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WHY CLOSURE OF THE 12 COI FILES BY DPP DOES NOT TOUCH OUR CASE ON NFP LEADER, FORMER FINANCE MINISTER BIMAN PRASAD

22/1/2026

WHY THE CLOSURE OF THE 12 COI FILES DOES NOT TOUCH OUR CASE ON BIMAN PRASAD

Over the past 12 hours, following the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ public statement on the Commission of Inquiry files, I have received a steady stream of messages from readers asking a simple and legitimate question: does this mean the case against Biman Prasad is now over

The answer is NO. And it is important to explain why, clearly and calmly.

What the ODPP Decision Actually Does

The ODPP has confirmed that 12 investigation files referred by the Fiji Police, all originating from the Ashton-Lewis Commission of Inquiry, do not meet the criminal threshold required to sustain charges.

An independent legal opinion from Ian Lloyd, an Australian KC, was obtained and adopted. That opinion states that there is insufficient admissible evidence to prosecute those persons named in the COI.

This decision brings to an end criminal prosecutions flowing from the COI itself.

It does not go beyond that.

What Those 12 Files Were About

Those files shared a common feature:

they arose because of the Commission of Inquiry,
relied on COI material, and
concerned conduct examined within the COI process.

The ODPP decision therefore means one thing only: the COI has failed as a vehicle for criminal prosecution.

Nothing more should be read into it.

Why Our Biman Prasad File Is Not Affected

Our file concerning BIMAN PRASAD does not arise from the Commission of Inquiry.

It is not based on opinions, witness impressions, or compelled testimony.

It is based on:

statutory declaration forms personally signed by him;
omissions and false statements capable of objective proof;
company, land, and transaction records; and
repetition of the same omissions across multiple declaration years.

Legally, that distinction is decisive.

What the ODPP Decision Does Not Say

The ODPP decision does not state that:

Biman Prasad complied with statutory declaration laws;
his declarations were accurate or complete;
declaration breaches were investigated and dismissed; or
future complaints are barred.

Our file was not one of the 12 files. It was not assessed by the ODPP. It was not part of the KC’s opinion.

There is therefore no legal clearance, no immunity, and no closure in relation to that matter.

A Point Readers Should Keep in Mind

Each statutory declaration is a personal legal act.
Each year stands on its own.
Each omission rises or falls on documentary proof.

A Commission of Inquiry cannot erase that obligation, and a prosecutorial decision on unrelated files cannot pre-empt it

In closing, what has ended is the criminal life of the Commission of Inquiry.

What has not ended, and has not even been formally tested, is whether a sitting MP and former Deputy Prime Minister and former Finance Minister repeatedly breached statutory declaration laws over multiple years.

Our work on that question remains intact, unaffected, and unresolved.

And until it is answered in law, it remains a live issue - no matter how loudly some may wish to declare otherwise.

FROM COMMISSION TO COLLAPSE: THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ODPP - KC OPINION ON THE DAVID ASHTON-LEWIS COI

The ODPP Press Release: What Has Actually Occurred

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions has now formally confirmed that all twelve investigation files referred by the Fiji Police Force, each arising from and populated by persons named in the Justice David Ashton-Lewis Commission of Inquiry, do not disclose sufficient evidence to sustain any criminal charge.

Crucially, this was not a unilateral prosecutorial assessment. The ODPP conducted its own internal review, and commissioned an independent external legal opinion from Ian Lloyd KC, a senior Australian King's Counsel.

The KC’s conclusion is unequivocal: there is insufficient evidence to sustain any criminal charges against those recommended in the Ashton-Lewis COI report.

This opinion was adopted by the ODPP. The legal consequence is plain: every person named in the COI for possible criminal liability has now been cleared at the prosecutorial threshold.

What This Means for the Ashton-Lewis Commission of Inquiry Itself?

The Ashton-Lewis COI recommended ten potential criminal charges, including against Barbara Malimali.

However, a Commission of Inquiry:

Is not a court;
Does not apply criminal standards of proof; and
Operates under statutory compulsion and immunity regimes that often render its evidence inadmissible in criminal proceedings.

The KC's opinion, and its adoption by the ODPP, means that:

None of the COI’s criminal recommendations survive prosecutorial scrutiny;
The COI findings now sit exclusively in the political and administrative domain;
The COI has no operative criminal consequence.

In effect, the COI’s criminal limb has collapsed.

SHREE Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji LETTER that should have shut Pacific Polytech DOWN, and Regulators who looked the other way

16/1/2026

On 28 March 2023, a formal letter landed on the desk of the Fiji Higher Education Commission (FHEC). It was not anonymous. It was not ambiguous. It was not a rumour. It came on the official letterhead of the Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji, signed by its Executive Director, and it carried a message that should have triggered immediate regulatory action.

Pacific Polytechnic Limited no longer had the legal right to operate from Sanatan-owned premises. The lease had been terminated on 15 February 2023. A 90-day eviction notice had been issued. Sanatan Fiji expressly disclaimed any responsibility for Pacific Polytech’s continued operations on its properties.

In plain language: Pacific Polytech had lost its lawful campus.

Under any credible regulatory system, that should have been the end of the matter, at least temporarily. Accreditation should have been reviewed. Enrolments frozen. Grants suspended. Students protected. Instead, nothing happened. Or worse: things continued as if the letter never existed.

This is not a technical oversight. It is a textbook case of regulatory failure.

A letter that changed everything - on paper

Approved premises are not a minor box-ticking requirement for tertiary institutions. They are foundational. Without lawful occupation of approved campuses, an institution cannot lawfully deliver accredited programmes. That is not a discretionary matter. It is a condition of registration.

The Sanatan letter explicitly notified FHEC that Pacific Polytech’s agreement to use the Nabua and Lautoka campuses had been terminated, effective 15 February 2023, with eviction to follow in May. From that moment, Pacific Polytech’s continued operation at those locations was legally precarious at best and unlawful at worst.

The letter was not written to Pacific Polytech. It was written directly to the regulator. That matters. Once FHEC was notified, the Commission acquired actual knowledge. From that point on, inaction was no longer ignorance. It was acquiescence.

What should have happened but did not

Upon receiving the letter, FHEC should have immediately required Pacific Polytech to demonstrate one of two things: either that the termination notice was invalid, or that it had secured alternative, approved premises. Failing that, FHEC should have suspended programme delivery pending compliance.

That is standard regulatory practice. It exists to protect students, public funds, and the integrity of the accreditation system. None of it appears to have been done.

There is no public record of an urgent compliance audit. No show-cause notice. No suspension of enrolments. No warning to students. No notification to funding agencies. Silence.

If Pacific Polytech continued teaching after May 2023 without approved premises, as appears to be the case, then it did so in breach of core accreditation conditions. That breach was known to the regulator.

The money question no one wants to answer

The most serious issue is not merely accreditation. It is money.

Public grants, TVET funding, skills development subsidies, all of these depend on an institution being compliant and properly registered. Once FHEC was notified that Pacific Polytech had lost its lawful campus, any further public funding should have been immediately suspended pending verification.

If grants continued to flow after March 2023, the question is unavoidable: on what legal basis?

Public funds paid to a non-compliant institution are not just an administrative problem. They may constitute unlawful expenditure. Officials who authorised payments with knowledge of non-compliance may face scrutiny not only from the Auditor-General but potentially from anti-corruption authorities, depending on what they knew and when.

The Sanatan letter creates a documentary trail that is difficult to wish away. It fixes a date. It fixes knowledge. It fixes responsibility.

Students caught in the middle

Lost in the bureaucratic evasions are the students. If Pacific Polytech continued enrolling students or delivering programmes after losing its lawful premises, those students were entitled to know. They were entitled to clarity about accreditation, recognition, and the legitimacy of their qualifications.

If they were not told - if enrolments continued under the assumption of full compliance - then the issue becomes one of misrepresentation. Students may have paid fees, taken loans, or committed years of their lives based on assurances that were no longer true.

Regulators exist to prevent precisely this kind of harm. When regulators fail, students pay the price.

Regulatory failure, not administrative error

This is not a case of a missing form or a delayed inspection. It is a case where a regulator was explicitly told that a core condition of accreditation no longer existed, and appears to have done nothing.

If FHEC did act, it should produce the paper trail: the notices, the audits, the decisions, the funding suspensions. If it did not act, the public is entitled to ask why. Was there political pressure? Institutional favouritism? Simple incompetence? Or something worse?

What cannot be credibly claimed is ignorance.

The broader accountability question

The Pacific Polytech episode exposes a deeper problem in Fiji’s tertiary education oversight: enforcement without fear or favour. Rules that exist only on paper are worse than no rules at all. They create the illusion of regulation while enabling abuse.

A regulator that receives a termination notice and allows business as usual is not regulating. It is enabling.

The Sanatan letter should have triggered a reckoning. Instead, it was buried.

Now it deserves daylight.

The questions are straightforward and demand answers: Did Pacific Polytech continue operating after losing its lawful premises? Did it continue receiving public funds? Did the regulator know? And if so, who decided to look the other way?

Until those questions are answered, this is not just a story about one institution. It is a story about the integrity, or lack of it, of Fiji’s regulatory state.

NEXT INSTALMENT: When Power Overeached the Law: Why former Finance Minister Biman Prasad Had No Business Intervening in a Private Eviction Dispute

3 June 2023

Subject: Termination of Pacific Polytechnic Agreement with Sanatan Fiji for Lautoka and Nabua Campuses

Dear Hon. Prime Minister,

Hope this email find you well. This email is in regard to the determination of the rental contract between Pacific Polytechnic (PPL) and Sanatan Fiji for Lautoka and Nabua Campuses.

A 90-days termination notice was given to PPL on 15th February 2023. Sanatan Fiji has given this campuses to PPL on rental for the operation of technical college. PPL was supposed to vacate the premises before 15th May 2023, however they failed to. Reminders were sent to PPL for vacant possession and payment of rental arrears during this 90 day period (letter attached to this email). A notification letter was also given to Fiji Higher Education Commission (letter attached).

16th /17th May Sanatan Fiji had requested PPL to give vacant possession of properties however, PPL refused to do so. Sanatan Fiji tried to negotiate with PPL but there was no positive response.

Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Fiji is faith based organization, we have tried other methods to resolve these issue, but were unsuccessful.

We are left with the last resort to continue with the legal action against PPL/filing of court case.

PPL owes Sanatan Fiji a total of $16000.00 (FJD) for rental arrears. We wish to inform you that Sanatan Fiji is not liable for any business being conducted on our Nabua and Lautoka premises.

This is because a fair 90 day notice was given to PPL to sort out their business. We are humbly requesting you to assist us in the dilemma.

Hope our request is accepted.

Your faithfully
National President
Dhirendra Nand
Sanatan Fiji

Acting Appointments and Legal Accountability: A Response to Claims Advanced by Waqanika and Others that if Rokoika's appointment is ruled illegal, she could be held criminally responsible for decisions at FICAC

12/1/2026

"Acting appointments are a routine feature of public administration and are expressly recognised by constitutional and administrative law. An individual who assumes an office under apparent authority, and performs its functions in good faith, is treated in law as a lawful office-holder unless and until a court rules otherwise. A later finding that an appointment was procedurally defective does not retroactively criminalise the conduct of the acting office-holder. Nor does it convert that individual into a legal trespasser from the date of appointment."

A recent Facebook post by Tanya Waqanika concerning developments at the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) advances a claim that warrants correction. In referring to commentary by Niko Nawaikula and Charlie Charters, the post suggests that Lavi Rokoika will be personally and criminally liable for any decision taken in her Acting capacity, on the premise that her appointment is unlawful.

That assertion is legally unsound.

This response addresses the claim directly, without entering into political debate or the merits of ongoing litigation.

The Context of the Claim

Waqanika’s post links several matters: the timing of the advertisement for a substantive FICAC Commissioner; the pending delivery of judgment in Barbara Malimali's judicial review; and public criticism by Nawaikula and Charters regarding the appointment process.

From these circumstances, the post advances the conclusion that the Acting Commissioner will be exposed to personal and criminal liability for “everything and anything” sanctioned in that role.

This conclusion does not follow from the premises.

Acting Appointments and Apparent Authority

Acting appointments are a routine feature of public administration and are expressly recognised by constitutional and administrative law. An individual who assumes an office under apparent authority, and performs its functions in good faith, is treated in law as a lawful office-holder unless and until a court rules otherwise.

A later finding that an appointment was procedurally defective does not retroactively criminalise the conduct of the acting office-holder. Nor does it convert that individual into a legal trespasser from the date of appointment.

The De Facto Officer Principle

The suggestion that personal or criminal liability automatically follows from an allegedly unlawful appointment ignores the well-established de facto officer doctrine. Under this principle, acts performed by a person exercising the functions of an office under colour of authority remain legally effective and are not treated as nullities.

The doctrine exists to protect:

institutional continuity,
public confidence in official acts, and
individuals who rely on decisions made by public authorities.

Absent proof of bad faith, corruption, or knowing abuse of power, the office-holder is not personally exposed merely because the appointment process is later impugned.

Criminal Liability: A Category Error

Neither Waqanika’s post nor the commentary she references identifies any statutory offence that would render an Acting FICAC Commissioner criminally liable simply for performing the functions of the office. Criminal responsibility arises only where:

Parliament has defined an offence;
the prohibited conduct is proved; and
the required mental element is established.

There is no offence in Fiji law, or in any comparable common-law jurisdiction, consisting of “acting pursuant to an invalid appointment”. To suggest otherwise is to conflate administrative unlawfulness with criminal culpability, a distinction the law does not recognise.

Civil Liability Lies With the State, Not the Successor

To the extent that Barbara Maimali seeks reinstatement, compensation, or damages in her judicial review, such remedies, if granted, would lie against the State. They do not create derivative personal liability for a successor acting office-holder who had no role in the impugned termination or appointment process.

Personal civil liability arises only in cases of misfeasance in public office or comparable wrongdoing, requiring proof of malice or deliberate abuse of power. No such conduct is alleged in relation to the routine exercise of statutory functions by the Acting Commissioner.

The Risk of Misleading Public Discourse

By invoking the authority of Nawaikula and Charters without distinguishing political criticism from settled legal principle, the post risks misleading the public as to the nature of legal accountability. Public law does not operate by implication, assumption, or moral outrage; it operates through defined doctrines, evidentiary standards, and judicial determination.

Claims of automatic personal or criminal liability undermine, rather than advance, respect for the rule of law.

Conclusion

Disputes over appointments to constitutional offices are properly resolved by courts through judicial review. Until such time, an acting office-holder exercising statutory powers under apparent authority does not incur personal or criminal liability merely because the legality of the appointment is contested.

The law does not support the claim advanced by Waqanika or attributed to others in her post. To assert otherwise is to misstate settled principles of public and criminal law.

When Counsel Speaks Outside the Courtroom on FACEBOOK:
The Limits of Advocacy During Active Judicial Review

Public confidence in the administration of justice depends not only on what happens in court, but also on the restraint exercised by those who appear before it.

That principle is tested when counsel in an active case uses public platforms to comment on the supposed legal consequences for others whose positions depend on the outcome of the very proceedings in which counsel is engaged.

This issue has arisen following public commentary by Tanya Waqanika, who is acting for Barbara Malimali in judicial review proceedings before the Fiji High Court. The proceedings challenge Ms Malimali’s removal and the process by which she was replaced by Lavi Rokoika.

Waqanika’s commentary does not merely explain the existence of the litigation or the relief sought. It extends to asserted personal and criminal consequences for Rokoika arising from her continued exercise of the office of Acting Commissioner while the case remains before the court.

That raises serious questions of professional propriety.

Advocacy and restraint

Lawyers are not prohibited from commenting publicly while a case is on foot. However, they are subject to a higher standard than politicians or private commentators. Their paramount duty is to the court and to the administration of justice, and that duty extends beyond the courtroom.

It is one thing for counsel to outline procedural facts or to correct public misinformation. It is quite another to assert, or imply, that a named individual (Lavi Rokoika) particularly a successor office-holder whose authority is directly in issue, faces personal or criminal liability depending on how the litigation is resolved.

Such commentary risks converting public explanation into surrogate advocacy.

Pressure by implication

When counsel publicly frames the consequences of litigation in terms of legal exposure for a successor, the effect is not neutral. Statements suggesting personal or criminal liability may reasonably be perceived as pressure on the office-holder to act, or refrain from acting, in ways that advantage the litigant’s position

In this case, any alleged consequences for Rokoika depend entirely on matters yet to be determined by the court: whether the termination of Malimali was lawful, whether the replacement process was valid, and whether any legal consequences flow from those findings. To present such consequences as real or impending while the court is seized of the issues is to pre-empt the judicial process.

Misstating legal accountability

There is a further difficulty. The proposition that an acting office-holder incurs personal or criminal liability merely by performing statutory functions under a contested appointment is not supported by established public or criminal law. Liability of that kind arises only where there is bad faith, corruption, or deliberate abuse of power - not from the mere fact of acting under an appointment later challenged in court.

Advancing such claims publicly while litigating the appointment itself risks misleading the public and heightening institutional uncertainty.

Sub judice in substance, if not in name

Although Fiji does not apply sub judice rules with rigid formality, the underlying principle remains intact: public commentary must not create a real risk of interfering with the administration of justice. Lawyers, by virtue of their professional role, are expected to exercise particular caution.

Commentary attributing adverse legal consequences to a non-party whose position is directly affected by the pending proceedings sits uneasily with that obligation.

The proper forum

Arguments about the legality of appointments and the consequences that may follow belong in affidavits, submissions, and judgments. Courts exist precisely to determine contested legal issues. Public commentary should not be used to dramatise or amplify disputes that are properly before the judiciary.

Conclusion

The issue here is not freedom of expression, nor the right of counsel to defend a client. It is the boundary between legitimate explanation and improper pressure.

When counsel in an active judicial review publicly asserts legal consequences for a successor office-holder whose authority is in issue, that boundary is at risk of being crossed.

Professional restraint in such circumstances is not optional. It is an essential safeguard of the rule of law.

COI Report. Discrediting the Inquiry is the Last Refuge of Those Named in the Record. We reported BIMAN PRASAD to FICAC in April 2024. We say, 'Malimali should be charged with Abuse of Office over Prasad FILE'

10/1/2026

As founder and editor of Fijileaks, I reported Biman Prasad to FICAC as far back as April 2024. I did not do so casually. I supplied documents, evidence, timelines, and declarations. I copied in the Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, and other relevant authorities. The material was detailed, sourced, and capable of sustaining charges.

When Barbara Malimali briefly became FICAC Commissioner, the same material was before her. Instead of advancing the investigation, she closed Prasad’s entire file. On the evidence, that decision alone raises serious questions of abuse of office and perverting the course of justice.

More troubling still is what happened on 5 September 2024, when lawyers whisked Malimali out of FICAC as investigators were preparing to charge Prasad that very afternoon. If that removal - directly or indirectly - interfered with an active anti-corruption process, then that conduct itself demands scrutiny.

This is why the current attempts to discredit the Commission of Inquiry ring hollow. The Commission did not invent these facts. Many of them were already on the record, reported, documented, and ignored. The inquiry merely forced them into the open, where they could no longer be quietly buried.

You can dispute the Commission’s conclusions. That is legitimate.

But stop pretending nothing was revealed.

And stop interfering if you were never a party to the wrongdoing in the first place.

The facts are now public. That - not bias, not politics - is what unsettles so many.

COI Frightened Them Because the Evidence Was Never Meant to Surface

Background to the Arrest and Investigation

Francis Puleiwai, Acting Deputy Commissioner of FICAC, explained at the start of the meeting that Malimali had been under investigation since April 2024, and that investigators had gathered sufficient evidence to warrant an interview and possible charges:

“The investigation for Ms. Malimali was ongoing since April… The team was ready to proceed. The interview was supposed to commence this morning and thereafter the team are ready to charge her as well.”

She further clarified that, under the Constitution, she possessed the same powers as the Commissioner and was lawfully exercising them:

“Under the Constitution the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner we both have the same powers. I’m exercising my right… to carry out due diligence and complete the investigation.”

Despite this, the meeting quickly descended into a series of interventions aimed at derailing the investigation and preventing charges.

Alleged Interference by Chief Registrar Tomasi Bainivalu

Tomasi Bainivalu, the Chief Registrar, immediately questioned FICAC’s authority to arrest Malimali and urged caution, while simultaneously suggesting that the investigation be halted:

“I do not know what power you have to arrest your own Commissioner… Why so fast overnight? Is it birthed from bitterness?… I’m not here to interfere with your work, but what is the right and best way?”

Most significantly, Bainivalu relayed what he described as instructions from the Chief Justice Salesi Temo:

“Just when she left… the Chair called again to CJ… and I remember he did say that on the phone… don’t accept any charge… this is the beginning of that dialogue.”

This statement is deeply concerning. If accurate, it indicates that a senior judicial officer sought to prevent the filing of a criminal charge, potentially amounting to judicial interference in an active investigation. It is one of the clearest indicators in the transcript of a potential attempt to pervert the course of justice, because it suggests coordination between the judiciary and external actors to prevent a criminal charge from ever reaching the courts.

Alleged Pressure and Threats from Senior Lawyer Amani Bale

Amani Bale, a senior lawyer, made some of the most direct and threatening interventions. He demanded that the suspect be released:

“I ask that you release her and she be released immediately and let the JSC go and convince…”

He also attempted to intimidate investigators by threatening their professional futures:

“What you have done now will spoil your careers but that’s your choice.”

Bale repeatedly asserted that pursuing charges would be futile because the courts would refuse to entertain them:

“You heard very clearly that Court would not accept it… if you go to Court it won’t accept your charges.”

These statements constitute clear attempts to pressure investigators into abandoning their lawful duties.

Alleged Misuse of Authority by Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society

Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society, argued that because Malimali had been appointed Commissioner, investigators were now obliged to obey her instructions, even though she was the subject of their investigation:

“She is now the substantive Commissioner under the law… you have to follow her direction right or wrong… If she directs you to stop this right now, what would you guys do?”

He further warned that continuing with the investigation would provoke institutional conflict:

“Continuing down this path is going to end up in a stand-off between this organisation and the Court… That will undermine confidence in the whole justice system.”

Such statements are significant because they explicitly suggest that institutional power, rather than law, should dictate the outcome of a criminal investigation.

Alleged Attempts by Senior Lawyer Laurel Vaurasi to Dissuade Investigators

Laurel Vaurasi, a senior practitioner, echoed similar arguments, warning that continuing the investigation could place FICAC “outside the law”:

“If you continue to keep her… the Court will listen to her application but not yours… Standing by your conviction has to be based on law… Otherwise, you are now operating outside the law.”

Her remarks were calculated to sow doubt about the legality of the investigation and discourage investigators from proceeding. While more subtle, Vaurasi's language is part of intimidation and pressure aimed at halting a criminal process. Even indirect attempts, by invoking consequences and urging withdrawal, can amount to perversion if they are intended to derail an investigation.

Alleged Conduct of Barbara Malimali – Initiating External Interference

It is understood that Barbara Malimali herself telephoned Wylie Clarke, while she was under active investigation and/or under arrest, to seek his assistance. If proven, this demonstrates that Malimali herself initiated efforts to interfere with the investigation.

The transcript also shows that her supporters repeatedly invoked her appointment as Commissioner as a shield against prosecution, implying that investigators were now subordinate to her, even though the investigation predated her appointment and concerned her own conduct.

Pattern of Coordinated Obstruction

When viewed collectively, the statements above reveal a pattern of coordinated conduct by senior figures, including judicial officers and members of the legal profession, aimed at obstructing a criminal investigation. This includes:

Relaying instructions allegedly from the Chief Justice not to accept charges.
Issuing threats to investigators’ careers.
Misrepresenting the legal effect of the suspect’s appointment.
Demanding her immediate release.
Warning of institutional retaliation if the investigation continued.
Soliciting external assistance from professional associations to intervene.

The content and tone of the meeting make clear that these were not mere opinions or legal debates.They were calculated acts intended to discourage, prevent, or defeat the course of justice.
Contrast: FICAC Investigation Team (Puleiwai, Saumi, Bokini Ratu)
These officers largely resisted pressure and emphasised:

The investigation had been ongoing since April.
Evidence existed to support charges.
They were acting under constitutional powers and the rule of law.

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY IS NOT A GAG ORDER: Why SPEAKING UP Twice Is Not a Crime, and Why Fiji’s Accountability System Depends on It Fijians can take the same FACTS to the Police, to FICAC, or to the DPP

5/1/2026

Fijileaks has reviewed both the audio recording and the transcript of the meeting held at FICAC headquarters on 5 September 2024 in relation to the release of Barbara Malimali following her arrest. Having considered these materials, we take the view that any current or prospective proceedings before the Fiji High Court concerning the Commission of Inquiry report should not operate to delay, compromise, or pre-empt the continuation of lawful police investigations arising from the events of that day.

Matters of potential criminal responsibility fall within the statutory mandate of the Fiji Police Force and must be addressed independently and in accordance with due process. The existence of parallel legal challenges does not, of itself, negate the public interest in a full and proper police inquiry.

There is a dangerous idea quietly circulating in Fiji’s public discourse and on social media that once a witness, participant or an individual has raised allegations before a Commission of Inquiry, they are somehow spent, morally, legally, or procedurally barred from ever taking the same facts to the police, to FICAC, or to prosecutors.

That idea is wrong in law, wrong in principle, and corrosive to accountability. A Commission of Inquiry is not a courtroom. It is not a trial. It does not convict, acquit, or immunise anyone. And it does not silence the very citizens it calls upon to speak.

If Fiji allows the fiction to take hold that “you already said that at the COI, therefore you can’t complain again,” then Commissions of Inquiry will become what authoritarian systems quietly hope they are: pressure-release valves that absorb dissent and neutralise consequences.

A Commission of Inquiry Does Not Exhaust Criminal Accountability

Under Fiji law, and under every common law system, a Commission of Inquiry is inquisitorial and advisory, not determinative. Its function is to inquire, gather facts, and make recommendations. It does not apply criminal standards of proof. It does not determine guilt. It does not issue charges.

That is the exclusive domain of the Fiji Police, FICAC and the Office of the DPP.

Anyone who gives evidence to a Commission of Inquiry is participating in a fact-finding exercise, often at the invitation, or compulsion, of the COI. That participation does not cancel the right, or civic duty, to later report suspected crimes to criminal authorities.

There is no double jeopardy here. There is no res judicata. There is no legal doctrine that says that once a COI has heard you, the criminal law is closed.

Findings or Silence Do Not Bind Prosecutors

Equally important is what a Commission of Inquiry cannot do. It cannot bind the police.
It cannot bind FICAC. It cannot bind the DPP.

Even where a COI makes findings adverse to a complainant, or declines to make findings at all, those conclusions do not foreclose criminal investigation. Criminal authorities are entitled, and obliged, to apply their own statutory tests, consider their own evidence, and act on their own discretion.

This is especially critical in Fiji, where COIs have often been constrained by:

narrow terms of reference,
limited forensic capacity,
political sensitivities, or
an explicit focus on governance or policy rather than criminal liability.

To suggest that a COI’s silence equals exoneration is to misunderstand both law and logic.

Why Re-Complaining Is Often Necessary, Not Abusive

In many cases, a subsequent complaint is not repetition. It is completion. Often, new documents surface after a COI concludes, witnesses only come forward later, financial or corporate records were never subpoenaed, or the COI deliberately avoided criminal findings.

In other cases, complainants only later appreciate that the facts they disclosed amount to specific statutory offences, not just ethical or administrative failures.

If Fijians were barred from acting on that realisation, accountability would depend entirely on the political will of whoever drafted the COI’s terms of reference. That is not justice; that is containment.

The Real Risk: Turning COIs into Accountability Graveyards

The most troubling implication of the “you already complained” argument is this: it turns Commissions of Inquiry into dead ends. Under that logic, the State could:

Call a Commission of Inquiry,
Invite or compel citizens to testify,
Issue a report, and
Quietly ensure that no criminal consequences ever follow, while telling complainants they have already “had their say.”

That is not transparency. It is procedural exhaustion by design.

In a small society like Fiji, where power is concentrated and whistleblowers already face real risks, such a doctrine would be chilling. It would reward silence, punish persistence, and protect impunity.

There Are Limits but They Are Narrow

This is not to say that anything goes. Authorities are entitled to decline complaints that are vexatious, malicious, purely repetitive without evidence, or clearly intended to harass.

But that is a high threshold, and it is applied case by case. It is not triggered simply because a Commission of Inquiry once heard similar facts.

Nor does the law require complainants to pretend the COI never happened. On the contrary, the responsible course is to disclose it openly, explain why criminal scrutiny remains necessary, and frame allegations in clear legal terms.

Basically, a Commission of Inquiry is not a gag order. It is not a plea bargain. It is not an amnesty. Citizens and non-citizens do not surrender their right to seek criminal accountability when they participate in one.

If Fiji is serious about integrity, then it must reject the lazy, and dangerous, idea that truth spoken once cannot be spoken again. Accountability is not duplication. It is persistence.

And in a country still reckoning with its constitutional and institutional past, persistence is not a nuisance. It is a necessity.

HAPPY NEW YEAR 2026, Fiji. Blow-Out Year Ahead for NFP leader BIMAN PRASAD: Fijileaks to Resume With Hard-Hitting Revelations on PRASAD

31/12/2025

How Prasad's cousin and business partner Sunil Chand Accidentally Triggered the Exposure of Prasad’s 2014 False Declaration

There is a special irony in politics when those who rush to silence critics inadvertently confirm the very misconduct they seek to bury.

That is precisely what has now happened in the case of the NFP leader and former Finance Minister Biman Prasad, his hidden interests in Lotus Construction (Fiji) Pte Ltd, and the legal letter sent by Sunil Chand’s lawyers in Australia.

In trying to shut down a complaint published on Fijileaks, Chand provided the evidence that proves the complaint was justified all along, and in doing so triggered the forensic scrutiny that now implicates the former Finance Minister in submitting a false declaration to the Fiji Elections Office in July 2014, and in subsequent years until 2024.

WHO OWNS THE REPORT AFTER AN INQUIRY ENDS? The COI Case and Fiji's Growing Accountability Crisis. The law allows that Justice Lewis as author of the COI Report MUST be heard to counter ambush by litigants

27/12/2025

Justice Ashton-Lewis was not a mere courier delivering a document to the President. He conducted hearings, assessed evidence, made findings of fact, and drew conclusions affecting the integrity of public office. Functus officio* does not erase authorship, extinguish standing, or impose silence. Finality of decision does not require the disappearance of the decision-maker.

Justice David Ashton-Lewis

*What is now being advanced is a distorted version of the doctrine: that once functus, a commissioner may not explain the process, may not defend the report, and may not be represented in court when the inquiry is attacked. There is no authority for that proposition. If it were correct, any inquiry could be ambushed the moment it reports, attacked without reply and restrained without defence. Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality.

Hemendra Nagin representing Justice Ashton-Lewis, Solicitor-General Ropate Green and JSC lawyer Isireli Fa

"Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality."

The Fiji High Court hearing scheduled for 31 December is being presented as a dispute over legal representation. That framing understates what is at stake.

The case before the Court raises a deeper constitutional question: whether an independent Commission of Inquiry in Fiji retains legal life after it reports, or whether it is absorbed, managed, and neutralised once its findings become inconvenient.

At the centre of the dispute is the Commission of Inquiry into the aborted appointment of former FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali. The Commission was not established by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), as some have suggested. It was appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, under executive authority.

The JSC was not the author of the inquiry; it was one of the institutions affected by its conclusions. That distinction matters, because it exposes the true nature of the litigation now before the Court.

The JSC’s uneasy role

Having neither commissioned the inquiry nor appointed its Chair, the Judicial Service Commission now seeks to restrain the use of the COI report. This is not an internal procedural correction. It is a constitutional body reacting to findings produced by an external accountability mechanism over which it had no control.

The JSC’s position is therefore not supervisory but defensive. Constitutional bodies do not enjoy a right to disown independent inquiries merely because the outcome is uncomfortable.

The Solicitor-General’s claim, and its danger

The Solicitor-General Ropate Green argues that once the COI report was submitted to the President, jurisdiction, including legal representation, shifted entirely to the State. At first glance, the argument appears administratively neat. Constitutionally, it is troubling.

If accepted, it would mean that the Executive may commission an inquiry, receive its findings, and then assume complete control over how those findings are defended, explained, deployed, or quietly set aside. Under such a doctrine, a Commission of Inquiry would have no independent legal existence beyond the moment of delivery. That is not accountability. It is absorption.

The distortion of functus officio before the Fiji High Court

Central to the attempt to sideline the Chair of the Commission is reliance on the doctrine of functus officio. Justice David Ashton-Lewis has himself acknowledged that the Commission is functus: its task is complete, its findings are final, and the inquiry cannot be reopened.

That is orthodox law.

But functus officio has limits. It prevents the re-exercise of decision-making power; it does not erase authorship, extinguish standing, or impose silence. Finality of decision does not require the disappearance of the decision-maker.

What is now being advanced is a distorted version of the doctrine: that once functus, a commissioner may not explain the process, may not defend the report, and may not be represented in court when the inquiry is attacked.

There is no authority for that proposition. If it were correct, any inquiry could be ambushed the moment it reports, attacked without reply and restrained without defence. Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality.

Natural justice, and the fatal contradiction

Those challenging the COI have not confined themselves to jurisdictional or technical objections. They rely heavily on natural justice, asserting that they were not consulted, not heard, or not given an opportunity to respond before adverse findings were made.

Once that argument is raised, the process of the inquiry itself becomes the issue. Natural justice claims cannot be assessed in the abstract. The Court must know:

who was notified,
who was invited to participate,
what opportunities were extended,
what was declined or ignored,
and why particular procedural choices were made.

Only one person can explain those matters authoritatively: Justice David Ashton-Lewis, the Chair of the Commission of Inquiry

Here lies the challengers’ fatal inconsistency. They allege procedural unfairness, yet seek to silence the very person who designed and conducted the process. They invoke natural justice while opposing the participation of the decision-maker whose conduct is under attack.

That position is untenable. Natural justice cannot be tested by excluding the author of the process. To do so would itself offend the principles of fairness the challengers claim to defend.

Justice Ashton-Lewis is not reopening the inquiry or revisiting findings. He is explaining how fairness was applied, why certain steps were taken, and what opportunities were afforded. That is not the exercise of power; it is the defence of process.

Why the Chair’s involvement remains constitutionally necessary

Justice Ashton-Lewis was not a mere courier delivering a document to the President. He conducted hearings, assessed evidence, made findings of fact, and drew conclusions affecting the integrity of public office.

The moment those findings were challenged, restrained, or sidelined, natural justice required that the author be heard. Representation in court is not a continuation of the inquiry; it is a safeguard against procedural ambush.

To deny that right would permit executive and institutional actors to attack an inquiry while denying the public a full account of how it was conducted.

The wider constitutional risk

This case reveals a deeper problem in Fiji’s governance culture: the instinct to manage outcomes rather than confront findings. When independent processes expose uncomfortable truths, the response is not reform but containment through settlements, jurisdictional disputes, and the creative misuse of legal doctrine.

If the Court accepts that a Commission of Inquiry effectively ceases to exist once it reports, future inquiries will be reduced to performative exercises: useful for appearances, expendable in substance.

That would mark a serious retreat from constitutional accountability.

What the Court must decide

The Court is not being asked to choose between lawyers. It is being asked to decide whether Commissions of Inquiry in Fiji are:

independent accountability mechanisms that retain legal standing when challenged, or
temporary devices whose findings can be absorbed and controlled by the Executive once delivered.

The answer will define whether truth in Fiji has a life beyond political convenience. The Constitution demands the former. Political comfort prefers the latter.

On 31 December, the Fiji High Court must decide who owns the Report after an inquiry ends, and whether truth in Fiji still matters once it becomes inconvenient.

Can the JSC and the State lawfully settle without Justice Ashton-Lewis?

Yes, procedurally they can attempt to settle but the settlement has sharp legal limits and cannot do what many assume it can.

Justice David Ashton-Lewis was appointed to chair the Commission of Inquiry (COI). In law, the COI itself is not a permanent legal person. Once it delivers its report, it effectively dissolves. The appointing authority is the President acting on executive advice, represented in court by the State (Attorney-General / Solicitor-General).

On that narrow basis:

The JSC and the State can agree to discontinue or settle the judicial review proceedings.
Justice Ashton-Lewis’s consent is not legally required to end the litigation.

However, and this is the critical point, they cannot lawfully “settle away” the truth, legality, or consequences of the COI report.

A settlement can:

stop the court from ruling on the validity of the COI report;
withdraw or abandon the JSC’s challenge.

A settlement cannot:

convert contested findings into legal nullities;
erase historical facts;
bind third parties not before the court;
shield individuals from criminal or disciplinary consequences.

Justice Ashton-Lewis may not be a party to the settlement, but his findings do not evaporate simply because the litigants walk away. They remain a public document unless formally quashed by a court.

That is why the court is cautious: it is being asked, in effect, to endorse a settlement that may have constitutional and public-interest consequences far beyond the parties before it.

What happens to police investigations launched because of the COI?

They are entirely unaffected. This point is legally clear and often misunderstood. Police investigations are grounded in:

criminal law,
evidence,
reasonable suspicion,
and statutory duty.

They are not dependent on:

the survival of a COI report,
the outcome of judicial review proceedings,
or any settlement between state institutions.

Even if:

the COI report were withdrawn,
criticised,
or declared flawed, any police investigation already commenced remains lawful and must proceed on its own merits.

Why? Because:

A COI report is not evidence in the criminal law sense.
It is an investigative trigger, not a prosecutorial foundation.
Once police have independent material, witness statements, documents, or admissions, the inquiry has done its job.

Put bluntly, criminal liability does not depend on the comfort level of the JSC or the acting Attorney-General. Any attempt, explicit or implicit, to use a civil settlement to:

discourage police,
delay investigations,
or suggest matters are now “resolved” would itself raise serious rule-of-law concerns.

What if police investigations relied heavily on the COI findings?

Even then, the legal position does not change. Police may:

reassess evidence,
discard flawed aspects,
proceed on independently verifiable material.

What they cannot do is lawfully abandon an investigation solely because the JSC and the State have settled a judicial review case.

If they did, that decision would itself be vulnerable to challenge as:

improper purpose,
abdication of duty,
or external interference.

The Bigger Picture (Why This Matters)

This is precisely why the settlement is so controversial. If the COI findings are wrong, they should be tested and struck down by a court; the findings are right, they should stand and be acted upon.

A settlement does neither. It freezes the law in an ambiguous space where:

no court ruling exists,
political actors declare closure,
and complainants and investigators are left navigating uncertainty.

But legally, one thing remains firm.

Police investigations, prosecutorial discretion, and criminal accountability cannot be bargained away, with or without Justice David Ashton-Lewis.

From Fijileaks Archive, 23 October 2025

‘Fake News’ for Thee, Not for Me: How Power Decides Truth in Fiji. BEN Padarath faces travel restrictions, strict bail after Tabuya & Biman Prasad allegedly report him to Police. Who dictates Fake News narrative in Fiji?

26/12/2025

In Fiji, fake news has become a dangerous phrase. It is no longer just a descriptor of false information; it is increasingly a trigger for police action, detention, prosecution, and the curtailment of liberty. But recent events expose an uncomfortable truth: who gets accused of fake news, and who gets away with calling the truth fake, depends on where power sits.

At the centre of this contradiction are three names: Lynda Tabuya, Biman Prasad, and an FLP member and political activist Ben Padarath.

Taken together, their cases reveal not just inconsistency, but a deep credibility crisis in how “fake news” is being policed in Fiji.

When ‘Fake News’ Was NOT a Lie, And Nothing Happened

In January 2024, Fijians woke up to explosive allegations involving Cabinet ministers, a Melbourne hotel room, sex, drugs, and explicit text messages. One of the ministers named was Lynda Tabuya. Her response was swift and unequivocal. “It is fake news.”

That denial was carried prominently by regional media, including Radio New Zealand. There was no ambiguity. No hedging. The claim was absolute: the messages were fabricated. They were not.

Padarath

It later emerged that the messages were authentic. The political fallout followed. Tabuya was stripped of her position as deputy leader of the People’s Alliance Party, an internal political sanction, not a legal one. There was no police investigation into whether the public had been misled. No inquiry into whether branding true material as “fake news” had caused harm. There is no suggestion of criminal liability.

The episode was treated as a political embarrassment, not a legal problem.

Fast Forward: Fake News as a Criminal Weapon

Now consider what happened next.

Seven months ago, political activist Ben Padarath was arrested, detained, and interrogated for five days over alleged online content. He was released without charge. No explanation was given.

Months later, the State has returned. Padarath was re-arrested, detained overnight, rushed to Suva, and charged under the Online Safety Act for allegedly reproducing fake news on Facebook. He was produced in court without disclosures. The charge particulars were not read or served. When questioned, the prosecution offered no explanation.

Padarath was granted bail but only after surrendering his travel documents. The complainants? Lynda Tabuya and Biman Chand Prasad.

This is where the system breaks down.

The Unanswered Question

How does a Cabinet minister who publicly branded true information as fake news become a complainant against a political activist accused of spreading fake news?

Legally, she can file a complaint. Procedurally, police can receive it. But substantively, the contradiction is glaring, and corrosive. If “fake news” is a harm the criminal law must address, then false claims of fake news by those in power cannot be treated as irrelevant. If they are, the law is not protecting the truth. It is protecting status.

Selective Truth, Selective Enforcement

The problem is not that Tabuya was not charged. The criminal law should not be used to prosecute every public lie. The problem is selectivity. That is not neutral enforcement. It is directional enforcement.

Courts around the Commonwealth have long warned that laws regulating speech must be applied with extreme caution, especially where political expression is involved. When enforcement consistently flows downwards, against critics, activists, and private citizens, while stopping short at the doors of Cabinet, the chilling effect is real.

People stop speaking not because they are wrong, but because they are afraid.

Enter Biman Prasad: Delay for Power, Pressure for Critics

The contrast sharpens further when placed alongside the case of Biman Prasad, charged with lying in a statutory declaration.

A false statutory declaration is a serious integrity offence. It is sworn. It is deliberate. It goes to the heart of democratic accountability. Crucially, it is a pure statutory offence with no limitation period. Parliament designed it that way.

Yet Prasad’s lawyer Richard Naidu has argued that the charge is unfair because it is “ten years old”. Compare that with Padarath:

detained and grilled,
released without charge,
then charged seven months later,
for expressive conduct.

If delay is said to undermine fairness for a Cabinet minister accused of a timeless statutory offence, how can it be dismissed in a speech-based case revived after prior detention?

The answer, increasingly, appears to be, because one man holds power, and the other does not.

Bail That Tells a Story

Then there is bail.

Padarath is treated as a flight risk. His passport is taken. Prasad, with international connections and routine overseas travel, moves freely.

Bail is meant to manage risk, not hierarchy. When restrictions correlate more closely with political vulnerability than with objective risk, the system signals its priorities, loudly.

What This Is Really About

This is not about defending falsehoods. It is not about excusing misconduct. It is about who gets to define truth, and who pays the price when that definition is challenged.

When a minister can falsely call something “fake news” with no legal scrutiny, and later rely on the same label to trigger criminal proceedings against a critic, the law loses moral authority.

The Online Safety Act was not enacted to shield politicians from embarrassment. It was not designed to become a selective truth-enforcement mechanism. Used this way, it ceases to be a safeguard and becomes a warning.

The Question Fiji Must Answer

Fiji now faces a simple but uncomfortable question: is “fake news” a genuine legal concern or a convenient label, applied only when power is challenged?

If the answer depends on who is speaking, then the issue is no longer misinformation. It is misuse of law.

And when that happens, it is not activists who endanger democracy. It is the system meant to protect it.

Editor's Note: I place this note on record in the interests of transparency. I have long-standing personal knowledge of all three public figures discussed in this article. In particular, I have known Ben Padarath since childhood. His father was a former editor and publisher of the old Fiji Sun in the 1980s, and during that period I often looked after Ben Padarath after school hours.

That prior familiarity does not shape the facts or legal analysis set out above, which are drawn from court proceedings, public records, and contemporaneous reporting. I disclose it simply to make clear that this commentary is grounded in the record and in principle, not in personal favour or animus. For completeness, I add that Ben Padarath has, over the years, continued to refer to me as “Uncle Vic”, a reflection of long-standing familiarity arising from his childhood, not of any political alignment or involvement in the matters discussed. This personal detail is disclosed solely in the interests of transparency.

The leader of the National Federation Party and Member of Parliament, Professor Biman Prasad, has pleaded not guilty to the charges laid against him by FICAC.

Professor Prasad has been charged with two counts of failing to comply with statutory disclosure requirements.

He is also charged with providing false information in a statutory declaration, after he allegedly recklessly submitted a declaration that omitted his directorship, rendering the document materially false.

Defence lawyer Richard Naidu told the court that there had been some delays on the part of the judge regarding the permanent stay application to be heard in the High Court.

Naidu also requested that the mention be set for the end of January, and the court has approved this.

Professor Prasad will be travelling overseas on the 20th of this month and is expected to return on the 27th, FICAC did not object to his travel.

The matter has been set for mention on 26 January 2026.

It was revealed that on or about 30th December 2015, in Suva, Prasad, as an officeholder of the registered National Federation Party under the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Act 2013, allegedly failed to comply with Section 24(1) (b) (iv) by omitting to declare his directorship in Platinum Hotels & Resorts Pte Limited in his annual declaration of assets, liabilities, and income submitted to the Registrar of Political Parties.

Prasad is also charged with providing false information in a statutory declaration, having allegedly recklessly submitted a declaration omitting his directorship, which rendered it materially false.

GO FUND HIM: Help Reverend Akuila Yabaki Walk Tall Again. Support a Fearless Voice Who Stood Against 1987 Coups and Bravely Condemned the violent and racist Taukei Movement leaders as "Klaus Barbies of Fiji"

16/12/2025

*Reverend Yabaki now urgently requires hip replacement surgery to address a serious medical condition that has significantly impaired his mobility and quality of life.

*We appeal especially to Indo-Fijians to stand with Reverend Yabaki, a man who, at great personal risk, spoke out against the racist violence of the 1987 coups, and he never stopped speaking out again in 2000 and 2006 for the dignity and rights of all the peoples of Fiji

Reverend Yabaki now urgently requires hip replacement surgery to address a serious medical condition that has significantly impaired his mobility and quality of life. Without this surgery, his condition is expected to worsen, further limiting his independence and daily functioning.
The combined costs of surgery, hospital care, medication, and post-operative rehabilitation are well beyond what his family can meet on their own.
*The family is seeking compassionate financial support for Reverend Yabaki, a highly respected human rights advocate, Methodist clergyman, and former Executive Director of the Citizens Constitutional Forum

As Minister for Internal Security, Mr Rabuka had extraordinary range of powers, which violated international standards of human rights, including the detention of any person for two years; order restriction of movement, freedom of expression, employment, residence or activity; prohibit the printing, publication, sale, issue, circulation or possession of any written material, and prohibit its communication through word of mouth etc.

And yet Mr Rabuka was free to publish his book “No Other Way”. But no criticism of his book was permitted, and one USP Indo-Fijian lecturer who dared to criticise it, was detained and severely beaten up. - VICTOR LAL

Klaus Barbie

Reverend Akuila Yabaki described the Taukei Movement leaders as the “Klaus Barbies of Fiji” to convey, in stark moral terms, the nature and consequences of the terror unleashed after the 1987 coups.

He was drawing a deliberate parallel with Klaus Barbie, the Nazi “Butcher of Lyon,” not to sensationalise history, but to warn Fiji about a pattern of organised brutality:

Midnight raids and intimidation of civilians
Targeting of women, children, and families, particularly within the Indo-Fijian community
Racialised violence and fear used as a political weapon
Impunity for perpetrators, shielded by power, uniforms, and nationalist rhetoric

Yabaki’s warning was prophetic. He argued that every act of tolerated abuse, every silence in the face of terror, allowed future abusers to grow bolder - just as post-war Europe had learned too late that cruelty thrives when societies look away.

His message was not anti-Taukei; it was anti-racism, anti-torture, and anti-terror, aimed at saving Fiji from moral collapse.

By invoking Klaus Barbie, Yabaki was saying this plainly: when racism, violence, and intimidation are normalised in the name of nationalism, Fiji risks creating its own monsters.

He paid a personal price for speaking this truth in 1987, and again in 2000 and 2006, but he never retreated.

He spoke not for one race, but for the conscience of Fiji itself.

THE MEANING OF “KLAUS BARBIE”

Klaus Barbie was not invoked lightly.

He was the Nazi “Butcher of Lyon,” a man whose name became shorthand for state-backed cruelty - midnight arrests, torture, terrorised families, and a system that rewarded brutality while demanding silence from everyone else.

When Reverend Akuila Yabaki warned in 1987 that Fiji risked producing its own “Klaus Barbies,” he was issuing a moral alarm, not an insult. He meant this: when racist violence is tolerated, when intimidation becomes political currency, and when victims are told to endure quietly, monsters are being trained in plain sight.

History teaches that terror does not begin with mass graves. It begins with shrugs, excuses, and fear.

WHY “THE BUTCHER OF LYON” MATTERED

Klaus Barbie earned the name “the Butcher of Lyon” because, as head of the Gestapo in the French city of Lyon during the Second World War, he personally ordered, supervised, and participated in torture, deportations, and executions.

Men, women, and children were dragged from their homes in midnight raids, beaten, broken, and sent to death camps. Fear was his method; silence was his goal.

After the war, Barbie did not face justice immediately. He escaped accountability for decades, sheltered by Cold War politics, living comfortably in Bolivia under a false name while survivors waited and the dead remained unavenged.

It was only in 1987, the same year Fiji fell under the shadow of its own coup, that Barbie was finally extradited to France.

At his trial, the world heard again the voices of victims. Barbie was convicted of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment, where he died in prison in 1991.

That history is why the name mattered. “Butcher of Lyon” is not about exaggeration; it is about what happens when terror is normalised and justice delayed.

Reverend Akuila Yabaki’s warning was simple and devastating: if brutality is excused in the present, it will demand judgment in the future.

Please click link below to make a generous donation

www.gofundme.com/f/appeal-for-medical-support-for-reverend-akuila-yabaki?fbclid=IwY2xjawOumxtleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEekaxQr-tRxl1kYe10Do2oHOd-H9YBsgCBhZ0Stkvfk2vZ2W78O3fudh2Lldk_aem_gJ4Ju0ki7e7yJw-sy7TESA

BRITAIN's BREXIT Referendum Bill and Fiji's NATIONAL Referendum Bill. UK Gave Voters a BALLOT. Fiji Gives Them a NOOSE and a RULEBOOK

15/12/2025

When Britain held the Brexit referendum in 2016, the country tore itself apart politically but not legally.

People argued, campaigned, knocked on doors, filled newspapers, flooded social media, and spent millions persuading voters. All of it was lawful. That is the point.

The British referendum was conducted under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The law did not tell people what they could say. It did not tell them where they could speak. It did not criminalise persuasion. It regulated money, transparency, and fairness but not opinion.

Under British law, campaigning was not a privilege granted by the state. It was a right. Citizens did not need permission to urge a “Leave” or “Remain” vote.

Newspapers did not clear headlines with the government. Civil society groups did not consult ministers before educating voters. Door-to-door canvassing was routine. Private homes were not off-limits to political discussion.

Contrast that with Fiji’s National Referendum Bill 2025

Under this Bill, publishing material “in connection with” the referendum may be a criminal offence unless authorised. Persuading someone how to vote may be unlawful. Visiting a private home “for any purpose” related to the referendum may be illegal.

And when civil society asked for clarity, the response from government was not reassurance, but advice to consult the Attorney-General to avoid “miscommunication”.

That is not how Britain ran Brexit. It is not how any serious democracy runs a referendum.

In the UK, the state did not act as gatekeeper of debate. The Electoral Commission was independent. Ministers campaigned openly. Citizens argued freely. The courts would never tolerate a law that banned persuasion or outlawed political discussion in private homes. Such a law would be struck down immediately.

The irony is obvious. Britain trusted its citizens with too much freedom and lived with the consequences. Fiji proposes to trust its citizens with so little freedom that the result risks being legally and morally tainted before the first vote is cast.

A referendum is not an administrative exercise. It is a collective act of political will. The legitimacy of the outcome depends on how freely people were allowed to think, speak, argue, and persuade before polling day.

Brexit showed what happens when debate is unrestrained. Fiji’s Bill shows something else entirely: fear of debate itself. And a referendum conducted in fear is not democratic consent. It is managed compliance.

That is the difference.

The Brexit referendum legislation was not drafted by a politician or a political party lawyer.

Who drafted the Brexit Referendum Legislation?

The European Union Referendum Act 2015 was drafted by the UK Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC).

The OPC is a permanent, non-political body of specialist legislative drafters
Its lawyers are civil servants, independent of ministers
Their job is to translate government policy into precise, legally coherent legislation that will withstand judicial scrutiny

Who sponsored it politically

The Bill was introduced to Parliament by the Conservative government
It was sponsored in the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary (Philip Hammond) and other ministers
But ministers do not draft the law. They instruct the OPC on policy objectives

Why this matters (especially for Fiji)
The OPC has:

centuries of drafting tradition
strict internal standards on clarity, legality, and rights-compatibility
a drafting culture that assumes political speech is free unless expressly and narrowly limited.

That is why the Brexit Act:

did not criminalise persuasion
did not restrict door-to-door campaigning
did not regulate opinion or advocacy
left speech regulation to general law, and spending to electoral law

Any UK drafter proposing provisions like Fiji’s sections 22 and 23 would have been stopped inside the drafting office, long before Parliament.

Brexit was legislated by:

professional, independent parliamentary drafters
operating in a system that treats free political debate as non-negotiable

That institutional difference, not culture, not politics, explains why Britain could hold a referendum like Brexit, and why Fiji’s Bill looks so alien by comparison.

Amendment Wanted: Fearless MP Required to table our Amendment Bill

NATIONAL REFERENDUM (AMENDMENT) BILL 2025

A Bill
to amend the National Referendum Act 2025 to safeguard freedom of expression and lawful civic participation in referendum processes.

ENACTED

by the Parliament of the Republic of Fiji

1. Short title and commencement

This Act may be cited as the National Referendum (Amendment) Act 2025.
This Act comes into force on the date of its assent.

2. Replacement of section 22

The National Referendum Act 2025 is amended by repealing section 22 and substituting the following--

22. Referendum advocacy and publication

A person may publish, distribute, or otherwise communicate any material expressing support for or opposition to a referendum proposal.
No offence is committed merely because such material is intended to persuade persons to vote in a particular manner.
Subsection (1) does not apply to material that

(a) falsely purports to be issued by, or on behalf of, the Electoral Commission; or
(b) is published or distributed using public funds otherwise than in accordance with this Act.

The Electoral Commission may issue non-binding guidelines relating to transparency and good practice in referendum advocacy.”

3. Replacement of section 23

The National Referendum Act 2025 is amended by repealing section 23 and substituting the following:

23. Lawful campaign activities

For the avoidance of doubt, the following activities are lawful for the purposes of a referendum--
(a) campaigning for or against a referendum proposal;
(b) persuading a person how to vote;
(c) distributing referendum-related materials;
(d) holding meetings, including in private premises with the consent of the occupier;
(e) peaceful door-to-door canvassing.

A person commits an offence only if that person, in connection with a referendum:
(a) uses force, threats, intimidation, or undue influence to influence how another person votes;
(b) knowingly provides false information relating to voting procedures or the casting or counting of votes; or
(c) falsely represents that the person is acting on behalf of the Electoral Commission.

Nothing in this section authorises entry onto private premises without the consent of the occupier.”

4. Consequential amendments

Any reference in the National Referendum Act 2025 to an offence under sections 22 or 23 is to be read as a reference to sections 22 or 23 as replaced by this Act.

Explanatory Note (not part of the Act)

This Bill amends sections 22 and 23 of the National Referendum Act 2025 to remove criminal liability for ordinary advocacy, persuasion, and civic participation in referendum processes, while retaining offences necessary to protect the integrity of the referendum. The amendments align the Act with constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and political participation.

National Referendum (Amendment) Bill 2025

Mr Speaker, Sir

I rise to move that the National Referendum (Amendment) Bill 2025 be now read a second time.

This Bill is narrow, focused, and necessary. It does not seek to frustrate a referendum. It seeks to protect it.

At the heart of this amendment is a simple principle: a referendum on constitutional matters must be conducted in an environment of free, open, and lawful debate. If citizens fear prosecution for persuading others, distributing materials, or discussing the issue in private homes, then the referendum may be orderly but it will not be legitimate.

Mr Speaker, the existing sections 22 and 23 of the principal Act have raised serious and reasonable concern across civil society, the legal profession, and the public. Those concerns are not about policy outcomes. They are about process, clarity, and constitutional compatibility.

As currently drafted, those provisions risk criminalising ordinary civic activity, including persuasion, advocacy, and peaceful engagement through vague and overly broad language. They also vest excessive discretion in enforcement authorities, creating uncertainty about what conduct is lawful and what is not.

This Amendment Bill resolves that problem directly.

First, it affirms the right of citizens to campaign, persuade, and express opinions for or against a referendum proposal. It makes clear that persuasion, by itself, is not a crime.

Second, it draws a clear and lawful boundary around criminal conduct. Fraud, impersonation of the Electoral Commission, intimidation, coercion, and the misuse of public funds remain offences. These are the behaviours that genuinely undermine referendum integrity.

Third, it protects private homes and private association, making clear that meetings and discussions are lawful where there is consent, and that no provision authorises entry without consent.

Mr Speaker, this approach is consistent with our Constitution, particularly the guarantees of freedom of expression, thought, and political participation. It is also consistent with international democratic practice. Referendum laws in established democracies regulate money and deception not opinion.

Importantly, this Bill does not weaken the Electoral Commission. It strengthens public confidence in the process by removing ambiguity and fear. A referendum conducted under clear, fair, and rights-respecting rules is far more likely to command respect, whatever the outcome.

Mr Speaker, constitutional change demands the highest standard of democratic legitimacy. That legitimacy cannot be achieved through silence, restraint, or managed debate. It can only be achieved through trust in the people.

This Amendment Bill ensures that trust is reflected in law.

I commend the Bill to the House.

Anticipated Government Objections and Responses

Objection 1: The Bill is necessary to prevent misinformation and protect voters

Response:

No one disputes the need to protect voters from deception. That is precisely why this Amendment Bill preserves offences relating to fraud, impersonation of the Electoral Commission, and knowingly false information about voting procedures.

What the amendment removes is the criminalisation of opinion and persuasion. Misinformation is addressed through targeted offences. Broad bans on advocacy do not stop falsehoods; they suppress lawful speech and create confusion.

Objection 2: Restrictions are needed to ensure order and public safety

Response:

Existing laws already address public order, intimidation, harassment, and unlawful assembly. There is no evidence that ordinary referendum campaigning creates a unique public safety risk requiring special criminal restrictions on speech.

Order is best maintained through clear law and consistent enforcement, not through vague prohibitions that leave citizens unsure of what is permitted.

Objection 3: Allowing persuasion risks undue influence over vulnerable voters

Response:

Persuasion is not undue influence. Undue influence involves coercion, threats, or exploitation, all of which remain criminal offences under the amendment.

To prohibit persuasion because some persuasion may be unethical is to prohibit democracy itself. The proper response to bad arguments is better arguments, not criminal law.

Objection 4: The amendments weaken the authority of the Electoral Commission

Response:

On the contrary, the amendments strengthen the Commission by clearly defining its role. The Commission remains protected against impersonation and misuse of public funds and retains the power to issue guidance.

What the amendments remove is any perception that the Commission or the executive licenses political speech. That perception undermines, rather than enhances, institutional credibility.

Objection 5: The Bill is already constitutional and will withstand challenge

Response:

Constitutionality is not determined by confidence alone. Laws affecting political speech are subject to the highest level of scrutiny.

The breadth and ambiguity of the current sections create unnecessary litigation risk. These amendments reduce that risk and protect the referendum from post-vote legal challenges that could undermine its outcome.

Objection 6: This amendment will allow well-funded groups to dominate the debate

Response:

That concern relates to campaign finance, not speech. If spending dominance is the issue, the solution lies in spending caps, disclosure, and transparency and not in criminalising speech by everyone.

Silencing all to restrain a few is neither fair nor effective.

Objection 7: This is an attempt to delay or derail the referendum

Response:

This amendment does not delay the referendum. It ensures that when it occurs, it is conducted lawfully and credibly.

A referendum vulnerable to legal challenge is far more likely to be delayed after the fact. Preventing that risk now is prudent governance.

The choice before the House is not between control and chaos. It is between clear, constitutional law and avoidable legal risk.

These amendments protect voters, protect institutions, and protect the legitimacy of the referendum itself.

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