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From Fijileaks Archive, 22 July 2026
ACQUITTAL DOES NOT MEAN THE COI GOT IT WRONG: Why the Kamikamica Verdict Should Not Be Used to Rewrite the History of the Commission of Inquiry
The acquittal of former Deputy Prime Minister Manoa Kamikamica has triggered a predictable chorus from critics of the Commission of Inquiry into Barbara Malimali's appointment as FICAC Commissioner.
To them, the verdict is proof that the Commission was fundamentally flawed, that Commissioner David Ashton-Lewis and counsel Janet Mason were wrong to rely on Kalaveti Ravu's evidence, and that the entire inquiry has now been discredited.
That conclusion is legally unsustainable. It confuses the constitutional role of a Commission of Inquiry with that of a criminal court. The two are entirely different institutions performing entirely different functions.
The COI was never a criminal court. A Commission of Inquiry does not decide whether someone is guilty of a criminal offence. It does not apply the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Nor does it pronounce convictions or acquittals. Its task is investigative.
It gathers evidence, hears witnesses under oath, resolves factual disputes where necessary and decides whether there is sufficient material to recommend that appropriate authorities investigate possible criminal conduct. That is precisely what happened here.
Ravu's affidavit was not accepted blindly. Much has been made of Kalaveti Ravu's affidavit. Critics suggest the Commissioners simply accepted his allegations and built their conclusions around them. The public record demonstrates otherwise. Ravu did not merely lodge an affidavit. He appeared before the Commission. He adopted his affidavit under oath. He answered questions about its contents. He was examined on the conversations he alleged had taken place with Kamikamica concerning his pending FICAC prosecution and Barbara Malimali's anticipated appointment as Commissioner.
Equally important, Kamikamica also appeared before the Commission. He was confronted directly with Ravu's allegations. He denied the central claims or said that he could not recall the conversations described. The Commissioners therefore had before them two competing sworn versions of events.
Assessing competing evidence is exactly what commissions of inquiry are established to do. Janet Mason's evidence confirms the Commission's process. Far from undermining the Commission, Janet Mason's subsequent evidence in the Magistrates' Court reinforced the integrity of its procedures.
Mason explained that witnesses were not merely invited to file affidavits. They were questioned extensively. Where allegations had been made against another witness, those allegations were put directly to that witness for response.
According to Mason's testimony, Kamikamica acknowledged asking Ravu about his criminal case "out of sympathy" but denied ever discussing Barbara Malimali or knowing beforehand that she would become FICAC Commissioner.
That evidence demonstrates that the Commission did not proceed on one-sided or untested assertions. It heard both sides before making recommendations. An acquittal does not invalidate the investigation. This is the distinction the Commission's critics either overlook or deliberately ignore.
A criminal acquittal means the prosecution has failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It does not automatically establish that every prosecution witness was dishonest; every Commission finding was wrong; the investigation lacked foundation; or the referral for investigation should never have been made.
Many investigations result in no conviction. That does not mean the investigation itself was illegitimate. Nor does it follow that investigators acted improperly by referring the matter to prosecuting authorities. The criminal court applied a different test. The Magistrates' Court was not reviewing the Commission's work.
It was deciding whether the prosecution had proved criminal charges beyond reasonable doubt. Those are entirely different exercises. The magistrate was free to reach conclusions different from those reached by the COI.
Indeed, Fiji's legal system expects different tribunals applying different legal standards to reach different conclusions where appropriate. That is not a failure of justice. It is the justice system functioning as intended.
Ravu's courtroom evidence
Much attention has focused on reports that, during the criminal trial, Ravu became reluctant to elaborate on some matters and remarked that he had "said enough".
Whether that affected his credibility was a matter entirely for the trial court. If the magistrate considered that his evidence was insufficiently reliable to support a conviction, that was a conclusion reached within the criminal process applying the criminal standard of proof.
It does not retrospectively invalidate the evidence Ravu gave before the Commission or establish that the COI acted irrationally in considering it worthy of further investigation. The COI could only assess the evidence before them at the time.
They heard Ravu. They heard Kamikamica. They considered the documentary evidence. They assessed credibility. They reached recommendations, not criminal verdicts.
Critics are rewriting history
Some of the Commission's most vocal critics now argue that the acquittal proves the inquiry was a waste of time. That argument misunderstands both the law and the purpose of commissions of inquiry.
If every Commission recommendation had to guarantee a conviction, commissions would become little more than shadow criminal courts. That has never been their constitutional role.
Their role is to expose facts, identify possible wrongdoing and recommend whether independent investigative or prosecutorial authorities should consider further action. Whether those authorities can ultimately prove criminal liability is another question altogether.
The real constitutional lesson
The Kamikamica acquittal should not become an excuse to diminish the work of the Commission of Inquiry. Reasonable people may disagree with the COI's assessment of particular witnesses. Reasonable people may also disagree with the magistrate's evaluation of the evidence.
That is the nature of independent decision-making. What cannot fairly be said is that the Commission acted improperly merely because the criminal prosecution ultimately failed.
An acquittal is not a judicial declaration that the Commission was wrong. It is simply a determination that the prosecution did not establish criminal guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Those are two entirely different propositions.
The Commission fulfilled its constitutional mandate by investigating, hearing sworn evidence from competing witnesses, testing that evidence, and recommending that potentially criminal conduct be examined by the proper authorities.
The Magistrates' Court fulfilled its constitutional mandate by independently deciding that the prosecution had not proved its case to the criminal standard.
The two outcomes are not inconsistent.
They reflect the different constitutional functions performed by a Commission of Inquiry and a criminal court.
That distinction is one the Commission's critics would do well to remember before proclaiming that an acquittal has somehow erased everything that the Commission heard, considered and ultimately recommended.
To them, the verdict is proof that the Commission was fundamentally flawed, that Commissioner David Ashton-Lewis and counsel Janet Mason were wrong to rely on Kalaveti Ravu's evidence, and that the entire inquiry has now been discredited.
That conclusion is legally unsustainable. It confuses the constitutional role of a Commission of Inquiry with that of a criminal court. The two are entirely different institutions performing entirely different functions.
The COI was never a criminal court. A Commission of Inquiry does not decide whether someone is guilty of a criminal offence. It does not apply the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Nor does it pronounce convictions or acquittals. Its task is investigative.
It gathers evidence, hears witnesses under oath, resolves factual disputes where necessary and decides whether there is sufficient material to recommend that appropriate authorities investigate possible criminal conduct. That is precisely what happened here.
Ravu's affidavit was not accepted blindly. Much has been made of Kalaveti Ravu's affidavit. Critics suggest the Commissioners simply accepted his allegations and built their conclusions around them. The public record demonstrates otherwise. Ravu did not merely lodge an affidavit. He appeared before the Commission. He adopted his affidavit under oath. He answered questions about its contents. He was examined on the conversations he alleged had taken place with Kamikamica concerning his pending FICAC prosecution and Barbara Malimali's anticipated appointment as Commissioner.
Equally important, Kamikamica also appeared before the Commission. He was confronted directly with Ravu's allegations. He denied the central claims or said that he could not recall the conversations described. The Commissioners therefore had before them two competing sworn versions of events.
Assessing competing evidence is exactly what commissions of inquiry are established to do. Janet Mason's evidence confirms the Commission's process. Far from undermining the Commission, Janet Mason's subsequent evidence in the Magistrates' Court reinforced the integrity of its procedures.
Mason explained that witnesses were not merely invited to file affidavits. They were questioned extensively. Where allegations had been made against another witness, those allegations were put directly to that witness for response.
According to Mason's testimony, Kamikamica acknowledged asking Ravu about his criminal case "out of sympathy" but denied ever discussing Barbara Malimali or knowing beforehand that she would become FICAC Commissioner.
That evidence demonstrates that the Commission did not proceed on one-sided or untested assertions. It heard both sides before making recommendations. An acquittal does not invalidate the investigation. This is the distinction the Commission's critics either overlook or deliberately ignore.
A criminal acquittal means the prosecution has failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It does not automatically establish that every prosecution witness was dishonest; every Commission finding was wrong; the investigation lacked foundation; or the referral for investigation should never have been made.
Many investigations result in no conviction. That does not mean the investigation itself was illegitimate. Nor does it follow that investigators acted improperly by referring the matter to prosecuting authorities. The criminal court applied a different test. The Magistrates' Court was not reviewing the Commission's work.
It was deciding whether the prosecution had proved criminal charges beyond reasonable doubt. Those are entirely different exercises. The magistrate was free to reach conclusions different from those reached by the COI.
Indeed, Fiji's legal system expects different tribunals applying different legal standards to reach different conclusions where appropriate. That is not a failure of justice. It is the justice system functioning as intended.
Ravu's courtroom evidence
Much attention has focused on reports that, during the criminal trial, Ravu became reluctant to elaborate on some matters and remarked that he had "said enough".
Whether that affected his credibility was a matter entirely for the trial court. If the magistrate considered that his evidence was insufficiently reliable to support a conviction, that was a conclusion reached within the criminal process applying the criminal standard of proof.
It does not retrospectively invalidate the evidence Ravu gave before the Commission or establish that the COI acted irrationally in considering it worthy of further investigation. The COI could only assess the evidence before them at the time.
They heard Ravu. They heard Kamikamica. They considered the documentary evidence. They assessed credibility. They reached recommendations, not criminal verdicts.
Critics are rewriting history
Some of the Commission's most vocal critics now argue that the acquittal proves the inquiry was a waste of time. That argument misunderstands both the law and the purpose of commissions of inquiry.
If every Commission recommendation had to guarantee a conviction, commissions would become little more than shadow criminal courts. That has never been their constitutional role.
Their role is to expose facts, identify possible wrongdoing and recommend whether independent investigative or prosecutorial authorities should consider further action. Whether those authorities can ultimately prove criminal liability is another question altogether.
The real constitutional lesson
The Kamikamica acquittal should not become an excuse to diminish the work of the Commission of Inquiry. Reasonable people may disagree with the COI's assessment of particular witnesses. Reasonable people may also disagree with the magistrate's evaluation of the evidence.
That is the nature of independent decision-making. What cannot fairly be said is that the Commission acted improperly merely because the criminal prosecution ultimately failed.
An acquittal is not a judicial declaration that the Commission was wrong. It is simply a determination that the prosecution did not establish criminal guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Those are two entirely different propositions.
The Commission fulfilled its constitutional mandate by investigating, hearing sworn evidence from competing witnesses, testing that evidence, and recommending that potentially criminal conduct be examined by the proper authorities.
The Magistrates' Court fulfilled its constitutional mandate by independently deciding that the prosecution had not proved its case to the criminal standard.
The two outcomes are not inconsistent.
They reflect the different constitutional functions performed by a Commission of Inquiry and a criminal court.
That distinction is one the Commission's critics would do well to remember before proclaiming that an acquittal has somehow erased everything that the Commission heard, considered and ultimately recommended.
From Fijileaks Archive, 5 May 2026
Prasad: The Economics Professor With a Disclosure Problem
Professor Biman Chand Prasad walked into the Suva Magistrates Court to answer charges that have stalked him for years: false declarations and failure to disclose.
Let’s be clear. These are not trivial slips of memory. These are the very breaches that the Political Parties Act was designed to prevent.
Prasad stands accused of omitting his directorship and other relevant interests from his statutory declarations, documents that the law treats as sacrosanct because they protect the public from precisely the gamesmanship Fiji has seen from politicians for decades.
The allegation?
He filed declarations that were recklessly incomplete, to mislead the public and breach the transparency obligations he publicly champions.
These are regulatory offences. They turn on paperwork, timelines, and corporate records.
Professor Biman Chand Prasad walked into the Suva Magistrates Court to answer charges that have stalked him for years: false declarations and failure to disclose.
Let’s be clear. These are not trivial slips of memory. These are the very breaches that the Political Parties Act was designed to prevent.
Prasad stands accused of omitting his directorship and other relevant interests from his statutory declarations, documents that the law treats as sacrosanct because they protect the public from precisely the gamesmanship Fiji has seen from politicians for decades.
The allegation?
He filed declarations that were recklessly incomplete, to mislead the public and breach the transparency obligations he publicly champions.
These are regulatory offences. They turn on paperwork, timelines, and corporate records.
Dear Mr Iyer,
I am writing in relation to the National Federation Party's official statement of 25 June 2026, in which you referred to me as a "pervert."
I would be grateful if you could clarify the basis upon which you made this allegation.
Specifically, I ask:
As this was an official statement issued on behalf of the National Federation Party and widely disseminated through the media and the Party's official platforms, I would appreciate your response at your earliest convenience.
Yours sincerely,
Victor Lal
Editor-in-Chief
Fijileaks
I am writing in relation to the National Federation Party's official statement of 25 June 2026, in which you referred to me as a "pervert."
I would be grateful if you could clarify the basis upon which you made this allegation.
Specifically, I ask:
- What facts or evidence did you rely upon in describing me as a "pervert"?
- Do you possess any documentary or other evidence to support that allegation?
- If so, please provide copies of the material upon which you relied.
As this was an official statement issued on behalf of the National Federation Party and widely disseminated through the media and the Party's official platforms, I would appreciate your response at your earliest convenience.
Yours sincerely,
Victor Lal
Editor-in-Chief
Fijileaks
Coming soon: THE INVISIBLE DIRECTOR? How Lotus Construction (Fiji) Ltd's $4 Million Villa Project Was Publicly Unveiled While Co-Director and NFP leader Biman Prasad Stayed in the Shadows
