Sitiveni Rabuka’s 2012 submission is not merely an archival curiosity locked away in Fijileaks 'CRC Submissions Archive'. It is a standard against which his Government’s conduct and the Commission’s proposals can be measured. It reminds us that Rabuka understood, at least in principle, that a Constitution cannot rest upon Cabinet authority alone. It must command the confidence of the people. His Government must therefore publish the Cabinet subcommittee’s membership, its instructions, the advisers and drafters assisting it, every alteration it proposes and the reasons for those alterations. It must allow the people enough time to compare the Commission’s draft with the Government’s Bill. And it must not use the 6 February 2027 election deadline as an excuse to hurry Fiji into a constitutional settlement that the Commission itself admits could have been much improved with more time. Rabuka told the Ghai Commission in 2012 that constitutional deliberations should be completed “without fear or favour”.
Fourteen years later, the same requirement applies to him.
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Fourteen years ago, Sitiveni Rabuka told the Ghai Commission that Fiji should be a Christian state, that politicians should face no term limits, that FICAC should be placed under the Police Commissioner, and that constitutional legitimacy must rest upon the expressed will of the people.
The present Draft Constitution accepts some of his ideas, rejects others and may prevent him from returning as Prime Minister.
In October 2012, Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka presented a 20-page personal submission to the Constitution Commission chaired by Professor Yash Ghai.
Fijileaks subsequently published it under the headline: “Coupist to constitutionalist: Sitiveni Rabuka shares his vision of post-coup Fiji before the Constitution Review Commission.”
Fourteen years later, Rabuka is Prime Minister, the minister responsible for constitutional matters, and the political custodian of another Constitution Review Commission report and Draft Constitution.
His 2012 submission has therefore acquired a significance that it could not have possessed when it was written.
It allows us to compare what Rabuka advocated as a former coup leader and former prime minister in 2012 with what the Commission appointed by his Government has now recommended in 2026.
It also permits comparison with Rabuka’s latest public statements, including his declaration that the constitutional process is not being rushed, his more accommodating position on Fiji’s religious character, his acknowledgement that the two-term provision could prevent him from returning as Prime Minister, and his disclosure that a Cabinet subcommittee is changing the Commission’s proposals before they reach Parliament.
The comparison reveals continuity, retreat, adaptation and several striking contradictions.
The people’s will and the Cabinet door
Rabuka’s 2012 submission began with an assumption that the Bainimarama Government would adhere to the 1997 Constitution.
He regarded that Constitution as the most democratically legitimate of Fiji’s constitutional instruments, although he acknowledged that the road leading to it was not entirely free of constitutional difficulty.
His description of the 1990 Constitution is particularly relevant today.
Rabuka recalled that the Interim Government Cabinet had considered the Falvey Commission’s recommendations, sent them for drafting into constitutional form and presented the resulting document to the Bose Levu Vakaturaga before the President promulgated it.
He then acknowledged the essential defect: “Because the 1990 Constitution was not ‘the will of the people’, it was always going to be difficult to work with.”
Rabuka was correct.
A Constitution does not acquire democratic legitimacy merely because a commission first receives public submissions. The fate of those submissions, the drafting that follows, the institutions controlling the final text and the opportunity given to the people to scrutinise it are equally important.
That observation now returns to confront the present process.
The 2026 Constitution Review Commission conducted public consultations and delivered its report and Draft Constitution to the President. But Rabuka has disclosed that a Cabinet subcommittee has spent two weeks deliberating on the Commission’s proposed amendments and making changes.
He says those changes will be the ones that proceed to Parliament.
The historical circumstances are not identical. The present Government was elected, Parliament remains in existence, and any constitutional amendment must satisfy the parliamentary and referendum requirements identified by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, the warning contained in Rabuka’s own 2012 submission remains applicable.
Public consultation with a commission cannot automatically legitimise provisions subsequently rewritten by Cabinet.
If the Cabinet subcommittee materially changes the Draft Constitution, the final document will no longer be exclusively the product of the Commission’s consultation. It will be the Coalition Government’s constitutional Bill.
That is not necessarily unconstitutional or improper. Cabinet is entitled to formulate legislation. But it must accept political authorship and responsibility for what it changes.
Who sits on the subcommittee? Who is advising it? Who is drafting its amendments? Which Commission recommendations have been accepted, rejected or rewritten? Will the public be given both versions and enough time to compare them?
The Government’s Cabinet statement identifies none of the members. It says only that the subcommittee will consider the practical, legal and policy implications of the recommendations, including transitional arrangements, and report to Cabinet.
The Constitution Review Commission’s own report makes Rabuka’s dismissal of concerns about haste difficult to sustain.
The Commission records that it had little more than five months to complete its work. Public consultations continued until early July. Deliberations occupied the period from early July to the middle of August. Drafting instructions were being prepared while the drafter attempted to keep ahead of the Commission’s decisions. A revised draft became available only near the end of August.
The Commission candidly accepts that the draft could be considerably improved, but that there was insufficient time for a comprehensive revision.
That is the Commission speaking, not a political opponent.
Rabuka says constitutional change has been discussed since 2013 and therefore the present process is not rushed. But years of general criticism of the 2013 Constitution cannot be converted into years of public consultation on a document that did not exist until August 2026.
Fijians could not have studied in 2013 the proposed 41-seat House of Representatives, the 19-member Senate, the mixed-member proportional electoral system, the Presidential Appointment Commission, the constitutionalised BLV, the two-term limit for the Prime Minister or the Commission’s new transitional provisions.
Nor could they have commented upon changes now being made by the Cabinet subcommittee.
From a Christian state to constitutional religious liberty
The clearest change in Rabuka’s public position concerns religion.
In his 2012 submission, Rabuka acknowledged that Fiji had never been declared a Christian state by any written law or Constitution. He warned that declaring Fiji either Christian or secular could produce disadvantages.
But he then came down firmly on one side: “It is better that the Constitutions and written laws declare Fiji a Christian state rather than declaring it a secular state.”
He argued that Fiji’s political evolution had been influenced by love, forgiveness, accommodation, custom and customary law grounded in the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
The 2026 Draft Constitution does not follow that recommendation.
Its preamble gives Christianity a prominent place. It recalls the conversion of Fiji’s indigenous inhabitants and recognises Christianity’s enduring influence, together with the contribution of other faiths to the country’s spiritual life.
But the operative constitutional provisions do not declare Fiji a Christian state.
Nor does the draft expressly retain the 2013 Constitution’s description of Fiji as a “secular State”.
Instead, proposed section 4 declares religious liberty to be a founding principle. It provides that religious belief is personal, that the State must treat all religions equally, and that public officers must not prefer or advance one religion, denomination or belief over another or over a non-religious belief.
In substance, that is the constitutional principle of secular government, even if the word “secular” has been removed.
Rabuka’s latest statements are notably different from his 2012 position. He has said that his Christian faith is well known, but that simply declaring Fiji a Christian state would not make the country Christian. Christianity, he says, must be demonstrated through humility, kindness, compassion, hard work, service and love.
That represents a significant retreat from his 2012 proposal for a formal Christian state.
It is also a more constitutionally inclusive position for a multi-religious country.
The Commission’s draft attempts a compromise. It recognises Fiji’s Christian history and influence in the preamble while retaining legal neutrality among religions in the enforceable provisions.
Some Christians may regard that as insufficient. Some non-Christians may consider the preamble too heavily weighted towards Christianity. But it is not accurate simply to describe the draft as either a Christian-state Constitution or an abandonment of religion.
It is a religiously worded preamble attached to a substantively non-establishment constitutional provision.
Rabuka’s BLV and the Commission’s BLV
On the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, there is considerable agreement between Rabuka’s 2012 submission and the 2026 Commission.
Rabuka argued that the BLV should be recognised in the Constitution rather than left to ordinary legislation. He described it as an institution capable of operating during political instability and a vacuum of authority.
But he did not advocate a narrowly hereditary body.
Rabuka said the contemporary BLV should be more inclusive of non-traditional chiefs and other Fijians who had distinguished themselves in the professions and industry. It should include high achievers and benevolent thinkers, remain non-partisan and possess the confidence of the country.
That part of his submission deserves renewed attention.
The 2026 draft constitutionalises the BLV and gives it significant national powers. It would nominate eight members of the proposed 19-member Senate and three members of the proposed Presidential Appointment Commission. It would also nominate representatives to bodies concerned with iTaukei land, fisheries, administration and trust funds.
But the proposed composition is not as professionally or socially inclusive as Rabuka’s 2012 vision.
The draft provides for 42 chiefs representing the 14 provinces, three from each province. They must come from identified categories of traditionally installed chiefs. One of the three provincial representatives must be a woman, “if possible”.
There would also be six members nominated by the minister responsible for iTaukei affairs, three Rotuman representatives and the President, Prime Minister and iTaukei Affairs Minister as ex officio members.
Rabuka wanted an apolitical assembly containing qualified non-traditional leaders and accomplished Fijians. The new draft constructs a predominantly chiefly institution while giving a Cabinet minister the power to nominate six additional members.
It also places the Prime Minister and a minister within the body, although as non-voting members.
The Commission calls the BLV independent, but its proposed composition introduces a visible political presence.
There is another problem. By giving the BLV three of seven seats on the Presidential Appointment Commission, the draft makes it the largest single bloc in choosing the Head of State. The Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, Fiji Council of Churches and Interfaith Search Fiji would each hold one place.
That structure does not ensure that Fiji’s communities outside the BLV and the faith organisations will have an effective voice. Indo-Fijians, Rotumans, Banabans, other Pacific Islanders, women, young people, commoner iTaukei and those of no religious faith are not guaranteed direct representation.
Rabuka’s 2012 call for a broader council of chiefs and national achievers may, in this respect, have been more inclusive than the institution now proposed by his Commission.
Parliament, political parties and local representation
Rabuka’s 2012 submission criticised an electoral system in which unsuitable individuals could enter Parliament merely because they were candidates of a popular political party.
He argued that an MP’s capacity to represent the wishes of the people was more important than the strength of the party label.
He proposed a 53-member elected Parliament, based roughly upon one MP for every 15,000 people.
The 2026 draft follows the spirit, although not the arithmetic, of that recommendation.
It proposes a 41-member House of Representatives and a 19-member Senate, producing a total Parliament of 60.
The House would be elected through mixed-member proportional representation. Twenty-six members would be elected from constituencies, including five maritime constituencies. Fifteen would come from party lists. Parties would generally need 5 per cent of the party vote or at least one constituency victory to qualify for proportional representation.
This partially responds to Rabuka’s demand for identifiable local representatives. It ends the present single national constituency and allows independent candidates to contest constituency seats.
But political parties would remain powerful. Fifteen House seats would be filled from party lists, and party discipline provisions remain embedded in the draft.
The Commission has therefore attempted a compromise between Rabuka’s constituency-based representation and the proportionality of the present system.
Whether 41 elected members are sufficient to represent Fiji’s population, islands, ethnic diversity and remote communities is another question. Rabuka himself proposed 53 elected MPs in 2012. The present draft offers only 41 elected representatives, supplemented by an appointed Senate.
The 75-year warning and the two-term barrier
One paragraph in Rabuka’s 2012 submission now possesses an unavoidable personal relevance. He wrote: “There should be no limit to the length of time a politician can serve in parliament.” But he immediately added that service beyond the age of 75 could become “more burdensome to the state than productive”.
Rabuka is now 78.
He remains Prime Minister and leader of the People’s Alliance. His name continues to feature in discussions about the next election and the premiership that may follow.
The Commission has not imposed a retirement age upon parliamentarians. In that sense, its draft remains consistent with Rabuka’s 2012 position. He could still stand for election to the House, subject to satisfying the general qualifications.
But the draft introduces a separate limitation upon the office of Prime Minister.
Proposed section 115(5) states that no person may be appointed or elected Prime Minister more than twice, whether the terms are consecutive or non-consecutive.
Rabuka has served as Prime Minister following the 1992 election and again following the 2022 election. He has publicly accepted that the proposed provision, if enacted in its current form, would prevent him from returning as Prime Minister after the next election.
The drafting remains open to legal argument because it contains no clear transitional provision stating whether prime ministerial appointments before commencement must be counted.
FBC was therefore right to identify a possible constitutional barrier, but the matter is not as simple as counting three calendar periods. The provision limits appointments or elections to the office, not parliamentary candidacy, and its retrospective application requires clarification.
The Cabinet subcommittee may now preserve, alter, qualify or remove that clause.
That is why its membership and amendments must be disclosed. A committee containing politicians should not secretly determine whether the serving Prime Minister may return to office.
FICAC: a direct rejection of Rabuka’s 2012 proposal
Rabuka’s 2012 position on FICAC was unequivocal.
He said corruption was a serious problem but that FICAC was not justified as an independent body. He proposed placing it under the Commissioner of Police for administrative and professional control.
The 2026 Draft Constitution rejects that proposal.
It retains FICAC as a constitutionally recognised body comprising a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. Both would be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission.
There is, however, an important alteration. FICAC would investigate corruption but would not independently prosecute. It could recommend that the Director of Public Prosecutions institute or conduct criminal proceedings.
The Commission has therefore chosen to preserve an independent specialist investigative body while transferring prosecutorial authority to the DPP.
That is almost the reverse of Rabuka’s 2012 recommendation. FICAC would not fall under the Police Commissioner, but its power would be divided to create a check between investigation and prosecution.
The military under civilian authority
On the constitutional position of the military, Rabuka’s 2012 submission and the 2026 draft share a common principle. Rabuka proposed that the RFMF be constitutionally established for defence and internal security, acting with the Police, but operating under Parliament and subject to legislation.
The Commission goes further. Its draft gives the RFMF primary responsibility for defence against external threats. Domestic assistance would be limited to legally specified purposes, including disasters and emergencies, and would require civilian authorisation.
The Commander would retain military executive command but would exercise it subject to the direction of Cabinet through the responsible minister. The report expressly seeks to close the “guardianship” loophole historically invoked to justify military intervention in politics.
This is broadly consistent with the civilian subordination Rabuka proposed in 2012. But the 2026 draft is clearer in limiting the military’s constitutional function and rejecting any independent entitlement to intervene in government.
The Commission also proposes a constitutional Military Court, presided over by a sitting High Court judge. That is a significant addition absent from Rabuka’s 2012 submission and requires careful scrutiny of jurisdiction, prosecutorial independence and the rights of military accused.
Immunity: Rabuka hesitated then and hesitates now
Rabuka’s 2012 position on immunity was complicated. He proposed forgiveness for Bainimarama and others involved in the 2006 coup, first through the BLV and Methodist Church, followed by a South African-style truth and reconciliation commission considering restorative justice, restitution, compensation, amnesty and pardon.
He argued that immunity or amnesty would be legitimate only if it reflected the expressed will of the people.
He also stated that no new immunity should be included in the Constitution, apart from immunity already enacted by a government of the people.
The 2026 Commission takes a firmer position.
Its draft declares that no immunity may lawfully be granted for an attempt to establish a government contrary to the Constitution. Its report recommends repealing the existing immunity chapter inherited from the 2013 Constitution.
Curiously, the Draft Constitution reproduces a Chapter 15 headed “Immunity” but does not draft a complete replacement provision. It inserts a bracketed note stating that the Commission recommends that the chapter be repealed.
Rabuka has so far stopped short of personally endorsing that repeal. When questioned after tabling the report, he emphasised that it was a Commission recommendation and that the Cabinet subcommittee had been examining the proposals.
His hesitation resembles the caution in his 2012 submission.
Then, he opposed automatic new immunity but favoured a nationally accepted process capable of producing amnesty after truth and reconciliation. Now, faced with a recommendation to remove existing immunity, he has left the matter to Cabinet and Parliament.
The country must be told whether the Cabinet subcommittee intends to retain, repeal or modify Chapter 15.
The common name
Rabuka’s 2012 submission stressed the preservation of Fiji’s different cultures and identities. He argued that constitutional unity should not require cultural uniformity.
He later explained publicly that his submission had opposed forcing Fiji’s Indian community to discard its distinctive identity and adopt a name traditionally associated with the indigenous population.
The 2026 Commission has adopted an elaborate compromise.
The Draft Constitution provides that all citizens will continue to be known as Fijians for an interim period of up to 12 months. A culturally appropriate national consultation would then seek agreement on a common identity. If no consensus emerged, the question would proceed to a referendum within a further 12 months.
That approach corresponds with Rabuka’s objection to imposing identity without consent. But it also risks reopening ethnic divisions that the common name was intended to overcome.
The Commission itself was divided. A minority wanted “Fijian” retained for all citizens and warned that a referendum on national identity could polarise the country.
The Cabinet subcommittee must now decide whether this proposal survives.
Which Rabuka will Parliament hear? The 2012 Rabuka and the 2026 Rabuka are not wholly different men.
Both emphasise Christianity, reconciliation, indigenous institutions, customary rights, constituency representation and civilian control over the military.
But there are important changes.
The Rabuka who preferred a constitutionally declared Christian state now says Christianity cannot be created by constitutional declaration.
The Rabuka who opposed limits on parliamentary service now accepts that the Commission’s two-term prime ministerial provision may prevent his return.
The Rabuka who wanted FICAC placed under the Police Commissioner presides over a draft retaining it as a separate constitutional institution.
The Rabuka who argued that constitutional legitimacy depends upon the expressed will of the people now defends a timetable that his own Commission’s report reveals was severely compressed.
The Rabuka who described the 1990 Constitution as deficient because it was not the people’s will now heads a Government whose unidentified Cabinet subcommittee is altering the product of public consultations before Parliament sees the final Bill.
None of this automatically establishes bad faith.
Political leaders change their views. Constitutional experience teaches lessons. Fiji in 2026 is not Fiji in 1987, 1990 or 2012. A leader should not be imprisoned permanently by every position he once held.
But constitutional consistency and transparency still matter.
Rabuka’s 2012 submission is not merely an archival curiosity. It is a standard against which his Government’s conduct and the Commission’s proposals can be measured.
It reminds us that Rabuka understood, at least in principle, that a Constitution cannot rest upon Cabinet authority alone. It must command the confidence of the people.
His Government must therefore publish the Cabinet subcommittee’s membership, its instructions, the advisers and drafters assisting it, every alteration it proposes and the reasons for those alterations.
It must allow the people enough time to compare the Commission’s draft with the Government’s Bill.
And it must not use the 6 February 2027 election deadline as an excuse to hurry Fiji into a constitutional settlement that the Commission itself admits could have been much improved with more time.
Rabuka told the Ghai Commission in 2012 that constitutional deliberations should be completed “without fear or favour”.
Fourteen years later, the same requirement applies to him.
The present Draft Constitution accepts some of his ideas, rejects others and may prevent him from returning as Prime Minister.
In October 2012, Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka presented a 20-page personal submission to the Constitution Commission chaired by Professor Yash Ghai.
Fijileaks subsequently published it under the headline: “Coupist to constitutionalist: Sitiveni Rabuka shares his vision of post-coup Fiji before the Constitution Review Commission.”
Fourteen years later, Rabuka is Prime Minister, the minister responsible for constitutional matters, and the political custodian of another Constitution Review Commission report and Draft Constitution.
His 2012 submission has therefore acquired a significance that it could not have possessed when it was written.
It allows us to compare what Rabuka advocated as a former coup leader and former prime minister in 2012 with what the Commission appointed by his Government has now recommended in 2026.
It also permits comparison with Rabuka’s latest public statements, including his declaration that the constitutional process is not being rushed, his more accommodating position on Fiji’s religious character, his acknowledgement that the two-term provision could prevent him from returning as Prime Minister, and his disclosure that a Cabinet subcommittee is changing the Commission’s proposals before they reach Parliament.
The comparison reveals continuity, retreat, adaptation and several striking contradictions.
The people’s will and the Cabinet door
Rabuka’s 2012 submission began with an assumption that the Bainimarama Government would adhere to the 1997 Constitution.
He regarded that Constitution as the most democratically legitimate of Fiji’s constitutional instruments, although he acknowledged that the road leading to it was not entirely free of constitutional difficulty.
His description of the 1990 Constitution is particularly relevant today.
Rabuka recalled that the Interim Government Cabinet had considered the Falvey Commission’s recommendations, sent them for drafting into constitutional form and presented the resulting document to the Bose Levu Vakaturaga before the President promulgated it.
He then acknowledged the essential defect: “Because the 1990 Constitution was not ‘the will of the people’, it was always going to be difficult to work with.”
Rabuka was correct.
A Constitution does not acquire democratic legitimacy merely because a commission first receives public submissions. The fate of those submissions, the drafting that follows, the institutions controlling the final text and the opportunity given to the people to scrutinise it are equally important.
That observation now returns to confront the present process.
The 2026 Constitution Review Commission conducted public consultations and delivered its report and Draft Constitution to the President. But Rabuka has disclosed that a Cabinet subcommittee has spent two weeks deliberating on the Commission’s proposed amendments and making changes.
He says those changes will be the ones that proceed to Parliament.
The historical circumstances are not identical. The present Government was elected, Parliament remains in existence, and any constitutional amendment must satisfy the parliamentary and referendum requirements identified by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, the warning contained in Rabuka’s own 2012 submission remains applicable.
Public consultation with a commission cannot automatically legitimise provisions subsequently rewritten by Cabinet.
If the Cabinet subcommittee materially changes the Draft Constitution, the final document will no longer be exclusively the product of the Commission’s consultation. It will be the Coalition Government’s constitutional Bill.
That is not necessarily unconstitutional or improper. Cabinet is entitled to formulate legislation. But it must accept political authorship and responsibility for what it changes.
Who sits on the subcommittee? Who is advising it? Who is drafting its amendments? Which Commission recommendations have been accepted, rejected or rewritten? Will the public be given both versions and enough time to compare them?
The Government’s Cabinet statement identifies none of the members. It says only that the subcommittee will consider the practical, legal and policy implications of the recommendations, including transitional arrangements, and report to Cabinet.
The Constitution Review Commission’s own report makes Rabuka’s dismissal of concerns about haste difficult to sustain.
The Commission records that it had little more than five months to complete its work. Public consultations continued until early July. Deliberations occupied the period from early July to the middle of August. Drafting instructions were being prepared while the drafter attempted to keep ahead of the Commission’s decisions. A revised draft became available only near the end of August.
The Commission candidly accepts that the draft could be considerably improved, but that there was insufficient time for a comprehensive revision.
That is the Commission speaking, not a political opponent.
Rabuka says constitutional change has been discussed since 2013 and therefore the present process is not rushed. But years of general criticism of the 2013 Constitution cannot be converted into years of public consultation on a document that did not exist until August 2026.
Fijians could not have studied in 2013 the proposed 41-seat House of Representatives, the 19-member Senate, the mixed-member proportional electoral system, the Presidential Appointment Commission, the constitutionalised BLV, the two-term limit for the Prime Minister or the Commission’s new transitional provisions.
Nor could they have commented upon changes now being made by the Cabinet subcommittee.
From a Christian state to constitutional religious liberty
The clearest change in Rabuka’s public position concerns religion.
In his 2012 submission, Rabuka acknowledged that Fiji had never been declared a Christian state by any written law or Constitution. He warned that declaring Fiji either Christian or secular could produce disadvantages.
But he then came down firmly on one side: “It is better that the Constitutions and written laws declare Fiji a Christian state rather than declaring it a secular state.”
He argued that Fiji’s political evolution had been influenced by love, forgiveness, accommodation, custom and customary law grounded in the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
The 2026 Draft Constitution does not follow that recommendation.
Its preamble gives Christianity a prominent place. It recalls the conversion of Fiji’s indigenous inhabitants and recognises Christianity’s enduring influence, together with the contribution of other faiths to the country’s spiritual life.
But the operative constitutional provisions do not declare Fiji a Christian state.
Nor does the draft expressly retain the 2013 Constitution’s description of Fiji as a “secular State”.
Instead, proposed section 4 declares religious liberty to be a founding principle. It provides that religious belief is personal, that the State must treat all religions equally, and that public officers must not prefer or advance one religion, denomination or belief over another or over a non-religious belief.
In substance, that is the constitutional principle of secular government, even if the word “secular” has been removed.
Rabuka’s latest statements are notably different from his 2012 position. He has said that his Christian faith is well known, but that simply declaring Fiji a Christian state would not make the country Christian. Christianity, he says, must be demonstrated through humility, kindness, compassion, hard work, service and love.
That represents a significant retreat from his 2012 proposal for a formal Christian state.
It is also a more constitutionally inclusive position for a multi-religious country.
The Commission’s draft attempts a compromise. It recognises Fiji’s Christian history and influence in the preamble while retaining legal neutrality among religions in the enforceable provisions.
Some Christians may regard that as insufficient. Some non-Christians may consider the preamble too heavily weighted towards Christianity. But it is not accurate simply to describe the draft as either a Christian-state Constitution or an abandonment of religion.
It is a religiously worded preamble attached to a substantively non-establishment constitutional provision.
Rabuka’s BLV and the Commission’s BLV
On the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, there is considerable agreement between Rabuka’s 2012 submission and the 2026 Commission.
Rabuka argued that the BLV should be recognised in the Constitution rather than left to ordinary legislation. He described it as an institution capable of operating during political instability and a vacuum of authority.
But he did not advocate a narrowly hereditary body.
Rabuka said the contemporary BLV should be more inclusive of non-traditional chiefs and other Fijians who had distinguished themselves in the professions and industry. It should include high achievers and benevolent thinkers, remain non-partisan and possess the confidence of the country.
That part of his submission deserves renewed attention.
The 2026 draft constitutionalises the BLV and gives it significant national powers. It would nominate eight members of the proposed 19-member Senate and three members of the proposed Presidential Appointment Commission. It would also nominate representatives to bodies concerned with iTaukei land, fisheries, administration and trust funds.
But the proposed composition is not as professionally or socially inclusive as Rabuka’s 2012 vision.
The draft provides for 42 chiefs representing the 14 provinces, three from each province. They must come from identified categories of traditionally installed chiefs. One of the three provincial representatives must be a woman, “if possible”.
There would also be six members nominated by the minister responsible for iTaukei affairs, three Rotuman representatives and the President, Prime Minister and iTaukei Affairs Minister as ex officio members.
Rabuka wanted an apolitical assembly containing qualified non-traditional leaders and accomplished Fijians. The new draft constructs a predominantly chiefly institution while giving a Cabinet minister the power to nominate six additional members.
It also places the Prime Minister and a minister within the body, although as non-voting members.
The Commission calls the BLV independent, but its proposed composition introduces a visible political presence.
There is another problem. By giving the BLV three of seven seats on the Presidential Appointment Commission, the draft makes it the largest single bloc in choosing the Head of State. The Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, Fiji Council of Churches and Interfaith Search Fiji would each hold one place.
That structure does not ensure that Fiji’s communities outside the BLV and the faith organisations will have an effective voice. Indo-Fijians, Rotumans, Banabans, other Pacific Islanders, women, young people, commoner iTaukei and those of no religious faith are not guaranteed direct representation.
Rabuka’s 2012 call for a broader council of chiefs and national achievers may, in this respect, have been more inclusive than the institution now proposed by his Commission.
Parliament, political parties and local representation
Rabuka’s 2012 submission criticised an electoral system in which unsuitable individuals could enter Parliament merely because they were candidates of a popular political party.
He argued that an MP’s capacity to represent the wishes of the people was more important than the strength of the party label.
He proposed a 53-member elected Parliament, based roughly upon one MP for every 15,000 people.
The 2026 draft follows the spirit, although not the arithmetic, of that recommendation.
It proposes a 41-member House of Representatives and a 19-member Senate, producing a total Parliament of 60.
The House would be elected through mixed-member proportional representation. Twenty-six members would be elected from constituencies, including five maritime constituencies. Fifteen would come from party lists. Parties would generally need 5 per cent of the party vote or at least one constituency victory to qualify for proportional representation.
This partially responds to Rabuka’s demand for identifiable local representatives. It ends the present single national constituency and allows independent candidates to contest constituency seats.
But political parties would remain powerful. Fifteen House seats would be filled from party lists, and party discipline provisions remain embedded in the draft.
The Commission has therefore attempted a compromise between Rabuka’s constituency-based representation and the proportionality of the present system.
Whether 41 elected members are sufficient to represent Fiji’s population, islands, ethnic diversity and remote communities is another question. Rabuka himself proposed 53 elected MPs in 2012. The present draft offers only 41 elected representatives, supplemented by an appointed Senate.
The 75-year warning and the two-term barrier
One paragraph in Rabuka’s 2012 submission now possesses an unavoidable personal relevance. He wrote: “There should be no limit to the length of time a politician can serve in parliament.” But he immediately added that service beyond the age of 75 could become “more burdensome to the state than productive”.
Rabuka is now 78.
He remains Prime Minister and leader of the People’s Alliance. His name continues to feature in discussions about the next election and the premiership that may follow.
The Commission has not imposed a retirement age upon parliamentarians. In that sense, its draft remains consistent with Rabuka’s 2012 position. He could still stand for election to the House, subject to satisfying the general qualifications.
But the draft introduces a separate limitation upon the office of Prime Minister.
Proposed section 115(5) states that no person may be appointed or elected Prime Minister more than twice, whether the terms are consecutive or non-consecutive.
Rabuka has served as Prime Minister following the 1992 election and again following the 2022 election. He has publicly accepted that the proposed provision, if enacted in its current form, would prevent him from returning as Prime Minister after the next election.
The drafting remains open to legal argument because it contains no clear transitional provision stating whether prime ministerial appointments before commencement must be counted.
FBC was therefore right to identify a possible constitutional barrier, but the matter is not as simple as counting three calendar periods. The provision limits appointments or elections to the office, not parliamentary candidacy, and its retrospective application requires clarification.
The Cabinet subcommittee may now preserve, alter, qualify or remove that clause.
That is why its membership and amendments must be disclosed. A committee containing politicians should not secretly determine whether the serving Prime Minister may return to office.
FICAC: a direct rejection of Rabuka’s 2012 proposal
Rabuka’s 2012 position on FICAC was unequivocal.
He said corruption was a serious problem but that FICAC was not justified as an independent body. He proposed placing it under the Commissioner of Police for administrative and professional control.
The 2026 Draft Constitution rejects that proposal.
It retains FICAC as a constitutionally recognised body comprising a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. Both would be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission.
There is, however, an important alteration. FICAC would investigate corruption but would not independently prosecute. It could recommend that the Director of Public Prosecutions institute or conduct criminal proceedings.
The Commission has therefore chosen to preserve an independent specialist investigative body while transferring prosecutorial authority to the DPP.
That is almost the reverse of Rabuka’s 2012 recommendation. FICAC would not fall under the Police Commissioner, but its power would be divided to create a check between investigation and prosecution.
The military under civilian authority
On the constitutional position of the military, Rabuka’s 2012 submission and the 2026 draft share a common principle. Rabuka proposed that the RFMF be constitutionally established for defence and internal security, acting with the Police, but operating under Parliament and subject to legislation.
The Commission goes further. Its draft gives the RFMF primary responsibility for defence against external threats. Domestic assistance would be limited to legally specified purposes, including disasters and emergencies, and would require civilian authorisation.
The Commander would retain military executive command but would exercise it subject to the direction of Cabinet through the responsible minister. The report expressly seeks to close the “guardianship” loophole historically invoked to justify military intervention in politics.
This is broadly consistent with the civilian subordination Rabuka proposed in 2012. But the 2026 draft is clearer in limiting the military’s constitutional function and rejecting any independent entitlement to intervene in government.
The Commission also proposes a constitutional Military Court, presided over by a sitting High Court judge. That is a significant addition absent from Rabuka’s 2012 submission and requires careful scrutiny of jurisdiction, prosecutorial independence and the rights of military accused.
Immunity: Rabuka hesitated then and hesitates now
Rabuka’s 2012 position on immunity was complicated. He proposed forgiveness for Bainimarama and others involved in the 2006 coup, first through the BLV and Methodist Church, followed by a South African-style truth and reconciliation commission considering restorative justice, restitution, compensation, amnesty and pardon.
He argued that immunity or amnesty would be legitimate only if it reflected the expressed will of the people.
He also stated that no new immunity should be included in the Constitution, apart from immunity already enacted by a government of the people.
The 2026 Commission takes a firmer position.
Its draft declares that no immunity may lawfully be granted for an attempt to establish a government contrary to the Constitution. Its report recommends repealing the existing immunity chapter inherited from the 2013 Constitution.
Curiously, the Draft Constitution reproduces a Chapter 15 headed “Immunity” but does not draft a complete replacement provision. It inserts a bracketed note stating that the Commission recommends that the chapter be repealed.
Rabuka has so far stopped short of personally endorsing that repeal. When questioned after tabling the report, he emphasised that it was a Commission recommendation and that the Cabinet subcommittee had been examining the proposals.
His hesitation resembles the caution in his 2012 submission.
Then, he opposed automatic new immunity but favoured a nationally accepted process capable of producing amnesty after truth and reconciliation. Now, faced with a recommendation to remove existing immunity, he has left the matter to Cabinet and Parliament.
The country must be told whether the Cabinet subcommittee intends to retain, repeal or modify Chapter 15.
The common name
Rabuka’s 2012 submission stressed the preservation of Fiji’s different cultures and identities. He argued that constitutional unity should not require cultural uniformity.
He later explained publicly that his submission had opposed forcing Fiji’s Indian community to discard its distinctive identity and adopt a name traditionally associated with the indigenous population.
The 2026 Commission has adopted an elaborate compromise.
The Draft Constitution provides that all citizens will continue to be known as Fijians for an interim period of up to 12 months. A culturally appropriate national consultation would then seek agreement on a common identity. If no consensus emerged, the question would proceed to a referendum within a further 12 months.
That approach corresponds with Rabuka’s objection to imposing identity without consent. But it also risks reopening ethnic divisions that the common name was intended to overcome.
The Commission itself was divided. A minority wanted “Fijian” retained for all citizens and warned that a referendum on national identity could polarise the country.
The Cabinet subcommittee must now decide whether this proposal survives.
Which Rabuka will Parliament hear? The 2012 Rabuka and the 2026 Rabuka are not wholly different men.
Both emphasise Christianity, reconciliation, indigenous institutions, customary rights, constituency representation and civilian control over the military.
But there are important changes.
The Rabuka who preferred a constitutionally declared Christian state now says Christianity cannot be created by constitutional declaration.
The Rabuka who opposed limits on parliamentary service now accepts that the Commission’s two-term prime ministerial provision may prevent his return.
The Rabuka who wanted FICAC placed under the Police Commissioner presides over a draft retaining it as a separate constitutional institution.
The Rabuka who argued that constitutional legitimacy depends upon the expressed will of the people now defends a timetable that his own Commission’s report reveals was severely compressed.
The Rabuka who described the 1990 Constitution as deficient because it was not the people’s will now heads a Government whose unidentified Cabinet subcommittee is altering the product of public consultations before Parliament sees the final Bill.
None of this automatically establishes bad faith.
Political leaders change their views. Constitutional experience teaches lessons. Fiji in 2026 is not Fiji in 1987, 1990 or 2012. A leader should not be imprisoned permanently by every position he once held.
But constitutional consistency and transparency still matter.
Rabuka’s 2012 submission is not merely an archival curiosity. It is a standard against which his Government’s conduct and the Commission’s proposals can be measured.
It reminds us that Rabuka understood, at least in principle, that a Constitution cannot rest upon Cabinet authority alone. It must command the confidence of the people.
His Government must therefore publish the Cabinet subcommittee’s membership, its instructions, the advisers and drafters assisting it, every alteration it proposes and the reasons for those alterations.
It must allow the people enough time to compare the Commission’s draft with the Government’s Bill.
And it must not use the 6 February 2027 election deadline as an excuse to hurry Fiji into a constitutional settlement that the Commission itself admits could have been much improved with more time.
Rabuka told the Ghai Commission in 2012 that constitutional deliberations should be completed “without fear or favour”.
Fourteen years later, the same requirement applies to him.
Rabuka and the Media: From the Silencing of 1987 to a Welcome Promise of Freedom in 2026
*Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s declaration at the 8th Pacific Media Summit in Savusavu that his Government does not want to silence the media is encouraging. I say this as one of the journalists whose freedom and career were directly affected by the events of 1987.
*Nearly four decades later, his public commitment to allow Fiji’s media to keep talking should be welcomed, while history reminds us why that promise must be honoured.
