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Katonivere-Leung Affidavits: The former President portrays AG Leung as part of assurance structure that convinced him to endorse Malimali for job. Leung says his role was peripheral. He was critical part of process

18/3/2026

"The most important inconsistency in the affidavits are this: Graham Leung says he was merely consulted over Barbara Malimali's appointment. But the former President’s affidavit indicates that the the Attorney-General’s concurrence was one of the assurances relied upon before the appointment was signed. That difference may appear subtle, but constitutionally it is enormous. If the former President signed because the AG concurred with the JSC recommendation, then the AG was not simply consulted. He was part of the chain of constitutional assurance that legitimised the appointment. The former President’s affidavit quietly places the Attorney-General inside the decision-making structure, whereas Leung’s press conference places him outside it. That is the single most striking contrast between the two accounts in the affidavits before the COI."

From Consultation to Controversy: How the Appointment of Barbara Malimali Unravelled the Offices of the President, the Attorney-General and the Judicial Services Commission

The appointment of Barbara Malimali as Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) began as a routine constitutional act. It ended as one of the most politically destabilising episodes of the Rabuka government, culminating in a Commission of Inquiry, conflicting affidavits by main constitutional actors, and ultimately the removal of Attorney-General Graham Leung from office following the release of the inquiry’s findings. He was sacked via a text message while in Hong Kong.

What initially appeared to be a straightforward recommendation by the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) quickly evolved into a constitutional drama that exposed tensions between the Presidency, the Attorney-General’s office, the Judiciary and FICAC itself.

The documentary record now available, including the affidavit of former President Ratu Wiliame Katonivere, the affidavit of former Attorney-General Graham Leung and the materials annexed to those affidavits, reveals a compressed and controversial sequence of events that unfolded over only a few days in early September 2024.

The Presidential Appointment

Under section 5 of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2007, the Commissioner of FICAC is appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission following consultation with the Attorney-General.

This structure was intended to distribute authority across three constitutional offices: the JSC, the Attorney-General and the President.

The former President stated in his affidavit that his role was limited to acting upon the recommendation presented to him through the Judicial Services Commission. He emphasised that the Office of the President does not conduct interviews or assess candidates but simply formalises appointments once the constitutional requirements appear to have been satisfied.

According to the President’s evidence, the recommendation to appoint Barbara Malimali was delivered to him on the morning of 4 September 2024 by the Chief Registrar, Tomasi Bainivalu. The recommendation had been signed by Acting Chief Justice Salesi Temo in his capacity as Chairperson of the Judicial Services Commission.

The President stated that he was informed the JSC had conducted interviews, shortlisted candidates and completed its recruitment process. He was also assured that the Attorney-General had been consulted and supported the recommendation.

On that basis the President signed the letter appointing Barbara Malimali as Commissioner of FICAC. At that point, constitutionally speaking, the appointment process appeared complete.

The Warning Letter

What complicated matters was a letter sent to the Office of the President several days earlier.

On 30 August 2024, Francis Puleiwai, then Acting Deputy Commissioner of FICAC, wrote to the President raising concerns that Malimali was under investigation by FICAC in relation to allegations arising from the Electoral Act.

This letter effectively warned the Presidency that the candidate being considered for appointment to head the country’s anti-corruption body was herself the subject of a FICAC investigation.

The President confirmed in his affidavit that he was aware of the letter. The Office of the President subsequently responded that the concerns had been referred to relevant authorities for consultation and advice.

The Attorney-General Leung Enters the Picture

According to the affidavit of Graham Leung, who had been appointed Attorney-General in June 2024, the then Acting Chief Justice Salesi Temo consulted him around 2 September 2024 regarding the recommendation that Barbara Malimali be appointed Commissioner of FICAC.

Leung stated that he communicated to the Temo that he was in agreement with the recommendation and endorsed the decision of the Judicial Services Commission. However, the matter did not end there.

On 3 September 2024, Leung telephoned Francis Puleiwai and confirmed that complaints had indeed been made against Malimali. The conversation prompted him to contact Temo and suggest that the appointment should be placed on hold.

This brief intervention by the Attorney-General was later emphasised by Leung both in his affidavit and in a subsequent press conference as evidence that he had exercised caution once he became aware of the allegations.

The Electoral Commissioners’ Letter

The pause appears to have lasted only a matter of hours. Later on 3 September 2024, Leung received a letter from five members of the Electoral Commission defending Malimali and describing the complaint against her as vexatious.

The commissioners wrote that it would be “concerning” for a search warrant to be issued against Malimali on the basis of what they characterised as an unfounded complaint. After receiving the letter, Leung informed Temo that he no longer persisted in his reservations and could see no rational basis for delaying the appointment. The Judicial Services Commission subsequently proceeded with its recommendation to the President.

The Judicial Services Commission’s Recruitment Process

The documents annexed to Leung’s affidavit shed further light on the recruitment process. The position of Commissioner of FICAC had been advertised in June 2024 and again in July after the JSC decided to widen the pool of applicants. Twenty-three applications were received and four candidates were shortlisted for interviews.

The interview panel consisted of:

Acting Chief Justice Salesi Temo
Solicitor-General Ropate Green
Acting Chief Magistrate Josaia Waqaivolavola

According to the selection report, Barbara Malimali received the highest marks among the candidates interviewed. The panel therefore unanimously recommended her appointment. It was later revealed by Temo that he did not press for character references because he had personally observed Malimali as a lawyer for the last 15 years.

The Appointment Takes Effect

Following the JSC recommendation, the President signed the appointment letter on 4 September 2024 confirming Malimali’s appointment as Commissioner of FICAC. The appointment was scheduled to take effect on 5 September 2024. What followed the next day would plunge the government into crisis.

The FICAC Confrontation

When Malimali arrived at FICAC headquarters on 5 September 2024 to assume office, she encountered opposition from within the institution. According to Leung’s affidavit, she was detained and questioned by FICAC investigators acting on instructions from Francis Puleiwai.

The situation quickly became chaotic. The spectacle of the newly appointed anti-corruption commissioner being detained by officers from the same institution dominated media headlines. Leung later described the events as a “strange and confusing drama” that unfolded over several days.

The Commission of Inquiry

The controversy surrounding the appointment eventually led to the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1946.

The inquiry was tasked with investigating whether the appointment had been conducted with integrity, fairness and transparency and whether improper influences had been exerted. The inquiry gathered evidence from multiple constitutional actors, including the former President and the Attorney-General. Their affidavits form part of the documentary record that now illuminates the sequence of events leading to the appointment.

Graham Leung’s Defence

In his affidavit and later press conference, Leung consistently maintained that his role in the process was limited. He emphasised that:

the JSC controlled the recruitment process;
he was consulted as required by law;
the Constitution did not require his approval;
and the final appointment was made by the President.

Leung also denied allegations that he had encouraged Malimali to apply for the position or that he had served as one of her referees. He stated that he had never seen her application and had no knowledge of who her referees were.

The Central Contradiction

Yet the documentary record reveals a subtle but important tension. Leung repeatedly described himself publicly as having been “only consulted”. However, his affidavit states that he communicated to the Acting Chief Justice that he agreed with and endorsed the decision of the Judicial Services Commission.

The difference between consultation and endorsement may appear technical. In constitutional practice it can be decisive.

The former President’s affidavit further complicates matters. Katonivere stated that he signed the appointment after being assured that the Attorney-General had been consulted and supported the recommendation.

In other words, Katonivere relied on the Attorney-General’s concurrence as part of the due diligence preceding the appointment.

The Political Aftermath

The Commission of Inquiry’s report ultimately led to the removal of Graham Leung as Attorney-General. His dismissal transformed what had begun as a procedural dispute about an appointment into a full-blown political crisis for the Rabuka government.

The Malimali affair also exposed the fragility of Fiji’s institutional architecture. The appointment process involved at least four constitutional actors - the Judicial Services Commission, the Attorney-General, the President and FICAC itself. Yet the episode demonstrated how quickly tensions between those institutions could escalate once allegations of impropriety entered the process.

A Constitutional Cautionary Tale

The controversy surrounding the Malimali appointment now stands as one of the most consequential constitutional episodes of the Rabuka administration.

What began as a routine recommendation by the Judicial Services Commission became a chain reaction involving warnings from FICAC, competing institutional assurances, a dramatic confrontation at the FICAC headquarters and ultimately a Commission of Inquiry that reshaped the political landscape. In the end, the affair left behind a stark lesson.

In constitutional systems where appointments rely on multiple actors acting in sequence, consultation, recommendation and formal appointment, the integrity of the process depends not only on the letter of the law but also on the judgment exercised by those entrusted with its execution.

In the Malimali saga, that judgment is now being scrutinised more closely than ever before.

Our main focus is Graham Leung.

So what can we conclude in our conclusion about his role, protestations, affidavit, press conference and the former President's affidavit regarding Leung.

What Can Reasonably Be Concluded About Graham Leung’s Role

When the documentary record is read together, the former President’s affidavit, Graham Leung’s affidavit, the annexed documents, and Leung’s press conference statements, a reasonably clear picture of Leung’s role in the Malimali appointment begins to emerge.

The evidence does not support the claim that he orchestrated the appointment, but it equally does not sustain the public portrayal that he was merely a passive constitutional consultee.

A more nuanced conclusion is unavoidable.

1. He Was Not a Bystander

Leung repeatedly insisted in his press conference that he was “only consulted” and that the appointment decision rested entirely with the Judicial Services Commission.

Technically that description is correct in law: the JSC recommends the appointment and the President formally appoints the Commissioner. However, the documentary record shows that Leung’s involvement was more substantive than a passive consultation.

In his own affidavit he acknowledged that:

the Acting Chief Justice consulted him on the proposed appointment;
he initially communicated that he agreed with and endorsed the recommendation;
he later intervened to suggest the appointment be placed on hold;
and he subsequently withdrew that objection.

These steps demonstrate that Leung was an active participant in the consultation stage, not merely a recipient of information.

2. His Advice Formed Part of the Presidential Assurance

The significance of Leung’s role becomes clearer when the former President’s affidavit is considered. The former President stated that before signing the appointment he was assured that:

The Judicial Services Commission had conducted due process; and
The Attorney-General Graham Leung had been consulted and supported the recommendation.

Those assurances were conveyed to the President by the Chief Registrar Tomasi Bainivalu when the appointment documents were presented for signature. In other words, the President understood the Attorney-General’s concurrence to be one of the factors confirming that the appointment process had been properly conducted.

This places Leung’s consultation within the chain of constitutional assurance that led directly to the President signing the appointment.

3. His Attempt to Halt the Appointment Was Brief

Leung’s strongest defence is that he briefly intervened on 3 September 2024 after learning of the allegations against Malimali. He contacted Acting Deputy FICAC Commissioner Francis Puleiwai and then suggested to the Acting Chief Justice that the appointment be paused.

However, the pause appears to have been short-lived. Later that same day, after receiving a letter from Electoral Commissioners defending Malimali, Leung informed the Acting Chief Justice that he no longer persisted in his reservations.

The appointment therefore proceeded almost immediately afterwards.

The episode shows that Leung did exercise caution, but it also demonstrates how quickly that caution was reversed.

4. The Documentary Evidence Contradicts the “Passive Consultation” Narrative

The consultation document annexed to Leung’s affidavit bears his signature acknowledging that he had been consulted regarding the appointment.

This document confirms that the consultation was not informal but formed part of the formal appointment process. Furthermore, Leung’s own affidavit records that he endorsed the JSC recommendation before subsequently reconsidering and then reaffirming that endorsement.

Taken together, these elements undermine the suggestion that his role was purely ceremonial.

5. His Public Defence Was More Restrictive Than His Affidavit

Another notable feature is the difference in tone between Leung’s sworn affidavit and his press conference.

The affidavit is procedural and factual. It describes his consultation with the Acting Chief Justice and his communications regarding the appointment.

The press conference, by contrast, emphasised a much narrower role. Leung repeatedly stressed that the decision belonged entirely to the JSC and that he had merely been consulted.

The press conference therefore represented a political framing of his role, while the affidavit reveals a more detailed and active involvement.

6. The Core Constitutional Reality

The evidence suggests that the appointment unfolded through a sequence of constitutional actors:

The Judicial Services Commission conducted the recruitment process.
The Attorney-General was formally consulted and initially endorsed the recommendation.
The President relied on assurances that consultation had occurred and that due process had been followed before signing the appointment.

In that chain of events, Leung was neither the ultimate decision-maker nor an uninvolved observer. He was the intermediate constitutional adviser whose concurrence formed part of the justification for the appointment proceeding.

Conclusion

The Malimali affair ultimately cost Graham Leung his position as Attorney-General. The Commission of Inquiry report prompted his removal from office, transforming what might have been a technical dispute about an appointment process into a political crisis for the Rabuka government.

The available evidence does not demonstrate that Leung engineered the appointment of Barbara Malimali. But it equally shows that his role was more than the limited consultation he later emphasised publicly.

His affidavit confirms that he endorsed the Judicial Services Commission’s recommendation, briefly attempted to halt the process after learning of allegations against the candidate, and then withdrew that objection. The former President’s affidavit further indicates that the Attorney-General’s concurrence was among the assurances relied upon before the appointment was signed.

In constitutional terms, Leung stood at the critical midpoint of the process, not the architect of the appointment, but one of the key institutional actors whose advice helped enable it to proceed.

That distinction explains why the Malimali controversy ultimately reached beyond the Judicial Services Commission and the Presidency to engulf the office of the Attorney-General itself, leading to his unceremonious sacking by Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka.

REVIEW WITHOUT RESOLUTION? FLP leader Claims No Parliamentary Mandate for Constitution Review Commission. Fijileaks: POLITICAL but NOT Legal Breach. Danger lies in how that Review is used by Coalition

17/3/2026

WHO GAVE THEM THE MANDATE? Chaudhry Challenges Coalition’s Unilateral Constitution Review Move

Labour Leader Mahendra Chaudhry has questioned the government’s mandate to appoint a constitution review commission without getting parliamentary approval for it.

How can a committee to review the Constitution be appointed without first obtaining Parliamentary approval? Mr Chaudhry asked. A review of the constitution must be properly authorised through a parliamentary resolution as it was done in 1997. Only then was a commission appointed to review the racist 1990 Constitution at the time,” Mr Chaudhry said.

This is a matter dealing with the Constitution. It must have proper mandate through Parliament which must also approve a terms of reference for the review commission.

“The government cannot simply go ahead and appoint a commission to review the constitution without proper terms of reference and without it having parliamentary approval,” Mr Chaudhry said.

One wonders why the parliamentary Opposition has not raised this matter?

The Coalition government has not even obtained parliamentary approval to lower the voting threshold from 75% (3/4) to 66% (2/3) in reference to amendments to the Constitution, as per the Supreme Court opinion in August last year.

“This government has been acting unilaterally in matters concerning the Constitution, creating fear and instability, undermining confidence in Fiji’s future,” Mr Chaudhry warned.

CHAUDHRY CRIES ‘UNILATERALISM’ BUT IS COALITION REALLY ACTING ILLEGALLY?

Fiji Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry has sounded the alarm over the Coalition Government’s decision to appoint a Constitution Review Commission without prior parliamentary approval, warning that the move risks “fear and instability” and undermines confidence in Fiji’s future.

His intervention has injected a familiar constitutional anxiety into the national debate: who, in truth, has the authority to initiate change to the supreme law?

At first glance, Chaudhry’s criticism carries intuitive force. Constitutions are not ordinary statutes. They derive legitimacy not merely from legal form, but from process, participation, and consent. His invocation of the 1997 constitutional review, initiated through Parliament and entrusted to the Reeves Commission, is not incidental. It reflects a model of constitution-making grounded in deliberation and cross-party endorsement, rather than executive initiative.

Yet, when stripped to its legal essentials, Chaudhry’s argument proves less conclusive than his rhetoric suggests.

The Legal Position

Under the Constitution of Fiji 2013, there is no express requirement that Parliament must first approve the establishment of a Constitution Review Commission.

The Executive retains broad residual authority to establish committees and advisory bodies; define their terms of reference; and consult the public and solicit submissions.

A review commission, in this sense, is not a law-making body. It has no constitutional standing beyond that of an advisory mechanism. Its recommendations carry no legal force unless and until they are translated into formal amendments and passed in accordance with constitutional procedures.

In short, the Government can appoint a review commission unilaterally. The Constitution does not prohibit it.

The Real Issue: Legitimacy, Not Legality

Where Chaudhry is on firmer ground is not in law, but in constitutional convention and legitimacy. The 1997 process remains the gold standard precisely because it originated in Parliament; operated under agreed terms of reference; and commanded broad political acceptance.

By contrast, an executive-driven review risks appearing partisan; pre-determined in outcome; lacking national consensus. In constitutional politics, perception matters as much as procedure. A process that is legally valid may still be politically fragile.

The Threshold Controversy

Chaudhry’s more serious concern lies elsewhere: the suggestion that the Government has not secured parliamentary approval to reduce the constitutional amendment threshold from 75 per cent to 66 per cent, following the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion.

Here, the stakes are significantly higher.

If the Government were to attempt to alter entrenched amendment provisions without complying with the Constitution itself, the issue would cease to be political and become justiciable. Any such move could invite constitutional challenge and judicial scrutiny.

This is where the real legal battleground lies - not in the appointment of a review commission but in the method of amendment that may follow.

A Question for the Opposition

Chaudhry’s pointed query - why the parliamentary Opposition has remained silent - exposes a broader malaise. Constitutional questions of this magnitude demand rigorous scrutiny within Parliament itself. Silence, whether strategic or complacent, weakens the very institutional safeguards the Constitution is meant to protect.

Fear, Instability or Strategy?

Chaudhry warns of “fear and instability”. That language is political, but not entirely misplaced. Constitutional processes conducted without visible consensus can unsettle investors; institutions; and the public at large.

Yet it is equally true that governments, particularly those seeking reform, often prefer executive control of the agenda. A review commission appointed by Cabinet allows the Coalition to shape the narrative before entering the more hazardous terrain of parliamentary negotiation.

The Verdict

Chaudhry is right in principle but overstated in law. He is correct that constitutional reform should ideally be Parliament-led; legitimacy flows from broad-based participation; and process matters as much as outcome.

But he is incorrect to suggest that the Government is acting unlawfully merely by appointing a review commission without parliamentary approval.

The Constitution permits such a step. The true constitutional test lies ahead, in whether the Government respects the entrenched procedures for amendment, or seeks to circumvent them.

Fiji has lived through too many constitutional ruptures to treat the present moment lightly. The danger does not lie in reviewing the Constitution. It lies in how that review is used.

If the process becomes a vehicle for predetermined change without lawful authority, Chaudhry’s warnings may yet prove prophetic.

If, however, the Government ultimately submits itself to the discipline of constitutional procedure, then the current controversy will be remembered not as a crisis, but as yet another episode in Fiji’s long and unfinished conversation about its constitutional future.

From Fijileaks Archives: They all wanted the 1997 Constitution Binned

Sitiveni Rabuka: Bring Back South African 'Apartheid' Fijileaks: Astonishingly, in June 2000, shortly after George Speight and others seized Parliament, Rabuka told the world that the old South Africa might be a model for Fiji.
He no longer seemed to believe in a multi-racial chamber.
Rabuka said Fiji might need racially segregated houses of parliament, ‘like pre-Mandela South Africa’, as part of a constitutional settlement to its problems. The solution to Fiji's problems ‘must come with a constitutional arrangement that [i-Taukei] Fijians can work with ... and at the moment, they cannot work with the 1997 Constitution’.

"I supported every move to destabilise the Chaudhry government, but I was not part of the coup. I was not involved in any of the [pre-coup] marches. But I was going to be involved in the next one because it was [to be held at] the time of the signing of the successor to the Lome Convention this month.’
Sitiveni Rabuka, 'Chief of All Chiefs'- Chairman, Great Council of Chiefs

"[Frank] Bainimarama thanked me at a reception at the military barracks in the early stages of the coup for deposing of Mahendra Chaudhry"
George Speight, 16 September 2001, Nukulau Island

"I had abrogated the 1997 Constitution because I was satisfied that people engaged in the events of May 19 [George Speight coup] were of the perception that the document had watered down the interests of indigenous Fijians. Whether or not those perceptions accorded with reality was not my principal consideration. The perceptions were genuinely held by largely unsophisticated Fijians not equipped to adequately comprehend the niceties and technicalities of the Constitution.”
Bainimarama, affidavit before Fiji High Court, 2001

LAISENIA QARASE to UN General Assembly, September 2000:
"The crux of our political crisis in Fiji is that indigenous Fijian and Rotuman communities felt threatened by certain policies which the non-indigenous leadership of the People's Coalition Government had implemented following their decisive victory in our National Elections in May 1999. It was this fear and anxiety about their future as the world's only indigenous Fijian and Rotuman community of just over 420,000 people that led to mass demonstrations and ultimately the Coup d'etat on May 19th this year. It manifested itself also in the mass looting of shops, destruction of property, and threats to people and their families, and unfortunately and tragically, the victims were mainly members of our Indian community. It was in this serious and deteriorating law and order situation that the Fiji Military Forces responded to a request from our Police to take over direct control of law and order and the protection of citizens. To facilitate this role, the Fiji Military Forces abrogated our 1997 Constitution on 29th May. However, as the civilian Interim Administration, we have ourselves taken over from the Army and, as I have said, we are firmly committed to returning Fiji to constitutional parliamentary democracy. We intend to promulgate the new constitution in August next year. General elections will then follow within twelve months."
Address to the Fifty-Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly by Interim Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, Bainimarama's then Interim PM, 16 September 2000

NEW FIJI PRIME MINISTER LAISENIA QARASE WITH COMMODORE BAINIMARAMA IN SUVA, 2000-07-04

1990 Racist Constitution: Lest We Forget, We were held down until 1999

"The Indians [Indo-Fijians] with a history of rebellion on the sugar plantations are repeating the lines of Richard Lovelace: Stone walls do not a prison make - Nor Iron bars a cage' - Victor Lal, in his book Fiji: Coups in Paradise-Race, Politics and Military Intervention, while condemning coupist Sitiveni Rabuka's racist 1990 Constitution of Fiji. He also warned Rabuka and the native Fijian chiefs: "...The Fijian chiefs still have a choice today - to borrow the late Martin Luther King Junior's warning: non-violent co-existence or violent co-annihilation."

Just Imagine: 'We don't want this bloody iTaukei dominated Government'

And the GCC who have blackmailed Indo-Fijians since 1879, from cradle to grave, and still at it.
The Indian indentured labourers were uprooted to prevent the disintegration of feudalistic colonial chiefs lifestyles, and for chiefs and their white colonial masters to hold back commoner iTaukei in their villages.

From Banana Plantations to Banana Republic of Fiji

*The abolition of indenture created conditions in which Indo-Fijians could pursue advancement beyond the rigid constraints of plantation life and inherited hierarchy. Over time, this fostered a culture that prioritised education and enterprise. By contrast, iTaukei society has retained stronger continuity with its traditional chiefly and communal structures, which continue to influence patterns of authority, obligation, and social mobility.

*One is left to wonder what the indentured labourers, confined to the cramped ‘lines’ of the plantations, thought as they passed the iTaukei villages that bordered their routes, whether these encounters stirred memories of the worlds they had left behind in India, or underscored the distance, social as much as geographic, between their past lives and their present condition in colonial Fiji.

*The colonial administration took active measures to limit interaction between indentured labourers and neighbouring iTaukei communities, confining workers to plantation 'lines' and regulating their movement. In this system of indirect rule, local chiefly authorities were at times drawn into the enforcement of colonial labour discipline, including the reporting or return of labourers who had absconded from tea, sugar, and banana plantations.

The Racist's Indigenous Rhetoric. Speight: 'Indo-Fijians smell differently'

SEVULONI VALENITABUA. Too Sick for FICAC Commissioner JOB. Yet FIT to Chair and Review Fiji's Coup 2013 Constitution. GOD's MIRACLE?

15/3/2026

A Miracle in Fiji: From Heart Trouble to Constitutional Surgeon

If the Judicial Services Commission once believed the demands of running FICAC might endanger his health, the public is entitled to ask a simple question: What exactly has changed?*
Has there been a miraculous recovery?

Sevuloni Valenitabua’s Miracle: Too Sick for FICAC, Yet Fit to Review Fiji’s Coup Constitution by AUGUST 2026

Fiji is a deeply Christian country. Politicians pray before meetings, pastors bless Parliament, and political events are often explained in the language of faith.

Which may explain the latest miracle in Fiji’s constitutional politics.

At the centre of it stands Sevuloni Valenitabua, now appointed to chair the commission reviewing the 2013 Constitution of Fiji.

On the surface, the appointment might appear routine. A senior lawyer is asked to help guide a national conversation about the country’s constitutional future.

Except that not so long ago Valenitabua sought another powerful public office, Commissioner of FICAC.

He applied willingly.

There was no hesitation about seeking to head FICAC, an institution created during the political order that followed the 2006 coup.

The origins of the institution apparently caused him no moral discomfort.

But he did not get the job.

The reason was that the JSC concluded that the position might not be suitable for him because of heart-related health concerns.

In simple terms, the job was considered too stressful.

The Miracle Recovery

Fast forward to today.

The same individual whom the Judicial Services Commission believed might struggle with the pressures of leading the anti-corruption watchdog is now presiding over a Constitutional Review Commission.

This is no ceremonial committee.

The commission must travel across Fiji, consult the public, receive submissions, and navigate intense political disagreement about the legitimacy of the 2013 Constitution itself, and deliver its report by August 2026.

In other words, the assignment will be politically explosive, legally complex, and administratively demanding.

Yet somehow the earlier medical concerns appear to have disappeared.

One is tempted to conclude that Fiji’s political system has discovered a remarkable form of healing.

Divine Guidance in Fijian Politics

Perhaps the explanation lies in Fiji’s long-standing tradition of invoking divine intervention in political affairs.

After all Sitiveni Rabuka once famously suggested that God had whispered to him before he carried out the 1987 coups.

If divine inspiration can justify coups, perhaps divine healing can also cure heart conditions.

Seen in that light, Valenitabua’s recovery may simply be the latest chapter in Fiji’s curious blend of religion and politics.

The Constitutional Irony

The irony does not end there.

Valenitabua once sought to lead FICAC, an institution born out of the post-2006 coup state.

Now he presides over a commission reviewing the 2013 Constitution, itself the constitutional offspring of that same political order.

At the same time, many of the loudest voices calling for the Constitution to be scrapped come from ethno-nationalist quarters and supportered by the Great Council of Chiefs.

Thus Fiji now finds itself in a rather extraordinary situation.

A lawyer once willing to run a coup-era anti-corruption body FICAC now chairs a commission examining the coup-era constitution that created it.

A Simple Question

None of this is about Valenitabua personally.

Health matters deserve respect.

But public institutions also require consistency.

If the Judicial Services Commission once believed the demands of running FICAC might endanger his health, the public is entitled to ask a simple question.

What exactly has changed?

Has there been a miraculous recovery?

Or has Fiji simply discovered that reviewing the Constitution is somehow less stressful than fighting corruption?

In a country where coups have been explained as divine whispers, perhaps the answer lies in faith.

For in Fiji’s political theatre, miracles apparently do happen.

Karavaki Nominated by SODELPA. But Rabuka’s Lawyer Valenitabua and Cousin’s Wife Unaisi-Baba Get the Constitutional Review Seats

In Fiji’s ever-fascinating system of public appointments, nominations appear to function more as polite suggestions than decisive recommendations.

Take the case of Semesa Karavaki. Karavaki was reportedly nominated by SODELPA to serve on the Constitutional Review Commission.

One might reasonably assume that a nomination from a coalition partner would carry some weight. But Fiji’s political appointments often operate according to a different logic.

Karavaki did not make the final list. Instead, the seat went to Sevuloni Valenitabua and Unaisi Nabobo-Baba.

The FNU Backstory

The appointment of Unaisi-Baba is particularly striking given her previous clash with Karavaki during the turbulent period at FNU.

While serving as chair of the FNU Council, Karavaki raised a series of allegations concerning Unaisi-Baba’s leadership as Vice-Chancellor. Among the accusations he publicly highlighted were:

Bullying and victimisation of staff, raised by whistleblowers;
Governance irregularities within the university administration;
Questionable appointments and promotions, including academic titles;
Management decisions allegedly bypassing the authority of the university council.

Karavaki indicated that these issues were serious enough for complaints to be lodged with both the Fiji Police and FICAC. Those allegations remain allegations, but they formed part of one of the most contentious governance crises in the university’s history.

Fiji’s Family and Legal Connections

Yet the plot thickens.

The chair of the Constitutional Review Commission, Valenitabua, has also been known as a lawyer for Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka. And Unaisi-Baba, now a member of the same commission, happens to be married into Rabuka’s extended family - the wife of his cousin the late Dr Tupeni Baba (Editor: RIP, an old friend of mine for over 45 years).

Thus the final composition of the commission reveals a rather neat alignment:

Rabuka’s lawyer chairs the commission.
Rabuka’s cousin’s wife sits on it.
The other members are mostly from the NFP fold.

The man who nominated concerns about her leadership and was himself nominated by a political party is left out.

The Appointment Formula

Seen in that light, Fiji’s selection process begins to look almost mathematical. Step one: invite nominations. Step two: acknowledge them. Step three: appoint individuals with closer personal and professional proximity to power.

In fairness, Fiji has always been a small society where family and professional relationships inevitably overlap. But when those relationships begin to shape the composition of a commission reviewing the nation’s Constitution, the optics become difficult to ignore.

The Final Irony

For Karavaki, the outcome must carry a certain irony.

The man who once raised allegations about Unaisi-Baba’s governance at FNU finds himself excluded from the constitutional review body, while the very individual he criticised now sits on it. E levu na katuba vuni era vale levu ni Kalou me rawa kina na curu - me rawati kina e dua na idabedabe ena Komisoni ni Railesuvi ni Vunau ni Matanitu.
"In God's great mansion there are many secret doors through which one may enter - even to obtain a seat on the Constitutional Review Commission."
But for Karavaki, it seems those doors remained firmly shut.

FNUGATE: Auditor-General Flagged FNU Medical School Dean Over Four Year Undetected Paid Study Leave (2003 to 2007 in Japan). Now Rabuka's Office Takes Control of the University. Has Turagabeci cleared her debt?

13/3/2026

Turagabeci

Editorial Note: On 1 March, Fijileaks wrote to Dr Amelia Turagabeci and to her employer, the Fiji School of Medicine at Fiji National University, seeking clarification regarding the reference in the 2008 Auditor-General’s Report (Volume 3), which recorded that she was “alleged to have gone on unauthorized study leave with pay for four years with effect from October 2003 to October 2007 undetected”. In our email we asked whether the Auditor-General’s finding accurately reflected what had occurred, whether the matter had been investigated or resolved by the Ministry of Health or the Public Service Commission, and whether any salary or allowances received during that period were repaid to the Government.

At the time of publication, we have not received a response from either Turagabeci or Fiji National University. Should Turagabeci or the FNU wish to respond, Fijileaks* will publish their reply in full.

Parliament has approved legislation transferring oversight of Fiji National University from the Ministry of Education to the office of the Prime Minister under the Ministry of Strategic Planning. The passage of the FNU Amendment Bill marks a significant shift in the governance of one of Fiji’s most important public institutions, placing the university more directly within the government’s central development framework.

Supporters of the measure argued that the change would strengthen coordination between national development planning and the training of Fiji’s future workforce. Critics, however, have raised concerns that the move risks further politicising the governance of a university that has already been the subject of repeated controversy since its establishment in 2010.

Diagnosis: Four Years Undetected, The Study Leave That Escaped Examination

Among the institutions most directly affected by the restructuring is the Fiji School of Medicine, one of the region’s oldest centres for medical education. The school now operates under the leadership of Amelia Turagabeci, who serves as its head.

Her position at the helm of the institution responsible for training Fiji’s future doctors inevitably places her leadership under public scrutiny. That scrutiny becomes sharper when viewed alongside the historical record of her earlier career in the Ministry of Health.

In medicine, failure to detect a condition for four years would be considered catastrophic. In public administration, it raises a different but equally troubling question: who was monitoring the patient?

The public record shows that during Turagabeci’s tenure at the Ministry of Health she was the subject of a serious observation in the 2008 Auditor-General’s Report. The report recorded that she was: “Alleged to have gone on unauthorized study leave with pay for four years with effect from October 2003 to October 2007 undetected.”

Four years. Undetected. In the language of clinical governance, that would be described as a systemic monitoring failure.

The Audit Prescription

The report did not merely describe the absence. It recorded recommended corrective measures:

Her salary for the four-year period was to be deducted.
Recovery was proposed at $250 per fortnight over ten years.
The failure of her supervisor to monitor the leave was specifically noted.
As at the date of audit, nothing had been recovered.
The matter was reported to Police.
She resigned on 26 February 2008 and joined FNU.

These are not casual administrative oversights. A four-year absence on paid study leave, allegedly unauthorized and “undetected,” reflects a breakdown not just in payroll controls, but in supervisory accountability. The Auditor-General’s phrasing is precise. It does not record a conviction. It records an allegation, recovery recommendations, and institutional failure. But even allegations of this nature leave a long shadow.

The Institutional Blind Spot

How does a four-year paid absence go unnoticed? The audit itself answers part of that question: it refers to the failure of her supervisor to monitor the unauthorized leave. In medical education, supervision is foundational. Students are observed. Residents are assessed. Consultants are accountable. Systems are built around detection and review.

The irony is stark. The report suggests that within the Ministry of Health - the very architecture of Fiji’s public health administration - monitoring mechanisms were either absent or ineffective.

This was not an isolated administrative blip. The 2008 audit documented widespread weaknesses in payroll controls, overpayments, and failure to enforce recovery processes. The Turagabeci entry sits within a broader landscape of systemic governance deficiency.

Yet Amelia Turagabeci's was one of the more striking entries, not because of the amount alone, but because of duration. Four years is not a clerical delay. It is an era.

From Audit Appendix to Academic Leadership

The public record now shows Amelia Turagabeci as head of the Fiji School of Medicine at Fiji National University. That position carries profound responsibility:

Oversight of academic integrity,
Stewardship of public funding,
Assurance of compliance with national and international medical standards.

The role requires vigilance, not only in laboratories and lecture halls, but in budgets, payrolls and governance frameworks. The question that naturally arises is whether the lessons of 2003–2007 were fully absorbed. Were the recommended deductions ever implemented? Was the police report concluded? Were the supervisory failures addressed? Were control systems strengthened to prevent recurrence?

The audit noted that as at the time of review, nothing had been recovered. That silence in the record is as clinically significant as any diagnosis.

Governance and Memory

Public administration does not operate on amnesia. When individuals ascend to senior academic or institutional leadership, their prior public record forms part of the governance history of the nation. The 2008 Auditor-General’s Report is not gossip. It is a Parliamentary document. It forms part of the accountability architecture of the Republic.

In medicine, a patient’s history matters. In public service, so does an administrator’s.

The Broader Prognosis

The study in Japan was undertaken. It is possible that administrative approvals were mishandled. It is possible that systemic payroll failures masked deeper procedural confusion. But the official record describes the leave as “unauthorized” and “undetected” for four years.

For someone now entrusted with leading medical education, that description demands explanation. Institutions do not demand perfection. They demand accountability.

If Fiji’s future doctors are taught that documentation, authorisation, and supervision are essential to safe clinical practice, then those principles must also apply to those who train them.

In medicine, early detection saves lives. In governance, early detection preserves trust.

The four years between October 2003 and October 2007 remain part of the public record.

The question now is not what the Auditor-General wrote in 2008.

The question is whether Fiji’s medical leadership has fully reconciled that chapter or whether it remains an untreated institutional scar. Has Turagabeci paid back her debt?

The FNU's Long Running Script. One Episode after Another, Fiji
From Promise to Controversy: The Long List of Scandals That Have Rocked Fiji National University

When the Fiji National University was created in 2010, the project was promoted as one of the most ambitious reforms of Fiji’s education system. Six major tertiary institutions were merged to form a single national university intended to drive technical education, professional training and economic development.

Yet within a few years of its creation, the institution found itself repeatedly embroiled in controversy. Governance disputes, corruption investigations, financial losses, staff conflicts and campus scandals have periodically shaken the university’s reputation.

Today, as the government of Sitiveni Rabuka has placed the university under the Prime Minister’s direct ministerial responsibility, the long trail of crises surrounding the institution provides essential context.

What follows is a chronological overview of the major controversies that have dogged Fiji National University since its formation.

The Early Years: Corruption Allegations and the Ganesh Chand Affair

One of the earliest controversies to engulf the university centred on its founding Vice-Chancellor, Ganesh Chand.

In 2015, FICAC charged Chand with abuse of office. The allegation was that he had authorised the use of university funds, reportedly around FJ$213,000, to pay for medical treatment for the chairperson of the university council, the late Filipe Bole.

The case became politically sensitive and dragged on for years. In 2018 the prosecution collapsed after FICAC claimed they could not secure key witnesses, leading to the charges being stayed.

Governance Conflicts and Institutional Instability

Almost from its inception, the university has been plagued by repeated clashes between management and its governing council.

Recent events illustrate how persistent the problem has been. In 2026, the university council formally raised serious concerns about complaints made against the vice-chancellor Unaisi-Baba and governance practices within the institution.

At the same time, whistleblower reports emerged alleging widespread governance failures, questionable appointments and potential breaches of administrative procedures within the university.

These tensions have often revolved around a fundamental question: who truly controls the institution - the council, which legally governs the university, or the executive management that runs its daily operations.

Recent disputes became so intense that the university’s chancellor Semesa Karavaki alleged that management had effectively prevented him from entering his own office after a council meeting was cancelled, raising concerns about institutional governance and authority.

Such confrontations have repeatedly exposed deep structural weaknesses within the university’s governance framework.

Financial Mismanagement and the Multi-Million Dollar Campus Failure

Another recurring theme in the university’s troubled history has been financial controversy.

A particularly damaging episode involved the development of the Naiyaca campus in Labasa. Investigations revealed major project failures, forcing the university to write off approximately $9.9 million in losses, including taxpayer-funded capital expenditure.

The losses included:

$7.6 million in taxpayer-funded capital costs
$2.3 million in internal university funding
Millions more tied up in incomplete construction projects.

The project became so contentious that the university eventually lodged a complaint with FICAC following audit findings and a dispute involving a performance bond connected with the construction contract.

The episode raised uncomfortable questions about procurement processes, project oversight and the use of public funds.

Staff Revolts and Workplace Allegations

FNU has also been rocked by repeated staff disputes.

In 2025, groups of current and former staff publicly called for the removal of a senior management figure amid allegations of staff mistreatment and workplace breaches, including possible occupational health and safety violations.

Critics alleged that senior leadership had ignored complaints or attempted to suppress them. In some cases, staff claimed management was protecting individuals accused of misconduct.

The tensions within the institution eventually contributed to the resignation of senior officials, including Karen Lobendahn, who stepped down amid scrutiny over internal grievances and governance concerns.

Such disputes have periodically exposed a toxic internal environment within parts of the university administration.

The Labasa Campus Failure

Another controversy involved the collapse of a major development project at the Labasa campus.

The campus expansion was meant to strengthen technical and vocational training in the Northern Division. Instead, the project became a costly embarrassment after millions of dollars were effectively written off following its failure.

Critics questioned why such a large project was approved without adequate financial safeguards or oversight mechanisms.

Campus Incidents and Social Controversies

The university has also been forced to deal with incidents that raised concerns about campus welfare and student safety.

In 2025, a deeply disturbing incident occurred at the Natabua campus when an abandoned newborn baby was discovered at a student hostel.

Although the university described the incident as tragic and unrelated to its management systems, it nonetheless highlighted broader concerns about student welfare, supervision and campus support structures.

Disputes With National Education Authorities

Relations between FNU and national regulatory bodies have also been strained.

In 2025, the university rejected findings of an external review conducted by the Higher Education Commission, arguing that the report was flawed and based on weak methodology.

Such disagreements between universities and regulatory authorities are not unusual, but the dispute reinforced the perception that the sector was increasingly fragmented and politically contested.

The Latest Governance Crisis

The most recent controversy has centred on governance disputes within the university council itself. In early 2026, the council called for an independent investigation into complaints raised by whistleblowers and academic staff concerning management practices.

The dispute escalated to such a degree that council members sought a meeting with the Prime Minister to address what they described as serious governance concerns affecting the institution. Shortly afterwards, the government announced that responsibility for Fiji National University would be transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Prime Minister’s portfolio.

The modern Fiji National University was created in 2010 by decree under the military-led government of Frank Bainimarama. The regime amalgamated six previously separate tertiary institutions into a single national university. Among them were the Fiji Institute of Technology, the Fiji School of Medicine, the Fiji School of Nursing, the Lautoka Teachers’ College, the Fiji College of Agriculture and the National Training and Productivity Centre.

The official justification for the merger was efficiency: a unified national institution would reduce duplication, improve technical and vocational training, and produce graduates better aligned with the needs of the labour market. Critics, however, saw the project differently. They argued that the consolidation was also a political exercise designed to bring a diverse and sometimes independent tertiary sector under tighter central government oversight.

The university was established under the authority of the Fiji National University Act 2009, which placed responsibility for the institution with the minister responsible for education. This meant that, structurally and legally, Fiji National University remained part of the national education system, even though it functioned as an autonomous statutory university.

The story of Fiji National University cannot be separated from the political context in which it was born. The Bainimarama government viewed the restructuring of national institutions as part of a wider programme of state-led reform. In that sense, the university was both an educational institution and a product of political engineering.

The more important question is whether a national university should be placed under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister at all, where his sister and daughter hold senior academic positions.

COI Transcripts Order: A Pyrrhic Victory for Lawyers. 5 September 2024 Audio Recording, Transcript Tell Very Different Story. We welcome ruling

12/3/2026

The Fiji High Court’s decision ordering the release of the full transcripts and audio recordings from the Commission of Inquiry (COI) into the appointment of Barbara Malimali as Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption has been welcomed by the lawyers who fought for disclosure. Yet in reality, their courtroom success may prove to be little more than a Pyrrhic victory.

Justice Dane Tuiqereqere directed the Office of the Attorney-General to provide the transcripts and recordings of the inquiry proceedings so that the court and the parties in the judicial review case can properly examine the evidence underlying the COI’s findings. The court accepted that the transcripts were critical to assessing the factual foundation of the inquiry and the claims being advanced in the proceedings.

The applicants, including Barbara Malimali, former Attorney-General Graham Leung and others, had argued that only a redacted version of the COI report had been released and that the underlying evidence presented to the inquiry had never been disclosed. Their lawyers maintained that access to the full record was essential for the judicial review proceedings now scheduled to be heard in April.

In legal terms, the ruling represents an important affirmation of a basic principle: courts must have access to the evidentiary record that underpins contested decisions. Justice Tuiqereqere himself observed during the proceedings that it would be impossible for the court to properly discharge its duty without seeing the transcripts.

Yet the practical significance of the ruling may be far less dramatic than the lawyers now celebrating it might imagine.

Why the Victory May Be Pyrrhic

For one simple reason: the most controversial evidence may already exist outside the official channels that the parties are now seeking to access.

Fijileaks is already in possession of the transcript and audio recording of the 5 September 2024 session of the inquiry. That material, if examined objectively, raises serious questions about the conduct of several individuals who appeared before the Commission. In our view, the record contains statements and exchanges that go far beyond mere administrative irregularities and instead point toward potential criminal liability.

In other words, the evidence already available suggests that the real issue is not access to transcripts. The real issue is whether the material already in circulation warrants investigation and possible prosecution.

The Unanswered Question: Which Eleven Files Were Closed?

Complicating matters further is the decision of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to close eleven files that had reportedly been reviewed in connection with the inquiry.

The DPP’s decision was apparently based on advice provided by Australian King’s Counsel Ian Lloyd, who was asked to review certain matters arising from the inquiry. However, neither the public nor the complainants know precisely which cases were included in that review.

Without transparency about the specific files examined by Lloyd KC, the public is effectively being asked to accept a prosecutorial decision in a vacuum.

That is not how accountability works in a functioning democracy.

If eleven files were reviewed and subsequently closed, the public has a legitimate right to know: What allegations those files contained. What evidence was examined. What legal reasoning led to the conclusion that no charges should be laid.

Until those questions are answered, the closure of those files cannot reasonably be treated as the final word on the matter.

The Limits of the COI Process

The situation also highlights a deeper structural issue. Evidence given before a commission of inquiry is generally not admissible in criminal proceedings except in limited circumstances. That principle exists to encourage candid testimony before commissions.

But that does not mean that evidence uncovered by a commission cannot trigger criminal investigations. On the contrary, commissions of inquiry often serve precisely that purpose - uncovering facts that require further investigation by police or prosecutorial authorities.

If the evidence recorded on 5 September, and elsewhere in the inquiry, raises credible grounds to suspect criminal conduct, then the proper course is not to bury the matter behind legal technicalities but to subject it to independent investigation.

Transparency Is the Only Way Forward

The High Court’s ruling therefore represents only the beginning of a longer process.

The release of the transcripts will allow the parties in the judicial review proceedings to argue about whether the COI’s findings were justified. But that legal battle addresses only one dimension of the affair: the validity of the inquiry itself.

The more fundamental question, whether the evidence disclosed by the inquiry warrants criminal scrutiny, remains unresolved.

Until the public knows exactly which files were reviewed by Ian Lloyd KC and why the Director of Public Prosecutions concluded that no charges should follow, claims that the matter has been “closed” cannot be accepted at face value.

Indeed, the very transcripts now being celebrated by the lawyers may yet reopen questions that the authorities believed they had already put to rest.

If anything, the High Court’s order may ultimately achieve the opposite of what its proponents expect.

Instead of ending the controversy surrounding the COI, it may simply expose the full evidentiary record to public scrutiny, and with it, revive the question that has never truly gone away: Whether the events revealed by the inquiry demand not merely judicial review, but criminal accountability.

From Fijileaks Archives, 10 January 2026

Background to the Arrest and Investigation, 5 September 2024

Francis Puleiwai, Acting Deputy Commissioner of FICAC, explained at the start of the meeting that Malimali had been under investigation since April 2024, and that investigators had gathered sufficient evidence to warrant an interview and possible charges:

“The investigation for Ms. Malimali was ongoing since April… The team was ready to proceed. The interview was supposed to commence this morning and thereafter the team are ready to charge her as well.”

She further clarified that, under the Constitution, she possessed the same powers as the Commissioner and was lawfully exercising them:

“Under the Constitution the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner we both have the same powers. I’m exercising my right… to carry out due diligence and complete the investigation.”

Despite this, the meeting quickly descended into a series of interventions aimed at derailing the investigation and preventing charges.

Alleged Interference by Chief Registrar Tomasi Bainivalu

Tomasi Bainivalu, the Chief Registrar, immediately questioned FICAC’s authority to arrest Malimali and urged caution, while simultaneously suggesting that the investigation be halted:

“I do not know what power you have to arrest your own Commissioner… Why so fast overnight? Is it birthed from bitterness?… I’m not here to interfere with your work, but what is the right and best way?”

Most significantly, Bainivalu relayed what he described as instructions from the Chief Justice Salesi Temo:

“Just when she left… the Chair called again to CJ… and I remember he did say that on the phone… don’t accept any charge… this is the beginning of that dialogue.”

This statement is deeply concerning. If accurate, it indicates that a senior judicial officer sought to prevent the filing of a criminal charge, potentially amounting to judicial interference in an active investigation. It is one of the clearest indicators in the transcript of a potential attempt to pervert the course of justice, because it suggests coordination between the judiciary and external actors to prevent a criminal charge from ever reaching the courts.

Alleged Pressure and Threats from Senior Lawyer Amani Bale

Amani Bale, a senior lawyer, made some of the most direct and threatening interventions. He demanded that the suspect be released:

“I ask that you release her and she be released immediately and let the JSC go and convince…”

He also attempted to intimidate investigators by threatening their professional futures:

“What you have done now will spoil your careers but that’s your choice.”

Bale repeatedly asserted that pursuing charges would be futile because the courts would refuse to entertain them:

“You heard very clearly that Court would not accept it… if you go to Court it won’t accept your charges.”

These statements constitute clear attempts to pressure investigators into abandoning their lawful duties.

Alleged Misuse of Authority by Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society

Wylie Clarke, President of the Fiji Law Society, argued that because Malimali had been appointed Commissioner, investigators were now obliged to obey her instructions, even though she was the subject of their investigation:

“She is now the substantive Commissioner under the law… you have to follow her direction right or wrong… If she directs you to stop this right now, what would you guys do?”

He further warned that continuing with the investigation would provoke institutional conflict:

“Continuing down this path is going to end up in a stand-off between this organisation and the Court… That will undermine confidence in the whole justice system.”

Such statements are significant because they explicitly suggest that institutional power, rather than law, should dictate the outcome of a criminal investigation.

Alleged Attempts by Senior Lawyer Laurel Vaurasi to Dissuade Investigators

Laurel Vaurasi, a senior practitioner, echoed similar arguments, warning that continuing the investigation could place FICAC “outside the law”:

“If you continue to keep her… the Court will listen to her application but not yours… Standing by your conviction has to be based on law… Otherwise, you are now operating outside the law.”

Her remarks were calculated to sow doubt about the legality of the investigation and discourage investigators from proceeding. While more subtle, Vaurasi's language is part of intimidation and pressure aimed at halting a criminal process. Even indirect attempts, by invoking consequences and urging withdrawal, can amount to perversion if they are intended to derail an investigation.

Alleged Conduct of Barbara Malimali – Initiating External Interference

It is understood that Barbara Malimali herself telephoned Wylie Clarke, while she was under active investigation and/or under arrest, to seek his assistance. If proven, this demonstrates that Malimali herself initiated efforts to interfere with the investigation.

The transcript also shows that her supporters repeatedly invoked her appointment as Commissioner as a shield against prosecution, implying that investigators were now subordinate to her, even though the investigation predated her appointment and concerned her own conduct.

Pattern of Coordinated Obstruction

When viewed collectively, the statements above reveal a pattern of coordinated conduct by senior figures, including judicial officers and members of the legal profession, aimed at obstructing a criminal investigation. This includes:

Relaying instructions allegedly from the Chief Justice not to accept charges.
Issuing threats to investigators’ careers.
Misrepresenting the legal effect of the suspect’s appointment.
Demanding her immediate release.
Warning of institutional retaliation if the investigation continued.
Soliciting external assistance from professional associations to intervene.

The content and tone of the meeting make clear that these were not mere opinions or legal debates.They were calculated acts intended to discourage, prevent, or defeat the course of justice.

Contrast: FICAC Investigation Team (Puleiwai, Saumi, Bokini Ratu). These officers largely resisted pressure and emphasised:

The investigation had been ongoing since April.
Evidence existed to support charges.
They were acting under constitutional powers and the rule of law.

From Fijileaks Archive, 27 December 2025

The Fiji High Court hearing scheduled for 31 December is being presented as a dispute over legal representation. That framing understates what is at stake.

The case before the Court raises a deeper constitutional question: whether an independent Commission of Inquiry in Fiji retains legal life after it reports, or whether it is absorbed, managed, and neutralised once its findings become inconvenient.

At the centre of the dispute is the Commission of Inquiry into the aborted appointment of former FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali. The Commission was not established by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), as some have suggested. It was appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, under executive authority.

The JSC was not the author of the inquiry; it was one of the institutions affected by its conclusions. That distinction matters, because it exposes the true nature of the litigation now before the Court.

The JSC’s uneasy role

Having neither commissioned the inquiry nor appointed its Chair, the Judicial Service Commission now seeks to restrain the use of the COI report. This is not an internal procedural correction. It is a constitutional body reacting to findings produced by an external accountability mechanism over which it had no control.

The JSC’s position is therefore not supervisory but defensive. Constitutional bodies do not enjoy a right to disown independent inquiries merely because the outcome is uncomfortable.

The Solicitor-General’s claim, and its danger

The Solicitor-General Ropate Green argues that once the COI report was submitted to the President, jurisdiction, including legal representation, shifted entirely to the State. At first glance, the argument appears administratively neat. Constitutionally, it is troubling.

If accepted, it would mean that the Executive may commission an inquiry, receive its findings, and then assume complete control over how those findings are defended, explained, deployed, or quietly set aside. Under such a doctrine, a Commission of Inquiry would have no independent legal existence beyond the moment of delivery. That is not accountability. It is absorption.

The distortion of functus officio before the Fiji High Court

Central to the attempt to sideline the Chair of the Commission is reliance on the doctrine of functus officio. Justice David Ashton-Lewis has himself acknowledged that the Commission is functus: its task is complete, its findings are final, and the inquiry cannot be reopened.

That is orthodox law.

But functus officio has limits. It prevents the re-exercise of decision-making power; it does not erase authorship, extinguish standing, or impose silence. Finality of decision does not require the disappearance of the decision-maker.

What is now being advanced is a distorted version of the doctrine: that once functus, a commissioner may not explain the process, may not defend the report, and may not be represented in court when the inquiry is attacked.

There is no authority for that proposition. If it were correct, any inquiry could be ambushed the moment it reports, attacked without reply and restrained without defence. Functus officio would become a gag rule, not a doctrine of finality.

Natural justice, and the fatal contradiction

Those challenging the COI have not confined themselves to jurisdictional or technical objections. They rely heavily on natural justice, asserting that they were not consulted, not heard, or not given an opportunity to respond before adverse findings were made.

Once that argument is raised, the process of the inquiry itself becomes the issue. Natural justice claims cannot be assessed in the abstract. The Court must know:

who was notified,
who was invited to participate,
what opportunities were extended,
what was declined or ignored,
and why particular procedural choices were made.

Only one person can explain those matters authoritatively: Justice David Ashton-Lewis, the Chair of the Commission of Inquiry

Here lies the challengers’ fatal inconsistency. They allege procedural unfairness, yet seek to silence the very person who designed and conducted the process. They invoke natural justice while opposing the participation of the decision-maker whose conduct is under attack.

That position is untenable. Natural justice cannot be tested by excluding the author of the process. To do so would itself offend the principles of fairness the challengers claim to defend.

Justice Ashton-Lewis is not reopening the inquiry or revisiting findings. He is explaining how fairness was applied, why certain steps were taken, and what opportunities were afforded. That is not the exercise of power; it is the defence of process.

Why the Chair’s involvement remains constitutionally necessary

Justice Ashton-Lewis was not a mere courier delivering a document to the President. He conducted hearings, assessed evidence, made findings of fact, and drew conclusions affecting the integrity of public office.

The moment those findings were challenged, restrained, or sidelined, natural justice required that the author be heard. Representation in court is not a continuation of the inquiry; it is a safeguard against procedural ambush.

To deny that right would permit executive and institutional actors to attack an inquiry while denying the public a full account of how it was conducted.

Shoot the Messenger: Why Frenzied Attacks on COI Report Cannot Erase Its Damning Evidence. Whatever FCA decides - affidavits, testimony, and documentary material presented to the Commission will NOT Disappear

11/3/2026

Ever since the Commission of Inquiry Report began circulating in Fiji’s political and legal circles, a familiar strategy has emerged among those uncomfortable with its contents: attack the Report, discredit the process, and hope the evidence quietly disappears.

It is an old tactic. When the facts become inconvenient, the next best option is to rubbish the investigation that uncovered them.

Yet the increasingly shrill campaign to dismiss the Commission of Inquiry Report says far more about the desperation of its critics than about the credibility of the document itself.

For buried within the report, and within the affidavits, testimony, and documentary material presented to the Commission, are revelations that would make anyone uneasy.

The Evidence Cannot Be Wished Away

Those attempting to discredit the Report have focused obsessively on procedural complaints: who saw what draft, who was “named”, who received a copy of what findings, and whether the Commission followed every conceivable step of the so-called Maxwellisation process.

These are legitimate legal questions. But they are not the central issue. The real issue is the evidence that emerged during the inquiry. Witness statements, sworn affidavits, internal communications and institutional records were placed before the Commission.

These materials were not invented by political opponents or fabricated by journalists. They came from individuals directly involved in the events under investigation. And what they revealed was deeply troubling.

The evidence pointed to networks of influence, conflicts of interest, questionable legal manoeuvres, and decisions taken within some of the most sensitive institutions of the state. These revelations are precisely why the Report has triggered such a ferocious backlash.

The Strategy: Discredit the Inquiry

The strategy now being deployed is transparent. Rather than confront the substance of the evidence, critics of the Report have shifted the debate to technicalities. The focus has moved away from what witnesses actually said and toward whether the Commission followed every procedural step to the satisfaction of those who now feel aggrieved.

In other words, the argument has been reframed from “Did these events occur?” to “Was the process perfectly executed?”

But even if procedural criticisms were ultimately upheld by a court, they would not magically erase the testimony that was given or the documents that were produced. Evidence does not vanish simply because someone dislikes the conclusions drawn from it.

The Public Has Already Seen Enough

In today’s digital age, information does not remain confined to sealed envelopes or filing cabinets. The Report, together with many of the affidavits and supporting materials, has already entered the public domain.

Citizens, journalists and legal observers have been able to read for themselves the extraordinary claims and allegations contained within those materials. They describe a world of overlapping interests, political alliances, and legal manoeuvres that raise uncomfortable questions about the integrity of institutions entrusted with enforcing the rule of law.

For those named in the Report, the temptation is obvious: if the Report itself can be discredited, then the damaging narrative surrounding it might collapse as well. But the public has already seen enough to know that the issues raised cannot simply be swept aside.

Accountability Cannot Be Optional

Commissions of Inquiry exist for a reason. They are established when the ordinary mechanisms of oversight fail or when events occur that demand independent investigation. Their purpose is not to produce comfortable reading. They exist to uncover facts that powerful individuals might prefer to keep hidden.

In Fiji’s case, the Commission was tasked with examining matters that strike at the heart of institutional integrity. If the evidence presented to it reveals wrongdoing, abuse of power, or serious conflicts of interest, then the appropriate response is not to destroy the messenger.

The appropriate response is to examine the evidence and determine what consequences must follow.

A Familiar Pattern

Fiji has seen this pattern before. Time and again, investigations that threaten powerful interests are met with attempts to delegitimise the inquiry itself. Critics question the motives of investigators, the procedures they followed, and even the right of the inquiry to exist.

Meanwhile, the evidence that triggered the investigation quietly fades into the background. It is a strategy designed to exhaust public attention and blur the distinction between legitimate procedural debate and the far more serious question of whether misconduct occurred.

The Central Question Remains

No amount of rhetorical outrage can erase the fundamental question raised by the Commission’s work: What do the documents, affidavits, and testimony actually reveal about the conduct of those entrusted with public power?

That question has not been answered by the critics of the Report. Instead, they have chosen to wage a campaign against the Report itself. But attacking the Report does not erase the evidence that produced it.

And until the substance of that evidence is addressed honestly and transparently, the Commission of Inquiry Report will continue to haunt those determined to bury it. Because the problem was never the Report. The problem was what the Report revealed.

Take for example one story: Fijileaks had revealed that the newly appointed FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali had been banned from practising law in neighbouring Tuvalu.

It took the power of the Commission of Inquiry to write and obtain confirmation that it was true, and it came from the Attorney-General of Tuvalu to the COI that had been established to enquire into the appointment of Malimali as FICAC Commissioner.

The Tuvalu Ban: How the Commission of Inquiry Confirmed What Fijileaks Revealed About FICAC Commissioner Barbara Malimali

When Fijileaks first reported that the newly appointed Commissioner of the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC), Barbara Malimali, had previously been barred from practising law in neighbouring Tuvalu, the claim was met in some quarters with scepticism. Critics dismissed the revelation as speculation or political mischief, suggesting that the report lacked official confirmation.

What followed, however, demonstrated precisely why the Commission of Inquiry (COI) into Malimali’s appointment proved so significant.

Unlike journalists or civil society organisations, a Commission of Inquiry possesses statutory powers to obtain documents, summon records, and seek formal confirmation from public authorities both within and outside Fiji. During its investigation into the circumstances surrounding Malimali’s appointment as FICAC Commissioner, the Commission exercised those powers.

The Commission wrote directly to the Attorney-General of Tuvalu, seeking clarification about Malimali’s professional standing in that jurisdiction. The reply removed any lingering uncertainty.

The Attorney-General confirmed to the Commission that Barbara Malimali had indeed been barred from practising law in Tuvalu.

This official confirmation vindicated what Fijileaks had earlier reported. But the Commission’s findings did not stop there. Using its authority to obtain records from Fiji’s Legal Practitioners Unit (LPU), the Commission also examined Malimali’s applications for practising certificates in Fiji. Those applications required applicants to disclose any disciplinary findings or prohibitions affecting their ability to practise law in other jurisdictions.

According to the materials examined by the Commission, Malimali had submitted a series of practising certificate applications in which she failed to disclose the Tuvalu prohibition.

The Commission found that this omission occurred on seven separate occasions, each time the application form required disclosure of such matters.

If accurate, that pattern raises serious questions. Practising certificate applications are not casual documents; they are formal declarations made to the regulatory authorities governing the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to provide full and truthful disclosure about any disciplinary action or professional restrictions imposed in other jurisdictions.

Failure to do so may constitute a serious breach of professional obligations.

The Commission’s discovery therefore added a new dimension to the controversy surrounding Malimali’s appointment. What began as a disputed claim about her professional history in Tuvalu became, through documentary examination, a question about whether the regulatory authorities in Fiji had been given complete and accurate information when practising certificates were sought.

For critics who have sought to dismiss the Commission of Inquiry Report as flawed or politically motivated, the Malimali episode presents a difficulty.

The key facts did not originate from political opponents or speculative commentary. They emerged from official correspondence with the Attorney-General of Tuvalu and from documentary records held by Fiji’s own legal regulatory authorities.

In other words, the Commission did not merely repeat allegations. It verified them through official sources and primary records.

That is precisely what commissions of inquiry are designed to do.

Whatever disagreements may continue about the broader conclusions of the Report, the episode illustrates an uncomfortable truth for those determined to rubbish its findings: in at least one critical instance, the Commission used its powers to confirm facts that might otherwise have remained disputed.

And those facts raise questions that will not easily disappear. Hence, the JSC should SACK Barbara Malimali based on the failure to disclose the truth in her job application.

Clean Your Glasses, Mr Richard Naidu. The COI Recommended an Independent Review of Biman Prasad's File, and Fijileaks Holds the Damning Evidence on the NFP leader and former FINANCE MINISTER

FNUGATE: Why Is Rabuka Moving the Fiji National University Under His Direct Control? Confidential Cabinet Memo Reveals the Quiet Power Shift

11/3/2026

What safeguards will protect the university’s academic independence once it falls under Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s authority

Radrodro

Karavaki

Unaisi-Baba

Rabuka

"The decision to transfer Fiji National University into the Prime Minister’s portfolio has already been taken. The forthcoming legislation is merely the legal mechanism to formalise that shift. What remains unclear is why the university leadership sought this change in the first place, and what it will mean for the independence of one of Fiji’s most important public institutions."

RABUKA MOVES TO TAKE CONTROL OF FNU

A confidential Cabinet memorandum dated 9 March 2026 has revealed that the Rabuka Government is preparing legislation to place the Fiji National University directly under the Prime Minister’s authority. The proposed Fiji National University (Amendment) Bill 2026 will remove the university from the Ministry of Education and transfer it to the Prime Minister in his role as Minister for Strategic Planning, National Development and Statistics.

The memo also discloses that the move was triggered by FNU’s own leadership, which quietly approached the Prime Minister’s Office in August 2024 seeking what it called a “strategic reassignment”. By January 2026, the Prime Minister had already directed that the transfer proceed as government policy.

If Parliament approves the amendment, Fiji’s largest tertiary institution will no longer fall under the education sector but will sit directly within the Prime Minister’s portfolio.

Why did the university leadership seek to place itself under the Prime Minister’s control and what does it mean for the independence of Fiji’s flagship tertiary institution?

Full story below.

A confidential Cabinet memorandum dated 9 March 2026 reveals that the Rabuka Government is preparing legislation to place the Fiji National University (FNU) directly under the authority of the Prime Minister.

The document, marked “Confidential and Legally Privileged”, confirms that the Government has already drafted the Fiji National University (Amendment) Bill 2026, which will amend the Fiji National University Act 2009.

If passed, the legislation will remove FNU from the oversight of the Ministry of Education and transfer responsibility for the university to the Prime Minister in his capacity as Minister for Strategic Planning, National Development and Statistics.

In effect, the amendment would move Fiji’s largest tertiary institution directly under the Prime Minister’s political control.

The Timeline Behind the Decision

The memorandum reveals that the proposal did not originate within Cabinet.

Instead, the process began in August 2024, when the Chancellor of Fiji National University and members of its leadership team approached the Office of the Prime Minister with a proposal for what was described as a “strategic reassignment”.

The proposal recommended that FNU be removed from the Ministry of Education and placed under the Ministry of Strategic Planning, National Development and Statistics, which sits within the Prime Minister’s portfolio.

Why a public university leadership would seek to move itself away from the ministry responsible for education remains unexplained in the memorandum.

What is clear, however, is that the request was accepted.

On 13 January 2026, the Prime Minister Rabuka directed that the reassignment proceed as a matter of government policy.

Just six days later, on 19 January 2026, the Acting Prime Minister Filimoni Vosarogo publicly announced that FNU would be reassigned to the Prime Minister’s ministry.

The announcement also confirmed that legislation would be introduced to formalise the change once the Prime Minister returned.

By 3 February 2026, the Prime Minister had indicated that the proposed legislation would be brought before Cabinet.

The memorandum therefore shows that the Fiji National University (Amendment) Bill 2026 is essentially designed to legalise a policy decision already implemented administratively.

The Legal Mechanics

The proposed amendment is relatively simple.

It will amend provisions of the Fiji National University Act 2009 so that references to the Minister responsible for Education are replaced with references to the Prime Minister as Minister responsible for Strategic Planning, National Development and Statistics.

The Government argues that the change is necessary to align FNU more closely with national development priorities.

According to the memorandum, FNU’s role as Fiji’s “flagship dual-sector tertiary institution”, combining higher education with technical and vocational training, makes it central to: (1) the National Development Plan 2025-2027, and (2) the Government’s long-term development strategy, Vision 2050.

Officials therefore claim that placing FNU within the strategic planning portfolio will strengthen the link between skills training, national development policy and workforce planning.

The Unanswered Questions

Yet the memorandum raises more questions than it answers.

First, it does not explain why the leadership of FNU sought to move the university out of the Ministry of Education in the first place. Universities traditionally fall under education ministries precisely to preserve a degree of academic independence and institutional autonomy. Placing the university under the Office of the Prime Minister raises obvious questions about political oversight and governance.

Second, the document contains no evidence of consultation with academic staff, student bodies, unions, or the wider education sector before the policy decision was made.

Third, the memorandum does not address whether the move could affect university governance structures, including the authority of the FNU Council and the role of the Chancellor.

Centralisation of State Power

The proposed amendment also highlights a broader trend within Fiji’s governance structure.

Over the past two decades, key institutions have increasingly been placed under the direct authority of the executive branch, particularly the Prime Minister’s Office. Moving the country’s largest tertiary institution into that portfolio would further concentrate institutional authority at the centre of government.

Critics are likely to argue that this risks blurring the line between academic institutions and political power.

Supporters, however, may claim that closer integration with national development planning will allow the university to respond more effectively to Fiji’s economic and labour-market needs.

A University at the Centre of National Development

There is no doubt that Fiji National University occupies a pivotal role in the country’s development. Formed through the merger of several tertiary institutions, FNU now serves as the main provider of:

• technical and vocational education
• professional training
• degree programmes
• workforce development initiatives

Any structural change to its governance therefore carries implications not only for education policy but also for economic planning and national workforce strategy.

What Happens Next

The memorandum confirms that the Solicitor-General’s Office has already vetted both the Cabinet memorandum and the draft amendment bill.

Once Cabinet approves the proposal, the Prime Minister will seek authority to introduce the Fiji National University (Amendment) Bill 2026 in Parliament.

At that point the public, and Parliament, may finally be able to scrutinise the policy rationale behind a move that would place one of Fiji’s most important national institutions directly under the Prime Minister’s authority.

Conclusion

The confidential memorandum makes one thing clear.

The decision to transfer Fiji National University into the Prime Minister’s portfolio has already been taken.

The forthcoming legislation is merely the legal mechanism to formalise that shift.

What remains unclear is why the university leadership sought this change in the first place, and what it will mean for the independence of one of Fiji’s most important public institutions.

Those are questions that Parliament, and the public, will now have to confront.

THE TROJAN HORSE. ‘We Handed Him the Files’: How Langman Ignored the Chaudhry Tax Documents Sent to FICAC in 2007. Was he acting on instructions from his boss - coupster Bainimarama and Aiyaz Khaiyum?

10/3/2026

In August 2007, the late Fiji Sun publisher Russell Hunter sent all the tax documents relating to Mahendra Pal Chaudhry in our possession to George Langman, then deputy head of FICAC. Copies of the documents were also sent to Interim Prime Minister Commodore Frank Bainimarama. The documents were dispatched by registered post to FICAC headquarters in Suva. Langman responded in a manner that raised even more questions. He claimed that FICAC had not received the documents. Even more remarkably, he stated that the agency did not possess the expertise to investigate tax evasion allegations involving the minister and that the matter had been referred to the Fiji Islands Revenue and Customs Authority (FIRCA), whose ministerial line manager was Mahendra Chaudhry.

George Langman fronting court in the trial of Dr Neil Sharma, Bainimarama and Aiyaz Khaiyum

In their bid to intimidate us, the then FIRCA Board, composed of Jitoko Tikolevu, Peceli Vocea, Arvind Datt and Pio Tikoduadua, rushed to court

In the Fiji Sun, Victor Lal, 15 August 2007

Russell Hunter to Victor Lal — 10 August 2007

“Here is what I think. We publish, pointing out that these files were received before the coup. We don't name the daaku – at least not yet. We hand over copies of the documents to FICAC – and say so – and also to the RBF intelligence unit but don't say so.

We challenge FICAC to launch an inquiry naming the person being investigated – as it has done in the past. It won't do it, of course. But we can keep on badgering them about it. When the boot boys come down here demanding all our information we can put our hands on our hearts and say FICAC already has it.

At least someone is acting in the public interest here.”

Victor Lal reply

“Ok. The end game is to name him and I am sure we will get there.”

2016, London. FINALLY, after three decades of co-operation, we met in person for the first time over beer and his favourite fish and chips

“We also have the recent case of an opinion columnist in the Fiji Sun masquerading as a regular correspondent...writing front page stories. So blatant has been the Fiji Sun’s disregard for ethics that these lead stories have explicit opinions contained within the article. These little tricks are getting out of hand and that is the reason why we have called everyone here to explain to you in detail once and for all the truth that continues to be misconstrued and disregarded by most sections of the media.”

Bainimarama attacking Victor Lal at a hastily convened press conference while defending his then Finance Minister Chaudhry over the tax story, 24 February 2008

‘We Handed Him the Files’: How Langman Ignored the Chaudhry Tax Documents Sent to FICAC in 2007

Long before the recent courtroom revelations about stalled corruption investigations, the record shows that FICAC Deputy Commissioner Lt-Col George Langman had already been confronted with documentary evidence raising serious financial questions about the then interim Finance Minister Mahendra Pal Chaudhry.
That was in August 2007.

At the time, the late Russell Hunter and I were examining a set of tax records relating to Mahendra Chaudhry, then the Minister of Finance in Bainimarama’s interim government.

The documents, covering the period 1994–2004, appeared to reveal a troubling pattern: late payments, penalties, negotiated settlements with the tax authorities, and years in which tax returns had not been filed.

The material raised obvious questions about how a career politician had accumulated significant additional income and whether the records pointed to possible tax evasion.

But what followed was not an investigation.

Instead, the documents appear to have disappeared into the bureaucratic silence of Fiji’s anti-corruption system.

A Publication Strategy

Before the story was first published in The Fiji Sun on 15 August 2007, Hunter and I had already mapped out their strategy. An email sent by Hunter to me on 10 August 2007 laid out the approach. Hunter proposed that the documents should be published with a clear statement that they had been received before the coup. The individual concerned would not initially be named, but the authorities would be challenged to investigate.

Hunter suggested that copies of the documents should be sent to FICAC, while additional copies would quietly be provided to the Reserve Bank of Fiji’s intelligence unit.

“We challenge FICAC to launch an inquiry naming the person being investigated — as it has done in the past,” Hunter wrote. He predicted, however, that such an inquiry was unlikely. “It won't do it, of course. But we can keep on badgering them about it.” I agreed to the plan, responding succinctly: “Ok. The end game is to name him and I am sure we will get there.”

The Documents Sent to George Langman at FICAC

Three days later, on 13 August 2007, Lal acted on that strategy.

He sent all the tax documents in his possession to Lt-Col George Langman, then deputy head of FICAC.

Copies of the documents were also sent to Interim Prime Minister Commodore Frank Bainimarama.

The documents were dispatched by registered post to FICAC headquarters in Suva.

In other words, the anti-corruption body responsible for investigating financial wrongdoing had been formally placed in possession of material that raised questions about the financial affairs of a senior Cabinet minister.

Langman’s Response

The responses from the authorities could hardly have been more different. Bainimarama did not reply.

Langman, however, did respond in a manner that raised even more questions.

He claimed that FICAC had not received the documents.

Even more remarkably, he stated that the agency did not possess the expertise to investigate tax evasion allegations involving the minister and that the matter had been referred to the Fiji Islands Revenue and Customs Authority (FIRCA).

There was, however, one detail that stood out.

Despite claiming that FICAC had not received the documents, Langman never asked me to resend them.

Nor did he request further information or clarification about the allegations.

A Missed Opportunity

The episode represents one of the earliest documented instances in which allegations involving the financial affairs of a senior political figure were placed before Fiji’s anti-corruption authorities.

Years later, the Chaudhry tax controversy would re-emerge in a different context, eventually - seven years later - leading to FLP leader Chaudhry's conviction in 2014.

Langman’s Record Under Scrutiny

Today, Langman’s handling of the 2007 tax documents is being revisited in light of his recent testimony in the Health Tender trial.

In court, Langman acknowledged that he paused an investigation involving a government minister after being advised by then Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum to “hold off”.

The admission has raised serious questions about the independence of FICAC during that period.

But the events of August 2007 suggest that concerns about Langman’s approach to politically sensitive cases may stretch back much further.

The Unanswered Question

Nearly two decades later, the episode still raises a simple question.

If FICAC truly never received the documents sent by registered post in August 2007, why did Langman not ask for them to be sent again?

And if the documents were received, why did the anti-corruption agency responsible for investigating financial wrongdoing fail to pursue the matter further?

As new revelations emerge about stalled investigations and closed files, the story of the Chaudhry tax documents remains an early reminder of how corruption complaints can vanish, even when they are delivered directly to the doorstep of the institution meant to investigate them.

FROM HEALTHGATE TO ROADGATE: Langman Spoke About One File in Court But Whatever Happened to the Natuva FILE Exposed by Fijileaks? FICAC completed the File, allegedly implicating Natuva and Bainimarama

9/3/2026

Feroz Jan Mohammad poking fun at justice as he is jailed in the roadgate scam

FFP politicial buddies: Aiyaz Khaiyum and Timoci Natuva

The BOSS

From Fijileaks Archives, 2014

LANGMAN SPEAKS OF HEALTHGATE BUT WHAT ABOUT THE NATUVA FILE THAT FICAC HAD ALREADY COMPLETED IN 2011?

The courtroom testimony of former Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) Deputy Commissioner George Langman in the Health Tender trial has reopened a long-running debate about political interference in corruption investigations.

Langman has now told the court that he did not proceed with the Healthgate investigation after the then Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum told him to “hold off”. He said he respected the instruction even though, as he conceded in court, the Attorney-General had no legal authority to halt a FICAC investigation.

But Langman’s explanation raises another question, one that has lingered for more than a decade.

What happened to the completed FICAC investigation into former Minister Timoci Natuva?

Because unlike Healthgate, where Langman claims the investigation stalled, the documentary record published earlier by Fijileaks suggests that the investigation into payments involving T.F. Jan Bulldozing Company Ltd had already been completed.

The Natuva Investigation

The road-contracts scandal revolved around millions of dollars in payments made to contractor T. F. Jan Bulldozing Company Ltd for works associated with Fiji’s road infrastructure projects.

The case later resulted in criminal prosecutions against several officials linked to the Department of National Roads and related administrative units responsible for approving contractor payments.

However, documents published by Fijileaks at the time indicated that the investigation went much further.

Those leaked FICAC files suggested that investigators had examined the role of Timoci Natuva, who at the time held ministerial responsibility connected to the roads portfolio.

Crucially, the material indicated that FICAC had completed its investigation file.

That fact alone makes the subsequent silence deeply troubling.

A Completed File That Went Nowhere

If the investigation was complete, the normal procedure inside FICAC would have been straightforward.

Investigators would compile their findings and submit the file for prosecutorial review, leading either to charges or a formal decision not to prosecute.

Yet the public record shows no prosecution of Natuva.

Instead, the criminal proceedings that eventually reached court focused on officials and contractors while the political figure whose name surfaced in the investigative material remained untouched.

That discrepancy was one of the central questions raised in the Fijileaks postings at the time: why were subordinate officials charged while the minister named in the investigative file was not?

Two Files, Same Era

The comparison with the Healthgate investigation is unavoidable.

Both files emerged during the same political period.

Both concerned alleged corruption involving government procurement or infrastructure spending.

Both were first exposed publicly through Fijileaks documents.

And in both cases, serious questions arose about whether the investigative process stopped when it reached politically sensitive territory.

Langman has now explained why Healthgate stalled: he says he was told by the then Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum to wait.

But that explanation only deepens the mystery surrounding the Natuva file.

Because if the investigation into Natuva had already been completed, it could not simply have been “held off”. The investigative work had already been done.

The Question for Langman

Langman’s testimony has opened the door to a broader examination of how corruption investigations functioned during the Bainimarama-Khaiyum era.

His admission that FICAC’s independence existed “on paper” but was difficult to exercise in practice may explain why some investigations stalled.

Yet it also raises a direct question that cannot be ignored.

If FICAC completed the Natuva investigation, why did it never lead to charges?

Was the file reviewed and closed?

Was it referred to prosecutors?

Or did it simply disappear within the system?

The Unfinished Record

The Health Tender trial is now shedding light on one of the most controversial corruption investigations of the past decade.

But it may also reopen scrutiny of another case that has long remained unresolved.

Because if Langman is now prepared to explain why Healthgate stalled, the public may reasonably ask him to address another file that once sat on FICAC’s desks.

A file that, according to the documents already published, had already been completed: the Natuva File.

WESTERN BUILDERS: Shortly before the 2014 general elections, on 20 June 2014, Faiz Javed Jan donated $10,000 and on the same day his two uncles, Taj Jan and Mobin Jan, donated $5,000 each respectively. Their full names were not recorded in the donor list: Taj Jan Mohammed and Mobin Jan Mohammed. The $20,000 was accepted by FFP Treasurer and current acting Fiji Pine Ltd CEO VIMLESH KUMAR. FAIZ JAVED JAN is the son of Feroz Jan Mohammed, and nephew of the two Jan FFP donor brothers. Feroz Jan Mohammed, of TF Jan Bulldozing, is currently serving a 8 year jail term for a scam involving $3.1million. He was jailed in 2015 with a non-parole period of 5 years. Despite pleading poverty before the Fiji High Court (which the Judge refused to believe) his son Faiz, two years later, on 9 May 2017, donated another $10,000 (RN: 1720).

MIDLIFE INVESTMENTS LTD: Was Langman forced to protect Khaiyum?

PENSIONERS SHORT-CHANGED, AGAIN. Wadan Narsey rebukes his NFP party stalwart RICHARD NAIDU. Who are FNPF's Legal Advisers? Narsey: "In zoom meeting with Pensioners, Naidu spoke as FNFP's lawyer to us."

8/3/2026

"We have no idea if there was any input of FNPF lawyers into the MoF statement. But we do know that in a meeting that the core group of the 2012 pensioners had with the FNPF Board a few months ago (with Narsey attending by zoom from Melbourne), Richard Naidu was present and spoke as FNPF’s lawyer. Astonishingly Naidu lectured us at length on the need for FNPF to follow the “law” as it stood. He repeated over and over that the 2011 Decrees stopped the FNPF from addressing the 2012 pensioners’ grievances. Richard Naidu made no mention of the dastardly origins of the 2013 Constitution as opposed to the 1997 Constitution which had been approved by both Houses of the Fiji Parliament yet treasonously trashed by the Bainimarama Government." Wadan Narsey

Wadan Narsey’s Rebuke of Richard Naidu: When the Rule of Law Meets the Politics of Silence

In their recent commentary in the Fiji Times on the plight of Fiji’s 2012 pensioners, the Australian based economist Wadan Narsey and former Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki launched a broader critique of what they described as the continuing erosion of the rule of law in Fiji.

Embedded within that wider argument was a pointed and uncomfortable reflection on the role of prominent lawyer Richard Naidu, who now appears in the dispute as legal adviser to the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF).

Their criticism was not an outright denunciation but something more layered: a mixture of disappointment, irony, and a reminder of Naidu’s own long public record as a defender of legality and constitutional governance.

From defender of the rule of law to adviser of the system

Narsey began by situating Naidu within Fiji’s legal and political discourse. The lawyer had previously written a satirical commentary urging reflection on the rule of law in Fiji’s political life. Yet Narsey contrasted that earlier posture with Naidu's more recent role advising FNPF in discussions with representatives of the 2012 pensioners.

According to Narsey’s account, Naidu attended a meeting between the pensioners’ core group and the FNPF Board where he emphasised repeatedly that the institution must operate strictly according to the law as it currently stands. In particular, Naidu reportedly stressed that the 2011 decrees introduced during the military regime effectively prevented FNPF from addressing the grievances of pensioners whose contracted benefits had been drastically reduced.

For Narsey, this legalistic position raised an uncomfortable contradiction. If the legal framework itself emerged from decrees imposed by a military government following the 2006 coup, can it truly be invoked as an unquestionable authority against citizens whose contractual rights were stripped away under that same regime?

The deeper constitutional critique

The attack on Naidu therefore sits within a broader constitutional argument. Narsey and Fatiaki insisted that the legal regime governing the pension dispute cannot be separated from its origins in the decrees and constitutional framework imposed after the 2006 coup.

In their view, the 2013 Constitution, often cited as preventing retrospective remedies for the pensioners, lacks democratic legitimacy because it was never adopted through a parliamentary vote or national referendum.

Against that backdrop, Narsey found it troubling that lawyers who once stood against military rule now rely on legal provisions derived from that same period to justify institutional inaction. The implication is stark: fidelity to “the law as it stands” can become morally problematic when the law itself originates from unconstitutional authority.

A reminder of Naidu’s earlier reputation

Yet the article stopped short of portraying Naidu as a villain. On the contrary, Narsey acknowledged that many pensioners have long respected him for his principled opposition to coups, illegal governments and media censorship.

Indeed, Narsey reminded readers that he himself publicly defended Naidu in 2022 when the former Bainimarama administration attempted to pursue criminal action against the lawyer over a social media post.

This historical reminder is not incidental. It serves to underline Narsey-Fatiaki disappointment. The criticism is directed not merely at a lawyer performing a professional duty, but at a figure who had once symbolised resistance to authoritarian legal structures.

The ethical dilemma of the lawyer

At the centre of Narsey’s critique lies a classic professional dilemma: the role of the lawyer when confronted with laws perceived to be unjust.

On one side lies the orthodox legal position: a lawyer must advise clients according to the law currently in force, regardless of its origins. From that perspective, Naidu’s insistence that FNPF must comply with existing decrees and statutes is entirely orthodox.

On the other side lies a broader conception of legal ethics. If the law itself derives from unconstitutional or illegitimate acts, should lawyers treat it as morally binding? Or should they actively encourage institutions to seek legislative remedies to correct past injustices?

Narsey clearly favoured the latter view. In his account, the pensioners’ core group has already proposed a legislative pathway - a draft bill that would repeal the relevant provisions of the FNPF Act and the transitional legislation imposed during the military regime.

What he found troubling was that such options appeared to receive little attention from those advising the institutions involved.

The dwindling generation of pensioners

The most poignant element of Narsey’s argument lies in his closing observation: the number of pensioners affected by the 2012 cuts continues to decline with time.

For more than a decade they have sought restitution for what they describe as the unilateral breaking of irrevocable pension contracts by the military government and the FNPF. Now, as their numbers diminish, the hope for a negotiated or legislative solution grows increasingly urgent.

This urgency is precisely why Narsey and Fatiaki appeal to lawyers such as Naidu. They argued that legal advisers should recognise not only the technical constraints of existing statutes but also the moral and constitutional context in which those statutes emerged.

A broader indictment of Fiji’s legal culture

Ultimately, Narsey and Fatiak's criticism of Richard Naidu is less about a single lawyer and more about what they see as a wider problem in Fiji’s legal and political culture.

The article suggested that the country still struggleed to reconcile two competing realities: (1) the persistence of laws and institutions shaped during the military era; and (2) the democratic aspirations that followed the return to parliamentary government.

For Narsey and Fatiaki, invoking those laws to deny restitution to citizens who suffered under them amounts to a profound contradiction.

Whether one agrees with that view or not, the argument forces an uncomfortable question upon Fiji’s legal establishment: Is strict adherence to the law always compatible with justice when the law itself was born of unconstitutional power?

In raising that question, Narsey and Fatiaki’s critique extends far beyond the pension dispute. It touches the very foundations of Fiji’s post-coup legal order.

From Fijileaks Archives: We, together with Shaista Shameem and Wadan Narsey, had been fighting for the robbed PENSIONERS since 2012

Click to read Wadan Narsey and Daniel Fatiaki's Fiji Times Opinion Piece on Pension scandal below:
www.fijitimes.com.fj/opinion-fiji-government-betrayal-of-2012-pensioners-and-rule-of-law/

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