*Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka needs to either convince the JSC to approve Lavi Rokoika's acting role or ask her to step down from FICAC. That way, the JSC could choose someone from the current FICAC lawyers to act as Acting Commissioner instead, to avoid any legal challenge.
If the Acting FICAC Commissioner’s Appointment Falls, Do the Charges Stand?*All indictments filed while Lavi Rokoika holds office under a presidential instrument are likely to be upheld by the Fiji courts as valid acts of a de facto Commissioner. *The Judges will be reluctant to allow accused persons to escape prosecution merely because of a procedural defect in a high appointment. *In short, the unconstitutionality of the appointment does not collapse the prosecutions, but it exposes a serious breach of constitutional procedure that must be corrected without delay. | The Flower That's Fading: Each Revelation Wilts What's Left of Her Acting FICAC Appointment |
Lavi Rokoika Appointment: Background and Context
On 29 May 2025, the President of Fiji, Ratu Naiqama Lalalabalu, appointed Lavi Rokoika as Acting Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption. The appointment was made on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, rather than on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) as prescribed under section 115(12) of the 2013 Constitution.
The Prime Minister publicly acknowledged that the appointment was made without JSC advice, claiming that “we didn’t get the cooperation of the Judicial Services Commission” and thus “we progressed it through the direct recommendation from the Prime Minister to the President.”
This procedural departure has sparked a major constitutional debate:
This opinion addresses the second question: whether prosecutions commenced under an invalid appointment can lawfully proceed.
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Section 115(12) of the Constitution
“The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption shall be appointed by the President, on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission, following consultation with the Attorney-General.”
This clause is mandatory, not permissive or discretionary.
The President’s power is conditional upon receiving and acting on the JSC’s advice. In other words, the President can only act on the advice of the JSC.
Consultation with the Attorney-General is required but not binding.
Therefore, the Prime Minister and Cabinet have no constitutional authority to replace or bypass that advising body. They have no lawful role in appointing or removing the FICAC Commissioner or Acting Commissioner.
Section 81(3): Acting Appointments
“If the holder of an office established by this Constitution is unable to perform the functions of that office, the President may, on the advice of the person or body that is empowered to advise on the appointment to that office, appoint another person to act in that office.”
Even for temporary or “acting” appointments, the same advising authority here, the JSC, must advise.
FICAC Act 2007
The Act provides that the FICAC Commissioner “shall be appointed in accordance with the Constitution.” It further states that all proceedings are to be “instituted and conducted in the name of the Commissioner.” The FICAC Act is a statutory framework but it's subordinate to the Constitution. The Act gives FICAC functional and administrative powers but cannot override the constitutional process of appointment.
These provisions directly tie FICAC’s prosecutorial authority to the validity of the Commissioner’s appointment.
Legal Effect of an Unconstitutional Appointment
If the court rules that Rokoika’s appointment breached section 115(12), the act of appointment is unconstitutional and void ab initio, meaning she never lawfully held the office.
However, Fiji’s courts, like most Commonwealth jurisdictions, recognise a pragmatic exception: the de facto officer doctrine.
The De Facto Officer Doctrine
This long-standing common law principle preserves the validity of official acts performed by a person who appears to hold office under colour of lawful authority, even if their appointment is later found defective. Its core purpose is to prevent legal chaos and protect public reliance on the apparent authority of state officers.
What are the Basic Legal Requirements?
Fiji and Commonwealth Application
Under this doctrine, FICAC’s prosecutions already filed under Rokoika’s authority remain valid unless and until a competent court rules otherwise.
Ultra Vires and the Limits of Tolerance
While the de facto officer doctrine preserves acts done before a judicial declaration of invalidity, it cannot legitimise conduct after such a ruling.
Once the court declares the appointment void:
Hence, FICAC may continue only under a lawfully reconstituted leadership, either by re-appointment through proper JSC advice, or through delegation confirmed by a valid Commissioner.
Application to the FICAC Cases
Existing Charges (Manoa Kamikamica, maybe Biman Prasad, and Others)
All indictments were filed while Rokoika held office under a presidential instrument. She has been publicly recognised, paid, and has exercised control over FICAC staff. Those circumstances satisfy the requirements of the “colour of authority.”
Accordingly, the charges are likely to be upheld as valid acts of a de facto Commissioner. Courts will be reluctant to allow accused persons to escape prosecution merely because of a procedural defect in a high appointment.
Future Proceedings or Decisions
After a judicial declaration of invalidity:
To proceed lawfully, a new Commissioner or Acting Commissioner, appointed on the advice of the JSC, must ratify and adopt all pending matters.
Distinguishing Between Procedural and Jurisdictional Defects
A key question is whether the invalid appointment deprives FICAC of jurisdiction altogether, or merely introduces a procedural irregularity.
The latter interpretation is more consistent with public interest.
As the Indian Supreme Court observed in Gokaraju Rangaraju, the legitimacy of criminal justice “cannot depend on the accidental validity of the judge’s commission.”
Fiji’s courts are likely to apply the same reasoning: uphold the prosecutions to protect the administration of justice, while insisting that future appointments strictly comply with the Constitution.
Judicial Remedies and Institutional Options
If the court finds Rokoika's appointment unconstitutional, several outcomes are possible:
Broader Constitutional Implications
The bypassing of the JSC undermines the independence of one of Fiji’s core integrity institutions. Section 115(12) was designed precisely to prevent executive interference in the appointment of anti-corruption officers.
While the courts may preserve ongoing prosecutions to prevent impunity, they are equally likely to censure the constitutional impropriety that gave rise to the controversy.
A finding of invalidity would reaffirm that the rule of law demands adherence to proper appointment mechanisms, even in the name of expediency.
The constitutional defects in both the removal of Barbara Malimali and the appointment of Lavi Rokoika go to the root of jurisdiction. Section 115 of the Constitution is not procedural; it defines the legal existence and independence of FICAC itself.
Where the head of the body has been appointed without the mandatory advice of the JSC, any purported exercise of prosecutorial power lacks the constitutional foundation required for validity.
Although the de facto officer doctrine may preserve certain completed acts performed in good faith before the defect is known, it cannot validate continuing prosecutions or new charges commenced under an unlawful appointment.
An appointee who was never constitutionally vested with office cannot lawfully institute or sustain criminal proceedings in the name of FICAC.
Accordingly, prosecutions initiated or maintained under such defective authority are liable to be stayed or quashed, and any further exercise of power by the invalidly appointed Acting Commissioner would amount to a continuing breach of the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the unconstitutionality of the appointment does not collapse the prosecutions, but it exposes a serious breach of constitutional procedure that must be corrected without delay.
Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka needs to either convince the JSC to approve Lavi Rokoika's acting role or ask her to step down from FICAC. That way, the JSC could choose someone from the current FICAC lawyers to act as Acting Commissioner instead, to avoid any legal challenge.
On 29 May 2025, the President of Fiji, Ratu Naiqama Lalalabalu, appointed Lavi Rokoika as Acting Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption. The appointment was made on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, rather than on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) as prescribed under section 115(12) of the 2013 Constitution.
The Prime Minister publicly acknowledged that the appointment was made without JSC advice, claiming that “we didn’t get the cooperation of the Judicial Services Commission” and thus “we progressed it through the direct recommendation from the Prime Minister to the President.”
This procedural departure has sparked a major constitutional debate:
- Was the appointment valid?
- And if it was not, what becomes of the corruption prosecutions that FICAC has launched, including those against Manoa Kamikamica, the former Deputy Prime Minister, and probably against Biman Prasad, DPM and the Minister for Finance?
This opinion addresses the second question: whether prosecutions commenced under an invalid appointment can lawfully proceed.
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Section 115(12) of the Constitution
“The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption shall be appointed by the President, on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission, following consultation with the Attorney-General.”
This clause is mandatory, not permissive or discretionary.
The President’s power is conditional upon receiving and acting on the JSC’s advice. In other words, the President can only act on the advice of the JSC.
Consultation with the Attorney-General is required but not binding.
Therefore, the Prime Minister and Cabinet have no constitutional authority to replace or bypass that advising body. They have no lawful role in appointing or removing the FICAC Commissioner or Acting Commissioner.
Section 81(3): Acting Appointments
“If the holder of an office established by this Constitution is unable to perform the functions of that office, the President may, on the advice of the person or body that is empowered to advise on the appointment to that office, appoint another person to act in that office.”
Even for temporary or “acting” appointments, the same advising authority here, the JSC, must advise.
FICAC Act 2007
The Act provides that the FICAC Commissioner “shall be appointed in accordance with the Constitution.” It further states that all proceedings are to be “instituted and conducted in the name of the Commissioner.” The FICAC Act is a statutory framework but it's subordinate to the Constitution. The Act gives FICAC functional and administrative powers but cannot override the constitutional process of appointment.
These provisions directly tie FICAC’s prosecutorial authority to the validity of the Commissioner’s appointment.
Legal Effect of an Unconstitutional Appointment
If the court rules that Rokoika’s appointment breached section 115(12), the act of appointment is unconstitutional and void ab initio, meaning she never lawfully held the office.
However, Fiji’s courts, like most Commonwealth jurisdictions, recognise a pragmatic exception: the de facto officer doctrine.
The De Facto Officer Doctrine
This long-standing common law principle preserves the validity of official acts performed by a person who appears to hold office under colour of lawful authority, even if their appointment is later found defective. Its core purpose is to prevent legal chaos and protect public reliance on the apparent authority of state officers.
What are the Basic Legal Requirements?
- The office itself must exist in law.
- The person must occupy it under colour of a formal or public instrument.
- Their acts must occur before the appointment is judicially declared invalid.
Fiji and Commonwealth Application
- State v President of the Republic of Fiji; ex parte Prasad [2001] FJHC 390 recognised the doctrine in validating acts under a de facto government.
- In Gokaraju Rangaraju v State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1981 SC 1473), the Indian Supreme Court upheld convictions by a de facto judge whose appointment was unconstitutional, reasoning that “the administration of justice cannot be held hostage to procedural defects in appointment.”
Under this doctrine, FICAC’s prosecutions already filed under Rokoika’s authority remain valid unless and until a competent court rules otherwise.
Ultra Vires and the Limits of Tolerance
While the de facto officer doctrine preserves acts done before a judicial declaration of invalidity, it cannot legitimise conduct after such a ruling.
Once the court declares the appointment void:
- The office immediately becomes vacant.
- Any further decisions, authorisations, or prosecutions made in the name of that officeholder would be ultra vires and null.
Hence, FICAC may continue only under a lawfully reconstituted leadership, either by re-appointment through proper JSC advice, or through delegation confirmed by a valid Commissioner.
Application to the FICAC Cases
Existing Charges (Manoa Kamikamica, maybe Biman Prasad, and Others)
All indictments were filed while Rokoika held office under a presidential instrument. She has been publicly recognised, paid, and has exercised control over FICAC staff. Those circumstances satisfy the requirements of the “colour of authority.”
Accordingly, the charges are likely to be upheld as valid acts of a de facto Commissioner. Courts will be reluctant to allow accused persons to escape prosecution merely because of a procedural defect in a high appointment.
Future Proceedings or Decisions
After a judicial declaration of invalidity:
- No new charges can be laid,
- No continuing steps (such as disclosure directions, consent to prosecution, or settlements) can lawfully be authorised by the void officeholder.
To proceed lawfully, a new Commissioner or Acting Commissioner, appointed on the advice of the JSC, must ratify and adopt all pending matters.
Distinguishing Between Procedural and Jurisdictional Defects
A key question is whether the invalid appointment deprives FICAC of jurisdiction altogether, or merely introduces a procedural irregularity.
The latter interpretation is more consistent with public interest.
As the Indian Supreme Court observed in Gokaraju Rangaraju, the legitimacy of criminal justice “cannot depend on the accidental validity of the judge’s commission.”
Fiji’s courts are likely to apply the same reasoning: uphold the prosecutions to protect the administration of justice, while insisting that future appointments strictly comply with the Constitution.
Judicial Remedies and Institutional Options
If the court finds Rokoika's appointment unconstitutional, several outcomes are possible:
- Declaratory Judgment (Prospective Effect)
The court may declare the process invalid but preserve past acts for reasons of stability, a prospective declaration approach. - Mandamus for Re-appointment
The President may be directed to fill the post lawfully upon the JSC’s advice. - Ratification by a Lawful Commissioner
The successor may issue a formal instrument adopting all prior prosecutions to remove any procedural doubt. - Stay Applications by the Defence
Defendants like Kamikamica or even Prasad if he is charged, may seek a stay or dismissal. Yet courts generally refuse to terminate proceedings on such technical grounds unless clear prejudice is shown.
Broader Constitutional Implications
The bypassing of the JSC undermines the independence of one of Fiji’s core integrity institutions. Section 115(12) was designed precisely to prevent executive interference in the appointment of anti-corruption officers.
While the courts may preserve ongoing prosecutions to prevent impunity, they are equally likely to censure the constitutional impropriety that gave rise to the controversy.
A finding of invalidity would reaffirm that the rule of law demands adherence to proper appointment mechanisms, even in the name of expediency.
The constitutional defects in both the removal of Barbara Malimali and the appointment of Lavi Rokoika go to the root of jurisdiction. Section 115 of the Constitution is not procedural; it defines the legal existence and independence of FICAC itself.
Where the head of the body has been appointed without the mandatory advice of the JSC, any purported exercise of prosecutorial power lacks the constitutional foundation required for validity.
Although the de facto officer doctrine may preserve certain completed acts performed in good faith before the defect is known, it cannot validate continuing prosecutions or new charges commenced under an unlawful appointment.
An appointee who was never constitutionally vested with office cannot lawfully institute or sustain criminal proceedings in the name of FICAC.
Accordingly, prosecutions initiated or maintained under such defective authority are liable to be stayed or quashed, and any further exercise of power by the invalidly appointed Acting Commissioner would amount to a continuing breach of the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the unconstitutionality of the appointment does not collapse the prosecutions, but it exposes a serious breach of constitutional procedure that must be corrected without delay.
Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka needs to either convince the JSC to approve Lavi Rokoika's acting role or ask her to step down from FICAC. That way, the JSC could choose someone from the current FICAC lawyers to act as Acting Commissioner instead, to avoid any legal challenge.
Failure to Disclose Professional Disqualification: A Major Ground for Constructive Revocation of Barbara Malimali’s Appointment as FICAC Commissioner by the JSC
*Malimali’s failure to disclose that she had been barred from legal practice in Tuvalu is a major and independently sufficient ground for constructive revocation of her appointment as FICAC Commissioner |  |
JSC chair, CJ Temo Material Non-Disclosure Undermines Validity of Appointment
In any application for a high-integrity constitutional office, especially one requiring judicial, equivalent qualifications, truthful and full disclosure, is essential.
If Barbara Malimali was barred or suspended from legal practice in Tuvalu, this would:
This breach of duty of candour alone is sufficient to render the appointment invalid in substance, and voidable in law.
In any application for a high-integrity constitutional office, especially one requiring judicial, equivalent qualifications, truthful and full disclosure, is essential.
If Barbara Malimali was barred or suspended from legal practice in Tuvalu, this would:
- Call into question her fitness and propriety to hold a role equivalent to a judge (as FICAC Commissioner must be);
- Reflect adversely on her honesty, transparency, and ethics;
- Demonstrate intentional non-disclosure, which is a form of misrepresentation.
This breach of duty of candour alone is sufficient to render the appointment invalid in substance, and voidable in law.
Elevated Eligibility Standard Under the 2013 Constitution
“The Commissioner of FICAC must be a person who is qualified to be appointed as a judge.”
Any person with a disciplinary history, especially one resulting in prohibition from legal practice in local or foreign jurisdiction, would likely fail the threshold test of suitability. If the JSC had been aware of this prior bar, it is reasonable to conclude that it should not have endorsed her appointment.
Constructive Revocation Is the Proper Remedy
Because the JSC’s original advice was premised on incomplete, inaccurate, or concealed information, the appointment is constitutionally flawed. Under the doctrine of constructive revocation, the JSC is empowered to:
This is a corrective, not punitive, action. Its purpose is to restore the integrity of the Commission and uphold the public trust in the appointment process.
Precedents from Other Jurisdictions
Across Commonwealth jurisdictions, courts and appointment bodies have upheld the principle that failure to disclose adverse professional history (such as prior suspension, disbarment, or censure) is:
This applies equally whether the prior disciplinary action occurred in Fiji or in another jurisdiction, such as Tuvalu.
Implications for the Judicial Services Commission
If the JSC now knows (it certainly does) that Malimali:
To knowingly allow the appointment to stand, once such a material misrepresentation is confirmed, could itself become a dereliction of duty by the JSC.
The failure to disclose a prior bar from practising law in Tuvalu is a serious and independent ground for constructive revocation of Barbara Malimali’s appointment.
It goes directly to honesty, character, and eligibility.
The Judicial Services Commission now has both clear legal grounds and a constitutional obligation to act urgently and decisively.
Legal Basis for Revocation
The doctrine of constructive revocation permits the JSC to correct its own error where its prior advice was tendered:
Effect of Barbara Malimali's Pending Judicial Review before the Fiji High Court
The existence of judicial review proceedings does not bar the JSC from acting, provided it:
Recommended Steps
The JSC is advised to:
The JSC is empowered, and arguably obligated, to act under the doctrine of constructive revocation.
“The Commissioner of FICAC must be a person who is qualified to be appointed as a judge.”
Any person with a disciplinary history, especially one resulting in prohibition from legal practice in local or foreign jurisdiction, would likely fail the threshold test of suitability. If the JSC had been aware of this prior bar, it is reasonable to conclude that it should not have endorsed her appointment.
Constructive Revocation Is the Proper Remedy
Because the JSC’s original advice was premised on incomplete, inaccurate, or concealed information, the appointment is constitutionally flawed. Under the doctrine of constructive revocation, the JSC is empowered to:
- Recognize that the basis of its prior advice has been fundamentally compromised;
- Withdraw that advice;
- Formally recommend to the President that the appointment be terminated.
This is a corrective, not punitive, action. Its purpose is to restore the integrity of the Commission and uphold the public trust in the appointment process.
Precedents from Other Jurisdictions
Across Commonwealth jurisdictions, courts and appointment bodies have upheld the principle that failure to disclose adverse professional history (such as prior suspension, disbarment, or censure) is:
- A material breach of an applicant’s duty of honesty;
- Grounds for immediate termination of appointment, or refusal to confirm it;
- A basis for finding constructive fraud or misrepresentation.
This applies equally whether the prior disciplinary action occurred in Fiji or in another jurisdiction, such as Tuvalu.
Implications for the Judicial Services Commission
If the JSC now knows (it certainly does) that Malimali:
- Was barred from practising in Tuvalu, and
- Did not disclose this in her application, it is not merely permitted but likely duty-bound to:
- Reassess her continued fitness for the post;
- Withdraw its earlier recommendation under the constructive revocation doctrine;
- Preserve the constitutional integrity of FICAC and the JSC itself.
To knowingly allow the appointment to stand, once such a material misrepresentation is confirmed, could itself become a dereliction of duty by the JSC.
The failure to disclose a prior bar from practising law in Tuvalu is a serious and independent ground for constructive revocation of Barbara Malimali’s appointment.
It goes directly to honesty, character, and eligibility.
The Judicial Services Commission now has both clear legal grounds and a constitutional obligation to act urgently and decisively.
Legal Basis for Revocation
The doctrine of constructive revocation permits the JSC to correct its own error where its prior advice was tendered:
- On the basis of false, misleading, or incomplete information, or
- Where the integrity, independence, or credibility of the office is subsequently threatened. Courts have upheld such powers as essential to constitutional accountability, even in the absence of express revocation provisions.
Effect of Barbara Malimali's Pending Judicial Review before the Fiji High Court
The existence of judicial review proceedings does not bar the JSC from acting, provided it:
- Notifies the court of its decision,
- Does not seek to pre-empt the court’s jurisdiction,
- Acts with institutional caution, it may proceed to withdraw its recommendation.
Recommended Steps
The JSC is advised to:
- Convene an urgent meeting to reassess the appointment in light of the full factual matrix;
- Pass a formal resolution to withdraw its earlier advice;
- Write to the President of Fiji recommending the re-termination of the appointment;
- Notify the High Court of its action and offer to assist with disposal of the pending review.
The JSC is empowered, and arguably obligated, to act under the doctrine of constructive revocation.
| The case of Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State Of Andhra Pradesh addresses a pivotal issue in Indian jurisprudence concerning the validity of judicial decisions made by judges whose appointments have been subsequently declared invalid. This Supreme Court judgment, delivered on April 15, 1981, delves into the implications of the de facto doctrine, which serves as a legal safeguard to maintain the continuity and stability of judicial proceedings despite procedural irregularities in judicial appointments. |  |
Background
The appellant, Gokaraju Rangaraju, challenged the validity of judgments pronounced by Shri G. Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena, both Additional Sessions Judges, whose appointments were later quashed by the Supreme Court for violating Article 233 of the Constitution. The central question was whether the prior judgments rendered by these judges retained their validity in light of their impermissible appointments.
Key Issues
Parties Involved:
The appellant, Gokaraju Rangaraju, challenged the validity of judgments pronounced by Shri G. Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena, both Additional Sessions Judges, whose appointments were later quashed by the Supreme Court for violating Article 233 of the Constitution. The central question was whether the prior judgments rendered by these judges retained their validity in light of their impermissible appointments.
Key Issues
- Effect of invalid judicial appointments on past judgments.
- Applicability and limitations of the de facto doctrine in Indian law.
- Balancing public policy and legal propriety in judicial proceedings.
Parties Involved:
- Appellant: Gokaraju Rangaraju
- Respondent: State of Andhra Pradesh
Summary of Judgment
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the judgments pronounced by Shri G. Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena despite their appointments being declared invalid. The court invoked the de facto doctrine, emphasizing that actions performed by these judges in the course of their assumed judicial authority are to be regarded as valid and binding.
This stance is rooted in public policy and the necessity to prevent legal chaos and protect the interests of the public and third parties. Consequently, the appeals challenging the prior judgments were dismissed, reaffirming the principles underpinning the de facto doctrine in the Indian legal system.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the judgments pronounced by Shri G. Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena despite their appointments being declared invalid. The court invoked the de facto doctrine, emphasizing that actions performed by these judges in the course of their assumed judicial authority are to be regarded as valid and binding.
This stance is rooted in public policy and the necessity to prevent legal chaos and protect the interests of the public and third parties. Consequently, the appeals challenging the prior judgments were dismissed, reaffirming the principles underpinning the de facto doctrine in the Indian legal system.
Legal Reasoning
The Supreme Court's legal reasoning hinged on the distinction between de facto and de jure authority. The central tenet is that while the appointment of a judge may be procedurally flawed, the actions undertaken in the genuine execution of judicial functions must be respected to prevent legal uncertainty and societal disruption. The court emphasized the following points:
The Supreme Court's legal reasoning hinged on the distinction between de facto and de jure authority. The central tenet is that while the appointment of a judge may be procedurally flawed, the actions undertaken in the genuine execution of judicial functions must be respected to prevent legal uncertainty and societal disruption. The court emphasized the following points:
- Doctrine of Necessity: The de facto doctrine is essential to maintain the continuity and stability of the judicial system, safeguarding against the annulment of judgments that could lead to chaos and public disillusionment.
- Public Policy: Upholding the de facto actions aligns with public policy by ensuring that private rights and public interests are protected from being undermined by technicalities in judicial appointments.
- Legal Continuity: The judgments and orders issued by de facto judges carry the same legal weight as those by de jure judges, ensuring that legal processes are not rendered ineffective due to procedural lapses.
- Constitutional Provisions: The court referenced Article 71(2) of the Constitution and Section 107(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to illustrate that the legislature recognizes and incorporates the principles underlying the de facto doctrine.
- Comparative Jurisprudence: By drawing parallels with international cases, the court underscored the universal applicability and acceptance of the doctrine, reinforcing its validity within the Indian legal framework.
