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UniFiji Pro-Chancellor Bhuwan Dutt Faces Pressure to Step Aside Amid Campus Safety Controversy, Police Complaints, Questions Over His Dual Roles in the University Council, as Possible Action Against Him Looms

2/11/2026

 
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Bhuwan Dutt
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The controversy surrounding the University of Fiji's Samabula Campus has taken a potentially decisive turn, with Fijileaks understanding that Pro-Chancellor and University Council Chair Pundit Bhuwan Dutt is facing pressure to step aside while complaints relating to the construction and structural condition of the campus are examined.

The Minister responsible for Education is understood to favour Dutt temporarily relinquishing his position during the investigative process.

Fijileaks further understands that, should Dutt decline to step aside voluntarily, further action concerning his continued tenure could be initiated as early as today (Fiji time, Monday, 2 November 2026).
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No formal announcement confirming such action has been made available to Fijileaks. Nor has it been independently established whether a suspension notice has been prepared or which authority would exercise the relevant powers.

Nevertheless, the reported development represents a significant escalation in a controversy that began with complaints from nursing students about cracks in the University's Samabula Campus building.
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The affected building has reportedly been cordoned off, and the University has had to make alternative arrangements for students to sit their examinations.

What began as a dispute over the safety of lecture theatres and laboratories has now raised wider questions about accountability, institutional governance and the independence of any investigation into the original construction project.

From Student Complaints to Police Referrals

​The University of Fiji Students' Association (UFSA) has been at the forefront of demands for an independent examination of the Samabula Campus.

Students expressed particular concern about two major nursing lecture theatres and laboratories situated beneath the lower theatre, facilities used by more than 200 nursing students.
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The association questioned whether the building remained safe for continued occupation and whether an independent structural assessment had been undertaken.
The concerns were subsequently brought to the attention of the Fiji Higher Education Commission (FHEC), the Ministry responsible for Education and the Fiji Police Force.

Correspondence dated 2 October 2026 records Acting UFSA President Rodney Vakaloloma submitting a formal statement and supporting material to police.

The association requested that the circumstances surrounding the building's construction, oversight, certification, maintenance and present condition be independently examined.
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It also asked the authorities to determine whether any negligence, breach of duty, criminal offence or other wrongdoing might have occurred.

Importantly, the students expressly stated that they were not seeking to determine anyone's guilt.

Their primary concern was the safety of students and staff.
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The submission of a police complaint does not, by itself, establish that a criminal investigation has commenced. Fijileaks has not independently confirmed the present status of the police inquiries.

The Building Is Cordoned Off

The cordoning off of the affected Samabula building marks an important development.

The University has also reportedly been required to find alternative premises for students to undertake examinations.

These arrangements suggest that the safety concerns have had consequences extending well beyond the original complaints.
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The question is no longer simply whether cracks appeared in the building.
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It is whether the relevant authorities acted promptly, whether appropriate engineering assessments were undertaken, and whether students and staff were exposed to avoidable risks.

The building's precise structural condition, the findings of any subsequent engineering examination and the legal basis for restricting access have not been independently established.

Those matters should ultimately be determined by qualified professionals and the appropriate authorities.

Why Dutt's Position Has Come Under Scrutiny

​Dutt occupies two important positions within the University of Fiji's governance structure.

He is its Pro-Chancellor and also chairs the University Council.

The distinction is significant because the Council exercises institutional governance responsibilities, while the Pro-Chancellor holds a senior constitutional office within the University.

The students' correspondence has raised questions about the role of those involved in overseeing the original Samabula Campus construction project.

Dutt has been identified in that correspondence as having chaired the committee responsible for the project.

That assertion, and the precise scope of his responsibilities, require examination against the original project records.
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It would be wrong to assume that chairing a construction committee automatically establishes personal responsibility for structural defects subsequently identified in a building. Construction projects ordinarily involve architects, engineers, contractors, certifying authorities and institutional decision-makers, each exercising different responsibilities.

Nevertheless, if a person now responsible for governing the institution also exercised oversight over the project under examination, questions about potential conflicts of interest legitimately arise.
  • Who should determine the terms of reference of an investigation?
  • Who should appoint the independent experts?
  • Who should authorise the release of construction records, correspondence, certificates and financial documentation?

And should any individual previously associated with the project participate in decisions concerning the investigation of that project?

These questions go to the independence of the process, not to any presumption of wrongdoing.

Shiksha (Fiji) Limited: The University's Corporate Identity

There is a further dimension to the controversy that deserves attention. The University of Fiji was established by the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji (APS).

According to the University's Strategic Plan 2022–2026, the institution was incorporated on 22 December 2004 as Shiksha (Fiji) Limited, a non-profit company registered under the former Companies Act.

Its published financial statements have identified the corporate entity as Shiksha (Fiji) Limited, trading as the University of Fiji.

This corporate arrangement raises questions about the relationship between the University, its governing Council and the organisation responsible for its establishment.

The University's governance must be examined through its current constitutional instruments, company records and applicable legislation.


It cannot simply be assumed that the University's Council, its corporate directors and the governing bodies of APS are legally interchangeable. Nor can the powers of one organisation automatically be attributed to another.

The distinction becomes particularly important when considering who has the authority to appoint, suspend or remove the University's Pro-Chancellor.

Bhuwan Dutt's Positions in APS and UniFiji

Dutt's longstanding association with the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha introduces another issue. In addition to his University positions, he has been publicly identified as a patron of APS.

Questions have also been raised about his trusteeship within the organisation, although the current position and its legal responsibilities require confirmation from the relevant records.

Holding positions in both a sponsoring organisation and an institution established by that organisation is not inherently improper. Indeed, such arrangements may be expressly contemplated by the institution's constitution.

The difficulty arises where overlapping responsibilities create competing duties or where decisions concerning one organisation could affect the interests of another. In the present controversy, the relevant question is whether Dutt's positions, together with any previous responsibilities relating to the Samabula project, create an actual or perceived conflict in decisions concerning the investigation.

If so, what procedures exist for declaring and managing that conflict?

Has any relevant declaration been made?

And are there safeguards ensuring that those involved in the original project do not exercise inappropriate influence over the examination of its construction and condition?

These are matters for documentary scrutiny, not conclusions that can responsibly be reached merely from the existence of overlapping offices.

The Financial Relationship Between APS and UniFiji

The University's historical financial statements also demonstrate why the relationship between APS and Shiksha (Fiji) Limited warrants careful examination. The University's 2018 annual report identified both Bhuwan Dutt and former Pro-Chancellor Kamlesh Arya among the directors of Shiksha (Fiji) Limited during that financial year.

It also disclosed related-party financial dealings involving APS, including an internal loan balance of approximately FJ$3.12 million at the end of 2018.

Such financial arrangements are not evidence of wrongdoing.

Transactions between related organisations may be entirely legitimate, provided they are properly authorised, recorded and disclosed.

Nevertheless, the financial relationship reinforces the need for clarity about governance responsibilities, declarations of interest and the independence of institutional decisions.

Historical company records cannot establish the present composition of the company's board or the current financial position.

Updated filings would be necessary before making claims about present directorships, trusteeships or financial obligations.

Stepping Aside Is Not a Finding of Guilt

The reported pressure on Dutt to relinquish his position must be understood within the principles of procedural fairness.


If an officeholder is asked to step aside while matters involving previous institutional responsibilities are examined, that does not amount to a finding of guilt. Nor does temporary suspension necessarily establish negligence, misconduct or criminal responsibility.

Such measures may, where authorised by law and justified by the circumstances, be adopted to preserve the independence of an investigation.

Equally, no individual should be removed from office merely because allegations have been made or because public pressure has intensified. The applicable University statutes, corporate constitution and relevant legislation must determine the proper process.

The Minister's reported preference for Dutt to step aside should therefore not be confused with a legally enforceable direction unless the necessary authority and procedure can be established.

The same applies to any proposed action by FHEC or other regulatory bodies.

The powers of each institution must be distinguished.

Monday's Developments Could Be Significant

Attention now turns to whether the reported pressure on Dutt produces any formal decision.

If he agrees to step aside, questions will arise about the duration of the arrangement, who will assume his responsibilities and what safeguards will govern the investigation. If he refuses, the issue will become whether the relevant authorities possess the legal powers and sufficient grounds to pursue suspension or other action.

Whatever happens, the controversy should not be allowed to obscure the original concerns raised by nursing students.

They sought assurance that their lecture theatres, laboratories and learning environment were safe.

Their complaints have led to demands for independent technical scrutiny, correspondence with regulatory authorities and formal representations to police.

The reported restriction of access to the building and the relocation of examinations have added urgency to those questions.


The University of Fiji, its Council, the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and the relevant regulatory authorities now face a common test: whether the circumstances surrounding the Samabula Campus can be examined independently, transparently and without conflicts of interest.

Dutt is entitled to procedural fairness and the presumption that no wrongdoing has been established.

The students are equally entitled to expect that their complaints will be investigated without interference.

The question confronting the University's leadership is therefore not simply whether Dutt remains Pro-Chancellor.

It is whether the governance arrangements surrounding the investigation can command confidence among students, staff and the wider public.

For now, the reported move to have him step aside remains unconfirmed by an official announcement.
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What happens next may determine whether the Samabula controversy becomes a test not only of building safety but also of accountability at the highest levels of the University of Fiji.

From Fijileaks Archives

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Click below to read the full stories:

www.fijileaks.com/home/cracks-of-concern-at-unifijis-samabula-campus-as-students-alert-fhec-questions-intensify-over-roles-of-the-architect-ashok-balgovind-ranjeet-construction-and-arya-pratinidhi-unifiji-search-for-temporary-premises

https://www.fijileaks.com/home/university-of-fiji-students-seek-from-fhec-external-audit-over-19-million-in-fees-and-financial-relationship-with-arya-pratinidhi-sabha-prominent-political-figure-accused-of-failed-plot-to-remove-vc-shaista-shameem

John Rabuku, Constitutional Immunity and the DPP: When PERSONAL Opinions Risk Becoming Institutional Questions. Rabuku, 'Past immunity clauses that immuned Rabuka and the Bainimarama coups must remain'.

31/10/2026

 

*As Fiji debates the future of coup immunity, John Rabuku's public defence of constitutional protection for past coup-makers raises questions about prosecutorial independence, institutional restraint and the dangerous assumption that military takeovers must eventually be rewarded with immunity.

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John Rabuku has entered Fiji's increasingly contentious constitutional immunity debate with two lengthy Facebook statements defending the preservation of immunity for those responsible for the Rabuka and Bainimarama coups.

He is entitled to his personal views. The question, however, is whether a lawyer associated with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions should be publicly advancing arguments on a subject that may have implications for criminal proceedings involving alleged coup-related conduct.

This is not an academic question.

Fiji has already witnessed the prosecution of former prime minister Frank Bainimarama and former police commissioner Sitiveni Qiliho in separate proceedings. Reported allegations concerning the encouragement or planning of a coup make the distinction between protected historical conduct and potentially prosecutable later conduct especially important.

Meanwhile, proposals have been advanced to abolish the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) and transfer some or all of its responsibilities to the DPP.

Against that background, Rabuku's intervention deserves careful examination.

The Promise to Coup-Makers

​In his latest Facebook statement, Rabuku argues: 
"Past immunity clauses that immuned the Rabuka and the Bainimarama coups must remain." His justification is that democracy promised coup leaders protection from prosecution in exchange for returning political power to civilians.

He goes further, suggesting that without these guarantees Fiji might have remained under military rule. This argument is familiar. It treats immunity as the price of restoring democracy after its violent overthrow.

But it also raises a fundamental question.
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Who authorised those promises on behalf of the people whose constitutional rights had been extinguished? The victims of coups were not necessarily parties to these bargains. Nor were citizens given an unfettered opportunity to decide whether those who overthrew their elected governments should escape legal accountability.
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An immunity provision imposed by those exercising power after a coup is not necessarily equivalent to a freely negotiated democratic settlement.
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There is also a distinction between recognising that an immunity provision exists in law and defending its continued constitutional entrenchment as a matter of principle. Rabuku appears to treat the two as inseparable. They are not.

When Political Frustration Becomes an Explanation for Coups

Perhaps the most troubling passage in Rabuku's statement is his observation: "When people within a democracy feel unheard, feel ostracized or threatened and all avenues fail, they coup."
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Certainly, political exclusion and communal tensions can create conditions in which military intervention becomes possible. But Fiji's history cannot be reduced to frustrated citizens exhausting their democratic options.
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The coups of 1987, 2000 and 2006 had different origins, personalities, political objectives and consequences.

They also involved the overthrow or attempted overthrow of constitutional authority. Political grievances may explain why individuals support military intervention. They cannot confer legitimacy upon it.

Otherwise, every future group dissatisfied with an elected government could invoke political exclusion as an explanation for unconstitutional action. The armed forces do not acquire a constitutional right to overthrow governments merely because some citizens believe their grievances have been ignored.

That principle must remain non-negotiable.


The Dangerous Prediction About Future Coups

Rabuku also argues that removing immunity provisions will not prevent another coup. He predicts that a future military leader could simply abrogate the Constitution, introduce another constitution containing fresh immunity provisions, conduct elections and return Fiji to civilian rule.

He may be describing a historical pattern.
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But there is a difference between identifying a danger and presenting that danger as an almost inevitable constitutional sequence. A constitution cannot physically prevent a determined military commander from attempting a coup. Neither can the criminal law guarantee that murder, corruption or treason will never occur.

That does not mean constitutional prohibitions and criminal sanctions are pointless.
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Their purpose is to establish the legal boundaries of acceptable conduct and provide a framework for accountability. Rabuku's argument risks turning Fiji's repeated constitutional failures into a permanent political formula: overthrow the government, consolidate power, secure immunity and eventually hold elections.

That is precisely the cycle Fiji should be trying to break.
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The RFMF Has Entered the Debate

​The Republic of Fiji Military Forces has itself called for the constitutional immunity provisions to be replaced by a truth and reconciliation framework.

That intervention is significant.
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The military institution historically associated with Fiji's coups is now questioning the continued place of immunity in the constitutional order.

Whether the RFMF's proposal is legally workable, and how it would affect existing rights and protections, requires careful examination.
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But it should not be dismissed merely because past coup leaders secured immunity.

Nor should a truth and reconciliation process automatically be treated as a substitute for criminal accountability.

Truth-telling, reconciliation and prosecution serve different purposes. A credible constitutional settlement must address their relationship rather than assume that one necessarily excludes the others.

The DPP's Position Cannot Be Ignored

​This brings us to the most sensitive aspect of Rabuku's intervention. His association with the DPP places his statements in a different institutional context from those of an ordinary political commentator.
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Prosecutorial independence is not confined to the actual decision to lay or discontinue charges.
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It also requires public confidence that prosecutorial decisions will be made according to evidence and law, without political preference or preconceived conclusions. Rabuku's statements do not establish that he has interfered with a prosecution or prejudged a particular accused person's case.

Nevertheless, the appearance of impartiality matters.
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He has publicly defended the preservation of immunity for past coup-makers and suggested that future coup leaders would probably secure similar protections. In his earlier Facebook statement, he also urged the Prime Minister and parliamentarians to consult their lawyers and prepare for possible criminal or civil proceedings arising from conduct outside parliamentary immunity.

That advice is not inherently objectionable. No parliamentarian should assume that political office places personal conduct beyond the law.
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But why should someone associated with the prosecutorial establishment enter this debate in such expansive terms while Fiji is confronting sensitive questions concerning coup-related liability?

And where does personal constitutional commentary end and the appearance of an institutional position begin?
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These questions deserve answers, not because Rabuku should be deprived of freedom of expression, but because prosecutorial office carries responsibilities that extend beyond the courtroom.

What About Bainimarama and Qiliho?

​The distinction between historical immunity and subsequent criminal conduct is particularly important in relation to Frank Bainimarama and Sitiveni Qiliho.


The precise charges, dates of alleged conduct and applicable statutory provisions must determine whether any constitutional immunity is relevant.

An immunity protecting specified actions associated with a past coup does not automatically provide lifelong protection against prosecution for later alleged offences.

Nor should the existence of historical immunity be confused with a general licence to encourage, organise or participate in another unconstitutional seizure of power.

That is why public statements by those connected with prosecution services must be measured.
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The DPP must remain free to assess evidence independently, whether the suspect is a former prime minister, military commander, police commissioner, Cabinet minister or ordinary citizen.

Equally, every accused person remains entitled to the presumption of innocence and a fair trial.

The FICAC Connection

​There is another reason why Rabuku's intervention matters. Several political and legal voices, including figures associated with the National Federation Party, have advocated substantial changes to FICAC, with some proposals contemplating its abolition and the transfer of responsibilities to the DPP.

Such proposals require much more than arguments about administrative efficiency.
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If prosecutorial authority is to be concentrated in fewer institutions, public confidence in the independence and impartiality of those institutions becomes even more important.

FICAC's institutional weaknesses, controversies and failures deserve scrutiny. But abolishing an institution does not automatically eliminate the problems that afflicted it. Those problems can simply migrate elsewhere.
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The question is whether Fiji would be strengthening independent accountability or merely rearranging the institutions responsible for enforcing it.
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Rabuku's public statements should therefore be considered against the broader debate over the future structure of criminal prosecution in Fiji.

Immunity Is Not a Prosecutorial Bargaining Chip

In his earlier statement, Rabuku suggested that future immunity should not be constitutionally guaranteed and that decisions concerning prosecution should rest with the State's prosecutorial institutions.

Here, an important legal distinction must be maintained.

The DPP may exercise prosecutorial discretion within the law. It cannot simply manufacture constitutional immunity.
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A decision not to prosecute, or to discontinue proceedings, is not equivalent to a constitutional guarantee extinguishing criminal and civil liability.
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Nor can prosecutorial discretion properly become an informal mechanism through which future coup-makers bargain for protection.
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That would undermine the very independence that the DPP is supposed to safeguard.

Fiji Must Break the Cycle

​The constitutional immunity debate is not simply about whether promises made to past coup leaders should be honoured.

It is about the kind of constitutional order Fiji intends to establish.
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Does Fiji accept that every successful coup may eventually produce its own legal immunity?

Or does it insist that unconstitutional seizures of power are offences against democratic government for which accountability must remain possible, subject to the law and the rights of accused persons?

The Supreme Court's August 2025 advisory opinion recognising the validity of the 2013 Constitution adds another dimension to the debate.

​The existing constitutional framework cannot simply be treated as legally irrelevant because political opinion has shifted.

But constitutional validity does not require uncritical political endorsement of every provision.

Indeed, a responsible constitutional review should distinguish existing legal protections, proposals for future amendment and the consequences of those amendments.

Rabuku is right about one thing: removing immunity clauses cannot guarantee that Fiji will never experience another coup.

But neither does retaining them guarantee democratic stability.

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The real question is whether the Constitution should continue to carry provisions that may be understood as rewarding those who overthrew constitutional government.
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That is a question for the people, their elected representatives and, where necessary, the courts.
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It is not one that should be settled through assumptions about what future coup leaders might demand.
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John Rabuku may regard his Facebook statements as personal contributions to a national discussion.

But those associated with the DPP must recognise that their words can carry institutional implications, particularly when they concern immunity, criminal liability and the possibility of future military intervention.
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Fiji needs a prosecutorial system whose independence is beyond reasonable question. It also needs a constitutional culture in which the overthrow of democracy is never treated as an ordinary negotiating stage on the road back to democracy.

If Fiji is serious about ending its cycle of coups, it must stop treating immunity as the inevitable price of restoring the very constitutional government that coup-makers have destroyed.


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From Fijileaks Archives

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*On 14 May 1987, Rabuka committed treason against Queen Elizabeth 11 of England and Fiji but escaped the death penalty. On 19 May he was resigned to face the gallows, as he boasted:

‘The penalty for treason in all Commonwealth countries is death, and if this is to be my destiny I will accept it.’

But on the same day he managed to extract a questionable pardon, or immunity, from his paramount chief and Governor-General, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau who, on 23 May, confirmed that he had granted
Rabuka an amnesty.

*He turned Fiji into a 'Banana Republic' and Coup Coup Land.

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Thirty-Five Is Not Thirty-Six: Fiji's Constitution Cannot Be Changed by Rounding Down Democracy. And 35 votes cannot satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement of at least two-thirds of all Members of Parliament.

30/10/2026

 
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*On 2 October 2026, Speaker Filimone Jitoko ruled that the constitutional amendment threshold should be calculated against the 53 occupied parliamentary seats, excluding the two vacancies. His ruling was reported as permitting the Bill to proceed with 35 affirmative votes. Yet two-thirds of 53 is 35⅓, not 35. We insist that 36 votes are necessary. The Speaker must now explain how 35 votes can satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement of at least two-thirds of all Members of Parliament.

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Thirty-Five Is Not Thirty-Six: Fiji's Constitution Cannot Be Changed by Rounding Down Democracy

Speaker Filimone Jitoko ruled on 2 October that the constitutional amendment threshold would be calculated against occupied parliamentary seats and members present. His ruling was reported as requiring only 35 votes. But the Supreme Court prescribed at least two-thirds of all Members of Parliament. With 53 sitting MPs, the constitutional arithmetic points to 36. The controversy is no longer merely about Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka securing one more vote. It concerns the Speaker's interpretation of the Constitution and whether parliamentary procedure can override a constitutional safeguard.

The Speaker Has Already Ruled. So Why the Confusion?

On 2 October 2026, Speaker of Parliament Filimone Jitoko delivered a ruling that could determine the fate of Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka's Constitution Amendment Bill.

The Speaker ruled that the two-thirds parliamentary majority required for constitutional amendments should be calculated against the 53 occupied parliamentary seats, rather than the original 55 seats, following the deaths of two Members of Parliament.
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He also indicated that the calculation would depend upon the number of MPs present and seated in Parliament when the vote was taken.

Fijivillage reported that 35 affirmative votes would be sufficient for the Bill to proceed.

Yet on 30 October, the same news organisation raised the question of whether 35 or 36 votes would be necessary for the Bill to survive its third reading.

The Speaker, according to the report, had not responded to requests for clarification.

This is an extraordinary position for Parliament to find itself in.

A ruling has already been delivered. The second reading has already taken place. The Government is preparing for the decisive third reading. Yet uncertainty persists over the number of votes constitutionally necessary to amend Fiji's supreme law.
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The Speaker must explain not only the threshold he intends to apply but also the constitutional reasoning behind his earlier ruling.

For there is a fundamental distinction between excluding vacant parliamentary seats from the calculation and reducing a constitutional majority by rounding down a fraction.
The former raises questions of constitutional interpretation.

The latter raises questions of elementary arithmetic.

The Arithmetic the Speaker Must Explain

The Supreme Court's advisory opinion of 29 August 2025 interpreted the constitutional amendment provisions as requiring the support of at least two-thirds of all Members of Parliament at both the second and third readings.

On the basis of 53 sitting MPs, the calculation is straightforward: 53 × 2 ÷ 3 = 35.333333. Parliament cannot produce one-third of an affirmative vote. It must therefore obtain the next whole number.

That number is 36.

Thirty-five votes represent approximately 66.04 per cent of 53 MPs. Thirty-six votes represent approximately 67.92 per cent. The required two-thirds majority is 66.67 per cent. Thirty-five votes fall short.

The issue is not whether 35 is close enough to 36. The Constitution does not prescribe a majority that is approximately two-thirds. The Supreme Court used the expression at least two-thirds
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Those words matter.

If 35 votes were accepted against a denominator of 53, Parliament would be treating a number below the required majority as though it satisfied the constitutional requirement.

But the controversy goes further.

The Speaker's ruling also introduced the possibility of calculating the threshold against MPs present in the chamber rather than all current MPs.

That interpretation requires separate scrutiny.
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The Missing MP and the Second Reading

The second reading of the Constitution Amendment Bill took place on 2 October. The Bill secured 38 votes in favour, five against and nine abstentions. One MP did not vote.

The Bill therefore passed comfortably whether the threshold was 35 or 36.

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But the parliamentary record raises a significant question about the Speaker's calculation. According to an analysis published by Fiji Political Review and reproduced by the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre, the parliamentary Hansard records that Sanjay Kirpal was absent.

That left 52 MPs present. Two-thirds of 52 is 34.6667. Rounded upwards, that produces 35 votes. On this interpretation, the figure of 35 could be mathematically correct if the denominator were 52.

But it would not establish that 35 votes were sufficient against all 53 sitting MPs.
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This distinction is crucial.

The real constitutional controversy may therefore concern not simply whether the Speaker rounded down 35⅓, but whether he was entitled to substitute the number of MPs present for the number of all Members of Parliament.
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The Constitution and the Supreme Court's advisory opinion must provide the answer. The presence or absence of a particular MP should not be allowed to alter a constitutional safeguard unless the Constitution itself permits that consequence.

​Can an Absence Lower the Constitutional Threshold?

There is a troubling practical consequence to the Speaker's interpretation. Suppose 53 MPs are entitled to sit in Parliament. If the required majority is calculated against all 53, the Government needs 36 affirmative votes.

But if one MP is absent and the denominator falls to 52, the threshold becomes 35.

If further MPs are absent, the threshold could fall again.

That creates the possibility of a government securing constitutional amendments not by persuading additional MPs to support them, but through the absence of those who might otherwise oppose them.

The distinction between abstention and absence also becomes important.
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An MP who remains in the chamber and abstains may count towards the number present, while an MP who leaves may reduce the denominator.

Is that really what the Supreme Court intended when it required the support of at least two-thirds of all Members of Parliament?

Parliamentary Standing Order 93 refers to the necessary majority of all members, while Standing Order 4(3) defines that expression by reference to current Members of Parliament rather than merely those present.

The Speaker relied upon other provisions governing parliamentary attendance and vacancies.

But general procedural provisions should not be assumed to displace a specific constitutional amendment requirement.
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The Speaker's interpretation may govern the immediate conduct of parliamentary proceedings, but it does not place his ruling beyond judicial scrutiny.

Fiji's Constitution remains superior to Parliament's Standing Orders.

Rabuka's Thirty-Five-Vote Problem

The political importance of the dispute is immediately apparent from the parliamentary numbers reported by Fijivillage.

The People's Alliance Party has 20 MPs. The group of 11 associated with Ioane Naivalurua brings the potential total to 31. The National Federation Party has four MPs, while SODELPA has three. Both the NFP and SODELPA have indicated that they will direct their MPs to oppose the Bill if the Government persists with its present timetable.

However, Fijivillage reports indications that at least two MPs from each party may disregard those directions.
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If all 20 People's Alliance MPs, the Naivalurua group of 11, two NFP MPs and two SODELPA MPs support the Bill, Rabuka would secure precisely 35 votes.

One short of 36.

And therein lies the political significance of the Speaker's ruling.
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The difference between 35 and 36 could determine whether Fiji proceeds to a constitutional referendum on 9 December or whether Rabuka's constitutional programme is defeated in Parliament.

But the Government's political predicament cannot determine the meaning of the Constitution.
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A constitutional majority must be calculated according to law, not according to the number of votes a Prime Minister believes he can obtain.


The NFP and SODELPA Cannot Escape Responsibility

The position of the National Federation Party and SODELPA deserves particular attention.

Both are coalition partners.

Both have expressed reservations about the timetable.
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Both now face the possibility that individual MPs may disregard party directives and vote with Rabuka.

For the NFP, the issue goes beyond coalition loyalty.

The party has long presented itself as a defender of constitutionalism, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.

Its leader, Biman Prasad, and his parliamentary colleagues must now decide whether those principles require them to resist a constitutional process they regard as excessively hurried.

There is nothing inconsistent about supporting constitutional reform while opposing the manner in which the Government seeks to achieve it.

Indeed, the distinction is fundamental.

A party may believe that the 2013 Constitution requires amendment without accepting that an extensive constitutional overhaul should be pushed through Parliament on a timetable dictated by the Prime Minister.

SODELPA faces a similar dilemma.
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If party leaders formally direct their MPs to oppose the Bill, but some members vote in favour, questions of party discipline and the legal consequences of defying those directives will arise.

Fijivillage reports that MPs who disregard valid party directions risk losing their parliamentary seats.

That possibility raises a further question: what would happen if an MP cast the decisive vote in favour of the Bill and subsequently lost his or her seat for defying a party directive?

The answer would depend upon the relevant constitutional and electoral provisions, the timing of any vacancy and the legal effect of the vote already cast.

These are not matters that should be resolved through political improvisation after the event.
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The Fifteen Independents Hold the Balance

​The fifteen independent Opposition MPs may yet determine the Bill's fate.

Premila Kumar has indicated that the independent MPs have not agreed upon a collective voting position and remain free to exercise their individual judgment.

Alvick Maharaj has reportedly indicated that the ten independents associated with People's First will meet on Sunday to decide their position.

These MPs should remember that they are being asked to vote upon Fiji's constitutional future, not an ordinary government measure.

Their decision should be based upon the merits of the proposed amendments, the adequacy of public consultation and the constitutional legality of the process.

The temptation to treat the third reading as another contest between Rabuka's Government and its political opponents must be resisted.

A Constitution is intended to outlast the politicians who amend it.

It must protect those who support the Government and those who oppose it.
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It must also protect future generations against the excessive concentration of political power.

The Supreme Court Has Already Lowered the Threshold

There is a larger constitutional issue that must not disappear beneath the arithmetic. In August 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the legal effectiveness of the 2013 Constitution while interpreting its demanding amendment provisions to permit change through a two-thirds parliamentary majority and a simple majority at a referendum.

That interpretation substantially reduced the original amendment thresholds.

It was a consequential judicial intervention.

One may question the constitutional reasoning behind the Court's decision, particularly whether the judiciary should have altered thresholds expressly prescribed by the constitutional text.

But Parliament cannot selectively invoke the Court's opinion.

The Government has relied upon the Court's interpretation to pursue constitutional change without satisfying the original three-quarters parliamentary requirement.

It must therefore respect the conditions established by that same interpretation.
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If the Supreme Court required at least two-thirds of all Members of Parliament, the Government cannot reasonably treat that requirement as a flexible political target.

The Speaker's ruling must be measured against the Court's words.

The Legal Challenge Cannot Be Ignored

Independent MP Ketan Lal has already challenged the Constitution Amendment Bill and the validity of its parliamentary process in the High Court.
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His proceedings raise questions about the amendment threshold, the treatment of vacant seats, the Supreme Court's advisory opinion and the constitutional validity of the proposed changes.

His argument is not identical to that advanced by the Centre for Democracy and Dialogue.

Among other matters, he has questioned whether the required majority should be calculated against Parliament's full complement of 55 seats.

That would produce a different threshold.

The existence of these competing interpretations demonstrates why the Speaker's ruling must be carefully examined rather than accepted as conclusive merely because it was delivered from the Chair.

The courts, not the Speaker, possess the ultimate authority to determine constitutional legality.

Parliamentary privilege is an important protection of legislative independence.

It should not be confused with a power to amend the Constitution contrary to constitutional requirements.

A Referendum Cannot Repair an Invalid Parliamentary Vote

​Rabuka's Government intends to proceed to a referendum on 9 December if the Bill obtains the necessary parliamentary support. But a referendum cannot cure an earlier failure to comply with the constitutional amendment procedure.

The requirements are sequential.

The Bill must first obtain the prescribed parliamentary majority.

Only then can it proceed to the electorate.

Popular approval cannot retrospectively validate an unconstitutional parliamentary vote.
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Nor should the Government assume that the prospect of a referendum excuses deficiencies in consultation.

The proposed amendments concern fundamental questions about Fiji's constitutional identity, political institutions, electoral arrangements, individual rights and the distribution of authority.

They deserve careful consideration.

A rushed parliamentary process followed by a referendum conducted within weeks is not necessarily evidence of democratic legitimacy.

The quality of public participation matters as much as the opportunity to cast a ballot.

The Speaker Must Clarify His Own Ruling

The Speaker should now place beyond doubt the precise constitutional basis upon which the third-reading majority will be calculated.

Three questions require clear answers.

First, is the relevant denominator 55 parliamentary seats, 53 current MPs, or only those MPs present when the vote is taken?

Second, if all 53 sitting MPs are present, does the Speaker accept that at least two-thirds requires 36 affirmative votes?

Third, how does the interpretation that permits the denominator to fall with parliamentary absences accord with the Supreme Court's reference to all Members of Parliament?

These questions should be answered before the third reading, not after the Government discovers whether it has secured 35 or 36 votes.

The Speaker must also explain the apparent inconsistency between reports of his 2 October ruling and the constitutional arithmetic now being challenged.

A ruling from the Chair deserves respect.

But respect for the office does not require silence when a ruling raises substantial constitutional questions.

Fiji Cannot Afford Another Constitutional Controversy

Fiji's constitutional history provides sufficient warning against allowing political expediency to determine constitutional legality.

The coups of 1987, 2000 and 2006 demonstrated the consequences of political actors placing their immediate objectives above constitutional restraint.

The 2013 Constitution emerged from an undemocratic political process, but the Supreme Court has affirmed its legal effectiveness.

That determination cannot simply be ignored because the present Government wishes to replace substantial parts of the constitutional framework.

A government promising constitutional renewal must demonstrate greater fidelity to constitutional procedure than those whose actions it condemns.

It is not enough to claim that the proposed Constitution will be more democratic.

The process by which it is adopted must itself be lawful, transparent and credible.

The Speaker's ruling of 2 October has therefore assumed an importance extending far beyond parliamentary arithmetic.

If the Government secures 36 votes out of 53, the numerical two-thirds requirement is satisfied on that basis.

If it secures only 35, the requirement is not satisfied against all 53 current MPs.

The Government may argue that fewer MPs were present and that the threshold consequently fell.

But that argument rests upon a contested interpretation of the constitutional amendment procedure, not upon the proposition that 35 is two-thirds of 53.

The distinction must not be concealed.

Thirty-five is not thirty-six.

The Speaker has already ruled. What remains is for him to explain whether his ruling faithfully applies the Supreme Court's constitutional requirements.

And if the Bill's survival depends upon the difference between 35 and 36 votes, that question becomes more important than Rabuka's parliamentary majority.

Fiji has endured enough constitutional uncertainty.


Its next constitutional settlement should not begin with a dispute over whether Parliament counted the votes correctly.

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Constitutional Typo That Could Have Given Fiji's Coup-Makers, Political Elite Immunity Until 2027: Kamikamica Must Think the Fijians Are FOOLS

29/10/2026

 
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*The evidence is now in black and white. Section 206 of the Government's Constitution Amendment Bill points to a future Parliament, while its own Explanatory Note fixes the end of immunity at 6 October 2014. Manoa Kamikamica calls it a typing error. But who drafted it, who approved it, and how did such a consequential contradiction reach Parliament?

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Manoa Kamikamica must think the people of Fiji are fools.
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He now tells Fiji that the proposed extension of constitutional immunity until 2027 was a typing error.
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A typing error! Not a misplaced comma. Not a misspelt ministerial name. Not an incorrect page number.

We are dealing with a constitutional provision potentially extending protection from criminal prosecution, civil liability and other legal proceedings to an extraordinary range of public officials.
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And now, having examined the Government's Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, Bill No. 32, we can identify precisely where the problem lies.

More importantly, the Bill itself provides evidence of the contradiction.

The Evidence Is in Section 206

​Turn to printed page 110 of the Bill. Under Chapter 14, headed Immunity, Section 206 provides absolute and unconditional immunity to specified officeholders for participation or involvement in government from 5 December 2006 until the first sitting of the first Parliament elected after the commencement of the proposed Constitution.

Read those words carefully. They do not identify 6 October 2014, the date on which Fiji's first Parliament under the 2013 Constitution sat. Instead, they refer to a Parliament elected after the commencement of the proposed Constitution.

And when is that Constitution supposed to commence?

According to the Bill itself, 31 March 2028, unless an earlier commencement date is proclaimed.
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On a literal reading, therefore, the disputed immunity provision could potentially reach considerably further into the future than 2027.
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Its precise legal effect would depend on the Constitution's commencement and the interpretation of the provision, but the danger is unmistakable.

Now turn to printed page 148.

There, in the Government's own Explanatory Note, paragraph 2.206 describes the same provision as continuing immunity for persons holding specified offices between 5 December 2006 and 6 October 2014.

There it is. The operative constitutional provision points to a future Parliament. The explanatory material points to 2014.
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Two different descriptions of the same immunity period in one Government Bill.

And Kamikamica expects Fijians to dismiss this as a typing error.

Who Changed 2014 Into a Future Parliament?

​The question is no longer whether the contradiction exists. It does. The question is how it got there.

Who drafted Section 206?

Who instructed the drafter to use the expression referring to a Parliament elected after commencement of the new Constitution?
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Was that wording copied from the 2013 Constitution without appreciating that its meaning could change when incorporated into a new constitutional framework?

Or was the wording deliberately inserted and subsequently abandoned when its implications became politically embarrassing?

We make no allegation that the provision was deliberately manipulated. That has not been established.

But the Government must explain its drafting history.

And it should begin with the Attorney-General's Office.
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The Bill bears the name of S. D. Turaga, then Acting Attorney-General, beneath its Explanatory Note. That makes the legal scrutiny undertaken before the Bill was introduced a legitimate subject of public inquiry.

Did Siromi Turaga personally examine Section 206?

Was the contradiction identified by government lawyers? Was it brought to Cabinet's attention? And did Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka approve a constitutional Bill containing this discrepancy?

These questions cannot be brushed aside with an assurance that somebody will correct the wording.

The Constitution Review Commission Recommended a Different Course


​There is another aspect of this controversy that Kamikamica has conveniently failed to resolve.

The Constitution Review Commission recommended moving away from the historical immunity arrangements, while recognising the legal obstacles to removing entrenched protections.

The Government did not simply adopt that recommendation.

Instead, it introduced its own Chapter 14, preserving historical immunities and reproducing extensive protections for specified categories of public officials.

It also proposed provisions preventing the immunity chapter from being reviewed, amended, repealed or revoked, and excluding judicial challenges.

These are substantial constitutional choices.
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They cannot all be explained by an unfortunate typist pressing the wrong keys. Even if Section 206 is corrected to restore the 2014 end date, the Government must still justify its decision to preserve and entrench the immunity framework.

That is a separate political and constitutional issue.

And it is one that Kamikamica's explanation does nothing to settle.

What Did Rabuka Know? Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka cannot remain a spectator. He was responsible for Fiji's two military coups in 1987. He knows the political consequences of overthrowing an elected government and subsequently obtaining constitutional protection.
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His Government is now asking Parliament and the people to approve a constitutional framework containing provisions dealing with precisely that subject. Did Rabuka read Chapter 14? Did Cabinet examine the difference between the Government's proposals and the Constitution Review Commission's recommendations? Did ministers notice that Section 206 and its Explanatory Note were inconsistent?

If they did, why was the Bill introduced without correction? If they did not, what does that tell us about the seriousness with which Cabinet approached the proposed replacement of Fiji's supreme law?

There is no escaping ministerial responsibility.

The Constitution is not a document that can be rushed through Parliament and repaired afterwards like an incorrectly printed restaurant menu.

The RFMF Commander Had Every Reason to Object

​Major General Ro Jone Kalouniwai, Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, has raised concerns about extending immunity. His position is particularly significant because the military has historically been among the principal beneficiaries of Fiji's constitutional immunity arrangements.

The military leadership has reportedly indicated its willingness to relinquish immunity protections.
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If that is indeed the institutional position of the RFMF, it deserves careful consideration.

What an extraordinary situation Fiji now faces.

The Commander of the military questions the extension of immunity, while an elected Deputy Prime Minister explains away the Government's disputed provision as a typing error.

The Commander was not debating punctuation. He was addressing the constitutional consequences of extending legal protection for participation in government beyond the period covered by the existing arrangements.

That concern cannot be answered by changing a few words without explaining how they entered the Bill in the first place.

Biman Prasad and the NFP Must Also Answer

National Federation Party leader Professor Biman Prasad has publicly opposed immunity for coup-makers and those who supported or participated in coup governments.

But the NFP is part of the Coalition Government responsible for introducing the Bill.
Were its ministers aware of Section 206?

Did they examine the Explanatory Note? Did they object when the Government decided to retain the immunity chapter despite the Constitution Review Commission's recommendations? Or did they discover the problem only when it became the subject of public controversy?

Prasad's opposition to immunity must now be translated into parliamentary action.

The same applies to SODELPA.

Coalition partners cannot claim the moral credit for opposing immunity while avoiding responsibility for the legislation their Government has placed before Parliament. If the disputed provisions remain, they must explain how they intend to vote.

A Constitutional Typo With Potentially Enormous Consequences

Kamikamica has suggested that removing immunity could expose former political leaders, military personnel, judges, public servants and others to litigation and create instability.

But that argument does not answer the drafting question.


There is an important legal distinction between continuing existing immunities and extending the period to which immunity applies.

The Supreme Court's advisory opinion of 29 August 2025 addressed the legal status of the 2013 Constitution and its amendment framework, including the existing immunity provisions.

It should not be invoked as though it automatically authorises every immunity arrangement that a subsequent government chooses to propose.

If Kamikamica believes the disputed wording was constitutionally required, he should identify the legal authority supporting it.

If he believes it was an error, he should explain why the Government's lawyers did not correct it before the Bill was introduced.

Both propositions cannot conveniently be advanced without explanation.

The Ghosts of Fiji's Coups

The immunity debate is not merely about politicians and lawyers. It concerns the victims of Fiji's coups. In 1987, Indo-Fijians were subjected to intimidation, humiliation and violence following the overthrow of the Bavadra Government.

In 2000, Fiji experienced another assault on constitutional government. In 2006, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama removed the Qarase Government. These events destroyed livelihoods, damaged democratic institutions and forced many citizens to reconsider their future in Fiji.

Those who suffered the consequences have every reason to scrutinise constitutional provisions shielding the powerful from legal accountability.

They are entitled to something better than a Deputy Prime Minister announcing that an immunity extension was a typing mistake.

Publish the Drafting Instructions, Mr Kamikamica

The Government must now publish the precise amendment it intends to make to Section 206. Will it replace the disputed wording with 6 October 2014? Will it amend the entire immunity chapter? Will it preserve the provisions restricting judicial scrutiny?

And will it explain why the Constitution Review Commission's approach was rejected?
The public should also be given access to the relevant drafting instructions, earlier versions of Section 206 and the legal review undertaken before Cabinet approval.

There is no need to speculate about a conspiracy when the Government can establish the facts by producing the documents.

If the mistake was innocent, transparency will demonstrate that. If the drafting history reveals a deliberate policy choice, ministers must defend it.

What is unacceptable is the suggestion that the country should simply accept the Deputy Prime Minister's assurance and move on.

A Typo Today, an Immunity Certificate Tomorrow?

There is something deeply revealing about this entire episode. The Government has undertaken to replace Fiji's constitutional framework, restructure Parliament, alter constitutional appointments, redefine institutions and determine the future of immunity.

Yet it has produced a Bill in which the operative immunity provision and its own explanation point to materially different periods. The discrepancy was not hidden in some obscure administrative regulation.

It appeared in one of the most politically sensitive chapters of the proposed Constitution.

And it survived long enough to become part of the Bill presented to Parliament.

Manoa Kamikamica, this is not a satisfactory way to make a Constitution.

A typographical error is one thing.

A drafting discrepancy capable of changing the temporal reach of constitutional immunity is quite another.

The Government must tell Fijians who drafted Section 206, who approved it, who checked it and why the contradiction was not corrected before the Bill reached Parliament.

Until those questions are answered, the public is entitled to remain sceptical.

For once, the Government's own documents provide the evidence. On page 110, the operative provision points towards a future Parliament. On page 148, the explanatory note says 6 October 2014.

One Bill. Two different end points. And a Deputy Prime Minister who expects the country to believe that the explanation begins and ends with a typo.

Fiji deserves better.

GRAHAM LEUNG IN CONSTITUTIONAL HOT SEAT: From Condemning the 2013 Constitution in 2021 to Championing Its Review as A-G in 2024, Why Is He Now Warning Against a Rushed Process He Helped Set in Motion?

29/10/2026

 
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Source: The Fiji Tmes, 15 August 2026

THE FORMER ATTORNEY-GENERAL GRAHAM LEUNG MUST ANSWER QUESTIONS

Graham Leung's constitutional journey did not begin in 2024. Three years earlier, he and former parliamentary Secretary-General Mary Chapman published a lengthy critique of Fiji's democratic and constitutional arrangements. He subsequently became Attorney-General, publicly advocated constitutional review, welcomed Professor Anthony Regan into the debate and announced constitutional amendment as a government priority. Now, as Fiji Law Society president, he warns against rushed consultations and constitutional imposition.

​The question is not whether he has the right to criticise the government. It is whether he adequately discharged his own responsibilities when he had the opportunity to influence its constitutional programme.


Graham Leung has returned to the constitutional battlefield. This time, however, he is not speaking as Attorney-General of the Coalition government but as president of the Fiji Law Society.
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He is warning that the government's constitutional consultation process has been rushed, that the people have not been given sufficient opportunity to examine the proposed changes, and that Fiji must avoid repeating the mistakes of its constitutional past.

All perfectly reasonable.

But before Leung assumes the mantle of constitutional watchdog, there is a chapter of his own political and legal history that deserves examination. He was not merely a spectator when the Coalition government began discussing constitutional reform. He was its Attorney-General.
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And his criticism of the 2013 Constitution goes back considerably further than his appointment to that office. The documentary record stretches from October 2021 to October 2026. It is time to examine that record. 

October 2021: Leung and Chapman question Fiji's democracy


On 9 October 2021, the Fiji Times published an opinion article titled Is Fiji Still a Democracy?, jointly authored by Graham Leung and Mary Chapman, the former Secretary-General of Fiji's Parliament.

The Commonwealth Lawyers Association republished the article on 14 October 2021. It was a substantial critique of Fiji's constitutional and democratic arrangements under the Bainimarama government. The authors questioned the democratic legitimacy of the 2013 Constitution, its origins under military rule and the operation of democratic institutions.

They acknowledged the Constitution's extensive Bill of Rights while raising concerns about whether constitutional guarantees were being meaningfully respected. Their central argument concerned the relationship between constitutional form and democratic substance.

A constitution may promise rights and freedoms on paper, but those promises mean little if political power is exercised without adequate accountability. Leung was therefore already familiar with the dangers of constitutional arrangements that concentrate authority or weaken institutional checks.

He understood that democratic legitimacy depends upon more than the formal existence of a written constitution. He understood the importance of public participation, accountability and constitutional restraint.

These were not principles he discovered after leaving the Attorney-General's office. They were principles he had publicly articulated years earlier. And that makes his subsequent conduct in government a legitimate subject of scrutiny.

What did Graham Leung do, when he finally occupied one of Fiji's most powerful legal offices, to translate those constitutional principles into practice?

August 2024: Leung opens the door to constitutional review

On 5 August 2024, the Pacific Islands News Association published a report titled Fiji AG Leung Calls for Review of 2013 Constitution. Leung was then Attorney-General. He publicly questioned the concentration of constitutional powers in his own office, warning that an unscrupulous Attorney-General could abuse them.


He also criticised aspects of the Bill of Rights and Fiji's electoral arrangements. He disclosed that Professor Anthony Regan of the Australian National University had been invited to begin a serious discussion about constitutional reform.

Leung argued that the review should consider both what needed changing and what deserved retention. Most importantly, he acknowledged that the process of constitutional reform was as important as its content. That observation now returns to haunt the present controversy.

For if Leung understood the importance of process in August 2024, what practical measures did he recommend to ensure that the Coalition government's constitutional programme would be conducted transparently and with adequate public participation?

Did he advise Cabinet to establish an independent commission immediately? Did he recommend a timetable extending beyond the next general election if necessary? Did he warn against using parliamentary numbers to accelerate constitutional change? Or did the government simply embark upon an exercise whose practical difficulties were left to be resolved later?

Regan's involvement, including his subsequent constitutional consultancy and reported presentations to Cabinet ministers, has already been the subject of Fijileaks scrutiny. There is no need to repeat that investigation here.

The immediate question concerns Leung. As Attorney-General, what did he advise, what did he recommend, and what responsibility does he accept for the constitutional reform programme he helped promote?

March 2025: Constitutional reform becomes government business


By March 2025, constitutional review had moved beyond public lectures and general political discussion. Leung announced constitutional amendment as part of the government's legislative programme.

He criticised the rigid amendment provisions of the 2013 Constitution and argued that constitutional arrangements must permit democratic change. He also recognised the importance of public participation and broad agreement.

But recognising a principle is one thing. Ensuring that the government follows it is another. As Attorney-General, Leung was not merely another Cabinet minister expressing political preferences.

He was the government's principal legal adviser. He had a professional responsibility to identify legal risks and advise on constitutionally defensible procedures. He knew that Fiji's constitutional history was marked by military intervention, political division and disputes over legitimacy. He knew that replacing or substantially amending the Constitution would require careful management. He knew that the Coalition government was operating within a limited parliamentary term.

And he knew that constitutional change could not legitimately be reduced to a contest over parliamentary arithmetic.

Did he warn Cabinet that a comprehensive constitutional review could not be responsibly completed within an inadequate consultation timetable?

Did he distinguish between targeted amendments and the preparation of an entirely new constitutional settlement? Did he recommend a process that would survive a change of government? These are not accusations of misconduct. They are questions that arise naturally from his office and his own public statements.

The Supreme Court's advisory opinion

On 29 August 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 2013 Constitution and rejected the continuing legal operation of the 1997 Constitution. It also interpreted the constitutional amendment provisions to permit change through a two-thirds parliamentary majority followed by approval from a simple majority of voters participating in a referendum.

The judgment altered the legal landscape.

But it did not provide the Coalition government with an unlimited mandate to reconstruct Fiji's constitutional institutions. 
Nor did it relieve the government of the obligation to secure meaningful public participation.

The Supreme Court addressed constitutional legality.

The government remained responsible for the democratic legitimacy of its proposals.
That distinction is essential.

A constitution can be amended through a legally recognised procedure while the political process surrounding the amendment remains deeply unsatisfactory. Leung's present objections appear to recognise precisely that danger. But the question remains whether he anticipated and addressed it while serving as Attorney-General.

October 2026: Leung discovers the constitutional clock is running out

On 22 October 2026, Leung appeared before Parliament's special committee examining Constitution Amendment Bill No. 32 of 2026. Speaking as Fiji Law Society president, he criticised the limited public consultation arrangements.

He described the two-hour sessions in Suva and Lautoka as "hopelessly inadequate". He warned that insufficient public participation had undermined confidence in the exercise. He also acknowledged the pressure created by the parliamentary calendar and the approaching general election.

Most significantly, he suggested that the review should have begun earlier. There lies the question he must answer.

Earlier than when, Graham?

Earlier than August 2024, when he was already publicly advocating constitutional review? Earlier than March 2025, when he announced constitutional amendment as a government priority? Or earlier than March 2026, when the Constitution Review Commission was finally appointed?

Leung's observation that the process should have started earlier may be entirely correct. But he was among the senior legal figures advocating constitutional reform at an early stage.

What did he do to ensure that the necessary groundwork was laid? Did he propose a timetable? Did Cabinet reject his recommendations? Did he warn that delaying the review would eventually produce the very difficulties now confronting the government?

There may be reasonable explanations. He should provide them. The public should not be expected to accept his present criticism without examining his earlier responsibilities.

The former short-lived Attorney-General and the Fiji Law Society

Leung's election as president of the Fiji Law Society gives his constitutional interventions additional weight. The Society has a responsibility to defend the rule of law, judicial independence, constitutional government and professional integrity. Its criticism of rushed constitutional reform deserves attention.

But Leung's previous service as Attorney-General cannot be placed beyond examination simply because he now occupies a different office. The Fiji Law Society must remain independent of government.

Its president must also be prepared to explain his own involvement in the constitutional reform debate. There is no necessary contradiction between supporting constitutional reform in 2024 and criticising the government's handling of it in 2026. Indeed, Leung's insistence on public participation is consistent with principles he expressed before entering government.

The stronger question is whether those principles informed his conduct while he was Attorney-General. Did he consistently advocate them when he possessed governmental influence, or has he become more forceful in their defence now that he is outside Cabinet?

That question cannot be answered merely by examining his latest speeches. It requires an account of his earlier advice and actions.

The Constitution Review Commission and the government's Bill

The Constitution Review Commission submitted its report and draft Constitution in August 2026. The government subsequently introduced its own revised proposals as Bill No. 32.

The differences between the Commission's recommendations and the government's Bill have generated substantial controversy. Questions have arisen concerning the proposed Senate, presidential appointments, the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, emergency powers, electoral arrangements and the military's constitutional role.

The Fiji Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission has also called for greater transparency concerning those involved in constitutional drafting. These questions deserve answers from the present government.

But Leung should explain whether the constitutional reform programme now being pursued resembles the exercise he originally supported. Did he envisage a comprehensive replacement Constitution? Did he favour retaining the existing constitutional framework while amending specific provisions? Did he support the creation of new institutions, including a Senate?

Or did the government's proposals develop substantially after his departure? These distinctions are important. Leung should not be blamed for decisions made after he left office unless evidence establishes his involvement. But neither should his departure prevent scrutiny of the decisions and recommendations made during his tenure.

Constitutional fatigue, and Leung's own contribution

Leung has also warned that Fiji is suffering from coup and constitutional fatigue. He has observed that the proposed legislation could produce Fiji's fifth constitution since independence in 1970.

The warning is justified. Fiji has lived through the 1970, 1990, 1997 and 2013 Constitutions. Each constitutional rupture has carried political and social consequences.

For Indo-Fijians, the consequences of the 1987 coups and the 1990 Constitution were particularly severe. The removal of the elected government, the entrenchment of ethnic political arrangements and the resulting insecurity remain part of Fiji's constitutional memory.

The country cannot afford another settlement that becomes a source of division rather than stability. But if constitutional fatigue is now a serious concern, why was that danger not central to the Coalition government's earlier deliberations? Leung had written about Fiji's democratic deficiencies in 2021.

He had promoted constitutional review in 2024. He had supported constitutional amendment in 2025. He now warns in 2026 that the people are exhausted by constitutional change.

At what point did he conclude that the government's reform programme risked adding to that exhaustion?

And did he communicate that concern while he was in office? Leung must explain his recordThe Coalition government has repeatedly condemned the origins of the 2013 Constitution.

Its supporters have questioned the legitimacy of those who drafted it and the manner in which it was introduced. The government must now accept the same standard of scrutiny for its own constitutional proposals.
  • Who initiated the present reform programme?
  • Who advised Cabinet?
  • Who selected the constitutional experts?
  • Who determined the timetable?
  • Who authorised the preparation of the government's revised Bill?

And who decided that the country's constitutional future should be settled so close to the next general election?

These questions cannot be directed exclusively at the present Attorney-General or the Constitution Review Commission. They must also be directed at those who occupied senior legal office when the process began.

Graham Leung is one of them.

He has a documented constitutional record extending back at least five years. In 2021, he questioned Fiji's democratic arrangements. In 2024, he advocated reviewing the Constitution as Attorney-General. In 2025, he announced constitutional amendment as part of the government's legislative programme. In 2026, he criticised the government's rushed consultations.


The sequence is clear.

What remains unclear is the extent to which he attempted to ensure that the Coalition government followed the democratic principles he had publicly championed. That is the explanation Fijileaks now seeks.

The constitutional blowtorch must turn on Leung

Leung should not be condemned for criticising the government. Nor should he be accused of hypocrisy merely because he supported constitutional reform and subsequently objected to the manner in which it was pursued. But public accountability requires more than a declaration of good constitutional principles.

It requires an examination of what those entrusted with power actually did. Leung was given the opportunity to influence the Coalition government's constitutional programme from inside Cabinet. He knew the dangers of concentrated power. He understood the importance of democratic legitimacy. He had publicly criticised the constitutional arrangements inherited from the Bainimarama government. He cannot now expect his own period in office to escape examination.
  1. Did Graham Leung warn the Coalition government against the constitutional haste he now condemns?
  2. Did he recommend the consultation safeguards he now says were missing?
  3. Did he advocate a limited constitutional amendment programme, or did he support a broader constitutional reconstruction?

And does he accept any responsibility for the origins and early direction of the constitutional exercise?

These questions have been put to him for comment. His response, if received, should be considered before any final assessment of his responsibility.

Fiji's constitutional future is too important to be reduced to a quarrel between former and present officeholders.

The public deserves a complete account of how this process began, who shaped it and why it has reached its present controversial stage.

The constitutional blowtorch has been directed at the Coalition government, the Constitution Review Commission, Professor Anthony Regan and the authors of the revised Bill.

It is now time to direct it towards Graham Leung.

Not because he has criticised the process.

But because he was among those who helped set it in motion.

And because the former Attorney-General who now warns against constitutional haste must explain what he did, when he possessed the authority and opportunity, to prevent it.
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Two deacdes ago I decribed Graham Everett Leung as 'A Man With Too Many Hats', in an article published in Fiji's Daily Post on 4 November 2005. Long before Aiyaz Sayed Khaiyum became the 'Minister for Everything' after the 5 December 2006 coup.
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At the time, I questioned the wisdom of one man (Leung) simultaneously occupying the positions of President of the Fiji Law Society, Judge Advocate of the military court martial, managing partner of Howards and Chairman of the Fiji Electoral Commission.
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More than two decades later, I find myself returning to that description. The hats may have changed, but the questions about the boundaries between professional responsibility, political involvement and public office have not disappeared. Indeed, Leung's subsequent elevation to Attorney-General, and his involvement in Fiji's constitutional controversies, make those questions even more pertinent today.

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Who Really Drafted Fiji’s New Constitution? Anthony Regan, the Silent Australian Professor, Cabinet’s Private Briefings, Questions the Rabuka Government Must Answer as the FHRC joins demand to reveal identity

28/10/2026

 
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As Fiji’s Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission demands to know who drafted the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, questions I raised earlier in my Fiji Sun column remain unanswered. The Australian Professor Anthony Regan has yet to respond to my inquiries, as has former Acting Attorney-General Siromi Turaga, who subsequently resigned following the circulation of a sexually explicit video uploaded to his Facebook account. Meanwhile, a few trusted Cabinet ministers have privately confirmed to me that Regan made presentations to them on the Draft Constitution. One minister was so unimpressed that, in his own words, he had stopped paying attention to "The Aussie Professor".

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Who Really Drafted Fiji’s New Constitution? Anthony Regan, Cabinet’s Private Briefings and the Questions the Rabuka Government Must Answer

Who wrote the Constitution? The Rabuka Coalition Government has found itself confronting a question it once demanded others answer: who actually drafted Fiji's proposed Constitution? Having spent years denouncing the origins of the 2013 Constitution, it is now asking Parliament and the people of Fiji to embrace a new constitutional order without clearly identifying those responsible for preparing its own version.
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The irony is unmistakable. A government that came to power promising transparency and accountability now finds itself under scrutiny over the authorship of the very document it hopes will define Fiji's constitutional future. The question is no longer confined to political critics of the Coalition Government.

Fiji's Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission has now publicly demanded answers. According to FBC News, the Commission has questioned who drafted the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026 and whether local or overseas legal experts were responsible for preparing it.

I had already raised this issue in my Fiji Sun column. I had also directed questions to Professor Anthony Regan, the Australian associated with the constitutional review process, and to Siromi Turaga, who was then Acting Attorney-General.

Neither has responded to my questions.
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Turaga has since resigned following the circulation of a sexually explicit video uploaded to his Facebook account. The circumstances surrounding that controversy are separate from the constitutional drafting issue. His departure, however, has left unanswered questions about the constitutional legislation promoted during his tenure.

​Regan's silence is particularly significant because his involvement was not confined to distant academic commentary.

I can now disclose that several Cabinet ministers have privately confirmed to me that Regan made presentations to them concerning the Draft Constitution.

One minister was distinctly unimpressed.


Describing Regan's presentation, the minister told me: "He was so out of this world that I had stopped paying attention to him." That is the minister's assessment, not an independently established judgment about Regan's competence.


Nevertheless, it offers an insight into how at least one member of Cabinet received the constitutional advice being presented.
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It also invites an obvious question: if a Cabinet minister found the presentation so unpersuasive that he stopped paying attention, how carefully did Cabinet collectively examine the constitutional proposals placed before it?

A Constitution is not a departmental circular. It is not a Cabinet discussion paper that can be amended quietly when ministers discover an oversight. It is the supreme law of the land.

Its preparation demands considerably more than presentations by constitutional experts followed by Cabinet endorsement.

Anthony Regan: adviser, constitutional architect or something more?

Professor Anthony Regan is not an unknown figure in constitutional affairs. He has been associated with constitutional and peacebuilding work in the Pacific, including Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, and has publicly commented on Fiji's constitutional arrangements.

In August 2024, he appeared on fijivillage's Straight Talk programme, discussing weaknesses he perceived in the 2013 Constitution, including the ability of ordinary legislation to override certain rights protections.

There is nothing inherently objectionable about a government seeking advice from an overseas constitutional expert.

Constitutional law is a specialised field. Countries routinely engage comparative constitutional scholars, legislative drafters and international advisers. The objection arises when the precise nature of their involvement is not made sufficiently transparent.

The Centre for Democracy and Dialogue's account of the 2026 constitutional process identifies Regan as a technical adviser to the Constitution Review Commission, alongside legislative drafters Dr Kathrene Le Roy and Fiona Leonard. That establishes a publicly documented connection to the Commission's work.


It does not, however, establish who personally drafted every provision of the Commission's proposed Constitution, who subsequently redrafted the Government's version, or what precise role Regan played in that later exercise. These distinctions are fundamental.

Was Regan merely offering comparative constitutional advice? Did he recommend particular institutional arrangements? Did he prepare draft clauses? Did he review language prepared by others? Was he involved in discussions about the Government's subsequent departures from the Commission's recommendations?

And if he participated in presentations to Cabinet, was he explaining the Commission's original proposals or advising ministers on the substantially different version that ultimately emerged?

These are legitimate questions, not allegations of misconduct.

Regan should have the opportunity to answer them.

Indeed, a professor who has publicly discussed Fiji's constitutional deficiencies ought to appreciate why transparency about the drafting process matters. Academic expertise does not exempt an adviser from scrutiny when that expertise is brought into the service of government.

Nor should professional confidentiality become a blanket excuse for withholding the identities and institutional responsibilities of those who helped prepare the nation's proposed supreme law.

Two Constitutions, two drafting exercises, and an unexplained transformation

One of the most important facts in this controversy is that the Constitution Review Commission's Draft Constitution and the Government's Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026 are not identical documents.

The Commission completed its work at the end of August 2026. ts report and proposed Constitution were subsequently tabled in Parliament on 22 September. Cabinet then considered the recommendations and endorsed its own policy positions, including changes concerning parliamentary structures, the electoral system, the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, customary rights, judicial independence and the military's constitutional role.

The Government's Cabinet decision of 22 September explicitly contemplated finalising a Constitution Bill to reflect those endorsed positions and transitional arrangements. By 30 September, the Government had introduced Bill No. 32 of 2026. This was not simply the Commission's document being passed through Parliament unchanged.

It was a separate Government draft containing substantial revisions. And therein lies the problem. Even if the Commission's technical advisers and legislative drafters are identified, that does not answer who prepared the Government's revised text. Who instructed the drafters? Who decided which recommendations would survive? Who authorised the alterations? Who examined the consistency of the revised provisions with the Supreme Court's advisory opinion of August 2025?


And who was responsible for ensuring that changes made to one constitutional institution did not produce unintended consequences elsewhere? These questions cannot be answered merely by pointing to the Commission's membership. The Commission was one body. Cabinet was another.

The Government's final drafting team may have involved overlapping personnel, different personnel, or a combination of both. The public deserves to know which. A Cabinet minister who stopped listening

The private disclosures by Cabinet ministers deserve closer attention. Several have acknowledged to me that Regan made presentations concerning the Draft Constitution.

I am withholding their identities because these were confidential conversations. But the minister who described Regan's presentation as being so far removed from his understanding or expectations that he stopped paying attention has inadvertently highlighted a much larger problem.

What exactly were ministers being asked to consider? Were they presented with detailed comparisons between the 2013 Constitution, the Commission's draft and the Government's proposed amendments?

Were they given adequate time to study the consequences of introducing a Senate, changing the electoral system, altering constitutional appointments and redefining the relationship between elected government and the military?

Or were they expected to absorb complex constitutional propositions through presentations and then proceed towards Cabinet approval? I do not know what documents accompanied Regan's presentations, or precisely how each minister responded. Those matters require clarification.

But Cabinet government imposes collective responsibility.

Ministers cannot shelter behind the authority of an overseas professor when they are ultimately responsible for the constitutional proposals placed before Parliament. Nor can a minister's lack of interest in a presentation excuse a failure to scrutinise the proposals.

If anything, it makes that scrutiny more important. For years, Rabuka and other critics of the 2013 Constitution complained about its origins, the absence of meaningful consultation and the uncertainty surrounding its authorship.

Now the Coalition Government faces questions about the identity and responsibilities of those who prepared its own proposed replacement. A government that condemns secrecy in one constitutional process cannot demand unquestioning confidence in another.

Siromi Turaga's departure does not bury the questions

Siromi Turaga was one of the Government's principal public defenders of the constitutional changes. He argued that the proposed Bill of Rights would strengthen protections and defended significant institutional changes, including the proposed removal of FICAC from the constitutional framework.

As Acting Attorney-General, he occupied an office with particular responsibility for the legal integrity of the Government's legislative programme. My questions to him about the constitutional drafting process therefore went to the heart of his official responsibilities.

They were not personal questions. They concerned the provenance of a proposed Constitution, the legal advice behind it and the accountability of those involved. His subsequent resignation does not make those questions disappear.

Indeed, it makes it all the more important that his successor, the Solicitor-General and the Prime Minister explain the institutional arrangements under which the Government's draft was prepared.

A constitutional process should never depend on the continued presence of one minister. There should be documentary records of drafting instructions, revisions, approvals and legal scrutiny.

The public is entitled to know who exercised responsibility at each important stage.

The Human Rights Commission has identified a fundamental democratic issue


The Human Rights Commission's intervention is significant because it comes from a constitutional human rights institution, not merely from political opponents of the Government.

Its concern goes beyond identifying the names of individual lawyers.

The qualifications, professional experience and involvement of those responsible for drafting constitutional provisions may help explain why particular institutional choices were made.

The Commission has also raised concerns about the restricted consultation period.

FBC previously reported that the Commission objected to the 11-day period for written submissions and warned that rural communities, maritime populations and vulnerable groups could be excluded from meaningful participation.

The two issues are inseparable. Citizens cannot properly assess a constitutional proposal if they are denied adequate time to study it. And they cannot properly scrutinise its origins if they are not told who prepared it.

The Government may argue that the Commission's earlier consultations were extensive. But that argument overlooks the central difficulty: the Commission's original draft was subsequently altered by Cabinet.

Consultation on one document does not automatically constitute consultation on a materially different document. That is especially true when the alterations concern the architecture of representative government, the powers of constitutional institutions and the future distribution of political authority.

The 2013 Constitution and the Coalition's double standard


The mystery surrounding the authorship of Fiji's 2013 Constitution has long been a subject of political controversy. The Human Rights Commission has itself referred to the continuing uncertainty over its authorship and the importance of avoiding a similar situation today.

The Coalition Government should welcome the opportunity to demonstrate that its own constitutional exercise meets a higher standard. Instead, the unresolved questions risk producing precisely the suspicion the Government claims it wants to overcome.

There is also an important distinction between constitutional legitimacy and constitutional authorship. A Constitution does not become invalid simply because a foreign expert helped draft it.

Nor does it become democratic merely because a locally appointed commission supervised its preparation. The relevant questions are whether the process was lawful, whether the people had a meaningful opportunity to participate, whether the institutions involved acted within their authority and whether the resulting document commands sufficient democratic legitimacy.

Transparency over authorship contributes to those objectives. It does not replace them. The Supreme Court's August 2025 advisory opinion established the constitutional framework within which amendments to the 2013 Constitution could proceed.

It did not give the Coalition Government a blank cheque to conduct the remainder of the exercise without adequate public scrutiny.


The fact that a proposed amendment might satisfy the necessary parliamentary and referendum thresholds does not answer every question about the fairness and credibility of the process leading to it.

Legal authority and public confidence are related, but they are not identical. What was Anthony Regan's influence over Cabinet? The disclosure that Regan made presentations to Cabinet ministers raises a further issue.

An external adviser may legitimately explain constitutional options to ministers. But it matters whether the adviser was simply describing options or advocating particular outcomes.
  • Did Regan express preferences concerning the proposed Senate?
  • Did he advise on the relationship between constituency representation and proportional representation?
  • Did he comment on the proposed constitutional position of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga?
  • What advice, if any, did he give concerning the role of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces?
  • Did he discuss the proposed arrangements for constitutional amendment and emergency powers?

These are questions about his involvement, not assertions that he determined the answers.

And the distinction matters.

Regan may have provided entirely conventional technical advice within the limits of his appointment.

He may have had no role whatsoever in the Government's subsequent redrafting. Alternatively, his involvement may have extended beyond the Commission's original exercise. The public record examined so far does not conclusively establish which explanation is correct.

That is why a response from Regan, the Commission and the Government is necessary.

The confidential Cabinet accounts make the question more pressing, but they do not by themselves prove that Regan drafted Bill No. 32. Fiji's Constitution must not become another exercise in political expediencyThe Coalition Government appears determined to push its constitutional programme towards the next parliamentary stage.

Yet the process has already exposed disagreements among political parties, including parties whose support helped bring Rabuka to office in December 2022. The National Federation Party has attached conditions to its participation and support. SODELPA has expressed serious objections.

Questions remain over the proposed Senate, the electoral system, the presidency, the powers of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga and the protection of equal citizenship. These are not minor drafting inconveniences. They concern the future organisation of the Fijian state. And they are being debated against the background of Fiji's painful constitutional history.

The 1970 Constitution emerged from negotiations surrounding independence. The 1990 Constitution followed the military coups of 1987. 
The 1997 Constitution represented an attempt to restore a more inclusive constitutional settlement. The 2013 Constitution followed another period of military rule.

Each constitutional episode reflected struggles over political power, communal representation, democratic legitimacy and the relationship between civilian authority and the military. Fiji should have learned by now that constitutional engineering cannot substitute for political trust.

A Constitution designed principally to satisfy the immediate objectives of a governing coalition may become the source of the next constitutional crisis. The Government must therefore resist the temptation to treat the parliamentary timetable as more important than the quality and legitimacy of the constitutional settlement.

Publish the names, the instructions and the drafting record

There is a straightforward way for the Coalition Government to answer the Human Rights Commission and remove much of the uncertainty.

It should publish a clear account of the drafting process.


That account should identify:
  1. The lawyers and legislative drafters who prepared the Constitution Review Commission's original draft, and the responsibilities assigned to each.
  2. The precise terms of Professor Anthony Regan's appointment, including his advisory, drafting and Cabinet presentation roles.
  3. The individuals or institutions responsible for preparing the Government's revised Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026.
  4. The drafting instructions issued following Cabinet's consideration of the Commission's recommendations.
  5. The legal offices responsible for reviewing the final text and confirming its consistency with existing constitutional requirements.
  6. The dates and general subjects of constitutional presentations made to Cabinet, together with the status of any accompanying advice.
Where legal professional privilege or legitimate Cabinet confidentiality applies, the Government can explain the limits of disclosure. But neither principle should automatically prevent the identification of the drafting team or a proper explanation of the process.

The Prime Minister should also make clear whether the Government's final draft was prepared by the same technical personnel who assisted the Commission or by a separate team.

That single clarification would help resolve a substantial part of the controversy.

The unanswered questions will follow the Government into ParliamentThe Human Rights Commission's intervention has arrived at a critical moment.

The Constitution (Amendment) Bill is approaching a decisive parliamentary stage. Members of Parliament will be asked to exercise their constitutional responsibilities on a document that could fundamentally alter Fiji's institutions and political future. They should not be required to vote without knowing how the Government's version was produced.

Nor should they be content with assurances that experts were consulted.

Expertise is not a substitute for accountability. The Government should identify the experts, explain their responsibilities and distinguish their advice from the political decisions ultimately taken by Cabinet.

As for Professor Regan, my questions remain open.

I have not concluded that he secretly drafted the Government's Constitution Bill. I have not established that his advice was improper. And the private remarks of Cabinet ministers do not establish either proposition. What I have established through those conversations is that Regan made presentations to Cabinet ministers on the Draft Constitution, and that at least one minister was sufficiently unimpressed to say he stopped paying attention.

The professor is entitled to explain the purpose and scope of those presentations. The Government is obliged to explain who drafted its Bill. These are different questions, but both deserve answers.

Fiji has endured too many constitutional upheavals to accept another constitutional settlement whose preparation is obscured by uncertainty. The people have a right to know not only what their proposed Constitution says, but who prepared it, who changed it and who accepted responsibility for the final document.

The question is no longer simply whether Anthony Regan advised the Constitution Review Commission. His advisory role is already publicly documented.

The question is whether he, or others working with or independently of him, helped produce the substantially revised Government Bill now before Parliament.

Until the Government identifies those responsible, the constitutional authorship controversy will persist.

And if the Coalition Government cannot answer such a basic question about its own proposed Constitution, it should not be surprised when the people of Fiji ask a much more serious one: Why should we be expected to approve a Constitution when the Government has not fully explained who wrote it?


Questions the Coalition Government must answer
  • Who drafted the Commission's original Constitution, and who drafted the Government's revised Bill?
  • What precisely was Professor Anthony Regan's role in each exercise?
  • What advice did Regan present to Cabinet, and when?
  • Why have the identities and responsibilities of the Government's drafting team not been clearly disclosed?
  • Will the Government answer these questions before the Bill's third reading?

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Meanwhile, which businessman allegedly financed Siromi Turaga’s trip to New Zealand in October 2026, during which the sexually explicit video dubbed ‘Fijiwood's Kama Sutra’ was reportedly recorded?

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From Constitution Review CHAIRMAN to Sitiveni Rabuka's ATTORNEY-General: Which Constitution Will Sevuloni VALENITABUA Now Defend?

28/10/2026

 

*The man who chaired Fiji's supposedly independent Constitution Review Commission has become the government's chief legal adviser while Parliament is still considering constitutional changes that depart from his Commission's recommendations.

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On 27 October 2026, Sevuloni Valenitabua was sworn in as Fiji's Acting Attorney-General.
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Ordinarily, the appointment of an experienced lawyer to the government's highest legal office would attract little controversy, provided the constitutional qualifications had been satisfied.

But Valenitabua is no ordinary incoming Attorney-General.
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Until recently, he chaired the Constitution Review Commission (CRC), appointed to examine Fiji's 2013 Constitution and recommend changes after nationwide consultations.

On 31 August, the Commission delivered its report and draft Constitution to President Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu.

Less than two months later, its chairman has become Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka's chief legal adviser.

The timing is extraordinary.
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The government's constitutional amendment Bill remains politically contentious. Important recommendations made by the CRC have either been altered or omitted.

Valenitabua now occupies the office responsible for advising the government on the legal implications of those very changes.


There is no evidence that the appointment is unlawful merely because he previously chaired the CRC. But legality is not the only consideration.

The independence of a constitutional review process must be protected not only while a Commission is sitting, but also when its recommendations are being accepted, rejected or rewritten by the government.

An Independent Commission or a Government Stepping Stone?


The CRC was established to provide an independent assessment of the Constitution. Its members were expected to consider submissions from citizens, political parties, civil society organisations, religious groups and traditional institutions.

The exercise was presented as an opportunity for the people to participate in determining Fiji's constitutional future.

Valenitabua chaired that process.

His responsibility was to lead an independent Commission, not to serve as the government's constitutional advocate.

Yet within weeks of delivering the report, he has crossed from the review process into the executive government's legal machinery.

The distinction matters.

The Commission's recommendations were the product of public consultations. The government's subsequent decisions are political choices for which Cabinet must accept responsibility. The former chairman must not become the means by which those two very different processes are blurred.

The Recommendations Rabuka's Government Changed

The CRC recommended a two-term limit for the Prime Minister. The government's Bill did not retain that restriction. The Commission proposed limiting Cabinet to 15 members. The government's approach leaves greater discretion with the Prime Minister.

The CRC also advanced recommendations concerning constitutional appointments, institutional checks and balances, and the allocation of political power. The government's proposals have departed from aspects of that framework. These are substantial constitutional questions.

They concern whether executive power should be limited, whether political appointments should be subject to stronger safeguards, and whether constitutional reform will genuinely improve accountability.

Valenitabua now faces an obvious professional dilemma.

What happens when the government seeks his legal advice on provisions that differ from the recommendations his own Commission made?

As Attorney-General, he must provide independent and competent legal advice. He is not required to agree politically with every provision in the government's Bill. But the public is entitled to know whether he continues to support the CRC's recommendations and how he intends to manage any conflict between his previous responsibilities and his new office.

The Rabuka Connection

There is another aspect of Valenitabua's appointment that should not be overlooked. Fijileaks previously identified him as having acted as Rabuka's lawyer. A prior lawyer-client relationship does not disqualify someone from public office.


Nevertheless, that relationship is relevant when considering the appearance of independence surrounding his CRC appointment and his subsequent selection as Acting Attorney-General.

When was Valenitabua first approached about the Attorney-General's position? Was the possibility discussed while he was still chairman of the CRC? Did he participate in discussions concerning the government's departures from the Commission's recommendations?

There is no evidence establishing that any improper arrangement existed.

But transparency requires that these questions be answered.

Section 96 and the Appointment

The appointment must also satisfy Section 96 of the 2013 Constitution. Valenitabua's extensive legal experience suggests that the professional experience requirement is unlikely to be the principal difficulty.

The more relevant questions concern the constitutional conditions for appointing someone from outside Parliament and the provisions governing acting appointments. The government should publish the appointment instrument and identify the precise constitutional authority relied upon.

It should also explain why the appointment was considered appropriate following the resignation of Siromi Turaga. These questions are separate from the CRC issue, but they reinforce the need for transparency.

The Constitution Must Be Bigger Than Its Chairman

Fiji's constitutional history is littered with documents produced by commissions, committees and constitutional experts, only to be reshaped by those holding political power.

The Reeves Commission's recommendations in the 1990s underwent political negotiation before the adoption of the 1997 Constitution.

The 2012 Ghai Commission's draft was rejected by the Bainimarama government, which subsequently produced the 2013 Constitution.

Now another independent Commission has completed its work, only for its chairman to become the government's chief legal adviser while the recommendations are being contested.

The parallel is not exact, but the underlying problem is familiar.

Who ultimately controls the constitutional process: the people who were consulted, the independent Commission that considered their submissions, or the government that decides which recommendations survive?

Valenitabua's appointment does not answer that question.

It makes the question more urgent.

Rabuka should explain the circumstances of the appointment, the continuing status of the CRC's recommendations, and how the government intends to preserve the independence of the constitutional review.


The issue is not whether Valenitabua is entitled to become Attorney-General. It is whether the constitutional process he chaired can retain its credibility now that he has become the government's principal legal adviser.

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NEXT: Too Sick for FICAC, Fit for the CRC and Now Attorney-General: What Changed in Sevuloni Valenitabua's Suitability for Public Office?

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Ropate Green Signed the 2024 FICAC Report Questioning Valenitabua's Suitability. Did He Now Vet Him for Attorney-General of Fiji?
Rabuka publicly confirmed that the Solicitor-General was vetting candidates for Attorney-General. Two years earlier, Green was one of three officials who signed the FICAC selection report recording concerns about Valenitabua's suitability. Was he involved in assessing the same lawyer again?

FIJI: A LAND FULL OF MIRACLES, One minute one is dying, and NEXT?

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SPARE THE ROD, REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION. If Fiji's Children Need Chastisement, Why Not an Unruly Coalition Government by the RFMF?

27/10/2026

 

*From the beatings and humiliation of Indo-Fijians after Sitiveni Rabuka's 1987 coups to Frank Bainimarama's buturaki culture, the proposed constitutional protection for moderate chastisement raises disturbing questions about violence, discipline and the abuse of authority.

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Following the 1987 coups, Sunday restrictions were imposed as part of the new political and social order. Indo-Fijian children were reportedly beaten for violating restrictions on recreational activities. In Ba, historical accounts describe Indo-Fijian children being beaten with sticks and forced to rub their noses against concrete floors.
There is something deeply troubling about a Coalition Government that proposes to permit the physical chastisement of children while demanding constitutional discipline from those entrusted with protecting the Republic.
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Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka's Government has introduced a proposed Constitution containing an exception permitting what it describes as "lawful and moderate chastisement" for the correction of children.

The justification offered by supporters of corporal punishment is familiar. Children have become unruly. Teachers have lost authority. Parents cannot control their offspring. Respect has diminished. Discipline must therefore be restored. But what happens when the Government itself becomes unruly?
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What happens when ministers dismiss constitutional objections, disregard warnings from independent institutions and press ahead with fundamental constitutional changes despite serious public disagreement?

Should the Republic of Fiji Military Forces Commander then be permitted to administer a little constitutional buturaki to the Coalition Government?

The suggestion is deliberately provocative. Of course he should not.
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But if physical punishment is defended as an acceptable means of correcting indiscipline, the Government must explain why that reasoning is sound in one setting and wholly unacceptable in another.
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Children are not governments, and parents are not military commanders. The analogy is not one of equivalent legal powers. It challenges the assumption that physical coercion becomes legitimate merely because those exercising authority call it discipline.

From Bainimarama's buturaki to Rabuka's chastisement

In October 2016, then Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama addressed a United Nations regional conference on the Convention Against Torture.

He acknowledged a disturbing feature of Fiji's social and institutional history.

"This culture of what we call the buturaki, the beating, is deeply ingrained in parts of the Fijian psyche. But it is simply not acceptable in the modern age."
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His remarks were subsequently cited in Fiji's Parliament on 9 February 2017. Bainimarama was condemning the culture of beating, not endorsing it. That distinction matters, particularly given the record of violence and abuse associated with Fiji's security forces during his own period in power.

His public condemnation did not absolve his Government of responsibility for abuses committed under its watch. Nevertheless, he recognised something important: violence cannot be justified simply because it has become embedded in society's understanding of discipline and authority.

​A decade later, Rabuka's Coalition Government is proposing constitutional language expressly permitting moderate physical chastisement.

Are we now to understand that the buturaki culture Bainimarama publicly condemned is to receive constitutional recognition under Rabuka? The proposed wording does not authorise unrestricted beating. Its defenders would insist upon the distinction between moderate correction and abuse.

But who determines where correction ends and violence begins?

And why should the Constitution itself be used to preserve that disputed boundary?

Rabuka's 1987 buturaki: Even children were not spared

There is a particularly shameful chapter of Fiji's history that Rabuka should be reminded of before his Coalition Government constitutionalises permission for physical chastisement.

Following his military coups in 1987, Indo-Fijians were subjected to intimidation, humiliation and physical abuse. Amnesty International documented serious human rights violations during the period of military rule. Other accounts, subsequently reproduced in United States judicial proceedings, described Indo-Fijians being forced into sewage ponds containing human excrement and subjected to degrading treatment.

Even children were not spared. Following the coups, Sunday restrictions were imposed as part of the new political and social order. Children were reportedly beaten for violating restrictions on recreational activities.


In Ba, historical accounts describe Indo-Fijian children being beaten with sticks and forced to rub their noses against concrete floors. These were not acts of parental correction. They were abuses of power committed in the political climate created by the military overthrow of an elected government.

Rabuka cannot dismiss this history as belonging to another age.

He was the military leader who overthrew Dr Timoci Bavadra's government. The abuses that followed form part of the historical record of that upheaval, although responsibility for individual acts must be established separately.

And now, nearly four decades later, his Coalition Government proposes an express constitutional exception permitting lawful and moderate chastisement. The irony is disturbing.

In 2016, Bainimarama condemned Fiji's deeply ingrained buturaki culture. In 2026, Rabuka's Government is proposing language that could be invoked to defend physical punishment of children.

Have we learnt nothing from the past?

The children beaten under the Sunday restrictions of the coup era deserved protection from those exercising power over them.

Fiji's children today deserve no less.

Who inserted the corporal punishment provision?

The Constitution Review Commission submitted its draft on 31 August 2026. 
The Rabuka Government subsequently introduced its own Constitution Bill in Parliament on 30 September.

These are separate documents, and the changes between them require careful scrutiny.

Section 40(1)(e) of the Government's Bill contains the disputed exception permitting lawful and moderate chastisement for correction.

Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commissioner Alefina Vuki has questioned the wording and indicated that, to her understanding, it was not recommended by the Commission.

If that is correct, who introduced it?

Was it Cabinet? The Attorney-General's drafting team? Or did it emerge from consultations conducted after the Commission completed its work?

The Government should publish the drafting history and explain the legal advice upon which it relied.

There is a fundamental difference between leaving questions of parental discipline to ordinary legislation and inserting express permission for physical chastisement into the supreme law.

The latter could make future reform more difficult by allowing defenders of corporal punishment to invoke constitutional authority.

When the Government itself refuses discipline

Now consider the position of the RFMF Commander Ro Jone Kalouniwai.


Suppose he believes the Coalition Government's constitutional programme threatens Fiji's stability, weakens national institutions or creates conditions for another political upheaval.

Suppose he raises those concerns privately with the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Suppose they refuse to listen. Does their refusal give him the right to intervene? Absolutely not.

A military Commander cannot lawfully remove an elected government merely because he considers its policies reckless or its ministers unresponsive. Nor does disagreement over constitutional reform transform the armed forces into an alternative government.

The proposed Constitution's Section 151 places military command within a framework of civilian authority.

But constitutional subordination does not require intellectual silence.

A Commander may raise legitimate institutional concerns through authorised channels, seek legal advice and participate in lawful constitutional processes where appropriate. What he cannot do is appoint himself the final arbiter of the Government's political legitimacy.

Equally, ministers cannot dismiss every constitutional objection merely because they possess a parliamentary majority.

A parliamentary majority is authority to govern within the Constitution, not a licence to disregard its limitations.

The Government must submit its proposals to lawful scrutiny, including judicial determination where a justiciable constitutional question arises.

That is the difference between constitutional discipline and coercion.

Rabuka should remember what military intervention produced

Few politicians should understand the dangers of military intervention better than Rabuka. In May 1987, he led the overthrow of Bavadra's elected Coalition Government.

The intervention was defended by supporters through appeals to i-Taukei interests, political stability and the perceived dangers posed by the new government. But the consequences extended far beyond the immediate removal of a Prime Minister.

Fiji's constitutional order was shattered. Racial insecurity deepened. Democratic institutions were undermined. Thousands of citizens eventually left the country. The abuses inflicted upon Indo-Fijians, including those associated with Sunday restrictions, demonstrated how quickly political coercion could become physical humiliation.

Rabuka knows what happens when those possessing military power convince themselves that elected politicians must be corrected by force. If a Commander today argued that the Coalition Government had become sufficiently unruly to warrant military intervention, he would be reviving the reasoning used to justify the overthrow of Bavadra.

That would be constitutionally indefensible.

The Constitution must be defended through lawful institutions, not another coup.

A Government that wants to discipline children

In September 2026, the Coalition Government endorsed the National Action Plan to Prevent Violence Against Children 2026–2031. The Government acknowledged evidence that violent discipline remains widespread among Fiji's children.

Yet its proposed Constitution contains language permitting lawful and moderate chastisement.

How does the Government reconcile these positions?


If the objective is to protect children against violence, why constitutionalise an exception for physical punishment?

Minister for Women, Children and Social Protection Sashi Kiran has publicly opposed violence against children and indicated that the provision could be reconsidered during parliamentary scrutiny.

Was she consulted before Cabinet approved the Bill? Did she object to the wording? Was the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission invited to review the provision before its introduction?

These questions deserve answers before Parliament proceeds to the proposed third reading.

The Constitution should not become a handbook for administering punishment.

It should establish the rights of citizens and the limits of authority, including authority exercised within families, schools, government departments and security institutions.

Who disciplines the disciplinarians?There is a broader lesson in Fiji's troubled constitutional history.

Governments have repeatedly justified extraordinary measures by claiming that circumstances demanded them.

Military officers have invoked national security. Politicians have invoked racial protection. Chiefs have invoked traditional authority. Others have invoked public order, stability or the supposed wishes of the people.

Each justification becomes dangerous when those advancing it also claim the power to determine its limits.

A parent who considers punishment moderate may have a child who experiences it as violence.

A Prime Minister who considers constitutional changes necessary may face citizens who regard them as an abuse of authority.

A military Commander who believes a government is endangering the nation may be tempted to conclude that intervention is justified.

The constitutional answer cannot depend simply upon the convictions of those exercising power.

There must be enforceable limits, independent institutions and lawful means of challenging decisions.

That is why the rule of law matters.

Remove the chastisement clause

The disputed provision should be removed before the proposed third reading on 2 November 2026.

Parliament should also require the Government to explain precisely why it departed from the Constitution Review Commission's recommendations, wherever such departures occurred.

The Coalition cannot credibly claim to be strengthening fundamental rights while creating an express constitutional exception that could weaken children's protection against physical punishment.

Nor can it expect public confidence in constitutional reform if important alterations are introduced without adequate explanation.

This is not an argument for military intervention. Quite the opposite. Fiji must reject the notion that any institution, whether the family, Government or military, possesses an unlimited right to impose its will through coercion.

A little buturaki for the Coalition?

So let us return to the deliberately uncomfortable question. If Rabuka's Government believes an unruly child may require lawful and moderate chastisement, why should an unruly Coalition Government not receive a little buturaki from an exasperated RFMF Commander?

The answer is that the Commander has no such right.

And neither should the Constitution be casually used to legitimise physical violence against children.

Bainimarama publicly condemned Fiji's buturaki culture in 2016. 
Rabuka, whose political career began with the military overthrow of an elected government in 1987, should understand better than anyone the dangers of confusing coercion with legitimate authority.

The historical accounts of Indo-Fijians being beaten, humiliated and forced into sewage ponds, and children punished for breaching Sunday restrictions, should never be forgotten.

Fiji has endured enough political and institutional buturaki.

Its children deserve protection from violence.

Its elected governments must remain accountable to the Constitution.

Its military must remain within the law.

The answer to an undisciplined child is not violence. The answer to an undisciplined government is not a coup.

And if the Coalition Government cannot understand why both propositions matter, perhaps it should reconsider what constitutional discipline actually means before asking Parliament to rewrite the supreme law.


WHEN PARENTS BECOME PREDATORS: Fiji's Shameful Record of Fathers Raping Their Own Daughters While the Constitutional Review Commission Proposes Entrenching Corporal Punishment
*Two disturbing cases, reported in 2018 and 2024, raise a larger question: Who protects Fiji's children when the very parents entrusted with their care become their abusers? And why is the proposed Constitution addressing corporal punishment rather than placing greater emphasis on protecting children from violence and abuse?

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From Siddiq Koya in 1970 to Biman Prasad in 2026: Is the NFP Right to Challenge Constitutional Rush After Supporting Bill's Second Reading?

25/10/2026

 

*Parmod Chand is right to question the Coalition Government's hurried constitutional timetable. But why did the NFP support the Bill's second reading before demanding more time and substantial changes? The question recalls the party's constitutional compromises of 1970, when it accepted special Senate veto powers for the Great Council of Chiefs to allay iTaukei fears of Indo-Fijian political dominance.

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The National Federation Party supports the ongoing consultation on the  Constitution Amendment Bill, with party leader Professor Biman Prasad urging Fijians to come forward and share their views on the proposed changes.
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Parmod
Chand
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The NFP Is Right About the Timetable, But What About Its Own Vote?

​The National Federation Party is right to challenge the Coalition Government's hurried timetable for constitutional reform.

Its president, Parmod Chand, has correctly pointed out that Section 160 of the 2013 Constitution requires a minimum interval of 30 days between the second and third readings of a constitutional amendment Bill.
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It does not require Parliament to proceed immediately after those 30 days have expired.

The NFP is also justified in demanding adequate time for public submissions, parliamentary scrutiny and proper consideration of the proposed changes.

But there is an uncomfortable question the party must answer.
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If the NFP believes the constitutional process is being rushed, why did its own parliamentarians support the Bill at the second reading without first securing agreement on the timetable and the safeguards it now considers essential?
​

The party argues that supporting the second reading allowed the Bill to proceed to public consultation. That is a legitimate parliamentary position. A vote at the second reading does not automatically commit members to supporting the Bill at the third.
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Nevertheless, the NFP cannot indefinitely support the advancement of constitutional reform while distancing itself from the consequences. Its leader, Biman Prasad, has identified 18 areas requiring changes, including the proposed Senate, parliamentary composition and provisions concerning Christianity.

What happens if those changes are rejected?

Will the NFP vote against the Bill, or will coalition loyalty prevail?

These questions are particularly important because the party has confronted a similar constitutional dilemma before.
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The Constitutional Compromise of 1970

Re-reading my book Fiji: Coups in Paradise: Race, Politics and Military Intervention, I am reminded of the decisions made by the NFP leadership during the London constitutional negotiations that preceded Fiji's independence.
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In 1970, the NFP, led by Siddiq Koya, entered negotiations demanding common-roll voting, the principle championed by A. D. Patel as the foundation of equal citizenship. It returned with a Constitution that retained communal electoral arrangements.

The party also accepted a 22-member Senate, eight of whose members would be nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). Under Section 68 of the 1970 Constitution, changes to specified legislation protecting iTaukei land, customs and customary rights required special parliamentary majorities, including the support of at least six of the eight GCC-nominated senators.
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This was not a general veto over all legislation. It was a special blocking power over protected matters. The justification was partly that iTaukei, then numerically smaller than Indo-Fijians, needed constitutional reassurance against possible political domination.

The NFP accepted that argument.


But the party failed to anticipate adequately how Fiji's changing population would eventually undermine the demographic fears that helped shape the settlement.

​The Demographic Miscalculation

In Fiji: Coups in Paradise, I questioned why the constitutional negotiators had not given sufficient attention to future population trends. In 1976, Indo-Fijians constituted approximately 49.8 per cent of Fiji's population, compared with 44.2 per cent iTaukei.

By 1986, the figures had moved to 48.6 and 46.2 per cent respectively. Subsequent emigration and demographic changes transformed that balance. Today, iTaukei constitute a clear majority, while Indo-Fijians have become a substantially smaller minority. That is the constitutional irony.
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In 1970, the NFP accepted special political safeguards partly to reassure a community fearful of domination by a larger Indo-Fijian population.

In 2026, the NFP is participating in constitutional proposals that would again strengthen the influence of chiefly institutions, even though the demographic position has been reversed.
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This does not mean iTaukei land, culture, customs or traditional rights should lose constitutional protection. Those protections must remain secure regardless of population numbers.

But there is a fundamental distinction between protecting customary rights and allocating additional political authority to unelected chiefly institutions.
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The NFP must explain why the proposed distribution of constitutional power is appropriate for Fiji today.
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Why Strengthen the GCC's Political Influence?

The proposed Constitution envisages a restored Senate and an expanded constitutional role for the GCC, including participation in the appointment process for the President. What powers will the Senate possess? How will its members be selected? What influence will chiefly nominees exercise over legislation passed by elected representatives? And what safeguards will protect the democratic rights of citizens outside the chiefly structure?

These are legitimate constitutional questions, not attacks upon iTaukei rights. The GCC has an important historical and cultural role. But cultural authority and national political authority are not interchangeable. Nor should constitutional recognition automatically translate into an entitlement to exercise political influence over elected institutions.
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The NFP, whose political foundations were built upon equal citizenship, should understand that distinction better than most.

The Rabuka Contradiction

​There is another historical irony. In 1987, the NFP joined the Fiji Labour Party in an electoral coalition that defeated the Alliance Party. Within weeks, Sitiveni Rabuka overthrew the elected government in Fiji's first military coup.

The constitutional order negotiated in London was shattered. Today, the NFP is a partner in Rabuka's Coalition Government, helping shape another constitutional settlement.

Political reconciliation is desirable. But reconciliation cannot require historical amnesia. The party has experienced the coups of 1987 and 2000, the 1990 and 1997 Constitutions, the military takeover of 2006 and the imposition of the 2013 Constitution.

If any political party should understand the consequences of constitutional miscalculation, it is the NFP.

Why the Rush Before the General Election?

Prime Minister Rabuka has confirmed that the next general election will be held under the existing constitutional and electoral arrangements, by 6 February 2027.

Why, then, the urgency to complete constitutional reform before the election? The present Parliament retains the legal authority to consider constitutional amendments.

But that does not make an accelerated timetable politically wise. A newly elected Parliament could examine the proposals with a fresh democratic mandate.

Meanwhile, Fiji faces pressing problems involving poverty, unemployment, drugs, HIV and the cost of living. Constitutional reform should not become a substitute for addressing these problems.

Nor should public consultation become a formality designed to satisfy a predetermined political timetable.

The NFP Must Decide Where It Stands

The NFP has not yet repeated the mistakes of 1970. Parmod Chand's objections are constitutionally sound, and the party's demands for substantive amendments deserve consideration.

But those objections must ultimately be reflected in its parliamentary conduct.

The decisive test will come at the third reading.

If the Government refuses to extend consultations or address the party's substantive concerns, will the NFP oppose the Bill?

In 1970, the NFP could plead the pressures of independence negotiations. In 2026, it has fifty-six years of constitutional experience to guide it.

The question is not whether iTaukei rights should be protected. They should. The question is whether the political authority proposed for chiefly institutions in 2026 is justified by democratic principles rather than the demographic fears and political compromises of 1970.

The NFP must not mistake the opportunity to participate in constitutional reform for an obligation to endorse the Government's preferred settlement.

The lesson from Fiji: Coups in Paradise remains relevant: constitutional compromises made for immediate political convenience can impose consequences upon generations yet unborn.

Parmod Chand is right to question the rush. Biman Prasad and the NFP parliamentarians must now demonstrate that their objections are more than words.

Key Points:
  • The NFP is right about the timetable: Section 160 requires at least 30 days between the second and third readings, not an immediate vote after 30 days.
  • But why support the second reading? The party must explain what it will do if the Government rejects its demands for more consultation and substantive changes.
  • The 1970 precedent: Under Siddiq Koya, the NFP accepted communal voting and special Senate veto powers for GCC nominees over specified iTaukei protections.
  • The demographic reversal: In 1970, iTaukei feared Indo-Fijian numerical dominance. Today, iTaukei are the majority and Indo-Fijians a much smaller minority.
  • Protecting rights is different from granting political power: Safeguarding iTaukei land and customs does not automatically justify expanding the authority of unelected chiefly institutions.
  • The decisive test: Will Biman Prasad's NFP defend its constitutional objections at the third reading, or repeat the political compromises of 1970?​

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The NFP delegation in London

Manoa Kamikamica's Challenge: Where Is the Racism in Fiji's Proposed Constitution? The Answer Lies Not Merely in the Words but in Who Will Exercise Power. Why should unelected traditional Chiefs shape next Fiji?

24/10/2026

 

Fiji Singing the Blues: GCC's Blue Brigade Eyes Control of the Nation Once Again
The GCC have once again used cunning and trickery to gain control of Fiji.

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*Manoa Kamikamica has challenged critics to identify the racist provisions in the proposed Constitution. It is a legitimate challenge, but it raises an equally legitimate question: Must a Constitution expressly discriminate against a particular race before its distribution of political power can be questioned? And if the Great Council of Chiefs is to exercise decisive influence over the Senate and the appointment of the President, where does that leave the principle of equal citizenship in a multiethnic republic?

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MANOA KAMIKAMICA has thrown down the gauntlet. Those who describe the proposed Constitution as racist, he says, should identify the offending provisions.
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Fair enough. Constitutional debate should be conducted with the text before us, not with slogans, suspicions or political prejudices.

Those who allege racial discrimination should be prepared to identify the provisions upon which they rely and explain why those provisions offend the principles of constitutional equality. But Kamikamica's challenge cannot be answered simply by searching the draft for the words race, racial discrimination or Indo-Fijian.
​
Constitutions do not operate merely through their declarations of rights. They operate through the institutions they establish, the powers they distribute, the appointments they authorise and the political influence they confer.

A Constitution may proclaim equality in one chapter while establishing institutions in another whose composition and powers raise serious questions about the practical meaning of that equality.
​
That is the issue which Kamikamica and his colleagues in the Coalition Government must confront.
​
It is not necessary to accuse the Deputy Prime Minister, the Prime Minister or members of the Great Council of Chiefs of harbouring racist intentions. The proper inquiry concerns the constitutional arrangements themselves.

Do they protect legitimate indigenous interests, or do they go further by concentrating national political authority in institutions which do not represent the electorate as a whole?

The distinction is fundamental.

The Great Council of Chiefs and the Proposed Senate

​The proposed Senate provides a useful starting point.


Under the Government's constitutional proposals, the Senate would comprise 23 members, with 14 appointed through the Great Council of Chiefs, six through the Prime Minister, two through the Leader of the Opposition and one through the Rotuma Island Council.

Fourteen out of 23 amounts to approximately 61 per cent. The Great Council of Chiefs would therefore exercise decisive influence over the composition of the upper chamber.
​
The question is not whether the GCC should exist. Nor is it whether the chiefs should have a recognised place in Fiji's constitutional arrangements. The question is why an institution rooted in the traditional chiefly structures of the i-Taukei community should have the power to determine a majority of the membership of a national legislative chamber.

The Senate would not be an assembly dealing exclusively with customary land, chiefly titles, traditional obligations or the protection of indigenous cultural institutions. It would form part of the national Parliament.

Its constitutional functions would affect citizens of every ethnic origin.
​
An Indo-Fijian farmer in Ba, a Rotuman professional in Suva, a descendant of the Banaban community, a Chinese-Fijian businesswoman or an ordinary iTaukei citizen outside the chiefly establishment would all be subject to the constitutional arrangements in which that Senate participated. Yet none would necessarily have an equivalent institutional route to influencing its majority appointments.

This is the question Kamikamica must answer.
​
It is not enough to say that the GCC is an important national institution. Its historical and cultural significance is not in dispute. What requires justification is the proposed conversion of that significance into majority influence over a chamber of the national legislature.

Supporters may argue that such an arrangement is necessary to protect indigenous interests from the uncertainties of electoral politics. That argument deserves to be heard. But so does the opposing argument that indigenous protection should not require the concentration of national legislative authority in a body whose membership is not chosen by the entire electorate.
​
These are questions about political equality and institutional representation. Whether the arrangements amount to unlawful racial discrimination is a further legal question, requiring examination of their purpose, effects and justification.

Who Will Appoint the President of the Republic?

​The proposed arrangements for appointing the President and Vice-President raise another constitutional question.
​
The Government's proposals envisage a central role for the Great Council of Chiefs in these appointments, following consultation with the Prime Minister. The President is not the head of an indigenous institution. The President is the Head of State of the Republic of Fiji. The office belongs constitutionally to the entire nation, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, ancestry or social position. Its occupant represents all citizens.
​

Why, therefore, should the decisive appointment power rest with an institution whose constitutional identity is principally associated with one indigenous community?

There may be arguments for such an arrangement. The GCC's traditional standing, its role in national reconciliation and its historical relationship with the presidency may all be advanced in its defence.

But the office of President is different from that of a traditional chief. It carries national constitutional responsibilities. A distinction must therefore be drawn between respecting chiefly authority within its legitimate sphere and assigning that authority decisive influence over the appointment of the Head of State.
​
Kamikamica has invoked the 1997 Constitution in defending the GCC's role. He is entitled to do so. The 1997 Constitution did provide for presidential appointment by the Great Council of Chiefs, supported by the NFP under the leadership of the late Jai Ram Reddy. 
​
But the fact that an arrangement existed in an earlier Constitution does not relieve today's Government of the obligation to justify its restoration. Historical precedent is evidence of constitutional practice, not proof that the practice is beyond criticism.

Indeed, Fiji's constitutional history should encourage us to examine these arrangements with particular care. We have lived through the 1970 Constitution, the racially restrictive constitutional order imposed after the 1987 coups, the negotiated settlement of 1997 and the Constitution promulgated in 2013.

Each emerged from a different political environment. Each reflected competing ideas about indigenous rights, communal representation, national identity and democratic equality. The present proposals must be judged on their own merits, not simply because something similar existed before.

Christianity, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship

​There is also the proposed constitutional recognition of Christianity. Kamikamica argues that nobody would be compelled to practise Christianity and that religious freedom would remain protected.

On that point, he identifies an important distinction. A constitutional reference to Christianity does not necessarily amount to religious persecution, much less racial discrimination.

​The Government Bill also contains provisions requiring the State and public office-holders to treat religions equally and prohibiting official preference for one religious belief over another. Those safeguards must be acknowledged.

Nevertheless, the proposed identification of Christianity among Fiji's founding values raises a legitimate question about the relationship between religion and the State. Fiji is home to Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and people of other religious traditions, as well as citizens who profess no religion.

Christianity has undoubtedly influenced Fiji's history, institutions and social development. So have other religious traditions. The constitutional question is whether historical recognition should become a statement of preferred national values.

​If the State must treat every religion equally, how is that obligation reconciled with the special constitutional prominence given to Christianity? This is primarily a question of religious equality rather than racial discrimination. But in Fiji, where religious affiliation and ethnic history have frequently intersected, the distinction deserves careful public explanation.

Indigenous Rights Must Not Be Confused With Racism

There is another point which should not be overlooked. The constitutional recognition of indigenous rights is not, by itself, racist.

The protection of customary land, traditional institutions, chiefly titles, cultural inheritance and indigenous identity can be justified within a democratic constitutional order.

The rights of indigenous peoples have received international recognition precisely because their historical circumstances and cultural institutions require particular safeguards. Fiji is no exception.
​
The Great Council of Chiefs has a long history. Its abolition under the Bainimarama administration did not extinguish its historical importance or the place of chiefly institutions in iTaukei society.

Nor should those who defend the GCC automatically be accused of racial prejudice. But recognising indigenous rights and distributing national political power are different constitutional exercises.
​
A legal guarantee protecting customary land does not necessarily require a chiefly institution to control a majority of senators. Likewise, recognising traditional leadership does not necessarily require that institution to determine who becomes President. Those connections must be justified, not merely asserted.

The Problem With the Senate's Entrenched Powers

There is a further dimension to the proposed Senate which deserves attention. The Government Bill contains special protections concerning amendments to provisions affecting the Senate, presidential appointments and the Bose Levu Vakaturaga. Certain amendments would require the support of at least nine of the 14 senators appointed on the advice of the GCC.

This is constitutionally significant.
​
It means that the GCC-appointed senators would not merely constitute a majority of the upper chamber. A specified number of them would also have to consent to changes affecting particular constitutional arrangements.
​
Supporters may describe this as necessary protection against the erosion of indigenous institutions. Critics may regard it as entrenching the influence of one appointing institution over the future constitutional settlement.

Neither interpretation should be dismissed without examination. The question is whether the proposed safeguards are proportionate to the interests they seek to protect.

And that is precisely the kind of question which should be debated before a referendum, not after the Constitution has been approved.

The 1997 Constitution Is Not the End of the Argument

Kamikamica's reliance on the 1997 Constitution also requires historical perspective. 
The 1997 settlement emerged from negotiations intended to repair the damage inflicted upon Fiji's constitutional order after the coups of 1987.
​
It attempted to accommodate indigenous concerns while providing a framework for multiracial parliamentary government. But it was a political compromise, not a document immune from criticism.
​
The existence of communal representation and special institutional arrangements reflected the political realities of that period. Nearly three decades later, Fiji is entitled to ask whether every feature of that compromise should be restored.

The answer cannot be supplied by nostalgia alone.
​
Nor should the 2013 Constitution escape criticism simply because it adopted the language of common and equal citizenship. Its origins, the circumstances of its promulgation and the immunity arrangements associated with the coup era remain legitimate subjects of constitutional scrutiny.

The proper task is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of both constitutional traditions without treating either as sacred.

What Exactly Is the Government Asking Fiji to Approve?

There is also a procedural question. The Constitution Review Commission submitted its report and draft Constitution on 31 August 2026.

The Government subsequently produced its own draft, introduced as the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026. These are not identical documents.
​
The public must therefore distinguish between the Commission's recommendations and the text the Government actually wishes to enact. The timetable has been compressed.

The Government's Bill was introduced on 30 September, received its second reading on 2 October, and public consultations on that text began on 15 October.

The planned third reading is on 2 November, with a referendum proposed for 9 December.
​
This is not a minor legislative amendment. It concerns the institutions through which Fiji will be governed, the distribution of political authority and the constitutional rights of future generations. Kamikamica has urged citizens to read the proposed Constitution.

That is sensible advice. But citizens must also have adequate time to understand what they are reading, compare the different drafts and question the Government's choices. A referendum should be an informed constitutional decision, not merely a contest between competing political slogans.

Kamikamica's Challenge Deserves a Constitutional Answer

Kamikamica says the proposed Constitution is among the fairest documents presented to Fiji. That is his assessment. Others are entitled to reach different conclusions after examining the provisions.

The debate should distinguish between three questions.
​

First, does the proposed Constitution expressly discriminate against a particular racial or ethnic community?

Second, does its institutional design produce unequal political influence between communities, even without expressly excluding anyone on racial grounds?

Third, where differential treatment exists, can it be justified by the legitimate need to protect indigenous institutions and interests?

These questions are related, but they are not interchangeable.

A Constitution may protect indigenous rights without abandoning equal citizenship. It may also contain formally equal rights while establishing political institutions whose representativeness remains open to challenge.

The task is to determine where the proposed Fiji Constitution falls within those distinctions.

The Senate's composition, the GCC's role in presidential appointments and the special amendment safeguards provide concrete provisions for that examination.

The religious provisions raise a related but distinct question about equality of belief. Kamikamica has invited critics to identify their concerns. The Government should now explain, provision by provision, the constitutional justification for the arrangements it proposes.

There is no need to reduce the argument to accusations of racism on one side and accusations of hostility towards indigenous institutions on the other.

Fiji has suffered enough from constitutional disputes conducted along racial lines.

The country deserves a debate in which indigenous protection, democratic representation, religious liberty and equal citizenship are examined together, without pretending that any one of them automatically resolves the others.

Ultimately, the question is larger than Kamikamica's challenge.

It concerns the kind of constitutional republic Fiji wishes to establish.

The Constitution must protect the legitimate interests of its indigenous people while defining institutions whose authority is exercised on behalf of the whole nation.

Whether the present proposals achieve that balance is a question for rigorous constitutional examination and, ultimately, for the people of Fiji.

A Constitution should not be judged merely by the equality it promises. It must also be examined for the political power it distributes, the institutions it protects and the citizens whose voices may be diminished in the process.

That is where the constitutional debate must begin.

Democracy Does NOT Belong to Those Who Arrive After Bainimarama

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The late JOELI KALOU, Ahmed Bhamji and deposed Prime Minister Dr Timoci Bavadra
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NEARLY forty years later, the tears and fears grip Indo-Fijians in Fiji

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