‘[Fiji] Labour Party’s unorthodox tactic breached the spirit and intention of the preferential system of voting, where like-minded parties trade preferences among themselves and put those they most disagree with last. Political expediency and cold-blooded ruthlessness triumphed.’ |  TRUMPED BY CHAUDHRY: Jai Ram Reddy and Sitiveni Rabuka |
"As for the NFP, it is preposterous for the NFP and its politicians to argue that the Indo-Fijians bloc voted for the FLP because they had not forgiven Rabuka and the violence and brutality his two coups had unleashed on them. It might be partly true. However, the Indo-Fijian votes went to the FLP because for the first time the Indo-Fijian community came to its senses that it could not be taken for a ride by the NFP and its leaders like they had done with their lives since 1969. A new generation of Indo-Fijian voters had seen nothing but a slow and steady strangulation of their economic, educational, and political rights by supporting the NFP. The sins of their fathers continued to be visited on their sons as long as they remained under the false protection of the NFP. It was the People's Coalition which should have been punished at the polls. For the spectre of Apisai Tora and his PANU in coalition with Chaudhry was a far greater evil in the minds of the Indo-Fijian voters than the moderate Reddy and the supposedly born-again Methodist lay preacher Rabuka. Tora evokes far greater fear in the Indo-Fijian community with his past history of racial violence and repeated calls for the expulsion of Indo-Fijians than Rabuka, who had come across before the elections as a committed multi-racialist...The Indo-Fijian voters were more concerned with daily bread and butter issues than the achievements of Reddy and Rabuka giving them a new Constitution. Many Indo-Fijian voters were also acutely aware that the SVT and Rabuka had buckled under international pressure to make changes to the 1990 Constitution. There was no serious change of heart on the part of Rabuka or the SVT as recent events and constitutional developments have once again confirmed. The SVT was politically opportunistic and in order to make up the expected loss of seats to rival Fijian parties, it had gone into coalition with the NFP, believing that the NFP was the party of the Indo-Fijians.The NFP, on the other hand, had taken for granted that the SVT represented the Fijian voters. The confidence and cockiness of the two coalition partners can be seen from their announcement regarding political leadership...In passing, we would like to also point out that it is grossly insulting and unfair to blame the Indo-Fijian community for exercising their democratic right to cast their votes for the FLP...The Indo-Fijians have always been prepared to embrace multi-racialism, and it was for this reason that the Alliance Party was able to stay in power for too long..."
"By VICTOR LAL, Part Three, Fiji's Daily Post, 2000
Professor Yash Ghai The 1997 Constitution is arguably one of the best constitutional documents Fiji has ever had in attempting to create a truly multi-racial society. As constitutional expert Yash Ghai, a former legal adviser to the NFLP/FLP Coalition, has pointed out, ‘the purpose of the 1997 Constitution is to provide a basis, on which all of Fiji’s communities could agree, for thepeoples of Fiji to live together under a system of government. It is intended to bring to an end the social and political statements that had resulted from the 1987 coups and the constitutional system that was established as a consequence of the coups’.
To recapitulate, Ghai observed, ‘The Constitution seeks to establish a multiethnic Fiji, which is understood to be, in the political field, a system in which there is less pre-occupation with ethnicity and a clearer focus on social and economic issues froma broader, national perspective. It is a system in which political parties should coincide decreasingly with ethnicity, and should increasingly be organised along different alignment, such as class or region, however problematic such alignments may be. Itis a system in which the concept of citizenship, the Fiji islander, will replace that of ethnicity’.
Sitiveni Rabuka: SVT had to shed indigenous nationalism and separatism for benefit of all citizens
In his opening speech to the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee (JPSC) Sitiveni Rabuka had reminded the Committee: ‘We are a country where there are domiciled several ethnic groups, a diversity of cultures, and a variety of faiths. These give identity, solace and confidence to our citizens as individuals and as distinct groups. They cannot be ignored in the kind of exercise we are embarked upon in the interests of all our people and communities. We must appreciate that no one individually or collectively will show allegiance to what denies them their identity or undermines their society.’ He later went on to explain the new concept to Parliament, pointing out that his own party, the SVT, had ‘to shed our indigenous nationalism ideals and their separatism, and take on instead the most noble role of expanding our horizons to embrace the positive and all embracing national patriotism for the good of this beloved country’.
He also disclosed that as far as Christmas Eve 1992 he had called a meeting of himself, Reddy and Chaudhry to talk about their collective vision of Fiji. As recorded by his biographer John Sharpham: ‘We sat in my office and devoted our entire meetingto sharing our views and vision of the land we share, the kind of country that we would like Fiji to be. We agreed that although as individuals the people of Fiji belong to different ethnic groups, and whilst as communal groups we differed in our perception of the needs and interests of our communities we believed nevertheless there was ample common ground to bind and unite everyone together. We all belong to this country, to this nation Fiji. We are one nation.'
It must be pointed out however that the JPSC altered the recommendations which dealt with the House of Representatives. Instead of the proportion of reserved to open seats that the Commission had recommended, the Commission reserved it, with 46 seats being reserved or communal and 25 being open. Ofthe 46 reserved seats, 23 were to be Fijian, 19 Indo-Fijian, the three General Electors and one Rotuman. The JPSC recommended basically staying with the provincial boundaries, meaning that the spectre of provincialism might well continue. Rabuka, according to Sharpham, had argued against it, calling it ‘this ugly animal called provincialism’. As Sharpham observed, ‘by not accepting the Commission’s suggestion to more equitable constituencies the question of provincial impact would have to be tested in the next election’.
The 1997 Constitution: Handiwork of Sitiveni Rabuka and Jai Ram Reddy
A major recommendation of the Committee went beyond what the Reeves Commission had proposed, which was to allow power sharing to emerge from agreement and the electoral changes that would create multi-ethnic parties and coalition. Instead the Committee built on a proposal put forward by the NFP-FLP submission and put in place a formal arrangement for power-sharing in the Cabinet. The Cabinet would be multi-party with its size determined by the Prime Minister. Reddy, in particular, shared the concept of power sharing. He told the House: ‘Whilst the concept of power sharing is admittedly difficult to work, the alternative, which we have now, of one community in government and one in opposition, is infinitely worse, and could in the end prove disastrous.’ Rabuka also embraced the concept of power-sharing. After all, the new 1997 Constitution was the handiwork of Rabuka and Reddy who happened to be the key political players after the 1994 elections, and were widely expected to its beneficiaries inany future elections .
The Constitution also had the blessing of the Great Council of Chiefs whose paramountcy and constitutional role had been guaranteed in the new political order: the Council could veto legislation that touched issues of concern to theFijians; it nominated both the President and Vice-President; and the ownership of Fijian land ownership according to Fijian custom was to be governed through separate administrative system. Mahendra Chaudhry, on the other hand remained defiant, provoking a virulent attack from Reddy who accused the FLP leader of misleading the public and of cheap political grandstanding.
As Sharpham has pointed out, Chaudhry ‘despite signing off on the Report, still had major misgivings’. He opposed ‘the provincial allocation of Fijian seats, pointing correctly to the ethnic divisions of the past’. He was also ‘unhappy about the electoral arrangements, seeing in them the perpetuation of the old racial divisions’. He was, in Sharpham’s words, ‘in typical Chaudhry fashion, unhappy with the result, and said so forcefully in Parliament’.
Chaudhry and Alternative Voting (AV) System: FLP exploited it to its political advantage
It must be pointed out at the outset that Chaudhry went into the election with grave reservations about the new electoral system. Electoral reform can have an impact on a political system in a number of ways. The most obvious is to alter the distribution of parliamentary seats, and hence the relative importance, or even persistence, of the various parties. If the changes are sufficiently extreme, one may even see a fundamental change in the nature of the party system. Parties and politicians may also adapt in the face of altered constraints and opportunities. A party may conclude alliances or mutual stand-down agreements while in other circumstances it would compete individually; the party may adopt a catch-all strategy while in other circumstances it would adopt a strategy of mobilizing a more narrowly defined clientele. In other words, while the translation of preferences into votes reflects the strategic choices of voters, the set of competitors about which voters are allowed to express preferences reflect the strategic choices of the parties and candidates.
Overall, political behaviour is not simply the consequence of adaptation to the environment - it is not a case of change the environment and political actors will mechanically fall into line. It also reflects the ability of political actors to shape the environment, and to find ‘wiggle room’ within it, so as to pursue their multiple private and public objectives. As has been demonstrated, the Reeves Commission favoured a government that was multi-ethnic in character. The JPSC however went further - it sought to mandate a multi-party Cabinet under the new voting system. A former parliamentarian and a member of the Reeves Commission, Tomasi Vakatora, was reported as saying that the Fiji Labour Party noticed a flaw in the Alternate Voting System (AV) used in the 1999 May general elections and used it to win. The FLP saw that the AV system could be used to their advantage since voters had no control over where their votes would end up. They also took advantage of the expertise that was available to them from their Australian counterparts where the AV system is in use in elections.
To recapitulate, Ghai observed, ‘The Constitution seeks to establish a multiethnic Fiji, which is understood to be, in the political field, a system in which there is less pre-occupation with ethnicity and a clearer focus on social and economic issues froma broader, national perspective. It is a system in which political parties should coincide decreasingly with ethnicity, and should increasingly be organised along different alignment, such as class or region, however problematic such alignments may be. Itis a system in which the concept of citizenship, the Fiji islander, will replace that of ethnicity’.
Sitiveni Rabuka: SVT had to shed indigenous nationalism and separatism for benefit of all citizens
In his opening speech to the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee (JPSC) Sitiveni Rabuka had reminded the Committee: ‘We are a country where there are domiciled several ethnic groups, a diversity of cultures, and a variety of faiths. These give identity, solace and confidence to our citizens as individuals and as distinct groups. They cannot be ignored in the kind of exercise we are embarked upon in the interests of all our people and communities. We must appreciate that no one individually or collectively will show allegiance to what denies them their identity or undermines their society.’ He later went on to explain the new concept to Parliament, pointing out that his own party, the SVT, had ‘to shed our indigenous nationalism ideals and their separatism, and take on instead the most noble role of expanding our horizons to embrace the positive and all embracing national patriotism for the good of this beloved country’.
He also disclosed that as far as Christmas Eve 1992 he had called a meeting of himself, Reddy and Chaudhry to talk about their collective vision of Fiji. As recorded by his biographer John Sharpham: ‘We sat in my office and devoted our entire meetingto sharing our views and vision of the land we share, the kind of country that we would like Fiji to be. We agreed that although as individuals the people of Fiji belong to different ethnic groups, and whilst as communal groups we differed in our perception of the needs and interests of our communities we believed nevertheless there was ample common ground to bind and unite everyone together. We all belong to this country, to this nation Fiji. We are one nation.'
It must be pointed out however that the JPSC altered the recommendations which dealt with the House of Representatives. Instead of the proportion of reserved to open seats that the Commission had recommended, the Commission reserved it, with 46 seats being reserved or communal and 25 being open. Ofthe 46 reserved seats, 23 were to be Fijian, 19 Indo-Fijian, the three General Electors and one Rotuman. The JPSC recommended basically staying with the provincial boundaries, meaning that the spectre of provincialism might well continue. Rabuka, according to Sharpham, had argued against it, calling it ‘this ugly animal called provincialism’. As Sharpham observed, ‘by not accepting the Commission’s suggestion to more equitable constituencies the question of provincial impact would have to be tested in the next election’.
The 1997 Constitution: Handiwork of Sitiveni Rabuka and Jai Ram Reddy
A major recommendation of the Committee went beyond what the Reeves Commission had proposed, which was to allow power sharing to emerge from agreement and the electoral changes that would create multi-ethnic parties and coalition. Instead the Committee built on a proposal put forward by the NFP-FLP submission and put in place a formal arrangement for power-sharing in the Cabinet. The Cabinet would be multi-party with its size determined by the Prime Minister. Reddy, in particular, shared the concept of power sharing. He told the House: ‘Whilst the concept of power sharing is admittedly difficult to work, the alternative, which we have now, of one community in government and one in opposition, is infinitely worse, and could in the end prove disastrous.’ Rabuka also embraced the concept of power-sharing. After all, the new 1997 Constitution was the handiwork of Rabuka and Reddy who happened to be the key political players after the 1994 elections, and were widely expected to its beneficiaries inany future elections .
The Constitution also had the blessing of the Great Council of Chiefs whose paramountcy and constitutional role had been guaranteed in the new political order: the Council could veto legislation that touched issues of concern to theFijians; it nominated both the President and Vice-President; and the ownership of Fijian land ownership according to Fijian custom was to be governed through separate administrative system. Mahendra Chaudhry, on the other hand remained defiant, provoking a virulent attack from Reddy who accused the FLP leader of misleading the public and of cheap political grandstanding.
As Sharpham has pointed out, Chaudhry ‘despite signing off on the Report, still had major misgivings’. He opposed ‘the provincial allocation of Fijian seats, pointing correctly to the ethnic divisions of the past’. He was also ‘unhappy about the electoral arrangements, seeing in them the perpetuation of the old racial divisions’. He was, in Sharpham’s words, ‘in typical Chaudhry fashion, unhappy with the result, and said so forcefully in Parliament’.
Chaudhry and Alternative Voting (AV) System: FLP exploited it to its political advantage
It must be pointed out at the outset that Chaudhry went into the election with grave reservations about the new electoral system. Electoral reform can have an impact on a political system in a number of ways. The most obvious is to alter the distribution of parliamentary seats, and hence the relative importance, or even persistence, of the various parties. If the changes are sufficiently extreme, one may even see a fundamental change in the nature of the party system. Parties and politicians may also adapt in the face of altered constraints and opportunities. A party may conclude alliances or mutual stand-down agreements while in other circumstances it would compete individually; the party may adopt a catch-all strategy while in other circumstances it would adopt a strategy of mobilizing a more narrowly defined clientele. In other words, while the translation of preferences into votes reflects the strategic choices of voters, the set of competitors about which voters are allowed to express preferences reflect the strategic choices of the parties and candidates.
Overall, political behaviour is not simply the consequence of adaptation to the environment - it is not a case of change the environment and political actors will mechanically fall into line. It also reflects the ability of political actors to shape the environment, and to find ‘wiggle room’ within it, so as to pursue their multiple private and public objectives. As has been demonstrated, the Reeves Commission favoured a government that was multi-ethnic in character. The JPSC however went further - it sought to mandate a multi-party Cabinet under the new voting system. A former parliamentarian and a member of the Reeves Commission, Tomasi Vakatora, was reported as saying that the Fiji Labour Party noticed a flaw in the Alternate Voting System (AV) used in the 1999 May general elections and used it to win. The FLP saw that the AV system could be used to their advantage since voters had no control over where their votes would end up. They also took advantage of the expertise that was available to them from their Australian counterparts where the AV system is in use in elections.
Brij Lal Professor Brij Lal: ‘Labour’s unorthodox tactic breached the spirit and intention of the preferential system of voting...Political expediency and cold-blooded ruthlessness triumphed.’
Another member of the Reeves Commission, the distinguished Indo-Fijian historian, Brij Vilash Lal, commented after the election: ‘Labour’s unorthodox tactic breached the spirit and intention of the preferential system of voting, where like-minded parties trade preferences among themselves and put those they most disagree with last. Political expediency and cold-blooded ruthlessness triumphed.’ He was commenting on the loss of the SVT-NFP Coalition. The AV system worked against the Rabuka-Reddy Coalition because Labour gave key preferences to the VLV rather than the NFP even though many of the VLV policies were anti-Indo-Fijian.
Many Labour supporters, however, uncharitably accused Brij Lal of trying to ‘fix’ an electoral system favourable to Reddy-Rabuka Coalition, for after all the distinguished academic was Jai Ram Reddy’s nominee to the Reeves Commission. The Fiji Times Columnist Sir Vijay Singh wrote about the new electoral system: ‘Having imposed a politically correct voting system but one plainlybeyond the elector's reach, parliamentarians helpfully indulged in legislative manipulations that effectively transferred voting power to party leaders. They had already commandeered the power to over-turn the will of the electorate by expelling an elected member from the House, and the lure of a large lunge at the voting process itself was too irresistible. Rightly believing that most voters would much prefer an easy way out of the compulsorily entered polling booth to mark the complicated preferential ballots, Parliament duly provided for above-the-line voting. This was a corruption of the genuine system that permitted an elector to 'vote'-not for a candidate-but for a party. The ballot paper was then deemed to have expressed the same preference as the party bosses had previously filed with the Supervisor of Elections, even if the voter were ignorant of all else but his party's symbol.’.
Sir Vijay continued: ‘The defenders of the law argue, with some theoretical merit, that the voter was not obliged to vote above the line and had the option to express his preference by voting below line. But party leaders knew that few could or would do so. After further creative thought, they amended the law to allow for a voter to vote for a party above the line even in cases where the party had no candidate below the line! The opponents argue, with much merit, that by these legislative manoeuvres, Parliament may have fallen into a constitutional crevice. They say that preferential voting system having been provided for in the constitution, the authentic system's requirement cannot be modified by Parliament. The constitution clearly meant that every voter must personally express his or her preference by writing the appropriate numbers against the name of a human being who was a candidate, not a party. Those who question the above-the-line voting system provided for in the Electoral Act (and not the constitution) argue that such a law is unconstitutional for it permits an elector to vote for a party-and a party is not qualified to be a candidate.’
Sir Vijay touched on other aspects of the new system: ‘Also, when an elector 'voted' for a party, he didn't vote at all. At best, he merely signified his intention to appoint a party to be his agent or proxy, and, by virtue of a lawof dubious validity, he is taken to have adopted the same preferences as that officially filed by party's officials. Voting by proxy or agent in parliamentary elections is so alien a concept, even in totalitarian regimes, that it could only be legitimizedby specific constitutional provision. And there is no mention of such a novel phenomenon in the constitution. The opponents' argument is forcefully brought home by the further legislative legerdemain that permitted a party's name and symbol to appear above the line and a voter to vote for it when the party didn't even have a candidate for the seat at stake! The legislative contamination of the authentic preferential system by the provision of above the line voting might well be, constitutionally speaking, below -the-law.’
In recent months most of the submissions from the Fijians to the Constitutional Review Commission have called for the re-introduction of the first-past-the post voting system which allegedly held Fiji together, and ensured that the indigenous Fijians had retained control of the political leadership of Fiji under the 1970 Constitution of Fiji.Many electoral experts argue that the AV would be easiest replacement for the first-past-the post system of election. Historically, it is a system which was recommended by the British Royal Commission in England during the First World War and was almost part of a deal brokered between the Liberals and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in the relatively inactive period of his minority British Labour government in 1931.
Fijileaks: We have edited out the arguments for and against the Alternative Voting System
At this stage, we will not go into depth in analysing the 1999 elections. We will be writing about it in later columns. All we will say at this stage is that the AV did not achieve its objective in uniting the races. It also worked against the SVT. However, the Fiji Labour Party would still have won a general election under any system given the mood and temper of the electorate in May 1999, and the bitter tribal and provincial rivalries in the Fijian political camps.
Commenting on the election results, Chaudhry claimed that the FLP's victory was the result of the people's 'frustration' at problems of unemployment, poverty, crime, failure of government services and income disparity between the rich and the poor.' An editorial in The Fiji Times observed that the FLP won because of its multicultural image and 'its image as a caring, humane party that stays close to the grassroots people'.
Tora: Election result, 1987 Repeat. Adi Litia Cakobau: Chiefs lost because Voters wanted Change
The SVT, on the other hand, as the result of competition from rival indigenous Fijian parties also lost ground with five Ministers losing their seats. It won eight compared to 31 seats in 1994. In contrast to the Indo-Fijian seats, the contest for votes in the Fijian communal seats was more even. The other indigenous Fijian parties, FAP, PANU, VLV and the extremist NVTLP won at the expense of SVT, 11, four, three and one seats respectively. In a number of cases (and in one where an independent won) the new 'alternate vote' system contributed to the loss of SVT seats.
There have been calls to return to the old system. The SVT also became a victim of 'disunity among chiefs who set up and supported new Fijian political parties'. Many Fijians saw the election results as a repeat of 1987. This was the view of Apisai Tora, secretary-general of PANU and Bau Chief Adi Litia Cakobau of SVT, who also observed that the Fijian votes were split and many of the chiefs lost their seats because the people wanted a change. The Nationalists, in a meeting after the elections, made a 'blood pledge' to overthrow the Chaudhry government and constitution and to introduce a Fijianisation policy.
The Impact of Coalitions: Myth and Reality
A traditional conception of coalition politics might suggest that political parties compete independently during the election campaign to maximise their potential and engage in coalition bargaining only once the distribution ofseats are known. But of course in reality electoral competition and coalition bargaining are not so neatly sequential. After all, one matter that voters are likely to be interested in during the campaign is the identity of the new government to be formed.Most parties want to appear relevant to the business of forming a government in order to attract floating voters. They thus have incentives to suggest that they are well positioned to join a winning coalition. In many countries parties do this either by forming electoral coalitions or at least by signalling with whom they will (and perhaps with whom they will not) try to form a government once the dust has settled and the explicit post-election bargaining begins.
A new generation of Indo-Fijians saw the flaws in the National Federation Party
As already noted, the SVT/NFP/UGP was the first to declare itself as a coalition. In March 1999 the FAP/PANU/FLP led by Adi Kuini, Tora, and Chaudhry, announced their coalition. Much has been made of the fact that the SVT lost the election because it went into Coalition with the NFP. The same has been said of the defeat of the NFP. The truth is that the SVT lost because the Fijian voters (62 per cent) took their votes to the other Fijian parties. The SVT only got 38 per cent of the Fijian votes. As for the NFP, it is preposterous for the NFP and its politicians to argue that the Indo-Fijians bloc voted for the FLP because they had not forgiven Rabuka and the violence and brutality his two coups had unleashed on them. It might be partly true. However, the Indo-Fijian votes went to the FLP because for the first time the Indo-Fijian community came to its senses that it could not be taken for a ride by the NFP and its leaders like they had done with their lives since 1969.
A new generation of Indo-Fijian voters had seen nothing but a slow and steady strangulation of their economic, educational, and political rights by supporting the NFP. The sins of their fathers continued to be visited on their sons as long as they remained under the false protection of the NFP. It was the Peoples Coalition which should have been punished at the polls. For the spectre of Apisai Tora and his PANU in coalition with Chaudhry was a far greater evil in the minds of the Indo-Fijian voters than the moderate Reddy and the supposedly born-again Methodist lay preacher Rabuka. Tora evokes far greater fear in the Indo-Fijian community with his past history of racial violence and repeated calls for the expulsion of Indo-Fijians than Rabuka, who had come across before the elections as a committed multi-racialist.
The Indo-Fijians were acutely aware that Tora had played a leading role in ousting Chaudhry, Reddy, and Bavadra from power in 1987. As we have already demonstrated, the Indo-Fijian voters were more concerned with daily bread and butter issues than the achievements of Reddy and Rabuka giving them a new Constitution. Many Indo-Fijian voters were also acutely aware that the SVT and Rabuka had buckled under international pressure to make changes to the 1990 Constitution. There was no serious change of heart on the part of Rabuka or the SVT as recent events and constitutional developments have once again confirmed. The SVT was politically opportunistic and in order to make up the expected loss of seats to rival Fijian parties, it had gone into coalition with the NFP, believing that the NFP was the party of the Indo-Fijians. The NFP, on the other hand, had taken for granted that the SVT represented the Fijian voters. The confidence and cockiness of the two coalition partners can be seen from their announcement regarding political leadership.
If the SVT-NFP Coalition had come to power, Rabuka was to become prime minister and Reddy was supposed to be his deputy prime minister (i.e. a Fijian Prime Minister and an Indo-Fijian Deputy Prime Minister). It is unfair and despicable for both the SVT and NFP leaders to accuse the Indo-Fijian community of electoral betrayal. It is curious to read that the Indo-Fijians are described as ‘political traitors’ while the non-SVT Fijians are being chided for exercising their democratic rights by casting their votes for other Fijian political parties. As we have already shown, the SVT and Rabuka came to power in the 1994 elections because of the bloc votes of the military, the Church, and rural Fijian voters who were beneficiaries of the skewed 1990 Constitution in favour of rural Fijian voters over the urban Fijian voters.
SVT devoid of historical memory: It was not Chaudhry but Reddy who had supported Kamikamica
The SVT must be also mentally devoid of historical memory. It was not their arch rival, a former political saviour and current bogeyman-Mahendra Chaudhry-but their new-found coalition angel Jai Ram Reddy and the NFP which had thrown in their political support for Kamikamica against Rabuka in the 1992 leadership crisis. Maybe, the Fijian voters had a greater retentive memory of Reddy’s part in the leadership contest, which they presumablydid, than the SVT and Rabuka. Maybe, they could not trust Reddy in a future government with Rabuka. The SVT must ask itself: Why did it make an electoral pact with the political ‘devils’ in the NFP who had no confidence in their leader Rabuka’s leadershipof the nation?.
In passing, we would like to also point out that it is grossly insulting and unfair to blame the Indo-Fijian community for exercising their democratic right to cast their votes for the FLP. Why no call has been made to unite the Indo-Fijians through a new constitution similar to that now being made by the Interim Government, SVT, and the Great Council of Chiefs. Why should and must the Fijians be a united race and the Indo-Fijians a divided race? As we will show one of these days, the Indo-Fijians have always been prepared to embrace multi-racialism, and it was for this reason that the Alliance Party was able to stay in power for too long.
Meanwhile, the 1997 Constitution was taken for granted by the SVT/NFP Coalition as a right of passage to power. Rabuka’s biographer, John Sharpham recounts Rabuka’s optimism as his grip on the country was sliding by the hour:
‘Monday revealed how difficult it was going to be, for late on Monday it was clear that the election was turning into a rout. Reddy and the NFP were being trounced everywhere and by huge margins. Even key NFP candidates who had been tipped to enter Rabuka’s Cabinet, like Wadan Narsey, the young academic turned politician, were comprehensively beaten. Reddy, who had chosen, like Rabuka to run in an open seat, to prove the principle of multiracial support, was beaten handily. Tired, dispirited and unwell, he was ready to retire from politics forever and return to his successful law practice. The NFP lost all nineteen seats of the Indian communal seats to Labour. The eleven Open seats that Rabuka had given the NFP as part of the Coalition arrangement were also in jeopardy. The NFP had, effectively been destroyed by Chaudhry and the Labour Party, and by their commitment to the multiparty, multiracial Constitution. It was not just the NFP that was being mauled. The SVT was also in deep trouble. Apart from a few seats in the north and Jim Ah Koy’s win in Kadavu, there was little to show for all the hard work. Preferential voting, the AV system, was working against the SVT. Unless a candidate won on the first count, gaining 50 per cent plus one vote, the seat count then went to preferences. All their opposition parties had agreed to place their preferences against the SVT. It was virtually impossible for the SVT candidate to win if the vote went to preferences. The division among the Fijians, their fragmentation into eleven different parties, was now counting against the party that had been created to unite them."
Rabuka flew into Suva and called a two-hour meeting with Kubuabola and Jim Ah Koy.
To quote Sharpham: ‘The mood in the Prime Minister’s office area was a gloomy one. Workmen moved up and down the hall outside making drastic changes to the rooms on the fourth floor. These refurbishments had been planned for the incoming government, expected to be led by Rabuka. A different Cabinet and a new prime Minister would be using these improved facilities. Amidst the gloom of his staff and the noise of the builders Rabuka was upbeat. He talked over the options for the future with Ah Koy and Kubuabola. From time to time, his Cabinet secretary joined them to offer advice about the timing of resigning and conceding. At this stage Rabuka still believed the SVT and the UGP might win twenty seats and so be offered a Cabinet seat. Should they accept and support the multi-party approach? The longer they talked, the clearer the news became that the Labour Party would win a strong mandate. Ah Koy was, from the beginning, all for going into opposition. Eventuallythe others agreed, but Rabuka wanted to wait another day, just to see the results. He held out no hopes for any change, but the final vote count needed to be announced formally to make the situation absolutely clear.’
Chaudhry and his party regained what Rabuka had stolen from them at the point of a gun
The election results recorded a resounding victory for the People's Coalition. Rabuka insisted that the Constitution had been the correct issue on which to fight the election. His SVT had managed to win only eight seats in a new Parliament. The man responsible for this humiliation was no other than Mahendra Pal Chaudhry who had just won his own seat in Ba West. The westerly wind of change was blowing towards the south -the capital Suva-for the People's Coalition to occupy the newly furbished office of the Prime Minister. Chaudhry was a strong contender for the most coveted post. ‘I have never lost an election’, Rabuka told his supporters, ‘I am an army man and I have learned you must always be prepared for defeat’.
The truth of the matter was Chaudhry and the Fiji Labour Party had regained what Rabuka had stolen from them at the point of a gun in 1987. His nemesis was a man called Chaudhry. As Sharpham notes, ‘The final results of the election showed the devastation that the hurricane called Chaudhry, had caused to Rabuka’s Coalition. The SVT held just eight seats, enough to be invited to hold a Cabinet seat, but which Rabuka had rejected. The NFP had not won a single seat, while the UGP had done its part and won two. Chaudhry and the Fiji Labour Party had had a magnificent victory winning a mandate in their own right with 37 seats. The FAP had won ten seats, two more than the SVT, giving them a right to say they spoke for the Fijians, and PANU had own four. The Peoples Coalition had an overwhelming hold on the House of Representatives with 51 ofthe 71 seats. Rabuka, for his part, believed Chaudhry and his supporters had acted against the spirit of the new Constitution. He was dismayed that race was still so dominant a political factor, especially among the Indo-Fijians’.
Race had been subsumed in the politics of coalition. And only one of the two Coalitions was bound to emerge as a political winner.
As we have already stated, Rabuka’s statement was a perversity of truth and reality. The Indo-Fijians could no longer be taken for a ride by the NFP, especially the new breed of Indo-Fijian voters. The enemy, in fact, was from within the Fijian community. They were no longer going to be fooled by the SVT, especially over 60 per cent of the Fijian voters. They had voted en bloc for other Fijian parties. Race had been subsumed in the politics of coalition. And only one of the two Coalitions was bound to emerge as a political winner.In this instance, it was the Chaudhry led People's Coalition.
The former army commander had taken his troops into the electoral battle without any major preparation and was comprehensively beaten at the polls. As they say in military language, his electoral troops were called upon to take on the political enemy on empty stomachs.
In the next column, we will show how the Fijians inside the Coalition shamelessly tried to take advantage of the provisions for power sharing in the 1997 Constitution as they raced for the Prime Minister, fatally damaging Mahendra Chaudhry in the process.
The Fijian nationalists and the SVT had no opportunity to directly invoke the ‘Race Card’ in the appointment of a new Prime Minister because they were not a part of the winning Coalition. Adi Kuini Speed and Apisai Tora however sanctioned the race card in the eyes of grassroots Fijians throughout Fiji by trying to put forward a Prime Minister of Fijian origin.
To be continued
Another member of the Reeves Commission, the distinguished Indo-Fijian historian, Brij Vilash Lal, commented after the election: ‘Labour’s unorthodox tactic breached the spirit and intention of the preferential system of voting, where like-minded parties trade preferences among themselves and put those they most disagree with last. Political expediency and cold-blooded ruthlessness triumphed.’ He was commenting on the loss of the SVT-NFP Coalition. The AV system worked against the Rabuka-Reddy Coalition because Labour gave key preferences to the VLV rather than the NFP even though many of the VLV policies were anti-Indo-Fijian.
Many Labour supporters, however, uncharitably accused Brij Lal of trying to ‘fix’ an electoral system favourable to Reddy-Rabuka Coalition, for after all the distinguished academic was Jai Ram Reddy’s nominee to the Reeves Commission. The Fiji Times Columnist Sir Vijay Singh wrote about the new electoral system: ‘Having imposed a politically correct voting system but one plainlybeyond the elector's reach, parliamentarians helpfully indulged in legislative manipulations that effectively transferred voting power to party leaders. They had already commandeered the power to over-turn the will of the electorate by expelling an elected member from the House, and the lure of a large lunge at the voting process itself was too irresistible. Rightly believing that most voters would much prefer an easy way out of the compulsorily entered polling booth to mark the complicated preferential ballots, Parliament duly provided for above-the-line voting. This was a corruption of the genuine system that permitted an elector to 'vote'-not for a candidate-but for a party. The ballot paper was then deemed to have expressed the same preference as the party bosses had previously filed with the Supervisor of Elections, even if the voter were ignorant of all else but his party's symbol.’.
Sir Vijay continued: ‘The defenders of the law argue, with some theoretical merit, that the voter was not obliged to vote above the line and had the option to express his preference by voting below line. But party leaders knew that few could or would do so. After further creative thought, they amended the law to allow for a voter to vote for a party above the line even in cases where the party had no candidate below the line! The opponents argue, with much merit, that by these legislative manoeuvres, Parliament may have fallen into a constitutional crevice. They say that preferential voting system having been provided for in the constitution, the authentic system's requirement cannot be modified by Parliament. The constitution clearly meant that every voter must personally express his or her preference by writing the appropriate numbers against the name of a human being who was a candidate, not a party. Those who question the above-the-line voting system provided for in the Electoral Act (and not the constitution) argue that such a law is unconstitutional for it permits an elector to vote for a party-and a party is not qualified to be a candidate.’
Sir Vijay touched on other aspects of the new system: ‘Also, when an elector 'voted' for a party, he didn't vote at all. At best, he merely signified his intention to appoint a party to be his agent or proxy, and, by virtue of a lawof dubious validity, he is taken to have adopted the same preferences as that officially filed by party's officials. Voting by proxy or agent in parliamentary elections is so alien a concept, even in totalitarian regimes, that it could only be legitimizedby specific constitutional provision. And there is no mention of such a novel phenomenon in the constitution. The opponents' argument is forcefully brought home by the further legislative legerdemain that permitted a party's name and symbol to appear above the line and a voter to vote for it when the party didn't even have a candidate for the seat at stake! The legislative contamination of the authentic preferential system by the provision of above the line voting might well be, constitutionally speaking, below -the-law.’
In recent months most of the submissions from the Fijians to the Constitutional Review Commission have called for the re-introduction of the first-past-the post voting system which allegedly held Fiji together, and ensured that the indigenous Fijians had retained control of the political leadership of Fiji under the 1970 Constitution of Fiji.Many electoral experts argue that the AV would be easiest replacement for the first-past-the post system of election. Historically, it is a system which was recommended by the British Royal Commission in England during the First World War and was almost part of a deal brokered between the Liberals and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in the relatively inactive period of his minority British Labour government in 1931.
Fijileaks: We have edited out the arguments for and against the Alternative Voting System
At this stage, we will not go into depth in analysing the 1999 elections. We will be writing about it in later columns. All we will say at this stage is that the AV did not achieve its objective in uniting the races. It also worked against the SVT. However, the Fiji Labour Party would still have won a general election under any system given the mood and temper of the electorate in May 1999, and the bitter tribal and provincial rivalries in the Fijian political camps.
Commenting on the election results, Chaudhry claimed that the FLP's victory was the result of the people's 'frustration' at problems of unemployment, poverty, crime, failure of government services and income disparity between the rich and the poor.' An editorial in The Fiji Times observed that the FLP won because of its multicultural image and 'its image as a caring, humane party that stays close to the grassroots people'.
Tora: Election result, 1987 Repeat. Adi Litia Cakobau: Chiefs lost because Voters wanted Change
The SVT, on the other hand, as the result of competition from rival indigenous Fijian parties also lost ground with five Ministers losing their seats. It won eight compared to 31 seats in 1994. In contrast to the Indo-Fijian seats, the contest for votes in the Fijian communal seats was more even. The other indigenous Fijian parties, FAP, PANU, VLV and the extremist NVTLP won at the expense of SVT, 11, four, three and one seats respectively. In a number of cases (and in one where an independent won) the new 'alternate vote' system contributed to the loss of SVT seats.
There have been calls to return to the old system. The SVT also became a victim of 'disunity among chiefs who set up and supported new Fijian political parties'. Many Fijians saw the election results as a repeat of 1987. This was the view of Apisai Tora, secretary-general of PANU and Bau Chief Adi Litia Cakobau of SVT, who also observed that the Fijian votes were split and many of the chiefs lost their seats because the people wanted a change. The Nationalists, in a meeting after the elections, made a 'blood pledge' to overthrow the Chaudhry government and constitution and to introduce a Fijianisation policy.
The Impact of Coalitions: Myth and Reality
A traditional conception of coalition politics might suggest that political parties compete independently during the election campaign to maximise their potential and engage in coalition bargaining only once the distribution ofseats are known. But of course in reality electoral competition and coalition bargaining are not so neatly sequential. After all, one matter that voters are likely to be interested in during the campaign is the identity of the new government to be formed.Most parties want to appear relevant to the business of forming a government in order to attract floating voters. They thus have incentives to suggest that they are well positioned to join a winning coalition. In many countries parties do this either by forming electoral coalitions or at least by signalling with whom they will (and perhaps with whom they will not) try to form a government once the dust has settled and the explicit post-election bargaining begins.
A new generation of Indo-Fijians saw the flaws in the National Federation Party
As already noted, the SVT/NFP/UGP was the first to declare itself as a coalition. In March 1999 the FAP/PANU/FLP led by Adi Kuini, Tora, and Chaudhry, announced their coalition. Much has been made of the fact that the SVT lost the election because it went into Coalition with the NFP. The same has been said of the defeat of the NFP. The truth is that the SVT lost because the Fijian voters (62 per cent) took their votes to the other Fijian parties. The SVT only got 38 per cent of the Fijian votes. As for the NFP, it is preposterous for the NFP and its politicians to argue that the Indo-Fijians bloc voted for the FLP because they had not forgiven Rabuka and the violence and brutality his two coups had unleashed on them. It might be partly true. However, the Indo-Fijian votes went to the FLP because for the first time the Indo-Fijian community came to its senses that it could not be taken for a ride by the NFP and its leaders like they had done with their lives since 1969.
A new generation of Indo-Fijian voters had seen nothing but a slow and steady strangulation of their economic, educational, and political rights by supporting the NFP. The sins of their fathers continued to be visited on their sons as long as they remained under the false protection of the NFP. It was the Peoples Coalition which should have been punished at the polls. For the spectre of Apisai Tora and his PANU in coalition with Chaudhry was a far greater evil in the minds of the Indo-Fijian voters than the moderate Reddy and the supposedly born-again Methodist lay preacher Rabuka. Tora evokes far greater fear in the Indo-Fijian community with his past history of racial violence and repeated calls for the expulsion of Indo-Fijians than Rabuka, who had come across before the elections as a committed multi-racialist.
The Indo-Fijians were acutely aware that Tora had played a leading role in ousting Chaudhry, Reddy, and Bavadra from power in 1987. As we have already demonstrated, the Indo-Fijian voters were more concerned with daily bread and butter issues than the achievements of Reddy and Rabuka giving them a new Constitution. Many Indo-Fijian voters were also acutely aware that the SVT and Rabuka had buckled under international pressure to make changes to the 1990 Constitution. There was no serious change of heart on the part of Rabuka or the SVT as recent events and constitutional developments have once again confirmed. The SVT was politically opportunistic and in order to make up the expected loss of seats to rival Fijian parties, it had gone into coalition with the NFP, believing that the NFP was the party of the Indo-Fijians. The NFP, on the other hand, had taken for granted that the SVT represented the Fijian voters. The confidence and cockiness of the two coalition partners can be seen from their announcement regarding political leadership.
If the SVT-NFP Coalition had come to power, Rabuka was to become prime minister and Reddy was supposed to be his deputy prime minister (i.e. a Fijian Prime Minister and an Indo-Fijian Deputy Prime Minister). It is unfair and despicable for both the SVT and NFP leaders to accuse the Indo-Fijian community of electoral betrayal. It is curious to read that the Indo-Fijians are described as ‘political traitors’ while the non-SVT Fijians are being chided for exercising their democratic rights by casting their votes for other Fijian political parties. As we have already shown, the SVT and Rabuka came to power in the 1994 elections because of the bloc votes of the military, the Church, and rural Fijian voters who were beneficiaries of the skewed 1990 Constitution in favour of rural Fijian voters over the urban Fijian voters.
SVT devoid of historical memory: It was not Chaudhry but Reddy who had supported Kamikamica
The SVT must be also mentally devoid of historical memory. It was not their arch rival, a former political saviour and current bogeyman-Mahendra Chaudhry-but their new-found coalition angel Jai Ram Reddy and the NFP which had thrown in their political support for Kamikamica against Rabuka in the 1992 leadership crisis. Maybe, the Fijian voters had a greater retentive memory of Reddy’s part in the leadership contest, which they presumablydid, than the SVT and Rabuka. Maybe, they could not trust Reddy in a future government with Rabuka. The SVT must ask itself: Why did it make an electoral pact with the political ‘devils’ in the NFP who had no confidence in their leader Rabuka’s leadershipof the nation?.
In passing, we would like to also point out that it is grossly insulting and unfair to blame the Indo-Fijian community for exercising their democratic right to cast their votes for the FLP. Why no call has been made to unite the Indo-Fijians through a new constitution similar to that now being made by the Interim Government, SVT, and the Great Council of Chiefs. Why should and must the Fijians be a united race and the Indo-Fijians a divided race? As we will show one of these days, the Indo-Fijians have always been prepared to embrace multi-racialism, and it was for this reason that the Alliance Party was able to stay in power for too long.
Meanwhile, the 1997 Constitution was taken for granted by the SVT/NFP Coalition as a right of passage to power. Rabuka’s biographer, John Sharpham recounts Rabuka’s optimism as his grip on the country was sliding by the hour:
‘Monday revealed how difficult it was going to be, for late on Monday it was clear that the election was turning into a rout. Reddy and the NFP were being trounced everywhere and by huge margins. Even key NFP candidates who had been tipped to enter Rabuka’s Cabinet, like Wadan Narsey, the young academic turned politician, were comprehensively beaten. Reddy, who had chosen, like Rabuka to run in an open seat, to prove the principle of multiracial support, was beaten handily. Tired, dispirited and unwell, he was ready to retire from politics forever and return to his successful law practice. The NFP lost all nineteen seats of the Indian communal seats to Labour. The eleven Open seats that Rabuka had given the NFP as part of the Coalition arrangement were also in jeopardy. The NFP had, effectively been destroyed by Chaudhry and the Labour Party, and by their commitment to the multiparty, multiracial Constitution. It was not just the NFP that was being mauled. The SVT was also in deep trouble. Apart from a few seats in the north and Jim Ah Koy’s win in Kadavu, there was little to show for all the hard work. Preferential voting, the AV system, was working against the SVT. Unless a candidate won on the first count, gaining 50 per cent plus one vote, the seat count then went to preferences. All their opposition parties had agreed to place their preferences against the SVT. It was virtually impossible for the SVT candidate to win if the vote went to preferences. The division among the Fijians, their fragmentation into eleven different parties, was now counting against the party that had been created to unite them."
Rabuka flew into Suva and called a two-hour meeting with Kubuabola and Jim Ah Koy.
To quote Sharpham: ‘The mood in the Prime Minister’s office area was a gloomy one. Workmen moved up and down the hall outside making drastic changes to the rooms on the fourth floor. These refurbishments had been planned for the incoming government, expected to be led by Rabuka. A different Cabinet and a new prime Minister would be using these improved facilities. Amidst the gloom of his staff and the noise of the builders Rabuka was upbeat. He talked over the options for the future with Ah Koy and Kubuabola. From time to time, his Cabinet secretary joined them to offer advice about the timing of resigning and conceding. At this stage Rabuka still believed the SVT and the UGP might win twenty seats and so be offered a Cabinet seat. Should they accept and support the multi-party approach? The longer they talked, the clearer the news became that the Labour Party would win a strong mandate. Ah Koy was, from the beginning, all for going into opposition. Eventuallythe others agreed, but Rabuka wanted to wait another day, just to see the results. He held out no hopes for any change, but the final vote count needed to be announced formally to make the situation absolutely clear.’
Chaudhry and his party regained what Rabuka had stolen from them at the point of a gun
The election results recorded a resounding victory for the People's Coalition. Rabuka insisted that the Constitution had been the correct issue on which to fight the election. His SVT had managed to win only eight seats in a new Parliament. The man responsible for this humiliation was no other than Mahendra Pal Chaudhry who had just won his own seat in Ba West. The westerly wind of change was blowing towards the south -the capital Suva-for the People's Coalition to occupy the newly furbished office of the Prime Minister. Chaudhry was a strong contender for the most coveted post. ‘I have never lost an election’, Rabuka told his supporters, ‘I am an army man and I have learned you must always be prepared for defeat’.
The truth of the matter was Chaudhry and the Fiji Labour Party had regained what Rabuka had stolen from them at the point of a gun in 1987. His nemesis was a man called Chaudhry. As Sharpham notes, ‘The final results of the election showed the devastation that the hurricane called Chaudhry, had caused to Rabuka’s Coalition. The SVT held just eight seats, enough to be invited to hold a Cabinet seat, but which Rabuka had rejected. The NFP had not won a single seat, while the UGP had done its part and won two. Chaudhry and the Fiji Labour Party had had a magnificent victory winning a mandate in their own right with 37 seats. The FAP had won ten seats, two more than the SVT, giving them a right to say they spoke for the Fijians, and PANU had own four. The Peoples Coalition had an overwhelming hold on the House of Representatives with 51 ofthe 71 seats. Rabuka, for his part, believed Chaudhry and his supporters had acted against the spirit of the new Constitution. He was dismayed that race was still so dominant a political factor, especially among the Indo-Fijians’.
Race had been subsumed in the politics of coalition. And only one of the two Coalitions was bound to emerge as a political winner.
As we have already stated, Rabuka’s statement was a perversity of truth and reality. The Indo-Fijians could no longer be taken for a ride by the NFP, especially the new breed of Indo-Fijian voters. The enemy, in fact, was from within the Fijian community. They were no longer going to be fooled by the SVT, especially over 60 per cent of the Fijian voters. They had voted en bloc for other Fijian parties. Race had been subsumed in the politics of coalition. And only one of the two Coalitions was bound to emerge as a political winner.In this instance, it was the Chaudhry led People's Coalition.
The former army commander had taken his troops into the electoral battle without any major preparation and was comprehensively beaten at the polls. As they say in military language, his electoral troops were called upon to take on the political enemy on empty stomachs.
In the next column, we will show how the Fijians inside the Coalition shamelessly tried to take advantage of the provisions for power sharing in the 1997 Constitution as they raced for the Prime Minister, fatally damaging Mahendra Chaudhry in the process.
The Fijian nationalists and the SVT had no opportunity to directly invoke the ‘Race Card’ in the appointment of a new Prime Minister because they were not a part of the winning Coalition. Adi Kuini Speed and Apisai Tora however sanctioned the race card in the eyes of grassroots Fijians throughout Fiji by trying to put forward a Prime Minister of Fijian origin.
To be continued
