Rabuka’s Coalition Government through the Ministry of Justice and the Fiji Law Reform Commission appointed a four-person commission to advise on reform of the much criticised electoral system.
The website of the FLRC today states:
“The final report, titled Fiji Law Reform Commission Electoral Law Review 2025: An Electoral System FOR the People FROM the People, was officially presented to the Acting Attorney-General, Hon. Siromi Turaga, on 8 July 2025. The report marks a significant milestone in Fiji’s journey toward electoral reform and democratic enhancement. The review was conducted with support from the Ministry of Justice, Electoral Commission, Ministry of Women, Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development, Ministry of iTaukei Affairs, Ministry of Information, and the Fijian Elections Office. It included a four-month nationwide consultation across all four divisions and Rotuma. The process featured simulations with political parties, outreach in places of worship, villages, and universities, and materials translated into Vosa Vakaviti, Hindi, and Rotuman — demonstrating Fiji’s commitment to inclusive and participatory policymaking. The Final Report will be made publicly available in due course.”
While I am not at liberty to reveal the report’s details, there have been many media reports on views expressed at these nation-wide consultations (all fully documented in the report with appendices of the Verbatim records) which clearly hint at the contents.
Throughout the country there were many criticisms of the existing one constituency electoral system with its “sudoku” style ballot paper with just hundreds of numbers, not names or pictures or party symbols.
The salient criticisms were: there was no direct link between voters in any area with their MP; the “Superman” effect allowed MPs into parliament with minimal votes while far more popular candidates could not enter parliament because of the 5 per cent threshold; local candidates could not get votes because they were effectively competing with every other candidate in the election (thank you Sukha Singh); effectively no MP could be rejected at the next election for not serving their “constituency”; effectively thousands of voters were disenfranchised, representing more than four MPs in Parliament (the current PM was elected by a margin of one); there was a general desire for more women MPs; and many others (such as removing the climate of fear at election time, all addressed in the detailed changes to the legislations”.
Many sensible voices from the public called for throwing the 2013 Constitution into the dustbin of history, given its dastardly origins.
But the Supreme Court Opinion very pragmatically ruled that the 2013 Constitution is effectively in existence.
While the Electoral Law Reform Commissioners had no inkling of the Supreme Court’s likely Opinion in September, I can reveal that the proposed Electoral System 2025, is in fact abiding by the 2013 Constitution requirements while making radical changes wanted by the Fiji public to strengthen democracy at all levels. In other words, the proposed new 2025 Electoral System is within the bounds of the 2013 Constitution.
Genuine democracy to come?
The proposed system will have numerous “open” constituencies as in the 1997 Constitution in which all ethnic groups will vote and stand as candidates equally.
This draws on Professor Jon Fraenkel’s astute observation that the LITERAL text of the 2013 Constitution only requires ONE ELECTORAL ROLL, NOT ONE CONSTITUENCY.
The FELRC saw the possibility that each local constituency can be easily defined by the Elections Office allocating “polling venues” which are stated in the Voter ID Cards, so no re-registration will be required. This exercise has indeed been easily conducted by the Fiji Elections Office technical staff with the assistance of FELRC Commissioners Daniel Faitiaki and Seini Nabou.
What will the current MPs think?
I suspect many of the current MPs in Parliament will be relieved if they can go and campaign with their personal local constituencies for the next election, instead of relying on some “Superman” who is no longer allowed to stand or simply does not get the hoped for support at the next election.
With no ethnic constituencies, the Proposed 2025 Electoral System will maintain all the benefits of strict proportionality through a List for “popular losers” at the constituency level, with the proportionality complementary to the constituency results.
This proportionality is of course one of the benefits of the current 2013 Electoral System (bar the 5 per cent threshold effect).
One crucial benefit of proportionality in coup-prone Fiji is that given Fiji’s population composition, 63 per cent of the MPs in Parliament will be elected by the iTaukei voters (63 per cent of the total number of voters); likewise, 33 per cent of the MPs in Parliament will be elected by Indo-Fijian voters (33 per cent of the total).
Neither of the major ethnic groups can be marginalised as they were under the 1997 Electoral System, certainly not the iTaukei. I suspect that the 33 per cent of the Indo-Fijian elected MPs will be “king-makers” as currently.
The regionally distributed constituencies will also ensure that all local communities (even small island groups) will have their local MPs in Parliament to serve and be accountable for their local needs or pay the price at the next election. Voters will not have to depend on some distant “Superman”.
While there will be no ethnic constituencies there will be many constituencies reserved for women (but voted for by both men and women) satisfying Fiji’s international CEDAW commitments (reflecting the calls by women’s organisations).
The proposed 2025 Electoral System will not have the “Superman Effect” which Nilesh Lal (CEO of Dialogue Fiji) has correctly (but only lately) criticised since the 5 per cent threshold (which is in the 2013 Constitution) will apply only at the constituency level, with minimal effect.
Government needs Parliamentary Approval
With the Report of the Fiji Electoral Law Reform Commission completed and delivered on 8 July 2025, it would seem that it has every chance of being implemented by the Rabuka Government before the next election which is due in 2026 or before February 2027.
With a totally democratic freshly elected Parliament, the parties will in all probability comprise the same current ones (probably with increased numbers) plus those of the parties of Mr Mahendra Chaudhry and Mr Savenaca Narube (who have been previously unfairly excluded by the 5 per cent threshold rule).
The next Government will then have every democratic authority to propose any amendments to the 2013 Constitution.
I hope that one amendment, also popularly called for by the public, can be the re-establishment of an Upper House in which the GCC could be properly represented.
That would provide a very necessary “checks and balance” mechanism for the elected House of Representatives (the Lower House in the 1997 Constitution), which the current younger generation of voters (post 2006) have no inkling of the value of.
Sitiveni Rabuka will have then come full circle, again, as he did with the assistance of Mr Jai Ram Reddy with the 1997 Constitution.
PROFESSOR WADAN NARSEY is a former Professor of Economics at The University of the South Pacific. The views expressed are his and not of the three other FELRC Members (Daniel Fatiaki, Seni Nabou and Deidre Brookes) nor does it reflect the views of this newspaper. Source: The Fiji Times.
 |  |
