VINAKA VAKALEVU to all our old and new readers who visited FIJILEAKS last week:
"The penalty for TREASON in all Commonwealth countries is DEATH, and if this is to be my destiny I will accept it"
Coupist Sitiveni Rabuka, 19 May 1987.
Sadistically, after having walked away from the HANGMAN's NOOSE, he did not hesitate to start "NOOSING" Indo-Fijians who dared to set fire to his racist, feudalistic, and unconstitutional 1990 Constitution of Fiji
But the coward (lamu sona) conferred upon himself and his co-conspirators IMMUNITY which was included in the 1990, 1997, the Draft Ghai Constitution 2012, and the 2013 Constitution of Fiji
BY MICK BEDDOES
First up, I am not sure what my forgiveness or non-forgiveness of Mr Rabuka for committing treason in 1987, orchestrating his immunity from prosecution, being rewarded for his wrong doing by being allowed to contest an election and become Prime Minister has to do with anything?
I have no sway over Mr Rabuka, he does not need my forgiveness or anyone elses for that matter, he is after all ‘immune’ from prosecution, so the law [for now] can’t touch him. But I suspect his conscious can.
Mr Dakuvula and the like believe that because our elected leaders dealt with the 1987 coup as they did, we should just accept. Well I for one do not!
Our system of Justice is supposed to allow anyone found guilty of a crime and sentenced to jail the right to ‘appeal’ to, or seek review by, a higher court [Sec 14 (2) (o)], just as if new evidence is uncovered that proves a citizen who was found guilty and jailed is in fact innocent, then surely as a civilized society we would want to ‘correct the wrong’ that was done and free the person wrongly convicted and at the same time seek out and bring to account the guilty person.
But sadly, that rule only applies to the ordinary folk like you and me. The way our elected leaders have chosen to handle the coups is to sweep it under the carpet, pretend it never happened and hope like hell it goes away. Well it has not and it will not and until the leaders we elect acquire the moral integrity and political will to ‘do what is right’ for our people, and stop ‘rewarding the wrong doers’ coups will continue to plague us in the future, because immunity acts as an incentive to any other military officer looking for a ‘get rich quick’ opportunity.
All three individuals committed the exact same capital crime Mr Dakuvula, but you completely disregard the 2000 Speight coup and jump right to the 2006 coup and its immunity provisions, suggesting the 2006 coup remains open and unresolved? It’s also clear that you are among those who think it’s fair and just that the perpetrators of the 1987 and 2006 coups receive immunity for their capital crimes, and can enrich themselves, while the 2000 perpetrators do time for the same crime? There is nothing fair or just about this.
Until we deal comprehensively with the coups of 1987, 2000, 2006 and bring to account all those involved, allow due process to be applied equally to all citizens, establish the guilt or innocence of all those rightly or wrongly accused, allow the families of all coup victims to have their day in court where we establish absolutely the facts in all three coups, we cannot proceed with a reconciliation process that will finally allow us as a nation to have closure.
But once those seeking forgiveness have had their wrong doing properly determined through ‘a court of law’ and they show genuine remorse for their wrong doing, I have no doubt that our citizens will show compassion and be ready forgive them.
First up, I am not sure what my forgiveness or non-forgiveness of Mr Rabuka for committing treason in 1987, orchestrating his immunity from prosecution, being rewarded for his wrong doing by being allowed to contest an election and become Prime Minister has to do with anything?
I have no sway over Mr Rabuka, he does not need my forgiveness or anyone elses for that matter, he is after all ‘immune’ from prosecution, so the law [for now] can’t touch him. But I suspect his conscious can.
Mr Dakuvula and the like believe that because our elected leaders dealt with the 1987 coup as they did, we should just accept. Well I for one do not!
Our system of Justice is supposed to allow anyone found guilty of a crime and sentenced to jail the right to ‘appeal’ to, or seek review by, a higher court [Sec 14 (2) (o)], just as if new evidence is uncovered that proves a citizen who was found guilty and jailed is in fact innocent, then surely as a civilized society we would want to ‘correct the wrong’ that was done and free the person wrongly convicted and at the same time seek out and bring to account the guilty person.
But sadly, that rule only applies to the ordinary folk like you and me. The way our elected leaders have chosen to handle the coups is to sweep it under the carpet, pretend it never happened and hope like hell it goes away. Well it has not and it will not and until the leaders we elect acquire the moral integrity and political will to ‘do what is right’ for our people, and stop ‘rewarding the wrong doers’ coups will continue to plague us in the future, because immunity acts as an incentive to any other military officer looking for a ‘get rich quick’ opportunity.
All three individuals committed the exact same capital crime Mr Dakuvula, but you completely disregard the 2000 Speight coup and jump right to the 2006 coup and its immunity provisions, suggesting the 2006 coup remains open and unresolved? It’s also clear that you are among those who think it’s fair and just that the perpetrators of the 1987 and 2006 coups receive immunity for their capital crimes, and can enrich themselves, while the 2000 perpetrators do time for the same crime? There is nothing fair or just about this.
Until we deal comprehensively with the coups of 1987, 2000, 2006 and bring to account all those involved, allow due process to be applied equally to all citizens, establish the guilt or innocence of all those rightly or wrongly accused, allow the families of all coup victims to have their day in court where we establish absolutely the facts in all three coups, we cannot proceed with a reconciliation process that will finally allow us as a nation to have closure.
But once those seeking forgiveness have had their wrong doing properly determined through ‘a court of law’ and they show genuine remorse for their wrong doing, I have no doubt that our citizens will show compassion and be ready forgive them.
‘Rabuka had already learned the art of political double speak (what we in Fiji call aage pichie or liu muri) and was prepared to walk a precarious path to stay in power’ - Rabuka's official biographer John Sharpham in Rabuka of Fiji
The 1992 Elections: Rabuka fighting and betraying to remain Prime Minister
By VICTOR LAL
Fiji's Daily Post, 2001
The new 1990 Constitution was overtly racist and biased in favour of Fijians. In the new 70 seat Parliament, Fijians were allocated 37 seats, Indo-Fijians 27, General Voters 5 and Rotumans 1. The Senate had 24 seats for Fijians, 9 for other races and 1 for Rotumans. In addition, all the key government posts-the presidency, prime ministership and heads of the judiciary, military, public service-had to be held by Fijians. A quota of at least 50 per cent Fijians was set for new recruitment into the public service.
Another important feature of the distribution of Parliamentary seats was the gerrymandering of the 37 Fijian constituencies because many urban Fijians had voted for Bavadra’s government in the 1987 elections. Thus rural Fijian voters were given 32 constituencies with the remaining 5 going to urban Fijian voters.
With the new racist 1990 Constitution promulgated and Fijian political supremacy guaranteed, the first general election was held in 1992. The principal parties that entered the election contest were: SVT, FLP, NFP, General Voters Party (GVP) and the Fijian Nationalist United Front (FNUF). Meanwhile, the NFP-FLP Coalition had split up following the death of Dr Timoci Bavadra. The FNUF, led by the late Sakiasi Butadroka, was a coalition of extremists from Fijian nationalist party (FNP) and SVT, which was formed in March 1991 with Rabuka as its political leader. The SVT had the backing of the Great Council of Chiefs. The SVT was not necessarily a unified political group and the real issue for the party was who was to become Prime Minister after the election: the ‘Father of the Coups’ Sitiveni Rabuka or the reliable, safe, moderate but right-wing Josevata Kamikamica? .
The political divisions within the Indo-Fijians, who are ‘All Chiefs and No Indians’, was not surprising. As the old coolie saying goes: ‘You put two Indians on a desert island and on your return next day to pick them up, you will find they have become three Indians.’ The FLP, led by Chaudhry, initially threatened to boycott the elections, stating that taking part would be tantamount to endorsing the 1990 ‘racist constitution’. However, at the last minute, the FLP leaders changed their stance and contested the election. The result of the 37 Fijian seats were as follows: SVT 30, FNUF 5 and the last 2 went to Independents. The 27 Indo-Fijian seats were equally shared: the NFP won 14 and the FLP the other 13. The GVP won the 5 seats. The election results created the inevitability of a Coalition government.
Although the SVT was theoretically in a position to form a coalition government, Rabuka was not assured of the coveted Prime Ministership. Some newly-elected SVT parliamentarians had thrown in their lot with Rabuka’s arch political rival, Josevata Kamikamica, a former Finance Minister in the pre-election Interim Government.
Rabuka appeared to have 18 votes with Kamikamica only two, Filipe Bole four, and Ratu William Tonganivalu three. However Bole, Rabuka’s former teacher, freed his votes to allow them to support the majority-holder, in this case Rabuka who needed 36 confirmed votes from those who now held seats in the new House to grab the post of Prime Minister. He went to the Government House asking President Ratu Penaia Ganilau to appoint him as Prime Minister, declaring that he had 42 votes. Ganilau asked Rabuka to demonstrate his support with accompanying signatures to confirm the numbers. Ganilau also was acutely aware that that another high-ranking chief, Ratu Mara, and a number of SVT personalities had been backing Kamikamica.
In a cruel twist of irony, both the rival factions of the SVT began to court support from the NFP and FLP, the very parties deposed to ensure Fijian political supremacy in perpetuity. The SVT, formed to unify the Fijian people, could not agree on who should be its parliamentary leader. Rabuka was shocked to learn that Kamikamica had cut a deal with the veteran Indo-Fijian lawyer and politician Jai Ram Reddy and the NFP, and as a result Kamikamica had 30 votes to Rabuka’s 26.
In desperation, the desperately power-hungry Rabuka, who had imprisoned Mahendra Chaudhry twice, and had terrorised him and his family since 1987, shamelessly turned to the FLP leader for his political survival. But first Rabuka had to be humbled and humiliated, and reminded that power flows from the fountain of a ball point pen and not from the barrel of a Fiji Military Forces gun with a sticker reading, ‘God Loves You’. So Chaudhry and the FLP laid down the conditions for their support for Rabuka: a review of the Constitution; repeal of several controversial labour decrees, scrapping of the Value Added Tax (VAT) and land tenure reforms.
The so-called Methodist preacher, a decorated solider, and a cynically pragmatic Fijian nationalist Rabuka, who desperately needed Chaudhry’s 13 historical votes, agreed to sign a letter committing himself to a deal with the FLP. The letter read: ‘I acknowledge the proposed outlined in your letter (2 June) delivered this morning. I have considered your proposals favourably and agree to take action on these issues, namely the constitution, VAT, labour decree reforms and land tenure on the basis suggested in your letter. I agree to hold discussions on the above issue in order to finalise the machinery to progress the matter further.’ In return, he got Chaudhry’s 13 votes to take him well in excess of his required 36 for the post of Prime Minister. The FLP however informed Rabuka that it would not be part of the governing coalition. Desperate to remain Prime Minister, Rabuka had accepted all the conditions in writing, only to dishonour them on resuming power. He had managed to secure the support of the GVP, the Rotuman representative Paul Manueli, his former army commander, and 2 independents.
Now he had the numbers and the prime ministership in his sulu, Rabuka backed away from the agreement with the FLP. A spokesman of his insisted that all Rabuka had agreed to do was to discuss the issues that had been raised. There was, he stated, no agreement to do any more than this. As his official biographer John Sharpham recently put it, ‘Rabuka had already learned the art of political double speak (what we in Fiji call aage pichie or liu muri) and was prepared to walk a precarious path to stay in power’.
King Maker makes ‘Deal with the Devil’
What about Chaudhry who had done a deal with Rabuka and delivered him and a faction of the SVT the prime ministership? When Chaudhry was asked if he had done ‘a deal with the devil?’ he responded: ‘No, there was no deal; the fact is we laid down conditions’. He also acknowledged the irony of the situation between the jailed and the jailor. ‘Oh, yes’, he responded when asked, ‘we hope we can enjoy that type of irony, which does not happen very often’.
Chaudhry clearly relished the role of king-maker where an Indo-Fijian was called upon to arbitrate and settle question of leadership in the chiefly sponsored SVT. It is surprising that the SVT had not run to the Great Council of Chiefs, whom they have recently elevated as the guardians of Fijian political aspirations, to settle the question of political leadership within their own ranks.
Meanwhile Kamikamica continued, in a typical Fijian fashion, to harbour his political ambitions against Rabuka. He refused to enter the post-1992 election Rabuka Cabinet, feeling that he would have been a better Prime Minister. Rabuka’s political woes however continued to shadow him in office, notably the ‘Stephen Affair’. (We will write about the Stephen Affair soon)
Rabuka managed to ward off Chaudhry and his colleagues threatened withdrawal of Labour’s support for him by forming an inter-parliamentary committee to recommend appropriate machinery for considering changes to the 1990 Constitution.
On the Indo-Fijian political front, the rivalry between the NFP and FLP intensified to the benefit of the NFP. In October 1993 the NFP candidates had roundly defeated their FLP Indo-Fijian candidates in the municipal elections. The FLP had also fallen out with Rabuka in 1993 when he did not honour his promises in return for the FLP’s support for the premiership in 1992.
On the Fijian political front, politics essentially still revolved around Rabuka and his political foe, Kamikamica. Rabuka’s critics seized the adverse aspects of the Report into the ‘Stephens Affair’ and called for his resignation. Rabuka brushed aside the resignation calls and even survived a motion of no-confidence in him. However, six Fijian MPs including Kamikamica, and David Pickering from the GVP, finally succeeded in their dogged pursuit to get rid of Rabuka when they voted with the Opposition against his budget 36-33 (with one abstention). The dissidents had hoped that Mara might either appoint Kamikamica or Ratu William Tonganivalu to form a new government.
Instead, Rabuka exercised his constitutional right to dissolve his government and call for new elections.
By VICTOR LAL
Fiji's Daily Post, 2001
The new 1990 Constitution was overtly racist and biased in favour of Fijians. In the new 70 seat Parliament, Fijians were allocated 37 seats, Indo-Fijians 27, General Voters 5 and Rotumans 1. The Senate had 24 seats for Fijians, 9 for other races and 1 for Rotumans. In addition, all the key government posts-the presidency, prime ministership and heads of the judiciary, military, public service-had to be held by Fijians. A quota of at least 50 per cent Fijians was set for new recruitment into the public service.
Another important feature of the distribution of Parliamentary seats was the gerrymandering of the 37 Fijian constituencies because many urban Fijians had voted for Bavadra’s government in the 1987 elections. Thus rural Fijian voters were given 32 constituencies with the remaining 5 going to urban Fijian voters.
With the new racist 1990 Constitution promulgated and Fijian political supremacy guaranteed, the first general election was held in 1992. The principal parties that entered the election contest were: SVT, FLP, NFP, General Voters Party (GVP) and the Fijian Nationalist United Front (FNUF). Meanwhile, the NFP-FLP Coalition had split up following the death of Dr Timoci Bavadra. The FNUF, led by the late Sakiasi Butadroka, was a coalition of extremists from Fijian nationalist party (FNP) and SVT, which was formed in March 1991 with Rabuka as its political leader. The SVT had the backing of the Great Council of Chiefs. The SVT was not necessarily a unified political group and the real issue for the party was who was to become Prime Minister after the election: the ‘Father of the Coups’ Sitiveni Rabuka or the reliable, safe, moderate but right-wing Josevata Kamikamica? .
The political divisions within the Indo-Fijians, who are ‘All Chiefs and No Indians’, was not surprising. As the old coolie saying goes: ‘You put two Indians on a desert island and on your return next day to pick them up, you will find they have become three Indians.’ The FLP, led by Chaudhry, initially threatened to boycott the elections, stating that taking part would be tantamount to endorsing the 1990 ‘racist constitution’. However, at the last minute, the FLP leaders changed their stance and contested the election. The result of the 37 Fijian seats were as follows: SVT 30, FNUF 5 and the last 2 went to Independents. The 27 Indo-Fijian seats were equally shared: the NFP won 14 and the FLP the other 13. The GVP won the 5 seats. The election results created the inevitability of a Coalition government.
Although the SVT was theoretically in a position to form a coalition government, Rabuka was not assured of the coveted Prime Ministership. Some newly-elected SVT parliamentarians had thrown in their lot with Rabuka’s arch political rival, Josevata Kamikamica, a former Finance Minister in the pre-election Interim Government.
Rabuka appeared to have 18 votes with Kamikamica only two, Filipe Bole four, and Ratu William Tonganivalu three. However Bole, Rabuka’s former teacher, freed his votes to allow them to support the majority-holder, in this case Rabuka who needed 36 confirmed votes from those who now held seats in the new House to grab the post of Prime Minister. He went to the Government House asking President Ratu Penaia Ganilau to appoint him as Prime Minister, declaring that he had 42 votes. Ganilau asked Rabuka to demonstrate his support with accompanying signatures to confirm the numbers. Ganilau also was acutely aware that that another high-ranking chief, Ratu Mara, and a number of SVT personalities had been backing Kamikamica.
In a cruel twist of irony, both the rival factions of the SVT began to court support from the NFP and FLP, the very parties deposed to ensure Fijian political supremacy in perpetuity. The SVT, formed to unify the Fijian people, could not agree on who should be its parliamentary leader. Rabuka was shocked to learn that Kamikamica had cut a deal with the veteran Indo-Fijian lawyer and politician Jai Ram Reddy and the NFP, and as a result Kamikamica had 30 votes to Rabuka’s 26.
In desperation, the desperately power-hungry Rabuka, who had imprisoned Mahendra Chaudhry twice, and had terrorised him and his family since 1987, shamelessly turned to the FLP leader for his political survival. But first Rabuka had to be humbled and humiliated, and reminded that power flows from the fountain of a ball point pen and not from the barrel of a Fiji Military Forces gun with a sticker reading, ‘God Loves You’. So Chaudhry and the FLP laid down the conditions for their support for Rabuka: a review of the Constitution; repeal of several controversial labour decrees, scrapping of the Value Added Tax (VAT) and land tenure reforms.
The so-called Methodist preacher, a decorated solider, and a cynically pragmatic Fijian nationalist Rabuka, who desperately needed Chaudhry’s 13 historical votes, agreed to sign a letter committing himself to a deal with the FLP. The letter read: ‘I acknowledge the proposed outlined in your letter (2 June) delivered this morning. I have considered your proposals favourably and agree to take action on these issues, namely the constitution, VAT, labour decree reforms and land tenure on the basis suggested in your letter. I agree to hold discussions on the above issue in order to finalise the machinery to progress the matter further.’ In return, he got Chaudhry’s 13 votes to take him well in excess of his required 36 for the post of Prime Minister. The FLP however informed Rabuka that it would not be part of the governing coalition. Desperate to remain Prime Minister, Rabuka had accepted all the conditions in writing, only to dishonour them on resuming power. He had managed to secure the support of the GVP, the Rotuman representative Paul Manueli, his former army commander, and 2 independents.
Now he had the numbers and the prime ministership in his sulu, Rabuka backed away from the agreement with the FLP. A spokesman of his insisted that all Rabuka had agreed to do was to discuss the issues that had been raised. There was, he stated, no agreement to do any more than this. As his official biographer John Sharpham recently put it, ‘Rabuka had already learned the art of political double speak (what we in Fiji call aage pichie or liu muri) and was prepared to walk a precarious path to stay in power’.
King Maker makes ‘Deal with the Devil’
What about Chaudhry who had done a deal with Rabuka and delivered him and a faction of the SVT the prime ministership? When Chaudhry was asked if he had done ‘a deal with the devil?’ he responded: ‘No, there was no deal; the fact is we laid down conditions’. He also acknowledged the irony of the situation between the jailed and the jailor. ‘Oh, yes’, he responded when asked, ‘we hope we can enjoy that type of irony, which does not happen very often’.
Chaudhry clearly relished the role of king-maker where an Indo-Fijian was called upon to arbitrate and settle question of leadership in the chiefly sponsored SVT. It is surprising that the SVT had not run to the Great Council of Chiefs, whom they have recently elevated as the guardians of Fijian political aspirations, to settle the question of political leadership within their own ranks.
Meanwhile Kamikamica continued, in a typical Fijian fashion, to harbour his political ambitions against Rabuka. He refused to enter the post-1992 election Rabuka Cabinet, feeling that he would have been a better Prime Minister. Rabuka’s political woes however continued to shadow him in office, notably the ‘Stephen Affair’. (We will write about the Stephen Affair soon)
Rabuka managed to ward off Chaudhry and his colleagues threatened withdrawal of Labour’s support for him by forming an inter-parliamentary committee to recommend appropriate machinery for considering changes to the 1990 Constitution.
On the Indo-Fijian political front, the rivalry between the NFP and FLP intensified to the benefit of the NFP. In October 1993 the NFP candidates had roundly defeated their FLP Indo-Fijian candidates in the municipal elections. The FLP had also fallen out with Rabuka in 1993 when he did not honour his promises in return for the FLP’s support for the premiership in 1992.
On the Fijian political front, politics essentially still revolved around Rabuka and his political foe, Kamikamica. Rabuka’s critics seized the adverse aspects of the Report into the ‘Stephens Affair’ and called for his resignation. Rabuka brushed aside the resignation calls and even survived a motion of no-confidence in him. However, six Fijian MPs including Kamikamica, and David Pickering from the GVP, finally succeeded in their dogged pursuit to get rid of Rabuka when they voted with the Opposition against his budget 36-33 (with one abstention). The dissidents had hoped that Mara might either appoint Kamikamica or Ratu William Tonganivalu to form a new government.
Instead, Rabuka exercised his constitutional right to dissolve his government and call for new elections.
"The irony is that Indo-Fijian political leaders had become power brokers in the face of Fijian disunity [in 1994]. The newly-elected Prime Minister Rabuka could not ignore their demands for constitutional change in the light of political and ‘kama sutra’ scandals hovering over his head. But he could find refuge in the constitutional process, and he was forced to initiate negotiations between Reddy and Chaudhry culminating in the setting up of the Constitutional Review Commission (The Reeves Commission)."- VICTOR LAL, 2001, in Fijis The Daily Post
The 1994 Elections and Native Fijian Divisions
By VICTOR LAL
Fiji's Daily Post, 2001
It was the second general election under the new racist Constitution promulgated in 1990 after the two military take-overs in 1987 by Sitiveni Rabuka. The election was notable for the fact that the incumbent Prime Minister Rabuka was not expected to do well as dissidents in his party had broken away to form new political parties to challenge his rule. Fiji had undergone several changes prior to the 1994 elections. The President, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, had passed away, and the Great Council of Chiefs had elected Ratu Mara as his successor.
The 1994 election campaign was dominated by intra-ethnic instead of inter-ethnic issues and conflicts and debates centred around communal issues because each group was fighting for communal seats. For the Indo-Fijians, the central issue of the racially biased constitution took a back seat to FLP/NFP rivalry, most of it at a personal level between Mahendra Chaudhry and Jai Ram Reddy. Chaudhry and the FLP were repeatedly taunted by the NFP for their support for Rabuka in the aftermath of the 1992 election. The NFP claimed that the support had yielded nothing.
The FLP, on the other hand, accused the NFP for being too close to Rabuka, who unwittingly reinforced this image when he announced that he planned to set up a government of national unity with Reddy after the elections. FLP also attacked NFP for being an ‘Indian’ party as opposed to FLP’s multi-racial character.
On the Fijian side, Josevata Kamikamica hastily launched a new political party, Fijian Association Party (FAP) to challenge Rabuka and the SVT. The FAP had the tacit support of the President Mara who had openly expressed his support for Kamikamica for the premiership at the Great Council of Chiefs but he was outvoted, in part by Rabuka’s politicised nominees on the Council. The SVT also condemned Kamikamica of helping to hand political power back to the Indo-Fijians. Kamikamica, on the other hand, played right into the hands of SVT nationalists when he made the strategic mistake of announcing that he would form a coalition government with the Indo-Fijians if he won the 1994 elections. He had promised to restore integrity and dignity to Fijian leadership.
Tora-Adi Kuini Join Fray
The already fragmented Fijian populace had the spectre of dealing with two other political entrants in the election-Apisai Tora and Adi Kuini Vuikaba-Speed, widow of the deposed premier Bavadra, and the remarried wife of the Australian political consultant Clive Speed. Tora, who has been a member of every political party in Fiji, this time formed his own All National Congress(ANC), which did not win a single seat in the 1992 election. He solicited votes on a platform of multi-racialism (yes!) and the exclusion of the Great Council of Chiefs from politics. At his political side was Adi Kuini. Earlier she had announced her retirement from active politics but she attempted a comeback as a candidate for the ANC. Another candidate for the ANC was David Pickering, who had defected from the GVP. At the end of the day the issue among the Fijians and Indo-Fijians revolved around leadership: did they want Rabuka over Kamikamica and Reddy over Chaudhry?
The election results were interesting. The NFP won an extra 6 seats to increase its MPs to 20. There was also an increase of 5% of Indo-Fijian vote for it. The FLP only managed to win 7 seats. The results suggested that Indo-Fijians preferred Reddy’s cautious and moderate approach to Chaudhry’s often confrontational approach. The Indo-Fijian voters were also not ready for Chaudhry’s politics of multi-racialism.
Among the General Voters, the GVP managed to retain the four seats with the fifth going to Pickering. Tora and Adi Kuini were comprehensively beaten at the polls.
The SVT and Rabuka managed to hold on to power by one seat, increasing their seats to 31. In terms of voting percentages, SVT’s vote actually dropped 4%. The SVT’s Deputy Prime Minister, Filipe Bole, lost his seat to FAP’s candidate Ratu Finau Mara in the Lau constituency, where his father is the hereditary chief of Lau.
The FAP only managed to win 14 % of the Fijian vote which translated into 5 constituencies (3 in Lau and 2 in Naitasiri). The SVT had the upper hand because of the wide gulf between urban and rural Fijians and the fact that rural Fijians were allocated more seats. The military and significant members of the Methodist Church bloc-voted for the SVT boosting its overall win. Kamikamica’s announcement that he would form a Coalition with Indo-Fijians also robbed him of crucial Fijian votes. Kamikamica lost his own seat.
Ratu Mara had no choice but to ask Rabuka and the SVT to form the next government. Rabuka had the support of 37 MPs (31 SVT, 4 GVP, one independent and Rotuma’s Manueli). He did not have to rely on Indo-Fijian MPs. His main critics now nested in the rival FAP political bure. The indigenous Fijian political elite had embarked on an uncertain journey of political rivalry in the future.
The only thing the 1994 election resolved was which Fijian was to become Prime Minister and the answer was Rabuka and not Kamikamica.
The irony is that Indo-Fijian political leaders had become power brokers in the face of Fijian disunity. The newly-elected Prime Minister Rabuka could not ignore their demands for constitutional change in the light of political and ‘kama sutra’ scandals hovering over his head. But he could find refuge in the constitutional process, and he was forced to initiate negotiations between Reddy and Chaudhry culminating in the setting up of the Constitutional Review Commission (The Reeves Commission). The recommendations of the Commission provided the basis on which the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee (JPSC) made its recommendations to Parliament.
The end result, as we know, was the new electoral system, accountability, and multi-party government concept in the 1997 Constitution of Fiji. Fijileaks: To be continued, and how the very 1997 Constitution led to Mahendra Chaudhry's downfall in 2000
By VICTOR LAL
Fiji's Daily Post, 2001
It was the second general election under the new racist Constitution promulgated in 1990 after the two military take-overs in 1987 by Sitiveni Rabuka. The election was notable for the fact that the incumbent Prime Minister Rabuka was not expected to do well as dissidents in his party had broken away to form new political parties to challenge his rule. Fiji had undergone several changes prior to the 1994 elections. The President, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, had passed away, and the Great Council of Chiefs had elected Ratu Mara as his successor.
The 1994 election campaign was dominated by intra-ethnic instead of inter-ethnic issues and conflicts and debates centred around communal issues because each group was fighting for communal seats. For the Indo-Fijians, the central issue of the racially biased constitution took a back seat to FLP/NFP rivalry, most of it at a personal level between Mahendra Chaudhry and Jai Ram Reddy. Chaudhry and the FLP were repeatedly taunted by the NFP for their support for Rabuka in the aftermath of the 1992 election. The NFP claimed that the support had yielded nothing.
The FLP, on the other hand, accused the NFP for being too close to Rabuka, who unwittingly reinforced this image when he announced that he planned to set up a government of national unity with Reddy after the elections. FLP also attacked NFP for being an ‘Indian’ party as opposed to FLP’s multi-racial character.
On the Fijian side, Josevata Kamikamica hastily launched a new political party, Fijian Association Party (FAP) to challenge Rabuka and the SVT. The FAP had the tacit support of the President Mara who had openly expressed his support for Kamikamica for the premiership at the Great Council of Chiefs but he was outvoted, in part by Rabuka’s politicised nominees on the Council. The SVT also condemned Kamikamica of helping to hand political power back to the Indo-Fijians. Kamikamica, on the other hand, played right into the hands of SVT nationalists when he made the strategic mistake of announcing that he would form a coalition government with the Indo-Fijians if he won the 1994 elections. He had promised to restore integrity and dignity to Fijian leadership.
Tora-Adi Kuini Join Fray
The already fragmented Fijian populace had the spectre of dealing with two other political entrants in the election-Apisai Tora and Adi Kuini Vuikaba-Speed, widow of the deposed premier Bavadra, and the remarried wife of the Australian political consultant Clive Speed. Tora, who has been a member of every political party in Fiji, this time formed his own All National Congress(ANC), which did not win a single seat in the 1992 election. He solicited votes on a platform of multi-racialism (yes!) and the exclusion of the Great Council of Chiefs from politics. At his political side was Adi Kuini. Earlier she had announced her retirement from active politics but she attempted a comeback as a candidate for the ANC. Another candidate for the ANC was David Pickering, who had defected from the GVP. At the end of the day the issue among the Fijians and Indo-Fijians revolved around leadership: did they want Rabuka over Kamikamica and Reddy over Chaudhry?
The election results were interesting. The NFP won an extra 6 seats to increase its MPs to 20. There was also an increase of 5% of Indo-Fijian vote for it. The FLP only managed to win 7 seats. The results suggested that Indo-Fijians preferred Reddy’s cautious and moderate approach to Chaudhry’s often confrontational approach. The Indo-Fijian voters were also not ready for Chaudhry’s politics of multi-racialism.
Among the General Voters, the GVP managed to retain the four seats with the fifth going to Pickering. Tora and Adi Kuini were comprehensively beaten at the polls.
The SVT and Rabuka managed to hold on to power by one seat, increasing their seats to 31. In terms of voting percentages, SVT’s vote actually dropped 4%. The SVT’s Deputy Prime Minister, Filipe Bole, lost his seat to FAP’s candidate Ratu Finau Mara in the Lau constituency, where his father is the hereditary chief of Lau.
The FAP only managed to win 14 % of the Fijian vote which translated into 5 constituencies (3 in Lau and 2 in Naitasiri). The SVT had the upper hand because of the wide gulf between urban and rural Fijians and the fact that rural Fijians were allocated more seats. The military and significant members of the Methodist Church bloc-voted for the SVT boosting its overall win. Kamikamica’s announcement that he would form a Coalition with Indo-Fijians also robbed him of crucial Fijian votes. Kamikamica lost his own seat.
Ratu Mara had no choice but to ask Rabuka and the SVT to form the next government. Rabuka had the support of 37 MPs (31 SVT, 4 GVP, one independent and Rotuma’s Manueli). He did not have to rely on Indo-Fijian MPs. His main critics now nested in the rival FAP political bure. The indigenous Fijian political elite had embarked on an uncertain journey of political rivalry in the future.
The only thing the 1994 election resolved was which Fijian was to become Prime Minister and the answer was Rabuka and not Kamikamica.
The irony is that Indo-Fijian political leaders had become power brokers in the face of Fijian disunity. The newly-elected Prime Minister Rabuka could not ignore their demands for constitutional change in the light of political and ‘kama sutra’ scandals hovering over his head. But he could find refuge in the constitutional process, and he was forced to initiate negotiations between Reddy and Chaudhry culminating in the setting up of the Constitutional Review Commission (The Reeves Commission). The recommendations of the Commission provided the basis on which the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee (JPSC) made its recommendations to Parliament.
The end result, as we know, was the new electoral system, accountability, and multi-party government concept in the 1997 Constitution of Fiji. Fijileaks: To be continued, and how the very 1997 Constitution led to Mahendra Chaudhry's downfall in 2000
