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The Vuda Web: How One Document Linked Naikorokoro, Lyndhurst and Proposed Waste-to-Energy Project. Who owns the land? Who Benefits From Fiji’s Biggest and the Most Controversial DEVELOPMENT WEB?

13/5/2026

For months the public debate over the proposed waste-to-energy incinerator at Vuda has revolved around environmental concerns, traditional ownership claims, planning approvals, and fears over the long-term consequences of industrial waste processing on Fiji’s western coastline. Yet buried deep within the technical paperwork surrounding the development lies a revealing corporate disclosure that deserves closer public scrutiny.

One seemingly routine page from a development form has now exposed how several companies linked to the Vuda and Naikorokoro developments were connected through a common corporate structure, a shared operational address, and ultimately through the same controlling shareholder. At first glance, the document appeared ordinary enough. It was headed simply: “Landowner”. But its contents told a far larger story.

The form identified the contact person as Kiran Khatri, acting for both Vuda Port Development Pte Limited and Naikorokoro Developments Pte Limited. The postal address given was Factory 8, Kalabu Tax Free Zone, Valelevu, Suva. More importantly, the email address listed was not attached to either Vuda Port Development or Naikorokoro Developments. Instead, it was a Lyndhurst corporate email address of Kiran Khatri, who is General Manager Finance & IT at Lyndhurst Pte Ltd.

That single detail immediately raised larger questions regarding the operational relationship between Lyndhurst and the companies associated with the proposed Vuda developments.

The Kalabu Tax Free Zone address has surfaced repeatedly in documents linked to Lyndhurst-associated entities. Over time, an increasingly intricate web of companies began emerging around the Vuda development proposals, Naikorokoro land dealings, and the proposed waste-to-energy project. The latest disclosure adds another layer to that growing corporate network.

The form then moved to one of the most critical questions in any development application: What is the nature of the title to the land? The answer given was simple: “State Land”.

That description carries profound significance in the Fijian context. State leases are not private freehold holdings. They are subject to conditions, zoning restrictions, ministerial oversight, lease covenants, and environmental compliance obligations. Where major industrial projects are proposed on State land, the public interest becomes particularly acute because the land is ultimately held under governmental authority.

In the case of the Vuda waste-to-energy proposal, questions have already emerged regarding whether the land category and permitted use are compatible with the scale and nature of the proposed incinerator project. Critics and objectors have repeatedly argued that land associated with tourism-oriented or mixed development purposes was now being linked to a heavy industrial operation involving the processing of enormous quantities of waste.

Yet the most revealing section of the form came under the question asking whether the landowner had consented to the proposed development.

The answer originally stated that the landowner companies, namely Vuda Port Development Pte Limited and Naikorokoro Developments Pte Limited, “are subsidiaries of the proponent (Vuda Port Holdings Pte Limited)”.

That sentence was then struck out. In its place appeared a revised statement: “These companies have the same ultimate shareholder as the proponent - Ratu Qativi Robert Cromb.”

The alteration may appear technical. It is not. In corporate law, a subsidiary relationship carries a specific legal meaning involving direct ownership and control through shareholding. By crossing out the original wording, the drafters were effectively withdrawing a precise legal assertion. Instead, they replaced it with a broader disclosure that all the relevant companies were ultimately controlled by the same shareholder.

That shareholder was identified as Ratu Qativi Robert Cromb. The importance of that correction cannot be overstated. It means the landholding entities and the project proponent may not have been structured in a direct parent-subsidiary hierarchy as initially represented. Rather, they appear to have existed as interconnected companies within a wider corporate ecosystem under common ultimate ownership.

That distinction matters because it reveals how the Vuda and Naikorokoro entities were tied together through common control while potentially maintaining separate legal personalities.

In practical terms, the form was acknowledging that the landowners, the project companies, and the wider development structure all revolved around the same controlling corporate figure. This becomes even more significant when viewed against the backdrop of the wider Vuda controversy.

Over recent months, public concern has steadily intensified regarding the proposed $1.4 billion waste-to-energy incinerator project associated with TNG Fiji Pte Ltd and related entities. Environmental groups, landowners, and local residents have raised concerns over pollution, land use, marine impact, and long-term public health implications.

At the same time, questions have also emerged regarding the corporate structures behind the development.

Documents examined by Fijileaks over recent weeks have pointed to recurring overlaps involving Naikorokoro Developments, Lyndhurst-linked entities, Vuda Port companies, and individuals associated with the broader development proposal. The latest form now appears to provide direct documentary confirmation of those overlapping relationships.

The Lyndhurst connection is especially notable. Although the landowner companies themselves were separately named, the operational contact used a Lyndhurst email domain and a Lyndhurst-associated address. That strongly suggests that Lyndhurst personnel or infrastructure were being utilised in the management or administration of the project entities.

Whether that reflected formal corporate integration, shared management services, or common beneficial control is a matter that regulators and the public may eventually wish to examine more closely.

The document also demonstrates something else that has become increasingly evident throughout the Vuda debate: the extraordinary complexity of the corporate structures involved.

To ordinary Fijians, the proposed incinerator may appear to involve a single company or a single project. Yet the paperwork increasingly points to multiple overlapping entities, landholding vehicles, development companies, holding companies, and operational structures connected through common ownership and shared personnel.

Such arrangements are not unlawful in themselves. Large-scale developments frequently utilise layered corporate entities for financing, landholding, liability management, and regulatory purposes. But where developments involve environmentally sensitive land, substantial public controversy, and State-leased property, transparency becomes critically important.

The public has a legitimate right to know: who owns the land, who controls the companies, who benefits from the project, and how the various corporate entities are connected.

The document now under scrutiny provides one of the clearest glimpses yet into that underlying structure.

Far from being an isolated or standalone venture, the proposed Vuda development appears increasingly embedded within a larger interconnected corporate network tied together through common ownership and Lyndhurst-linked operational connections.

And it was all revealed in a single corrected sentence buried deep within a routine development form.

VUDA PORT HOLDINGS PTE LTD: A COMPANY ON PAPER, A PORT IN PROMISE, AND QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN

The corporate profile of Vuda Port Holdings Pte Limited revealed, and continues to reveal, a structure that is at once simple on paper yet suggestive of far broader ambitions beyond its formal disclosures. Incorporated on 7 November 2008 and recorded as an active private company, it has existed for over a decade within Fiji’s corporate registry without any clearly defined or declared primary business activity.

That absence of declared activity was not a minor omission. The company’s own filings stated that its primary activity was “not applicable,” a designation that sat uneasily alongside the scale of expectation and speculation surrounding developments linked to Vuda.

On its face, the company was, and remains, structured with notable simplicity. It operated from the Kalabu Tax Free Zone in Nasinu, an address that appeared across a number of related entities, and it was governed by its own articles of association. There was no ultimate holding company listed, indicating that control rested directly within its immediate ownership structure.

That ownership structure was, and still is, highly concentrated. The company issued just 100 ordinary shares, all fully paid and entirely beneficially held by a single individual, Ratu Qativi Robert Charles Cromb.

In effect, Vuda Port Holdings was a single-owner vehicle, with complete control vested in one person. There were no institutional shareholders disclosed, no evidence of equity participation by partners, and no indication, within the registry filings, of any external ownership interest.

The board structure reflected that same concentration. Alongside Cromb, the only other listed director was Rokoseru Nabalurua. The absence of recorded appointment dates for either director added to the limited transparency surrounding the company’s governance history.

From a legal standpoint, such a structure was entirely permissible. Private companies are not required to disclose complex ownership or maintain diversified shareholding. Yet where such a company became, or is perceived to be, linked to projects involving infrastructure, ports, or strategic land development, the simplicity of its structure inevitably invites scrutiny.

For what the records showed then, and still show now, was not a port operator, not a logistics enterprise, and not an infrastructure developer in any conventional sense. They showed a corporate entity with no declared activity, minimal share capital, and tightly held ownership.

That distinction remains central.

In corporate law, there is a clear difference between a company that exists as a vehicle and one that operates as a business. The former may be entirely legitimate, used to hold land, structure transactions, or position for future development. But it does not, in itself, demonstrate operational capacity. It does not show financing, execution capability, or readiness to deliver a project of scale.

In the case of Vuda Port Holdings, the filings disclosed none of those elements. There were no financial statements attached, no record of assets or liabilities, and no indication of contractual engagements or project financing. The company’s formal disclosures remained silent on the very matters that would ordinarily underpin a port development.

That silence did not prove absence but it continued to signal opacity.

The location of the registered office within the Kalabu Tax Free Zone remained another point of interest. This address appeared across multiple entities connected to property and investment structures, suggesting a centralised administrative base rather than an operational hub. It reinforced the impression of a network of companies organised around holding and structuring assets, rather than functioning as standalone commercial enterprises.

When viewed in isolation, Vuda Port Holdings could be read as a dormant or preparatory entity, one established in anticipation of future activity. When viewed alongside broader claims and expectations surrounding Vuda, however, the gap between corporate disclosure and public narrative becomes harder to ignore.

The central question therefore remains unchanged: How did a company with no declared activity, $100 in share capital, and a single beneficial owner come to be associated, directly or indirectly, with discussions of port development and large-scale investment?

The records do not answer that question. They framed it, and they continue to frame it.

Vuda Port Holdings existed, and still exists, on the register. The port itself remained, then as now, a promise awaiting substance.

NEXT: Vuda Port Developments Pte Ltd: The Company with No Revenue, Rising Related-Party Debt, and a Deepening Lyndhurst Connection

*Long before the proposed waste-to-energy incinerator and private port facility became the subject of fierce public controversy, the origins of the Vuda corporate network were already taking shape quietly through a small private company formed in 2013: Vuda Port Developments Pte Limited. At the centre of that early structure stands Alipate Tavai.

Burning Questions at Vuda Point: Energy Security, Waste Colonialism, and Politics of Desperation. A Reply to TNG Fiji consultant Cheerieann Wilson: 'Energy desperation can also distort PUBLIC decision-making.'

12/5/2026

The latest opinion piece in The Fiji Times presents the proposed Vuda waste-to-energy incinerator as a bold answer to two crises at once: Fiji’s mounting waste problem and its deep dependence on imported diesel fuel.

Written by communications consultant Cheerieann Wilson, who openly discloses her engagement with the project proponents, the article frames the proposed 80-megawatt facility at Naikorokoro, Vuda, as a transformative national infrastructure project capable of supplying up to 40 per cent of Fiji’s electricity needs while dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The argument is sophisticated, carefully constructed, and politically timed. It speaks directly to Fiji’s vulnerabilities as a small island economy exposed to oil price shocks, climate change, and fragile energy security. Yet beneath the rhetoric of renewable transition and energy independence lies a far more difficult and unresolved question: whether Fiji is being asked to embrace an industrial-scale incineration model whose environmental, cultural, health, and governance consequences remain deeply contested.

The article’s core thesis rests on a genuine national problem. Fiji remains heavily dependent on imported petroleum products, with diesel and heavy fuel oil continuing to underpin a substantial portion of electricity generation. The opinion piece cites figures placing refined petroleum imports at approximately US$718 million in 2023, much of it sourced from Singapore.

This dependence exposes Fiji to global commodity volatility over which it has no control. During periods of drought, hydroelectric generation declines and diesel generators return to prominence. The Coalition government's ambition of achieving near-100 per cent renewable electricity by 2030 therefore confronts a structural reality: solar and wind remain intermittent, battery storage remains expensive, and Fiji still lacks reliable baseload alternatives.

In that context, the appeal of waste-to-energy technology becomes obvious. Incineration plants promise continuous electricity generation regardless of weather conditions. The Vuda proposal claims it can convert up to 900,000 tonnes of non-recyclable waste annually into power through two 40MW generating units operating around the clock.

Yet this is precisely where the debate becomes far more complicated than the article suggests.

The first issue is scale. Fiji is a small island state with a modest population and comparatively limited domestic waste generation. Critics have already begun asking whether Fiji itself can realistically supply the volume of combustible waste required to sustain a plant of this magnitude over decades. If not, then an unavoidable question emerges: will Fiji eventually become dependent on imported waste streams to maintain the plant’s economic viability?

That concern is not theoretical. Around the world, large-scale waste-to-energy facilities have often required guaranteed long-term waste supply contracts. In several jurisdictions, this has created perverse incentives against aggressive recycling and waste reduction because the incinerator itself requires a continuous stream of combustible material to remain commercially viable. The more successful a country becomes at recycling and reducing waste, the less fuel exists for the incinerator.

This is why opponents increasingly describe such projects not as clean energy infrastructure, but as “waste colonialism” disguised as climate policy.

The second issue concerns emissions and public health. The opinion article repeatedly stresses that the plant would comply with European emissions standards and could reduce overall emissions by more than 80 per cent compared with landfill methane and diesel generation combined. That may well be true within certain carbon-accounting frameworks. But greenhouse accounting is only one dimension of environmental harm.

Incinerators do not make waste disappear. They transform it. High-temperature combustion generates ash residues, ultrafine particulates, heavy metals, dioxins, and other pollutants that require extremely sophisticated monitoring and disposal systems. Even in advanced industrial countries with robust environmental enforcement, waste-to-energy facilities remain controversial because communities fear long-term health consequences.

Fiji’s own waste-management history raises serious questions about institutional capacity. Open burning, unmanaged dumping, and inadequate waste collection remain widespread across the country. The issue is not merely whether modern incineration technology can theoretically operate safely. The issue is whether Fiji possesses the long-term regulatory infrastructure, technical expertise, laboratory monitoring capacity, and political independence necessary to supervise such a facility for decades.

That distinction matters enormously.

A country struggling to regulate basic dumping practices may find itself overwhelmed by the oversight demands of one of the largest industrial combustion facilities in the Pacific.

There is also the question of geography and symbolism. The proposed site at Naikorokoro and Vuda is not an empty industrial wasteland. It sits within an area carrying cultural, ecological, tourism, and historical sensitivities. Opposition from traditional landowners and local communities has already surfaced publicly. The Environmental Impact Assessment itself reportedly acknowledges future risks from cyclones and sea-level rise under worsening climate scenarios.

Critics therefore see a profound contradiction in placing a massive incineration facility on vulnerable coastal land in a country that simultaneously presents itself internationally as a moral voice on climate justice and ocean protection.

The article also illustrates how the language surrounding the project has shifted. Earlier controversies surrounding the Vuda incinerator focused primarily on land use, lease arrangements, environmental approvals, and the role of corporate actors connected to the project. Increasingly, however, proponents are reframing the debate through the language of national energy security. This is politically astute. It allows the project to be presented not merely as a waste facility, but as patriotic infrastructure essential to Fiji’s economic survival.

But energy desperation can also distort public decision-making.

Countries facing economic pressure sometimes accept projects they would otherwise reject. Fiji must therefore distinguish between projects that genuinely strengthen long-term resilience and those that solve one dependency by creating another.

The opinion piece correctly identifies Fiji’s fuel vulnerability. It correctly identifies weaknesses in the current waste system. It correctly notes that renewable intermittency presents real engineering problems. But it largely sidesteps the broader global debate surrounding incineration itself.

Many developed countries now prioritise circular economy models focused on reduction, reuse, recycling, composting, and decentralised waste management rather than locking themselves into massive combustion infrastructure dependent on continuous waste generation.

Several jurisdictions have faced public backlash against incinerators precisely because such facilities can undermine recycling targets and create long-term dependency on waste streams.

The Vuda debate is therefore no longer simply about electricity generation.

It is about the kind of environmental future Fiji wants to build.

Does Fiji become a regional leader in low-waste sustainable development rooted in Pacific ecological values? Or does it embrace a highly industrialised waste-management model imported from elsewhere and justified through the language of energy transition?

That is the real burning question now confronting the country.

Fiji imports more than US$700 million in petroleum products every year – its single largest import bill. A proposed plant at Vuda Point says it can generate 40 per cent of the country’s electricity needs from rubbish. Here is what the numbers actually show.

Every morning, somewhere between Suva and Lautoka, a diesel generator rumbles to life. Then another. And another. Across Fiji’s outer islands and remote communities, the ritual repeats itself – fuel shipped in from Singapore, trucked out, burned, gone. On the main grid, thermal power plants fuelled by imported diesel and heavy fuel oil cover the gaps when rain-fed hydro cannot keep up. It is an arrangement that costs Fiji hundreds of millions of dollars a year, leaves the economy exposed to a commodity it cannot influence, and makes climate commitments structurally difficult to honour.

Refined petroleum is Fiji’s single largest import by value. International trade data shows Fiji imported approximately US$718 million worth of refined petroleum products in 2023 – almost entirely from Singapore – representing roughly a quarter of all merchandise imports. That means for every $4 Fiji spent on imported goods, about $1 went on fuel alone. For a small island economy that exports fish, sugar, and bottled water, that is a structural vulnerability of the first order.

Fiji’s National Energy Policy 2023-2030 states the problem directly: the country’s energy production and consumption remains highly dependent on imported fossil fuels, exposing it to price volatility, supply insecurity, and rising greenhouse gas emissions. Currently, approximately 40 per cent of Fiji’s electricity is generated from diesel and heavy fuel oil. The government’s stated ambition is near-100 per cent renewable electricity by 2030, backed by a $2 billion transition plan. The distance between that ambition and current reality is significant and it is measured, for now, in diesel.

It is into this gap that a proposed energy-from-waste facility at Vuda Point, put forward by TNG Holdings Fiji, is positioning itself as a base-load answer.

What happens if nothing changes

The case for urgency begins with a straightforward projection: if Fiji’s energy mix does not change materially, diesel dependency deepens rather than eases. The numbers are already hard enough. Fiji’s National Development Plan targets 100 per cent renewable electricity by 2030. The Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement commits to reducing diesel and heavy fuel oil imports to no more than 200 million litres by the same year and cutting overall emissions by 30 per cent. Neither target is on track.

The 2022 global energy shock exposed how little insulation Fiji has against oil price movements. Diesel peaked at FJD$3.61 per litre, nearly 75 per cent above its long-run average. Households paid more for power. Transport costs rose across the supply chain. Tourism operators absorbed fuel surcharges. Government subsidies expanded to soften the blow, deepening a fiscal deficit already running at more than 4 per cent of GDP. Singapore had Fiji’s economy in a headlock, and Suva had no meaningful lever to pull. Climate change sharpens the risk further. Hydro provides roughly 60 per cent of Fiji’s electricity in good years, but rainfall patterns are becoming less predictable. Extended dry periods mean reduced hydro output, which means the grid falls back to diesel.

The more extreme the climate scenario, the more diesel Fiji burns – precisely the inverse of what its climate commitments require. Fiji speaks with authority at global climate forums as one of the Pacific’s most affected nations. Its domestic energy mix has not yet caught up with that voice.

Solar and wind can reduce daytime diesel consumption significantly, and the government’s $2 billion plan allocates half its investment to 165 megawatts of new solar capacity. But solar does not generate at night. Wind is intermittent. Battery storage at grid scale remains expensive and technically complex. Without a reliable base-load source that runs continuously regardless of weather, the renewable transition has a structural ceiling and diesel fills the space below it.

The proposal: 80 megawatts from rubbish

The TNG Holdings Fiji proposal, assessed in an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) prepared by GHD and submitted to the Fiji Department of Environment in March this year, is for an 80-megawatt energy-from-waste facility on an 84-hectare site at Vuda Point, approximately 10 kilometres south of Lautoka. The facility would use two 40MW power units to turn up to 900,000 tonnes of non-recyclable rubbish into energy each year. Critically for Fiji’s energy equation, it would run 24 hours a day, seven days a week delivering what solar panels and wind turbines cannot: continuous, weather-independent base-load power.

According to the EIA, using Energy Fiji Limited’s latest demand estimates, the facility would generate enough electricity to meet approximately 40 per cent of Fiji’s current national power demand. That’s enough to power hundreds of thousands of homes, businesses and public services across the country. The facility’s design capacity reflects projected long-term waste growth within Fiji. The EIA notes that the facility is capable of operating on domestic and legacy waste streams without reliance on waste imports.

Forty per cent is not a marginal contribution. It would reduce Fiji’s reliance on diesel and make waste-to-energy a key part of the power system instead of just a backup.

If that output were fed into the grid from 2029, as the proponents target, it would represent the single largest step-change in Fiji’s energy security in a generation and it would come from a fuel source that currently costs Fiji nothing: its own waste.

The project is designed to meet strict European emissions standards. It would also connect to Fiji’s national electricity grid through a new substation on-site and a transmission line to the Vuda substation.

The emissions dividend

Beyond keeping the lights on, the project could also cut pollution. The EIA estimates it would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 83 per cent compared to the current system of dumping rubbish in landfills and generating electricity from diesel.

The mechanism matters. When rubbish is buried in landfill, it breaks down and produces methane – a gas that traps heat in the atmosphere much more strongly than carbon dioxide. If that same waste is burned at very high temperatures instead, it produces carbon dioxide, which is less harmful, and also generates electricity.

So you get two benefits at once: less methane from landfill, less diesel needed for power.

That combination is what leads to the estimated 83 per cent drop in emissions.

Methane from landfill waste is one of the most powerful short-term gases driving climate change, far stronger than carbon dioxide over the next 20 years.

The project is expected to reduce overall emissions by more than 1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent each year compared to doing nothing.

The overall emissions reduction claimed for the project is driven largely by avoided landfill emissions.

This distinction is important in how the project is assessed against Fiji’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and it will be a key consideration for regulators when evaluating its climate impact. In simple terms, emissions from running the facility would be counted in Fiji’s own national totals under standard carbon accounting rules.

But when you look at the full picture – compared with continuing to dump waste in landfills and generate electricity using diesel – the project is expected to significantly cut overall greenhouse gas emissions. This matters for Fiji because its National Energy Policy recognises that relying on diesel makes it harder to meet Paris Agreement obligations. A project that could cut total system emissions by more than 80 per cent is therefore not a peripheral consideration. It is central to the policy case.

Where this fits in the policy framework

Fiji’s National Energy Policy 2023-2030 is built around five pillars: energy security and resilience, energy access and equity, energy sustainability, energy efficiency, and energy governance. The TNG Fiji proposal is directly relevant to the first three.

On security: the facility would produce domestically generated electricity from a fuel source which is waste that is not subject to Singapore spot prices or geopolitical disruption. It would be continuously available, filling the base-load gap that makes Fiji’s grid vulnerable whenever hydro output falls.

On equity: A steady source of electricity that replaces diesel power can help lower the cost of generating electricity, which could ease pressure on power prices for households and businesses. From a climate point of view, if the 83 per cent emissions reduction is achieved, it would make a significant contribution to Fiji’s national climate targets under its Paris Agreement commitments (NDCs).

When announcing Fiji’s $2 billion renewable energy plan in October 2025, former Deputy Prime Minister Professor Biman Prasad was direct: without private sector investment, the country’s renewable targets would not be met within the government’s own timeline.

The TNG Fiji facility, backed by private capital and structured to connect to the national grid, is the kind of investment the policy explicitly requires. The National Energy Policy calls for import taxes on heavy fuel by 2024 and a complete ban by 2030. Energy-from-waste, at scale, makes that ban structurally achievable in a way that intermittent renewables alone currently do not.

A decision with consequences either way

The project is not without legitimate questions. The Vuda Point site carries real environmental, cultural, and community sensitivities that Fiji’s regulatory process is designed to test.

The EIA warns that by 2090, stronger cyclones and rising sea levels could pose serious risks to the site if global emissions stay high.

These are important concerns, not minor ones, because they could affect whether the facility can safely operate long-term and whether the chosen location is suitable. The Department of Environment’s Technical Review Committee will weigh all of it. But the energy problem does not pause for the regulatory timeline.

Every year that Fiji’s grid remains 40 per cent dependent on imported diesel is another year of exposure to commodity markets it cannot control, another year of emissions that undermine its climate commitments, and another year of fiscal pressure from a fuel bill that crowds out spending on health, education, and infrastructure. Energy-from-waste is one possible solution to the base-load power challenge. It is not the only option, but it is one of the few proven technologies that can provide steady electricity at a large scale and be built within a realistic timeframe. Countries such as Germany, Sweden and Denmark use energy-from-waste as part of their energy mix, alongside recycling and renewable energy, because they recognise that renewables alone cannot always provide constant power to a modern electricity system.

Fiji’s situation is more acute than theirs. It is an island economy paying a quarter of its import bill for a fuel it burns to keep the lights on. The question of whether an energy-from-waste plant at Vuda Point is the right solution is a legitimate one. The question of whether Fiji can afford to keep doing what it is doing is not.

Disclaimer: The author is a communications consultant engaged by TNG Fiji to support public communications relating to the proposed energy from-waste project. The views expressed are not necessarily the views of this newspaper. Until recently, Wilson was deputy chief of staff at the Fiji Times. She was previously a media advisor in the Office of the Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka.

DPP's Immunity for DRUG DEALERS? Fiji Faces Grim Choice Between Catching Couriers or Crushing the Kingpins. Immunity should remain exceptional. Otherwise it risks undermining legitimacy of justice system

11/5/2026

“Not Interested in the Small Fish”: Fiji’s Drug War Enters Dangerous New Territory as DPP Offers Immunity Deals

Deputy DPP John Rabuku

From left: Ana Rokolati, Travis Cheer, Iliesa Cokanasiga, Sunia Vakaloloma and Jonathan Pedro Hill outside the High Court in Ba on March 23, 2026.

Granting immunity to lower-level or cooperating drug offenders in exchange for testimony against major traffickers is a recognised prosecutorial tool in many common law jurisdictions, including systems derived from British legal traditions.

The real question for Fiji is not whether immunity should ever be used, but under what safeguards, for what level of offender, and in what type of case.

In principle, there is a strong public interest argument for limited immunity arrangements where organised drug trafficking networks are involved.

Jonathan Hill

Large-scale narcotics enterprises rarely operate through a single offender. They function through layered hierarchies involving financiers, importers, transporters, distributors, corrupt facilitators, and street-level operatives. Without insider witnesses, prosecutors often struggle to penetrate the upper levels of those networks.

In that sense, immunity can be a legitimate investigative instrument.

A courier, intermediary, accountant, driver, or warehouse operator may possess direct evidence against the organisers who remain insulated from physical possession of the drugs themselves. In some cases, the only realistic path to dismantling a syndicate is to induce one participant to cooperate.

But immunity must never become arbitrary or politically selective.

The greatest danger is that the State ends up rewarding the most culpable actors while prosecuting only expendable figures lower down the chain. Public confidence collapses if ordinary citizens conclude that “big fish” receive deals while smaller offenders carry the full burden of punishment.

That is why any immunity framework in Fiji would require rigorous safeguards.

First, immunity should generally be reserved for testimony that is both necessary and independently corroborated. A conviction based solely on the unverified word of an accomplice is inherently dangerous. Courts across the common law world have repeatedly warned about the unreliability of incentivised witnesses who may exaggerate or fabricate evidence to save themselves.

Second, immunity should preferably target lesser participants in exchange for evidence against organisers, financiers, or corrupt officials. The proportionality principle matters. Granting full immunity to a syndicate leader merely to convict another syndicate leader would be difficult to justify morally or publicly.

Third, all immunity agreements should be transparent to the court and disclosed to the defence. The jury, or judge in a judge-alone trial, must know that a witness received a benefit from the prosecution. Otherwise the integrity of the proceedings is compromised.

Fourth, immunity should not become a substitute for proper police investigation. Fiji has periodically faced criticism over investigative capacity, chain-of-custody issues, witness management, and allegations of corruption within enforcement institutions. Immunity arrangements only work credibly where there is competent corroborative investigation through financial records, telecommunications data, surveillance, customs records, forensic evidence, and cross-border cooperation.

There is also a uniquely Fijian dimension to this debate.

Recent years have seen increasing public anxiety over allegations of transnational drug trafficking routes through Fiji, including concerns involving methamphetamine, cocaine trans-shipment, money laundering, and alleged corruption risks affecting ports, airports, and state institutions. In such an environment, prosecutors may well argue that extraordinary tools are necessary to dismantle sophisticated criminal networks.

However, Fiji must also guard against the perception that immunity deals become politicised, selectively granted, or used to manufacture testimony. In a small society where political, business, family, and social networks often overlap, the credibility of the DPP’s Office and law enforcement agencies becomes paramount.

Ultimately, the test should be pragmatic rather than ideological.

If granting immunity to a relatively minor participant enables authorities to expose the financiers, importers, corrupt facilitators, or international organisers behind a major trafficking enterprise, many would regard that as justified in the broader public interest.

But immunity should remain exceptional, tightly supervised, evidence-based, and proportionate. Otherwise it risks undermining the very legitimacy of the criminal justice system it is supposed to protect.

From the Skipper Drug Case to Fiji’s New Drug Kingpins: How I Warned of Narcotics Networks Four Decades Ago While Current Journalists Failed to Track the Cartels Now Running Amok in Fiji

As Editor-in-Chief of Fijileaks, I have watched with growing alarm how Fiji’s drug crisis has evolved from scattered trafficking operations into what increasingly appears to be a deeply entrenched transnational narcotics problem.

What disturbs me most is that many of the warning signs were identified decades ago, yet successive generations of journalists, institutions, and governments largely failed to pursue the networks, financiers, political protectors, and international cartels behind the trade with sustained investigative determination.

Between 1980 and 1983, following the July 1978 arrest at Nadi Airport of New Zealander Susan Florence Ray Rennie, who was travelling under the false passport name Christina Doreen Skipper, I spent three years investigating the so-called “Skippers” drug backgrounds, regional narcotics cartels, and Fiji’s growing use as a staging post for the movement of hard and soft drugs through the Pacific. Writing in the old Sunday Sun and Fiji Sun, I published an eight-part investigative series exposing how traffickers were exploiting Fiji’s geographic position, weak enforcement structures, and vulnerable border systems.

Those investigations came at personal cost. I received death threats and was violently assaulted by a notorious Suva drug peddler. Yet the investigations were regarded as so significant that the Fiji Customs and Excise Department later adopted my findings as a practical “Manual on Drugs and Smugglers” for police and customs officers.

Today, more than four decades later, Fiji’s drug problem appears far worse than anything many of us feared in the early 1980s. The tragedy is not simply that organised narcotics networks survived, but that much of Fiji’s journalism failed to maintain the long-term investigative pressure necessary to expose the financiers, importers, facilitators, and political connections behind the trade.

Too often, media attention faded after arrests, raids, or courtroom appearances, while the larger criminal structures remained hidden beneath the surface.

Fiji Police and the RFMF Must Re-Open the Room 233 ‘Weed’ File and Investigate How a Cabinet Minister Allegedly Obtained Drugs in a Melbourne Hotel

CONFIDENTIAL LETTER Exposes How People's Alliance Party Removed LYNDA TABUYA over 'SEX AND ILLICIT DRUG' Scandal in Melbourne

Letter Source: Grubsheet

The confidential letter dated 4 March 2024 reveals the formal internal decision by the People’s Alliance Party to remove Lynda Tabuya from her position as Deputy Party Leader following what the party itself described as a “sex and illicit drug scandal” arising during her official trip to the Parliament of Victoria in Melbourne between 21 and 23 August 2023.

Signed by Ratu Isoa Gavidi, Vice President of the People’s Executive Council (PEC), and countersigned by Party Leader and Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka, the document states that the PEC had deliberated on recommendations from the People’s Management Committee before concluding that Tabuya’s “actions and conduct” had caused “severe and probably irreparable damage” to the image and reputation of the People’s Alliance.

The letter is significant for several reasons.

First, it demonstrates that the controversy was treated internally not merely as a personal indiscretion but as a matter involving allegations connected to illicit drugs during an official overseas trip undertaken in her capacity as a senior political figure and Cabinet Minister.

Second, the wording used by the party is unusually severe. The PEC concluded that her conduct violated the party’s vision, mission, and constitutional obligations expected of a Deputy Leader. Such language suggests the leadership believed the controversy had escalated beyond reputational embarrassment into a matter affecting public trust and party integrity.

Third, the letter raises lingering public interest questions that appear never to have been fully answered. If the governing party itself formally characterised the matter as involving an “illicit drug scandal”, critics argue that it is legitimate to ask whether Fiji’s law enforcement agencies ever adequately examined how the alleged drugs were obtained, whether any criminal conduct occurred, and whether the matter warranted deeper investigation beyond its political consequences.

The broader issue is not simply Tabuya’s removal from a party leadership role. Rather, it touches on a larger national concern about political accountability, elite behaviour, and the seriousness with which Fiji’s institutions confront allegations involving narcotics at a time when the country faces growing fears over drug trafficking and organised criminal influence.

The document therefore reopens a politically sensitive debate: whether Fiji’s response to allegations involving powerful public figures has matched the severity of the rhetoric used privately within the ruling party itself.

Suspend the Cabinet Minister or Reveal the Identity: Fiji Cannot Afford Silence Over Alleged Positive Drug Test

JONE VAKARISI DEATH AT RFMF: Why We Publish One Image, Not All: On Evidence, Dignity, and the Voice of His DAUGHTER Isabelle Vakarise

9/5/2026

Fijileaks has obtained a series of photographs depicting the body of Jone Vakarisi following his death in custody. Some of these images are deeply distressing. All of them raise grave questions that demand answers.

We have decided to publish one carefully selected photograph. We will not publish the full set.

That decision is deliberate.

The central issue in this case is not spectacle. It is accountability. The public is entitled to understand, in clear and factual terms, the condition of a man who died while in the custody of the RFMF. Where official narratives are incomplete, inconsistent, or evolving, evidence matters. Sometimes, visual evidence speaks with a clarity that words cannot match.

But publication carries responsibility.

Graphic images of the dead are not neutral artefacts. Detached from context, they can quickly become objects of shock rather than instruments of truth. Repetition and excess risk dulling the very moral force they are meant to convey. They can also inflict further harm on those already grieving.

In this case, the statement of Isabelle Vakarise has weighed heavily on our editorial judgment.

Her words do not treat her father as an exhibit. They restore his humanity. They speak to loss, to dignity, and to a demand for truth. At the same time, her account directs attention to the physical condition of his body, a matter that sits at the heart of the public controversy.

We have therefore taken a measured course.

The image we publish is not the most graphic. It is not selected for shock value. It is selected because it corroborates what has been described, and because it allows readers to assess, for themselves, the seriousness of the issues raised. It is presented with clear warning and with context.

We have chosen not to publish the remaining photographs because they do not materially advance public understanding beyond what this single image and the available documentary evidence already establish. To reproduce them would risk crossing the line from documentation into excess.

Fijileaks has always maintained that the power of journalism lies not only in what it reveals, but in how it reveals it.

There are moments when the publication of disturbing material is justified in the public interest. This is one of those moments. But there is also a point at which repetition ceases to inform and begins to diminish both the subject and the audience.

We will not cross that line.

Our task is to present evidence, to amplify the voice of the family, and to hold institutions to account. It is not to sensationalise death.

Readers should approach the published image with care. It exists not to provoke, but to inform.

*Readers should also be aware that a wider set of images, including material of a far more graphic nature than we have chosen to publish, is already in the public domain. Those who consider it necessary to examine that broader record may refer to this Grubsheet article, which carries its own warning about distressing content.

https://www.grubsheet.com.au/this-article-contains-images-that-are-unsuitable-for-children-and-may-be-distressing-for-others-reader-discretion-advised/

VUDAGATE and Naikorokoro Point at Vuda–Saweni. From PROTECTED Habitat to 'Approved' Tourism Zone. Paper trail that refuses to disappear. The letters expose a shifting regulatory posture that demands scrutiny

8/5/2026

The documentary trail surrounding Naikorokoro Point at Vuda–Saweni reveals a pattern that sits at the heart of the wider Vudagate controversy: a site once firmly identified as environmentally sensitive and unsuitable for development has, over time, been progressively repositioned within official processes to accommodate “integrated tourism” and associated commercial ambitions.

The letters and decisions from the Lautoka Rural Local Authority, read together, do not merely record administrative steps. They expose a shifting regulatory posture that demands scrutiny.

The earliest position, set out in February 2012, is unequivocal. The application by Oldzone Corporation Limited to rezone Naikorokoro Point from rural to Special Use (Integrated Tourism) was refused. The grounds were not technical or procedural. They were substantive and rooted in environmental law and international obligations. The Authority cited Fiji’s commitments under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Ramsar Convention, and regional environmental protocols requiring the protection of sensitive habitats.

Naikorokoro Point was identified as a protected zone of national and regional significance. It was described as a breeding ground for migratory birds, including species that use Viti Levu as one of the few remaining bridging points in the Pacific. The implications were clear. Development in or near the site would disrupt breeding patterns, degrade habitat, and undermine ecological systems that extend beyond Fiji’s borders. The Environmental Management Act 2005 reinforced this position by requiring preservation of areas of national importance.

This was not a marginal or ambiguous classification. The site was treated as environmentally critical.

That position was reaffirmed in a subsequent decision. The Authority again refused rezoning, this time emphasising planning policy. The land was designated as agricultural under the Vuda Sabeto Advisory Plan 2009. Subdivision or fragmentation for non-agricultural use was discouraged. The Authority went further, recommending that the site be considered for designation as a Natural Park. The involvement of the Director of Environment and the Director of National Trust was explicitly contemplated, signalling that the land’s highest and best use lay in conservation, not commercial exploitation.

At that stage, the regulatory and environmental logic aligned. The site was protected in principle, in law, and in planning policy. Then, within a remarkably short institutional arc, the position changed.

By February 2013, the same rezoning proposal was approved. The justification was framed in procedural and conditional terms rather than environmental reconsideration. The land was approved for rezoning from Rural to Special Use (Integrated Tourism), subject to a series of compliance requirements. These included submission of an Environmental Impact Assessment, preparation of a Construction Environmental Management Plan, mangrove management approvals, and adherence to subdivision and planning controls.

On paper, these conditions appear robust. In practice, they represent a shift from prohibition to mitigation. The question is no longer whether the site should be developed, but how development can proceed within a controlled framework.
This is the critical turning point.

What changed between refusal and approval was not the ecological character of Naikorokoro Point. The site did not cease to be a migratory bird habitat. It did not lose its environmental sensitivity or its designation within agricultural and conservation planning frameworks. Instead, the regulatory approach shifted from protection to accommodation.

The approval letter introduces additional development parameters that further illustrate the transformation. A maximum density of 25 bedrooms per hectare was permitted, with buildings restricted to single storey construction. A 30-metre setback from the mean high-water mark was imposed, alongside a 6-metre foreshore reserve. Infrastructure requirements, including water supply and sewerage systems, were mandated to meet public health standards.

These are the hallmarks of a tourism development blueprint, not a conservation framework.

The cumulative effect is stark. A site once identified as unsuitable for development due to its environmental significance was repositioned as suitable for controlled tourism development, provided that technical compliance measures were met. The shift is not explained by any new environmental evidence within the documents themselves. There is no indication that the ecological concerns were resolved or mitigated at source. Instead, the burden appears to have been transferred to planning conditions and post-approval compliance mechanisms.

This pattern resonates directly with the present controversy surrounding the proposed waste-to-energy incinerator at Vuda. The same land, the same ecological sensitivities, and the same institutional actors now sit within a new and far more consequential development proposal. The incinerator project, far exceeding the scale and impact of the earlier tourism concept, is being advanced in a context where the foundational question of land suitability was already contested and, at one point, definitively answered in the negative.

The historical record matters because it establishes baseline knowledge within the system. Authorities were aware that Naikorokoro Point was environmentally sensitive, legally protected in principle, and unsuitable for fragmentation or intensive development. That knowledge cannot simply be disregarded in subsequent decision-making processes.

Equally significant is the procedural evolution reflected in the documents. The initial refusals emphasised national and international environmental obligations. The later approval emphasised compliance with procedural requirements such as Environmental Impact Assessments. This is a familiar trajectory in contested developments. The focus shifts from whether a project should proceed to how it can be managed once it is assumed that it will proceed.

In the context of Vudagate, this raises deeper questions about regulatory integrity. If a site can move from protected habitat to approved tourism zone without a transparent and evidence-based reversal of its environmental classification, then the credibility of subsequent approvals becomes inherently fragile.

The involvement of multiple agencies compounds the issue. The Director of Town and Country Planning, the Director of Environment, the Director of Lands, and the Lautoka Rural Local Authority all appear within the decision-making chain. Each carries statutory responsibilities. The coherence of their collective actions is therefore central to assessing whether due process was followed or whether institutional pressures influenced outcomes.

The letters also reveal the reliance on staged approvals. Environmental assessments, management plans, and subdivision consents are required before full development can proceed. While this framework is designed to ensure oversight, it can also diffuse accountability. Responsibility is distributed across stages and agencies, making it more difficult to pinpoint where critical decisions are effectively made.

For readers following the broader Vudagate narrative, the significance of these documents lies in their continuity. They are not isolated artefacts from an earlier period. They form part of a chain of decisions that culminates in the present-day controversy over industrial development at Vuda. The incinerator proposal does not emerge in a vacuum. It rests on a history in which the status of the land has already been contested, reinterpreted, and ultimately reclassified.

It is within this context that the proposed 900,000 tonne per year waste-to-energy incinerator must be understood. Unlike the earlier tourism proposal, which at least attempted to operate within the language of low-density development and environmental mitigation, the incinerator represents a fundamentally different land use with far greater ecological and public health implications. Such facilities involve continuous waste combustion, emissions management, ash disposal, and heavy industrial infrastructure. These characteristics sit uneasily with a site previously identified as a migratory bird habitat and a candidate for conservation status. The shift from rejecting tourism on environmental grounds to entertaining a large-scale incinerator raises a profound question about whether the original environmental safeguards have been diluted, bypassed, or simply reinterpreted to fit a predetermined outcome.

That history demands a clear answer to a simple question. If Naikorokoro Point was once deemed too sensitive for tourism development, on what basis can it now be considered suitable for a large-scale waste-to-energy facility?

Until that question is addressed with transparency and evidence, the documents will continue to speak for themselves. They show that the concerns raised today are not new. They were identified, documented, and formally recognised more than a decade ago. The difference is that those concerns were once sufficient to stop development.

They no longer appear to be. Why, why, why?

VUDAGATE. The Naikorokoro Lease: How a "HOTEL TOURISM" Approval to Rob Cromb Morphed Into A $1.4 Billion Waste-To-Energy Controversy

7/5/2026

What emerges from the official lease documents for the Naikorokoro Point site in Vuda is not merely a bureaucratic paper trail, but a deeply troubling narrative of regulatory drift, legal ambiguity, and potential misuse of State land for purposes far removed from those originally approved.

At the centre of this controversy is a formal Approval Notice of Lease issued by the Department of Lands & Survey, granting Naikorokoro Development Pte Limited rights over approximately 75 hectares of State foreshore land at Saweni Point.

The lease, effective from 31 July 2022 for a period of 10 years, was explicitly approved for “Hotel/Tourism and other Commercial Developments.”

The annual rent? A strikingly low $1,000 per annum, subject to survey adjustments. That alone raises eyebrows. But it is the conditions attached to the lease, and how they compare with the actual proposed use of the land, that exposes the deeper issue.

A Lease Built For Tourism Not Toxic Waste

The Development Lease Conditions are unambiguous in their intent. The lessee is required to develop the land in conjunction with hotel/tourism and commercial activities, submit detailed subdivision and engineering plans within strict timelines, obtain approvals from the Lautoka City Council before any works commence, complete development milestones within 6, 9, and 12 months respectively, and maintain the land, ensure environmental upkeep, and comply with all local authority requirements

Most critically, upon satisfactory completion, the State undertakes to grant a 99-year lease specifically for HOTEL TOURISM and commercial activities.

There is no mention, anywhere, of heavy industry, incineration, waste processing, or energy generation facilities.

And yet, in a separate development proposal form tied to the same site, the declared project is explicitly: “Energy-from-Waste (EfW) facility and commercial port… ncluding power grid connection and workers accommodation.”

The justification? “To produce energy for the electricity grid from residual waste, and to provide a commercial port.” This is not a hotel. This is not tourism. This is a large-scale industrial waste incineration facility with port infrastructure.

A Fundamental Legal Mismatch

This discrepancy is not a minor administrative oversight. It goes to the heart of land use legality. Under the State Lands Act framework and the lease conditions themselves, the purpose of the lease is a binding condition.

Any material deviation, especially from tourism to heavy industrial use, would ordinarily require a formal variation of lease purpose, fresh approvals from planning and environmental authorities, potentially a new lease or reclassification of land use, and public consultation and environmental scrutiny

There is no evidence within these documents that such a transformation, from tourism to waste incineration, was ever lawfully approved at the lease level.

Instead, what appears is a post-approval repurposing of land, raising serious questions: Was the original tourism lease used as a gateway approval, only to later introduce an entirely different project? Were decision-makers fully informed at the time of granting the lease? Or has the project evolved in a manner that now sits outside the legal boundaries of the lease itself?

State Foreshore Land and the Public Trust

The land in question is not ordinary freehold property. It is classified as State Foreshore Land, a category that carries heightened public interest considerations. Foreshore areas are environmentally sensitive, often involving mangrove ecosystems, coastal fisheries, community access zones, and climate resilience functions.

To allocate such land for tourism is one thing. To convert it into a waste-to-energy incineration hub with a commercial port is quite another. The lease itself reinforces State control through strict conditions, including prohibition on transfer or subleasing without consent, reservation of mineral rights to the State, compliance with all lawful directives of Lautoka City Council, and cancellation rights upon breach of conditions.

If the current project deviates from the approved purpose, the State retains the legal basis to re-enter, cancel, or impose penalties under Clause 16 of the lease conditions.

The Timeline Problem

Another issue lies in timing. The lease required subdivision approval within 6 months, engineering approval within 9 months, and commencement of works within 12 months. Given the lease took effect in July 2022, these milestones would have fallen within 2023.

Yet, the project now being publicly discussed, valued at $1.4 billion, appears to have emerged well beyond those initial timelines, raising questions about whether the original development conditions were ever met, whether extensions or waivers were granted, and whether the lease should have lapsed or been reconsidered

The Commercial Port Dimension

The proposal’s inclusion of a commercial port adds another layer of complexity. Ports are not incidental developments. They trigger maritime and environmental approvals, national infrastructure oversight, and potential international shipping implications. Combined with an EfW facility, the port strongly suggests the possibility of waste importation or large-scale material handling, an issue that directly intersects with Fiji’s obligations under regional environmental frameworks such as the Waigani Convention.

A Project on Legally Fragile Ground

Taken together, these documents tell a story that cannot be ignored. A lease granted for tourism development at a nominal rent on sensitive foreshore land now underpins a proposal for a massive industrial waste-to-energy project with port facilities.

The legal, environmental, and governance implications are profound. At minimum, the following questions demand urgent answers: (1) Has the lease purpose been formally varied, and if so, when and how? (2) Did the Lautoka City Council approve an EfW facility under a tourism zoning framework? (3) Were the original development conditions complied with, or quietly bypassed? (4) Is the State now exposed to legal risk for allowing a use inconsistent with its own lease terms?

This is no longer simply a development issue. It is a matter of public law, land governance, and national accountability.

And unless these contradictions are resolved transparently, the Naikorokoro lease may well become the defining case study of how State land can be repurposed far beyond its legal mandate, without the public ever being properly told.

Naikorokoro Lease Transfer to Next Generation: Lawyers Seek State Consent for Vuda Land Deal

A letter dated 18 December 2025 from Siwatibau & Sloan places a critical piece of the Vuda land puzzle on record. Addressed to the Director of Lands, the firm confirms that it is acting for both parties in an application to transfer State Lease 16531. The document identifies the transferor as Naikorokoro Developments Pte Limited and the transferee as The Next Generation Holdings (Fiji) Pte Limited.

This is a formal application for State consent, a mandatory requirement before any lease over State land can be legally transferred. The lawyers state that they act on behalf of both the outgoing and incoming entities and enclose the standard documentation required for approval. These include the application for consent, a certified copy of the lease, the executed agreement to transfer, the instrument of transfer itself, receipts for land rent, company registration records, shareholder and director schedules, and passport identification pages for the directors of the transferee company.

The letter records a sense of urgency. The firm requests that copies of the application be accepted while original documents are still in transit from Australia, with a commitment to submit the originals upon arrival. The application is described as being carried by the bearer of the letter, indicating that the process was being handled with immediacy at the Lands Department.

Two administrative stamps appear on the document. A “Fees Paid” stamp records a payment of $112.50 dated 18 December 2025. A second stamp confirms receipt by the Director of Lands office on the same date. These markings show that the application was formally lodged and processed at the administrative level.

The significance of the letter lies in the clarity with which it identifies the parties. Naikorokoro Developments, already linked to the Vuda landholding, is shown transferring its interest to The Next Generation Holdings (Fiji) Pte Limited, a company within the same corporate orbit as the proponents of the proposed waste to energy project. This establishes a direct transactional link between the landholding entity and the corporate structure associated with the development.

The document does not describe the intended use of the land. It is a technical instrument seeking consent to transfer a State lease. Yet, placed alongside the wider record, it reveals the moment at which control of the lease was being repositioned. In any project involving State land, that step is decisive. Without consent and registration of transfer, no new entity can claim lawful rights over the property.

This letter therefore stands as a key administrative record. It shows that by mid December 2025, a formal attempt was underway to move the Vuda lease from Naikorokoro Developments into the hands of The Next Generation Holdings (Fiji) Pte Limited.

NEXT: Naikorokoro Developments Pte Limited: Corporate Form, Control, and the Lyndhurst Nexus

Fijileaks Right All Along: Acting FICAC Commissioner LAVI ROKOIKA Shielded by De Facto Officer Doctrine as High Court Rules Appointment Challenge Must Be Brought by Judicial Review, Not via Stay Application

5/5/2026

Justice Siainiu Fa’alogo Bull

FIGHTING for Stay Applications: Biman Prasad and Manoa Kamikamica

FICAC Appointment Challenge Belongs In Civil Court: High Court Vindicates Long-Standing De Facto Officer Doctrine

Justice Siainiu Fa’alogo Bull has dismissed former Deputy Prime Minister Manoa Kamikamica’s permanent stay application, holding that any challenge to Acting FICAC Commissioner Lavi Rokoika’s appointment must be brought by judicial review in the civil jurisdiction, not smuggled into the criminal proceedings as a stay application.

This is the point I have argued all along: even if there is a serious public law challenge to the appointment of an office-holder, that does not automatically invalidate every act performed by that office-holder while apparently holding office. That is precisely where the de facto officer doctrine operates.

The ruling is important because it draws a firm line between two separate questions. The first is whether Rokoika’s appointment as Acting FICAC Commissioner was legally valid. The second is whether criminal charges filed under her authority should collapse before that question is determined in proper civil proceedings.

Justice Bull’s answer is that the criminal court is not the proper forum to determine the appointment issue, especially where the President and Prime Minister, whose constitutional roles may be directly implicated, are not parties before the Court.

That is orthodox public law. A criminal accused may complain of abuse of process, bad faith, oppression, or incurable unfairness. But a stay is an exceptional remedy. It is not a substitute for judicial review. It is not a roving commission to determine the legality of high constitutional appointments in proceedings where the necessary public actors are absent.

The decisive passage is the Court’s acceptance that Rokoika had been acting in the role since 29 May 2025 and continued to perform the functions of the office. On that basis, the Court held that the de facto doctrine applied, meaning that actions taken under her authority, including the laying of charges, remained valid.

That is the heart of the matter.

The de facto officer doctrine is a common law principle designed to protect public administration from collapse. It preserves the validity of official acts performed by a person who appeared to hold public office under colour of authority, even if a later court finds some defect in the appointment. Its policy basis is practical and constitutional: the public, third parties, complainants, witnesses, prosecutors, police, courts, and accused persons cannot be left in legal chaos every time an appointment is challenged.

As one formulation puts it, the doctrine protects official acts from collateral attack where an officer acts under colourable authority, even if the appointment is later found defective. Another classic statement says an officer de facto is one whose acts the law will hold valid on grounds of policy and justice, so far as they affect the public and third persons.

Applied to FICAC, the principle is straightforward. If Rokoika occupied the office publicly, performed the functions of Acting Commissioner, and was treated by the State machinery as exercising that office, then charges filed under her authority are not automatically void merely because an accused person alleges her appointment was unlawful.

That does not mean her appointment is immune from challenge. It means the challenge must be brought in the proper proceeding, against the proper parties, with the proper remedies sought.

This is why the High Court’s reference to judicial review is critical. A judicial review proceeding would allow the legality of the appointment to be tested directly. The President, Prime Minister, Judicial Services Commission, or other necessary constitutional actors could be joined or heard. The court could then decide whether the appointment was valid, invalid, voidable, prospectively invalid, or whether any relief should be refused or limited because of public consequences.

A criminal stay application cannot do that cleanly. It asks the criminal court to halt a prosecution by deciding an anterior constitutional question in a proceeding not designed for that purpose. That is why the Court appears to have rejected the attempt.

The ruling also weakens the broader argument that every FICAC prosecution authorised under Rokoika must be treated as contaminated. That argument was always too blunt. The law distinguishes between an unlawful appointment and the legal effect of acts already done by the apparent office-holder. The doctrine exists precisely because public law cannot operate on the simplistic formula: defective appointment equals void acts.

For Kamikamica, the immediate effect is that his prosecution proceeds. He faces one count of perjury under the Crimes Act 2009, with an alternative charge of giving false information to a public servant, arising from alleged statements about involvement in the FICAC Commissioner appointment process.

For Biman Prasad, the ruling is also significant. It does not decide his case, but it creates a serious obstacle to any argument that his charge must be stayed merely because Rokoika’s appointment is under challenge. If he wishes to attack the appointment, the proper route is likely judicial review.

But unless and until that challenge succeeds, and unless the reviewing court grants relief that invalidates relevant prosecutorial acts, the de facto officer doctrine points strongly toward the continuing validity of charges laid under Rokoika’s apparent authority.

The same applies to any accused person trying to convert the Rokoika appointment controversy into an automatic criminal defence. The High Court has now indicated that the appointment challenge belongs in civil court. The criminal court remains concerned with the charge, the evidence, fairness, and abuse of process, not with conducting a full constitutional appointment inquiry in the absence of the constitutional actors whose decisions are being attacked.

The ruling therefore vindicates the position that FICAC’s institutional acts cannot simply be wished away by branding the Acting Commissioner’s appointment unlawful.

The law requires more discipline than that. There must be a direct challenge. There must be evidence. There must be proper parties. And even then, the court must confront the de facto officer doctrine before disturbing acts already performed in the name of public administration.

From Fijileaks Archives

Legal Overview: The Rayawa Appointment & the Kunatuba Precedent

*In 2008, I revealed in the Fiji Sun that the FLP leader and then interim Finance Minister in the Bainimarama post-coup Cabinet, Mahendra Chaudhry, was holding
$2 million in a Sydney bank account. As historical records show, despite the arrest, detention, torture, and deportation of the late Fiji Sun publisher Russell Hunter for refusing to disclose who within FRCA had provided me with Chaudhry's 300 page tax file, Chaudhry was charged and brought before the Fiji High Court.
*His lawyers argued that the charging officer - Aca Rawaya - was NOT properly qualified for appointment and therefore lacked lawful authority to sanction or institute proceedings.
*Justice Paul Madigan rejected this collateral challenge (Chaudhry v State (Madigan J., 6 March 2014), replying explicitly on the earlier and decisive case of Peniasi Kunatuba (Shameen J), which established strong presumptions in favour of the validity of official acts, even where appointments are alleged to be flawed.
*What baffles me is that Rayawa is now calling on Temo to issue a directive instructing the courts not to accept any charges, while Tanya Waqanika leads the chorus on Facebook, urging Fiji and the world to take notice of Rawaya's intervention that any charges brought by Lavi Rokoika should be rejected because her appointment was tainted from the outset.

Editorial Note: This article below was written on 1 December 2025 but, due to other commitments and unforseen delays, was not published on Fijileaks at the time. It is being released now in the interests of public record and ongoing discussion, and to counter the narrative peddled by Rayawa and Waqanika on their recent Facebook postings

High Court Upholds Authority: Shameem J Reaffirms Presumption of Valid Appointment in Kunutaba, Madigan J in Chaudhry v State

The 2006 High Court ruling in Peniasi Kunatuba v State (HAM0066/2006) remains one of the clearest judicial statements on the constitutional presumption of validity surrounding senior public-office appointments, particularly the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Justice Nazhat Shameem rejected an attempt by the defence to derail an abuse-of-office prosecution by arguing that then-DPP Josaia Naigulevu was not properly qualified for office, and therefore lacked authority to sign the sanction and information initiating the charges.

The defence’s gambit hinged on Section 114 and 130 of the 1997 Constitution, which require the DPP to be a person qualified for appointment as a judge, meaning at least seven years’ post-admission practice as a barrister and solicitor, either in Fiji or another country. The defence insisted Naigulevu had never been admitted to the Fiji Bar, and that his experience as a state counsel could not be treated as post-admission practice.

Shameem J disagreed, firmly.

The prosecution produced the DPP’s letters of appointment, his New Zealand admission certificate, degree documents, and evidence that he had practised law overseas before joining the DPP’s office. Whether his Fiji admission (or lack of it) was relevant to the seven-year requirement was, the judge noted, a matter for proper judicial review, not a criminal trial diversion.

Central to the ruling was the long-standing common law principle omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta — that official acts are presumed valid unless clearly proven otherwise. This presumption applies particularly to public officers acting within their duties. The defence, Shameem J held, had “not discharged its burden” to rebut that presumption.

To clarify, the court did not finally decide whether Naigulevu was, in fact, correctly qualified under constitutional standards. Instead, it held that any challenge to the validity of his appointment had to be brought in the civil jurisdiction via judicial review, not used to invalidate a criminal prosecution already underway.

The DPP was presumed validly appointed. His signature on the sanction and information stood. The criminal case against Kunatuba was allowed to proceed.

Shameem J’s final line says it all: “The pleas are valid. The trial may proceed.”

For Fiji’s legal and political watchers, the judgment is a reminder of how courts navigate qualification challenges involving constitutional office holders, and why such challenges must follow proper procedure, rather than being used as tactical weapons in criminal defence.

Legal Overview: The Rayawa Appointment & the Kunatuba Precedent

The Fiji High Court ruling in Chaudhry v State (Madigan J., 6 March 2014) sets out a critical analysis of how Fiji’s courts treat challenges to a prosecutor’s appointment. Central to the ruling is the argument that Acting DPP Aca Rayawa was not qualified for appointment and therefore could not lawfully sanction or institute proceedings.

Justice Madigan rejected this collateral challenge, grounding his reasoning explicitly in the earlier and decisive case of Peniasi Kunatuba (Shameem J.), which established strong presumptions validating official acts even where appointments are alleged to be flawed.

This overview distills the ruling with specific focus on (1) the legal foundations of Rayawa’s appointment, (2) how the court relied on Kunatuba, and (3) the significance of the de facto officer doctrine in safeguarding prosecutions from technical collapse.

The Challenge to Aca Rayawa’s Appointment

Mahendra Chaudhry’s counsel argued that Rayawa, when he signed the original 2010 information, lacked the required ten years’ experience and was therefore ineligible to be appointed Acting DPP. If true, the defence argued, the prosecution lacked the statutory consent required under section 2(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Exchange Control Act.

The defence attempted a three-step inference: (1) Rayawa was admitted in 2004–05, (2) He did not meet the 10-year requirement of the Administration of Justice Decree or State Service Decree, and therefore (3) his “consent” to prosecute was invalid and the information should be quashed.

Justice Madigan found this chain not only unproven but legally irrelevant given long-standing doctrines on validity of official acts.

The Kunatuba Precedent: Presumption of Regularity

To address the challenge, Madigan invoked the ruling of Shameem J. in Kunatuba where an identical argument had been raised regarding the DPP’s appointment. The court in Kunatuba held Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta. Until proven otherwise, official acts and appointments are presumed valid.

The principle is broad:

Courts must avoid turning criminal trials into collateral inquiries about appointments of DPPs, FICAC officers, police, or statutory officers.
Any challenge to the validity of appointment belongs to the civil courts, not in interlocutory skirmishes inside criminal proceedings.

Madigan directly reproduced this reasoning, emphasising that allowing such challenges would paralyse prosecutions by spawning mini-trials about professional résumés, administrative irregularities, or internal government processes.

The De Facto Officer Doctrine: Strengthening the Shield

Madigan advanced the analysis further by invoking the de facto officer doctrine, a powerful common law rule that validates official acts even when the appointment itself is defective.

Key points highlighted:

A person who acts in an official capacity, is accepted by the public, and appears to hold the office is treated as validly exercising that office.
This protects the public interest and prevents retrospective collapse of official acts, administrative decisions, convictions, or prosecutions.
Authorities from New Zealand, England, and the Fiji Court of Appeal (e.g., Bainimarama v Heffernan) were used to reinforce the point.

Madigan concluded that Rayawa was at minimum a de facto Acting DPP, even if the appointment was technically flawed. Thus “All information and documents he signed were validly performed.”

Effect on the Chaudhry Prosecution

Applying Kunatuba and the de facto doctrine, the Court held:

Rayawa’s signature validly instituted the proceedings.
Section 2(1) of Part II of the Fifth Schedule to the Exchange Control Act was fully satisfied.
The challenge to jurisdiction failed.

Madigan then proceeded to dismiss all other grounds (statutory construction, duplicity), clearing the way for trial.

Legal Significance of the Rayawa–Kunatuba Framework

A. Shielding criminal proceedings from technical sabotage

The ruling confirms that criminal courts will not derail prosecutions over appointment irregularities unless invalidity is definitively established in the proper forum.

B. Ensuring continuity of prosecutorial authority

Even where a DPP or Acting DPP is later shown to lack eligibility, their acts remain operative.

C. Affirmation of institutional stability

Judges emphasise that allowing collateral attacks would invite chaos: every police officer’s appointment, prosecutor’s promotion, or ministerial delegation could become grounds to challenge indictments.

D. Benchmark for future challenges

Anyone attempting to attack prosecutorial authority must do so by bringing a civil proceeding specifically challenging the appointment, and not using the criminal case as a platform for collateral review.

Conclusion

Justice Madigan’s ruling re-affirmed that Aca Rayawa’s appointment, valid or not, could not be used to invalidate the prosecution against Chaudhry, because both the Kunatuba presumption and the de facto officer doctrine rendered his official acts legally effective. The decision entrenches a strong barrier against collateral challenges to prosecutorial authority, ensuring that criminal trials proceed on their merits rather than administrative technicalities.

State v Mohammed Saneem: The Judiciary Reaffirms the “Rayawa Principle”: No Collateral Attacks on Prosecutorial Appointments

The Suva Magistrates Court’s ruling in State v Mohammed Saneem [2024] FJMC 40; Criminal Case 324 of 2024 (18 December 2024) is more than a procedural decision on pre-trial issues; it is a reaffirmation of a long-standing judicial doctrine in Fiji: prosecutorial acts remain valid even when the appointment of the DPP or Acting DPP is subsequently impugned. This doctrine, originating in Kunatuba and crystallised in Chaudhry, rests heavily on the case of Aca Rayawa, whose appointment as Acting DPP was found questionable, yet whose decisions were still deemed legally effective.

In this ruling, the court invoked the Rayawa precedent almost verbatim, effectively shutting down a defence attempt to invalidate the charge on the basis that Acting DPP John Rabuku was later declared ineligible for the position by the Supreme Court. The message is unmistakable: criminal courts will not entertain collateral challenges to the validity of appointments to the prosecutorial office, and the de facto officer doctrine remains firmly intact.

Why the Rayawa/Kunatuba Doctrine Matters

The defence’s argument was straightforward:

The Supreme Court’s June 2024 advisory opinion stated that Rabuku was not eligible to hold the office of DPP, and therefore
Any charge he sanctioned, including Saneem’s, must be invalid.

The court’s response was equally direct: this issue is already settled law, and settled against the defence.

The magistrate relied on the Kunatuba ruling and the Rayawa reasoning reproduced in Chaudhry v State. The principle, rooted in the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, is that a person acting in an official capacity is presumed to have been properly appointed, and their official acts are valid unless proven otherwise in the proper forum.

In the Rayawa example, even though there were concerns about his eligibility, everything he signed, sanctioned, or decided as Acting DPP remained legally sound because he was accepted as a de facto office-holder.
The Magistrates Court applies this same principle to Rabuku.

How the Court Applies the Rayawa Doctrine

1. Rabuku acted as de facto DPP
The court notes that Rabuku:

was appointed,
acted in the role,
was accepted by all relevant authorities as Acting DPP, and
made prosecutorial decisions in that capacity.

Therefore, following Rayawa, all his official acts, including sanctioning the charges against Saneem, are legally valid, whether or not his appointment was technically defective.

2. The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion has no retrospective effect
The ruling emphasised that the Supreme Court issued advice, not a mandatory order invalidating past acts. Its opinion does not retroactively void earlier prosecutorial decisions. Rabuku’s prior acts stand untouched.

3. Criminal courts will not intrude into civil/constitutional territory

The court again relied on Justice Shameem’s viewpoint from Kunatuba that criminal courts must be cautious not to wander into matters reserved for civil courts like challenging the legality of appointments of prosecutors or statutory officials.

Allowing such challenges in criminal proceedings, the judgment warns, would open the floodgates to endless litigation over whether every police officer, prosecutor, or statutory authority was “validly appointed,” paralysing the justice system.

4. The presumption of validity prevails

Until a civil court declares otherwise through proper procedure, the appointment stands for the purposes of criminal prosecution. The defence cannot circumvent this through pre-trial motions.

The Larger Significance

The reaffirmation of the Rayawa/Kunatuba/Chaudhry doctrine has important implications:

1. Shielding prosecutions from political turbulence

In Fiji’s politically charged environment, senior public-law appointments are frequently contested. This doctrine protects criminal prosecutions from being derailed every time a constitutional or administrative appointment is challenged.

2. Reinforcing judicial stability and procedural integrity

The judgment underlines consistency in judicial precedent and gives predictability to litigants and prosecutors. It clarifies that the courtroom is not the place to relitigate appointment disputes.

3. Preserving the continuity of the criminal justice system

Had the court accepted the defence position, it could have jeopardised hundreds of pending cases, past prosecutions sanctioned by Rabuku, and the functioning of the DPP’s Office itself.

The ruling avoids that instability.

Conclusion

The Rayawa principle, born out of Kunatuba and affirmed in Chaudhry, once again proved decisive. In State v Saneem, the court dismissed the attack on Acting DPP Rabuku’s authority by holding that all acts performed by a de facto office-holder remain legally valid.

This is a clear signal: Criminal proceedings cannot be weaponised to challenge the legitimacy of appointments. The validity of charges does not hinge on the perfection of the appointing process but on the role actually exercised and accepted at the time. The judgment stands firmly on precedent, ensuring continuity and preventing the criminal justice system from becoming collateral damage in broader political or constitutional disputes.

Establishing the De Facto Doctrine in Judicial Appointments. Insights from Gokaraju Rangaraju v State of Andhra Pradesh, Indian Supreme Court, 15 April 1981

Background

The appellant, Gokaraju Rangaraju, challenged the validity of judgments pronounced by Shri G. Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena, both Additional Sessions Judges, whose appointments were later quashed by the Supreme Court for violating Article 233 of the Constitution. The central question was whether the prior judgments rendered by these judges retained their validity in light of their impermissible appointments.

Key Issues

Effect of invalid judicial appointments on past judgments.
Applicability and limitations of the de facto doctrine in Indian law.
Balancing public policy and legal propriety in judicial proceedings.

Parties Involved:

Appellant: Gokaraju Rangaraju
Respondent: State of Andhra Pradesh

Summary of Judgment

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the judgments pronounced by Shri G. Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena despite their appointments being declared invalid. The court invoked the de facto doctrine, emphasizing that actions performed by these judges in the course of their assumed judicial authority are to be regarded as valid and binding.

This stance is rooted in public policy and the necessity to prevent legal chaos and protect the interests of the public and third parties. Consequently, the appeals challenging the prior judgments were dismissed, reaffirming the principles underpinning the de facto doctrine in the Indian legal system.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court's legal reasoning hinged on the distinction between de facto and de jure authority. The central tenet is that while the appointment of a judge may be procedurally flawed, the actions undertaken in the genuine execution of judicial functions must be respected to prevent legal uncertainty and societal disruption. The court emphasized the following points:

Doctrine of Necessity: The de facto doctrine is essential to maintain the continuity and stability of the judicial system, safeguarding against the annulment of judgments that could lead to chaos and public disillusionment.
Public Policy: Upholding the de facto actions aligns with public policy by ensuring that private rights and public interests are protected from being undermined by technicalities in judicial appointments.
Legal Continuity: The judgments and orders issued by de facto judges carry the same legal weight as those by de jure judges, ensuring that legal processes are not rendered ineffective due to procedural lapses.
Constitutional Provisions: The court referenced Article 71(2) of the Constitution and Section 107(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to illustrate that the legislature recognizes and incorporates the principles underlying the de facto doctrine.
Comparative Jurisprudence: By drawing parallels with international cases, the court underscored the universal applicability and acceptance of the doctrine, reinforcing its validity within the Indian legal framework.

Two Men, Two Cases, and Two Very Different Worlds:

Why Prasad’s Disclosure Charges Are Not the Same as Kamikamica’s Alleged Perjury

Once again, government operatives and coalition sympathisers want to muddy the waters. The spin machine is already in overdrive: “Everyone is being charged,” “the cases are similar,” “nothing to see here.”

But strip away the political fog, and the two cases now before the courts are worlds apart, legally, morally, and constitutionally.

Prasad: The Economics Professor With a Disclosure Problem

Professor Biman Chand Prasad walked into the Suva Magistrates Court to answer charges that have stalked him for years: false declarations and failure to disclose.

Let’s be clear. These are not trivial slips of memory. These are the very breaches that the Political Parties Act was designed to prevent.

Prasad stands accused of omitting his directorship and other relevant interests from his statutory declarations, documents that the law treats as sacrosanct because they protect the public from precisely the gamesmanship Fiji has seen from politicians for decades.

The allegation?

He filed declarations that were recklessly incomplete, to mislead the public and breach the transparency obligations he publicly champions.

These are regulatory offences. They turn on paperwork, timelines, and corporate records.

Kamikamica: A Minister Accused of Lying Under Oath About a Constitutional Appointment

Now look at Manoa Kamikamica. He is not charged with forgetting a form, omitting a company, or failing to update an asset register. He is charged with perjury. The most direct attack any public official can mount against the justice system. This is not about a filing error. This is not about negligence. This is not about oversight. This is about a senior minister allegedly swearing under oath that he had no role in the appointment of Barbara Malimali as the FICAC Commissioner, and then repeating that same statement to a Commissioner of Inquiry.

If proven, this is a deliberate, knowing deception on a matter central to constitutional accountability. The FICAC Commissioner is not some mid-level bureaucrat. It is a statutory officer who sits at the heart of Fiji’s anti-corruption machinery.

If a minister knowingly misled the inquiry investigating that appointment, the issue is not “bad paperwork.”

It is obstruction of constitutional oversight.

Perjury carries the weight it does for a reason. It tears at the fabric of the rule of law. A democracy cannot function if ministers can lie under oath and expect no consequences.

The Spin Doctors Will Try to Equate Them. Don’t Be Misled

Expect the talking points to appear in synchronised formation:

“They’re all being treated the same.”
“Charges are charges.”
“This is political persecution.”
“It’s just technicalities.”

Nonsense. Legally, the cases are in different universes. Prasad’s case is about reckless omission in a statutory declaration. Kamikamica’s case is about allegedly lying under oath in a matter involving the appointment of the very person meant to police corruption in government. That goes far beyond ethics; it strikes at the core of constitutional governance.

Perjury is not a paperwork offence.

It is a threat to the integrity of judicial and quasi-judicial processes.

And Let’s Not Forget the Context

Prasad’s problems stem from years of quiet omissions, cosy arrangements, and concealed corporate relationships finally catching up with him. The public suspected; the documents confirmed.

Kamikamica’s case exploded in the open because a Commissioner of Inquiry forced the country to look directly at how and by whom key accountability positions were filled during a period of political turbulence.

These are not overlapping narratives.

They are two separate crises in honesty, one administrative, one constitutional.

Prasad is accused of failing to tell the public the whole truth.

Kamikamica is accused of lying under oath about a matter that goes to the heart of state integrity.

One case is about transparency. The other is about the rule of law. Do not let anyone pretend otherwise.

In Biman Prasad's case, he had a duty to disclose, and the case is a strict liability one

VUDAGATE: THE $5,000 PAPER TRAIL: LYNDHURST PAYMENT To The Environment Trust Account Raises Questions Over the EIA Process. Was Lyndhurst acting as a principal, an agent, or an intermediary for TNG Fiji?

5/5/2026

TNG (Fiji) came into legal existence in September 2025. Yet within weeks, it is not that entity but Lyndhurst Pte Limited that surfaces in the official paper trail, paying the $5,000 Environment Trust application fee in October for the very EIA lodged in TNG Fiji’s name.

That sequence is not a trivial administrative overlap. It cuts directly to the question of legal identity at the point the project entered the regulatory system. If TNG Fiji was the proponent, why did another company fund the statutory gateway into the EIA process? And if Lyndhurst was paying, under what authority was it acting and in what capacity?

The timing sharpens the issue. The project appears to have been initiated before TNG Fiji was fully established, yet the financial obligation tied to that same application is discharged by Lyndhurst after incorporation. This creates a continuous thread linking Lyndhurst to the project both before and after the formal creation of the supposed project vehicle.

The $5,000 payment therefore does more than evidence compliance. It exposes a structural inconsistency: a project presented under one corporate name, but financially advanced by another. Whether Lyndhurst was acting as principal, agent, or intermediary is no longer an abstract question. It is now anchored in the documentary record.

The document reproduced above is a bank transfer confirmation issued by HFC Bank, recording a payment of $5,000.00 from Lyndhurst PTE Limited to the Government’s Environment Trust Account. Dated 16 October 2025 and marked as “settled”, the transaction is formally tied, through its narration field, to “Proposal No_EIA-W/140/2025”, indicating a direct connection to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) application.

At a superficial level, the document appears routine. It reflects a standard regulatory payment processed through formal banking channels. Yet, when placed within the wider context of the Vuda waste to energy project and the entities associated with it, the transfer assumes greater significance.

The payment is not merely administrative. It is evidential. It places Lyndhurst within an EIA process linked to a highly controversial development that has already attracted scrutiny over land use, zoning, and environmental risk. The specific reference to an EIA proposal number confirms that this was not a general fee but a targeted payment connected to a defined project pathway.

Of equal importance are the authorisation trails embedded within the document. The transaction bears approvals attributed to Rokoseru Nabalarua and John Barton, both of whom are now part of the documentary chain associated with this payment. In regulatory and investigative terms, such approvals establish accountability. They identify the individuals who reviewed and authorised the transfer. In any subsequent inquiry, whether administrative or legal, these names become central to reconstructing the decision making process.

The involvement of the Environment Trust Account is also significant. This account is used to receive statutory fees linked to environmental approvals, including EIA submissions. Payments into this account are procedural requirements for advancing development proposals. The $5,000 payment therefore represents a formal step in initiating or progressing the EIA process.

What emerges is a structured financial trail. A private entity initiates a payment to a government linked environmental account tied to a specific EIA proposal and authorised by identifiable individuals. This is both a record of compliance and a record of participation.

The critical issue is not whether the payment was lawful. It likely was as part of standard procedure. The issue is what it reveals about Lyndhurst’s role within the project timeline. It raises questions as to whether Lyndhurst was acting as a principal, an agent, or an intermediary for another entity such as TNG Fiji. It also raises the question of how this transaction aligns with wider claims about project ownership, partnerships, and undeclared interests that have surfaced in the Vuda files.

This document fixes a date, a sum, a purpose, and a set of responsible actors. It converts speculation into a verifiable sequence of events.

In the unfolding story of the Vuda incinerator project, that sequence is critical.

LYNDHURST EIA FILING NAMES LOTE RUSAQOLI LAKOLAKO AS KEY CONTACT FOR PROJECT

This extract from the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) application identifies Lote Rusaqoli Lakolako as the designated contact person responsible for handling all communications with the relevant authorities.

Acting in the capacity of EIA Principal Consultant, Lakolako serves as the formal interface between the project proponent linked in this filing to Lyndhurst, and the EIA Administrator.

Such disclosure is not merely procedural. The named consultant carries professional responsibility for the preparation and integrity of the submission, as well as for responding to regulatory queries, supplying additional material, and guiding the application through the screening phase.

In effect, Lakolako becomes the accountable voice of the project within the statutory EIA process.

The document confirms Lyndhurst’s involvement through the consultant’s listed e-mail domain in the original filing, indicating that the environmental work is being undertaken within, or on behalf of, that corporate structure.

The extract also records that the proposal has been classified as a “Part 1” application, placing it within the EIA Administrator’s processing track. This initial categorisation means the burden now rests on Lakolako and the Lyndhurst-associated consultancy to satisfy the regulatory threshold before any escalation to more rigorous approval stages.

DEPARTMENT OF LANDS & SURVEY, GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, SUVA, APPROVAL NOTICE OF LEASE

Your application to lease a piece of State Land as shown on the attached plan has been approved on the following terms and conditions:

Land Description

Part of foreshore areas north of Lot 1 ND 5003, east of Lot 2 SO1601 and west of Lot 1 SO 5139 & Lot 1 SO 1265 – Naikorokoro Point (Saweni PT OF)
District: Vuda
Province: Ba
Estimated Area: 75 hectares (subject to survey)
Term10 years with effect from 31st July 2022
Rent (Payable half yearly in advance) - $1,000 per annum
Survey Fee: To be assessed after survey.
Rental is subject to determination of area after survey.
Purpose: Development Lease – Hotel/Tourism and other Commercial Developments
Ownership: State Foreshore Land

Conditions

Lease to be subject to the conditions set out in the State Lands (Leases and Licences) Regulations, a summary of which is attached herewith. This is a protected lease under the provisions of the State Lands Act.
You are to pay the estimated balance of survey fee, together with rent assessed on the estimated area of the land, from the date of commencement of the lease without delay to the Director of Lands, Suva.
If you do not pay the rent and execute this lease within 6 months from the date of this notice, the approval of the lease will be cancelled without further notice.
You may not occupy the land approved for lease until you have executed and received a stamped copy of this lease.
In the event of it being shown by survey that the land approved for lease forms part of any existing freehold or leasehold title, this approval notice of lease shall be deemed to be cancelled without prejudice or loss to the Government.

To:
Naikorokoro Development Pte Limited
P.O. Box 7728
Valelevu

Approval Notice of Lease No.: 11002
Date Registered: 04 April 2023 at 9:11am
Registrar of Deeds

Fees
Drawing Fee: $32.70
Registration Fee: $2.18
Total: $34.88

A/C No: --
Land Ref: LD 60/997
Date: --

For Director of Lands
(Signature)
Senior Lands Officer
(Signature)

FORESHORE LEASE, FUTURE QUESTIONS: HOW NAIKOROKORO POINT ENTERED PRIVATE HANDS

The document reproduced above, an Approval Notice of Lease issued by the Department of Lands and Survey, marked a pivotal administrative step in the transformation of Naikorokoro Point at Saweni, Vuda. At the time it was registered on 4 April 2023, it confirmed that the State had approved an application by Naikorokoro Development Pte Limited to lease approximately 75 hectares of land.

Today, that same document continues to sit at the heart of a growing controversy over what the State intended, what it authorised, and what may ultimately be built on this stretch of foreshore.

The notice stated that the land comprised “part of foreshore areas”, a classification that was legally significant even then and remains so now. Foreshore land is not ordinary State land. It carries environmental sensitivity, public access implications, and heightened expectations of regulatory oversight. In 2023, the State proceeded to approve its lease for development purposes. In the present context, that decision is being revisited through a far sharper lens, as questions emerge about compliance, consultation, and the broader public interest.

The lease was granted for a ten-year term, backdated to take effect from 31 July 2022, with an annual rent of $1,000, payable half-yearly in advance. At the time, the figure appeared modest; in retrospect, it appears strikingly low for a coastal parcel of such scale and potential value. While the notice indicated that both the exact area and rental could be adjusted following survey, the optics of the arrangement continue to raise legitimate concerns about valuation and the State’s approach to monetising public land.

The conditions attached to the approval were standard in form but revealing in implication. The lessee was required to pay survey fees, execute the lease within six months, and refrain from occupying the land until a formal, stamped lease had been issued. Importantly, the notice also acknowledged uncertainty in land boundaries, providing that if the land was later found to overlap with existing freehold or leasehold title, the approval would be cancelled without prejudice to the Government. At the time, this clause functioned as a legal safeguard. In the present, it underscores that the approval may have been granted before all underlying title issues were definitively resolved.

The timing of the approval has since taken on added significance. Although the lease commenced in July 2022, the notice itself was only formally registered in April 2023. That gap, which may once have seemed procedural, now invites scrutiny. It raises questions about when the State’s consent became operative in practice and whether any preliminary steps or expectations had already been set in motion before formal registration.

Equally notable, both then and now, is what the document does not say. It identifies Naikorokoro Development Pte Limited as the lessee but provides no insight into the company’s ownership structure, financial capacity, or development partners. At the time, this omission was routine. In the present climate, where the proposed use of the land has become the subject of national debate, the absence of such detail reinforces the need to examine the wider network of corporate and institutional relationships connected to the project.

Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the notice lies in its stated purpose: “Development Lease – Hotel/Tourism and other Commercial Developments.” When the approval was granted, this formulation suggested a conventional tourism-oriented project. Today, however, it sits uneasily alongside proposals for a large-scale waste-to-energy incinerator in the same vicinity. This divergence between the original framing and the emerging reality raises a fundamental question. Was the State approving a tourism development, or was it creating a flexible legal framework capable of accommodating far more intensive industrial use?

In retrospect, the Approval Notice of Lease can be seen as the foundational moment at which public foreshore land at Naikorokoro Point began its transition into a private development asset. In the present, it remains a critical reference point in assessing whether that transition has proceeded in accordance with law, policy, and public expectation. The document itself is measured and administrative in tone. Its implications, however, continue to unfold, and they now reach well beyond the boundaries of the land it describes. To be continued.

A Lease Unfulfilled: Naikorokoro Developments, Lyndhurst, and the Anatomy of Non-Development in Fiji’s Land Regime

When the financial statements of Naikorokoro Developments Pte Limited are read in isolation, they tell a story of dormancy: a company holding land, incurring modest losses, and sustained by related-party funding. Yet when placed alongside the newly surfaced documents from the Ministry of Lands and the original lease instrument, that quiet picture gives way to something far more serious. What emerges is not merely inactivity, but a potential breach of the very legal foundation upon which the company’s landholding rests.

Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji v Pacific Polytechnic Ltd. Get Out Means Get Out: Fiji High Court Ruling Exposes Futility of Biman Prasad’s Intervention in Private Lease Dispute. Pacific Poly must vacate premises

4/5/2026

From Silence to Headlines: Fiji Media Reports Outcome of a Case It Ignored from Day One...A Story They Never Bothered to Follow

GET OUT MEANS GET OUT: HIGH COURT RULING EXPOSES FUTILITY OF BIMAN PRASAD’S INTERVENTION IN PRIVATE LEASE DISPUTE

The Fiji High Court ruling in Trustees of Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji v Pacific Polytechnic Ltd has now settled, in clear legal terms, a question that should never have arisen in the first place: can political intervention override a landlord’s lawful right to recover possession of its property?

The answer, delivered quietly but firmly by the Court, is no.

A Case About Law, NOT Politics

The dispute was straightforward. The Sanatan Dharm Sabha, as registered proprietor of the Samabula property, had entered into a tenancy agreement with Pacific Polytechnic. That agreement contained a termination clause requiring 90 days’ notice.

The Sabha gave notice.

Not merely 90 days, but effectively 448 days before initiating ejectment proceedings. By the time the matter reached the High Court, the legal position was already crystallised. The tenancy had been terminated. The Defendant remained in occupation.

The issue before the Court was narrow: Did the tenant have any legal right to remain? The Court answered in the negative.

Enter NFP leader and then DPM and Finance Minister

It is against this legal backdrop that the intervention by former Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Biman Prasad must be assessed.

As reported by us (14 February 2026), Prasad inserted himself into what was fundamentally a private landlord and tenant dispute, engaging with the parties at a time when the tenancy had already been terminated, the landlord had asserted its right to possession, and the tenant was, in legal terms, holding over without entitlement.

This was not a policy matter. It was not a regulatory dispute. It was not a question of public land or statutory allocation.

It was a private property dispute governed by contract and statute.

The Court's Silent Rebuke

The Fiji High Court did not mention Biman Chand Prasad. It did not need to. Instead, it dismantled, point by point, the very arguments that underpinned the rationale for intervention.

Legitimate Expectation.

Pacific Polytech argued that, as an educational institution enrolling students, it had an expectation of continued occupation. The Court rejected this outright. Expectation, however sincere, does not create legal entitlement.

Public Interest and Disruption

Pacific Polytech raised the disruption to students and educational programmes. Again, the Court was unmoved. Such considerations may be relevant to policy. They are irrelevant to legal possession under section 169.

Continued Payment of Rent

Pacific Polytech argued that ongoing rent payments created a continuing tenancy. The Court dismissed this, finding no legal basis for a tenancy at will in the face of clear termination.

What The Law Actually Requires?

Under section 169 of the Land Transfer Act 1971, the structure is brutally simple. The registered proprietor establishes title, the proprietor shows termination of the tenancy, and the burden shifts to the occupier to prove a right to remain. If that burden is not discharged, the result is inevitable: vacant possession must be granted. That is precisely what the Court ordered.

Why Prasad's Intervention Was Doomed From The Start

Prasad’s involvement, whatever its intention, was legally irrelevant for three reasons. First. No Executive Power Over Private Title. A Minister cannot suspend a termination notice, extend a lease, and confer a right to occupy private property. Such powers do not exist in law. Second. Summary Proceedings Exclude Political Considerations. Section 169 proceedings are designed to be expedited, narrowly focused, and immune to collateral arguments. Political engagement sits entirely outside this framework. Third. Rights Had Already Accrued. By the time of intervention, the contractual notice had long expired, the landlord’s right to possession had matured. No subsequent negotiation or intervention could unwind that legal reality.

The Real Consequence: False Hope

If anything, the intervention risked creating a dangerous illusion that the tenant could remain, that negotiations could override termination, and that political backing might substitute for legal entitlement. The High Court has now extinguished that illusion.

Property Rights and The Rule of Law

This case is not merely about one lease in Samabula. It goes to a deeper constitutional principle: Private property rights cannot be diluted by political influence.

The Court reaffirmed that registered ownership is decisive, contractual termination is enforceable, and possession follows legal right, not political convenience.

A Quiet But Devastating Conclusion

The judgment does not criticise Prasad. It does something more consequential. It renders his intervention legally meaningless. The Court proceeded as if it had never occurred, applying the statute with clinical precision and arriving at the only conclusion the law permits: The tenant must leave.

For those who believed that ministerial engagement could alter the outcome, the High Court has delivered a definitive answer. In Fiji’s land law system: Title governs. Contract governs. Statute governs.

And when a landlord says “GET OUT” in accordance with the law, the courts will enforce it.

From Fijileaks Archives

The letter shown documents a commercial tenancy dispute between Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji and Pacific Polytech Ltd (PPL), culminating in a formal demand for eviction in May 2023. Crucially, it records that Biman Prasad, then Deputy Prime Minister, personally intervened in negotiations after a notice of termination had already been issued.

This raises serious questions about the propriety and legitimacy of that intervention.

Background to the Dispute

According to the letter:

A Notice of Termination had already been issued by Sabha, the landlord.
Negotiations were held in early April 2023 following requests from Biman Prasad.
The landlord expressly states it never withdrew the termination.
A proposal and counter-proposal were exchanged but failed.
PPL did not respond to reminders and missed the final deadline to vacate.
By mid-May 2023, the landlord demanded immediate possession and threatened legal action.

In effect, the legal relationship had already reached the enforcement stage when political involvement occurred.

Nature of Biman Prasad’s Intervention

The letter indicates that Biman Prasad, as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, requested negotiations. Meetings were held at the landlord’s headquarters. His involvement was described as informal and based on “respect and courtesy”. The landlord Sabha did not approve the requests made in these discussions.

This suggests that the intervention was not part of any statutory mediation process, court proceeding, or regulatory framework. It was purely political and informal.

Was the Intervention Proper?

From a governance and rule-of-law perspective, several concerns arise.

No Legal Mandate

There is no indication that Biman Prasad was acting under any lawful authority. Commercial tenancy disputes are governed by contract and civil law. They are resolved by negotiation between parties, arbitration (if agreed), or the courts.

A Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister has no formal role in private lease enforcement.

Risk of Undue Influence

When a senior minister intervenes in a private dispute, especially involving eviction and financial obligations, it risks pressuring one party, creating expectations of political favour, and undermining equality before the law. Even if well-intentioned, such involvement can distort bargaining power.

Conflict with Rule of Law Principles

In constitutional systems, ministers are expected to respect institutional boundaries. Private commercial disputes should not be resolved through political channels. Allowing ministers to “broker” outcomes weakens judicial independence, contract certainty, and investor confidence.

Ineffectiveness of Intervention

The letter shows that the intervention did not resolve the dispute. The Sabha, as landlord rejected proposals. Deadlines were missed. Eviction was pursued. This suggests the involvement created delay rather than resolution.

Possible Justifications

Supporters might argue that the intervention was aimed at protecting an educational institution. It sought to avoid disruption to students. It was humanitarian or pragmatic. However, even socially motivated interventions must operate within lawful frameworks, such as formal mediation or government-supported relocation assistance, not informal political pressure.

On the available evidence, Biman Prasad’s intervention appears legally unnecessary, institutionally inappropriate, politically risky, and ultimately ineffective. Sabha, as landlord, had exercised contractual rights. The matter was already on a legal trajectory. Political involvement did not change the outcome and arguably blurred the boundary between state power and private rights.

While Biman Prasad may have acted out of concern for continuity and social impact, the letter demonstrates that his intervention had no legal foundation and did not alter the landlord’s position.

In a constitutional democracy, private disputes must be resolved by law, not by ministerial influence. On that basis, Biman Prasad’s involvement was not institutionally justified and sets an undesirable precedent for political interference in commercial matters.

In constitutional systems, ministers are expected to respect institutional boundaries.

Fiji High Court Judgment

VUDAGATE. Environmental Impact Assessment process was initiated in the name of the company (TNG Fiji) that didn't exist. This is not technical irregularity. It is structural flaw. TNG Fiji incorporated, 15 September 2025

2/5/2026

We have revealed the 19 August 2025 document in which Ian Malouf and Rob Cromb set out their proposed structure for the Vuda incinerator project: a special purpose vehicle jointly owned on a 50-50 basis between private interests and the Coalition Government-associated companies.

That document established something critical. From the outset, the project was conceived not as a purely private venture but as one that depended on state-linked capital.

Today, a closer reading of that same document reveals something even more fundamental.

At the very bottom of the submission, the proponent is identified simply as “TNG Fiji”.

On its face, this appears routine. It suggests that a company, already in existence, has made a formal application to initiate the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment process.

But the document itself tells a different story. Within its own text, the proponent is described as “to be formed”.

The timeline removes any doubt. TNG Fiji was not incorporated until 15 September 2025. Yet the submission bearing its name is dated 19 August 2025. The conclusion is inescapable. The Environmental Impact Assessment process was initiated in the name of a company that did not exist. This is not a technical irregularity. It is a structural flaw.

An Environmental Impact Assessment is not an abstract exercise. It is a statutory process grounded in accountability. The State is required to assess the environmental and social consequences of a proposal brought forward by a defined and legally constituted entity. That entity must be capable of making representations, entering into obligations, and bearing responsibility for the project.

On 19 August 2025, “TNG Fiji” could do none of these things. What appears instead is a substitution. A project name is used in place of a legal entity. A future company is presented as if it were already in existence. The submission borrows the form of legality without possessing its substance.

This matters because it alters the nature of the process itself.

If there is no incorporated proponent, then the question arises: who, in law, made the application? Was it Ian Malouf and Rob Cromb personally? Was it a foreign corporate structure? Was it an informal grouping operating under a project label? The document does not say. Instead, it presents “TNG Fiji” as the applicant, while simultaneously acknowledging that the entity had yet to be formed.

The contradiction is complete.

It also deepens the significance of what we reported this week. The same document that proposes a fifty percent stake for government-associated companies does so in the context of a project vehicle that does not yet exist. In other words, the State is written into the ownership structure of a company that, at the time of submission, is still hypothetical.

That raises a further question. How does a project reach the stage of proposing equal government participation before the legal entity itself has been created, and before any public process has confirmed such participation?

The sequence of events provides part of the answer.

On 19 August 2025, the Environmental Impact Assessment process is initiated under the name “TNG Fiji”. On 27 August 2025, The Next Generation Holdings Fiji Pte Ltd is incorporated. On 15 September 2025, The Next Generation Fiji Pte Ltd follows. The order is clear. The project enters the regulatory system first. The corporate structure is assembled afterwards.

This is not how major developments are ordinarily brought forward. The accepted discipline is straightforward. Incorporate the company. Define its ownership. Establish its legal identity. Then approach the Government. That order ensures transparency and accountability. It allows regulators and the public to know exactly who stands behind the proposal.

In the case of the Vuda incinerator, that discipline appears to have been reversed. The use of “TNG Fiji” at the foot of the 19 August submission therefore takes on a significance that cannot be dismissed as administrative convenience. It is the point at which appearance diverges from reality. It creates the impression of a legally constituted proponent where none yet exists. It allows the project to proceed under a name that stands in for something still in the process of being formed.

In plain terms, the project was not only advanced before its structure was completed. It was presented to the Coalition government as if that structure already existed. For a project of this scale, with profound environmental and economic implications, that is not a minor detail. It goes to the integrity of the process itself.

The Government has since insisted that no final decision has been made and that the Environmental Impact Assessment remains under review. That may be so. But the integrity of that review depends on the integrity of how the process began.

The document of 19 August 2025 shows that the beginning was not clean.

The company was not there. The structure was not complete. Yet the project moved forward.

And at the bottom of the page, where the law expects to find a real proponent, there was only a name: TNG FIJI. Editor's Note: To be continued.

THE $5,000 PAPER TRAIL: LYNDHURST PAYMENT TO ENVIRONMENT TRUST ACCOUNT RAISES QUESTIONS OVER EIA PROCESS

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