WHO GAVE THEM THE MANDATE? Chaudhry Challenges Coalition’s Unilateral Constitution Review Move
 |  Labour Leader Mahendra Chaudhry has questioned the government’s mandate to appoint a constitution review commission without getting parliamentary approval for it. |
How can a committee to review the Constitution be appointed without first obtaining Parliamentary approval? Mr Chaudhry asked. A review of the constitution must be properly authorised through a parliamentary resolution as it was done in 1997. Only then was a commission appointed to review the racist 1990 Constitution at the time,” Mr Chaudhry said.
This is a matter dealing with the Constitution. It must have proper mandate through Parliament which must also approve a terms of reference for the review commission.
“The government cannot simply go ahead and appoint a commission to review the constitution without proper terms of reference and without it having parliamentary approval,” Mr Chaudhry said.
One wonders why the parliamentary Opposition has not raised this matter?
The Coalition government has not even obtained parliamentary approval to lower the voting threshold from 75% (3/4) to 66% (2/3) in reference to amendments to the Constitution, as per the Supreme Court opinion in August last year.
“This government has been acting unilaterally in matters concerning the Constitution, creating fear and instability, undermining confidence in Fiji’s future,” Mr Chaudhry warned.
This is a matter dealing with the Constitution. It must have proper mandate through Parliament which must also approve a terms of reference for the review commission.
“The government cannot simply go ahead and appoint a commission to review the constitution without proper terms of reference and without it having parliamentary approval,” Mr Chaudhry said.
One wonders why the parliamentary Opposition has not raised this matter?
The Coalition government has not even obtained parliamentary approval to lower the voting threshold from 75% (3/4) to 66% (2/3) in reference to amendments to the Constitution, as per the Supreme Court opinion in August last year.
“This government has been acting unilaterally in matters concerning the Constitution, creating fear and instability, undermining confidence in Fiji’s future,” Mr Chaudhry warned.
CHAUDHRY CRIES ‘UNILATERALISM’ BUT IS COALITION REALLY ACTING ILLEGALLY?
Fiji Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry has sounded the alarm over the Coalition Government’s decision to appoint a Constitution Review Commission without prior parliamentary approval, warning that the move risks “fear and instability” and undermines confidence in Fiji’s future.
His intervention has injected a familiar constitutional anxiety into the national debate: who, in truth, has the authority to initiate change to the supreme law?
At first glance, Chaudhry’s criticism carries intuitive force. Constitutions are not ordinary statutes. They derive legitimacy not merely from legal form, but from process, participation, and consent. His invocation of the 1997 constitutional review, initiated through Parliament and entrusted to the Reeves Commission, is not incidental. It reflects a model of constitution-making grounded in deliberation and cross-party endorsement, rather than executive initiative.
Yet, when stripped to its legal essentials, Chaudhry’s argument proves less conclusive than his rhetoric suggests.
The Legal Position
Under the Constitution of Fiji 2013, there is no express requirement that Parliament must first approve the establishment of a Constitution Review Commission.
The Executive retains broad residual authority to establish committees and advisory bodies; define their terms of reference; and consult the public and solicit submissions.
A review commission, in this sense, is not a law-making body. It has no constitutional standing beyond that of an advisory mechanism. Its recommendations carry no legal force unless and until they are translated into formal amendments and passed in accordance with constitutional procedures.
In short, the Government can appoint a review commission unilaterally. The Constitution does not prohibit it.
The Real Issue: Legitimacy, Not Legality
Where Chaudhry is on firmer ground is not in law, but in constitutional convention and legitimacy. The 1997 process remains the gold standard precisely because it originated in Parliament; operated under agreed terms of reference; and commanded broad political acceptance.
By contrast, an executive-driven review risks appearing partisan; pre-determined in outcome; lacking national consensus. In constitutional politics, perception matters as much as procedure. A process that is legally valid may still be politically fragile.
The Threshold Controversy
Chaudhry’s more serious concern lies elsewhere: the suggestion that the Government has not secured parliamentary approval to reduce the constitutional amendment threshold from 75 per cent to 66 per cent, following the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion.
Here, the stakes are significantly higher.
If the Government were to attempt to alter entrenched amendment provisions without complying with the Constitution itself, the issue would cease to be political and become justiciable. Any such move could invite constitutional challenge and judicial scrutiny.
This is where the real legal battleground lies - not in the appointment of a review commission but in the method of amendment that may follow.
A Question for the Opposition
Chaudhry’s pointed query - why the parliamentary Opposition has remained silent - exposes a broader malaise. Constitutional questions of this magnitude demand rigorous scrutiny within Parliament itself. Silence, whether strategic or complacent, weakens the very institutional safeguards the Constitution is meant to protect.
Fear, Instability or Strategy?
Chaudhry warns of “fear and instability”. That language is political, but not entirely misplaced. Constitutional processes conducted without visible consensus can unsettle investors; institutions; and the public at large.
Yet it is equally true that governments, particularly those seeking reform, often prefer executive control of the agenda. A review commission appointed by Cabinet allows the Coalition to shape the narrative before entering the more hazardous terrain of parliamentary negotiation.
The Verdict
Chaudhry is right in principle but overstated in law. He is correct that constitutional reform should ideally be Parliament-led; legitimacy flows from broad-based participation; and process matters as much as outcome.
But he is incorrect to suggest that the Government is acting unlawfully merely by appointing a review commission without parliamentary approval.
The Constitution permits such a step. The true constitutional test lies ahead, in whether the Government respects the entrenched procedures for amendment, or seeks to circumvent them.
Fiji has lived through too many constitutional ruptures to treat the present moment lightly. The danger does not lie in reviewing the Constitution. It lies in how that review is used.
If the process becomes a vehicle for predetermined change without lawful authority, Chaudhry’s warnings may yet prove prophetic.
If, however, the Government ultimately submits itself to the discipline of constitutional procedure, then the current controversy will be remembered not as a crisis, but as yet another episode in Fiji’s long and unfinished conversation about its constitutional future.
Fiji Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry has sounded the alarm over the Coalition Government’s decision to appoint a Constitution Review Commission without prior parliamentary approval, warning that the move risks “fear and instability” and undermines confidence in Fiji’s future.
His intervention has injected a familiar constitutional anxiety into the national debate: who, in truth, has the authority to initiate change to the supreme law?
At first glance, Chaudhry’s criticism carries intuitive force. Constitutions are not ordinary statutes. They derive legitimacy not merely from legal form, but from process, participation, and consent. His invocation of the 1997 constitutional review, initiated through Parliament and entrusted to the Reeves Commission, is not incidental. It reflects a model of constitution-making grounded in deliberation and cross-party endorsement, rather than executive initiative.
Yet, when stripped to its legal essentials, Chaudhry’s argument proves less conclusive than his rhetoric suggests.
The Legal Position
Under the Constitution of Fiji 2013, there is no express requirement that Parliament must first approve the establishment of a Constitution Review Commission.
The Executive retains broad residual authority to establish committees and advisory bodies; define their terms of reference; and consult the public and solicit submissions.
A review commission, in this sense, is not a law-making body. It has no constitutional standing beyond that of an advisory mechanism. Its recommendations carry no legal force unless and until they are translated into formal amendments and passed in accordance with constitutional procedures.
In short, the Government can appoint a review commission unilaterally. The Constitution does not prohibit it.
The Real Issue: Legitimacy, Not Legality
Where Chaudhry is on firmer ground is not in law, but in constitutional convention and legitimacy. The 1997 process remains the gold standard precisely because it originated in Parliament; operated under agreed terms of reference; and commanded broad political acceptance.
By contrast, an executive-driven review risks appearing partisan; pre-determined in outcome; lacking national consensus. In constitutional politics, perception matters as much as procedure. A process that is legally valid may still be politically fragile.
The Threshold Controversy
Chaudhry’s more serious concern lies elsewhere: the suggestion that the Government has not secured parliamentary approval to reduce the constitutional amendment threshold from 75 per cent to 66 per cent, following the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion.
Here, the stakes are significantly higher.
If the Government were to attempt to alter entrenched amendment provisions without complying with the Constitution itself, the issue would cease to be political and become justiciable. Any such move could invite constitutional challenge and judicial scrutiny.
This is where the real legal battleground lies - not in the appointment of a review commission but in the method of amendment that may follow.
A Question for the Opposition
Chaudhry’s pointed query - why the parliamentary Opposition has remained silent - exposes a broader malaise. Constitutional questions of this magnitude demand rigorous scrutiny within Parliament itself. Silence, whether strategic or complacent, weakens the very institutional safeguards the Constitution is meant to protect.
Fear, Instability or Strategy?
Chaudhry warns of “fear and instability”. That language is political, but not entirely misplaced. Constitutional processes conducted without visible consensus can unsettle investors; institutions; and the public at large.
Yet it is equally true that governments, particularly those seeking reform, often prefer executive control of the agenda. A review commission appointed by Cabinet allows the Coalition to shape the narrative before entering the more hazardous terrain of parliamentary negotiation.
The Verdict
Chaudhry is right in principle but overstated in law. He is correct that constitutional reform should ideally be Parliament-led; legitimacy flows from broad-based participation; and process matters as much as outcome.
But he is incorrect to suggest that the Government is acting unlawfully merely by appointing a review commission without parliamentary approval.
The Constitution permits such a step. The true constitutional test lies ahead, in whether the Government respects the entrenched procedures for amendment, or seeks to circumvent them.
Fiji has lived through too many constitutional ruptures to treat the present moment lightly. The danger does not lie in reviewing the Constitution. It lies in how that review is used.
If the process becomes a vehicle for predetermined change without lawful authority, Chaudhry’s warnings may yet prove prophetic.
If, however, the Government ultimately submits itself to the discipline of constitutional procedure, then the current controversy will be remembered not as a crisis, but as yet another episode in Fiji’s long and unfinished conversation about its constitutional future.
From Fijileaks Archives: They all wanted the 1997 Constitution Binned
Sitiveni Rabuka: Bring Back South African 'Apartheid' Fijileaks: Astonishingly, in June 2000, shortly after George Speight and others seized Parliament, Rabuka told the world that the old South Africa might be a model for Fiji. |  |
"I supported every move to destabilise the Chaudhry government, but I was not part of the coup. I was not involved in any of the [pre-coup] marches. But I was going to be involved in the next one because it was [to be held at] the time of the signing of the successor to the Lome Convention this month.’
Sitiveni Rabuka, 'Chief of All Chiefs'- Chairman, Great Council of Chiefs
 | "[Frank] Bainimarama thanked me at a reception at the military barracks in the early stages of the coup for deposing of Mahendra Chaudhry" |
 | "I had abrogated the 1997 Constitution because I was satisfied that people engaged in the events of May 19 [George Speight coup] were of the perception that the document had watered down the interests of indigenous Fijians. Whether or not those perceptions accorded with reality was not my principal consideration. The perceptions were genuinely held by largely unsophisticated Fijians not equipped to adequately comprehend the niceties and technicalities of the Constitution.” |
  |   |
LAISENIA QARASE to UN General Assembly, September 2000:
"The crux of our political crisis in Fiji is that indigenous Fijian and Rotuman communities felt threatened by certain policies which the non-indigenous leadership of the People's Coalition Government had implemented following their decisive victory in our National Elections in May 1999. It was this fear and anxiety about their future as the world's only indigenous Fijian and Rotuman community of just over 420,000 people that led to mass demonstrations and ultimately the Coup d'etat on May 19th this year. It manifested itself also in the mass looting of shops, destruction of property, and threats to people and their families, and unfortunately and tragically, the victims were mainly members of our Indian community. It was in this serious and deteriorating law and order situation that the Fiji Military Forces responded to a request from our Police to take over direct control of law and order and the protection of citizens. To facilitate this role, the Fiji Military Forces abrogated our 1997 Constitution on 29th May. However, as the civilian Interim Administration, we have ourselves taken over from the Army and, as I have said, we are firmly committed to returning Fiji to constitutional parliamentary democracy. We intend to promulgate the new constitution in August next year. General elections will then follow within twelve months."
Address to the Fifty-Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly by Interim Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, Bainimarama's then Interim PM, 16 September 2000
 |  |
NEW FIJI PRIME MINISTER LAISENIA QARASE WITH COMMODORE BAINIMARAMA IN SUVA, 2000-07-04
1990 Racist Constitution: Lest We Forget, We were held down until 1999 |  |
"The Indians [Indo-Fijians] with a history of rebellion on the sugar plantations are repeating the lines of Richard Lovelace: Stone walls do not a prison make - Nor Iron bars a cage' - Victor Lal, in his book Fiji: Coups in Paradise-Race, Politics and Military Intervention, while condemning coupist Sitiveni Rabuka's racist 1990 Constitution of Fiji. He also warned Rabuka and the native Fijian chiefs: "...The Fijian chiefs still have a choice today - to borrow the late Martin Luther King Junior's warning: non-violent co-existence or violent co-annihilation."
 |  |
Just Imagine: 'We don't want this bloody iTaukei dominated Government'
And the GCC who have blackmailed Indo-Fijians since 1879, from cradle to grave, and still at it.
The Indian indentured labourers were uprooted to prevent the disintegration of feudalistic colonial chiefs lifestyles, and for chiefs and their white colonial masters to hold back commoner iTaukei in their villages.
From Banana Plantations to Banana Republic of Fiji
*The abolition of indenture created conditions in which Indo-Fijians could pursue advancement beyond the rigid constraints of plantation life and inherited hierarchy. Over time, this fostered a culture that prioritised education and enterprise. By contrast, iTaukei society has retained stronger continuity with its traditional chiefly and communal structures, which continue to influence patterns of authority, obligation, and social mobility.
*One is left to wonder what the indentured labourers, confined to the cramped ‘lines’ of the plantations, thought as they passed the iTaukei villages that bordered their routes, whether these encounters stirred memories of the worlds they had left behind in India, or underscored the distance, social as much as geographic, between their past lives and their present condition in colonial Fiji.
*The colonial administration took active measures to limit interaction between indentured labourers and neighbouring iTaukei communities, confining workers to plantation 'lines' and regulating their movement. In this system of indirect rule, local chiefly authorities were at times drawn into the enforcement of colonial labour discipline, including the reporting or return of labourers who had absconded from tea, sugar, and banana plantations.
*One is left to wonder what the indentured labourers, confined to the cramped ‘lines’ of the plantations, thought as they passed the iTaukei villages that bordered their routes, whether these encounters stirred memories of the worlds they had left behind in India, or underscored the distance, social as much as geographic, between their past lives and their present condition in colonial Fiji.
*The colonial administration took active measures to limit interaction between indentured labourers and neighbouring iTaukei communities, confining workers to plantation 'lines' and regulating their movement. In this system of indirect rule, local chiefly authorities were at times drawn into the enforcement of colonial labour discipline, including the reporting or return of labourers who had absconded from tea, sugar, and banana plantations.
The Racist's Indigenous Rhetoric. Speight: 'Indo-Fijians smell differently'
 |  |
 |  |
 |  |
